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“‘The grotesque’ describes a category of images that fits uneasily within the 
field of Western aesthetics and art history.”  
(Connelly, “Grotesque” 241) 
 
The second half of the twentieth century has seen a virtual surge of feminist writing. 
Concurrently, there has been a rise in representations of the grotesque in Anglophone 
cultures. Margaret Atwood’s The Edible Woman (1969), Angela Carter’s Nights at the 
Circus (1984), Shani Mootoo’s Cereus Blooms at Night (1996) and Pauline Melville’s 
The Ventriloquist’s Tale (1997), among others, attest to a concern both with the 
grotesque and with feminism. Moreover, transculturality has become gradually more 
represented in literary texts and has become an increasingly important critical 
concept. This thesis examines literary works written in the second half of the 
twentieth century that link these three elements – transcultural, feminist, grotesque – 
so as to trace the transformation of the mode of the grotesque during this time of 
intense, feminist debate. These four novels in particular are enmeshed in debates 
about feminism at their respective times. However, instead of simply reproducing 
dominant themes or concerns, these novels complicate some of the discourses around 
feminism. 
 The afore-mentioned novels challenge traditional representations of female 
bodies by means of the grotesque. Yet, they explicitly encourage a reading of the 
grotesque in a novel light, namely as linked to – at the time of their respective 
publications – the newly developing field of embodiment theory and in particular 
feminist phenomenology. In addition, based on the representations in these literary 
works, it is possible to carve out affiliations in feminist concerns that are global, i.e. 
that extend beyond national contexts. The primary texts analyzed here draw 
connections between grotesqueness and embodiment, and in particular, female lived 
bodily experience. As a result, they entail a feminist questioning of and reflection on 
the grotesque body as envisioned in art history and theoretically conceived by Mikhail 
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Bakhtin. In fact, they develop the grotesque towards a more gender-neutral and 
emancipatory aesthetic. In that sense, then, we can speak of a distinctly feminist use 
of the aesthetic, which employs the grotesque to convey feminist statements, above all 
the embodying of gender.1 Some of the statements that these novels make concern 
both ideal and non-normative bodies, transgressive and subversive bodies, yet, above 
all, the novels provide comments on gender as ‘real,’ in the sense of material and 
lived. Consequently, the analyses of the grotesque in this study do not merely 
concentrate on the representation of grotesque bodies but extend earlier studies of the 
‘female grotesque’ by devoting special attention to grotesque being-in-the-world. All 
four novels attest to the importance of lived experience for a more inclusive feminism 
and thus potentially extend their interventions beyond literature. 
 While transcultural elements are not central in the text itself, Margaret 
Atwood’s The Edible Woman (1969) can be considered an early example of the 
transcultural feminist grotesque. This is so because Atwood’s novel anticipates 
feminist concerns, in particular of new materialist feminisms, of the 1990s. The novel 
puts emphasis on the agentic materiality of the main protagonist’s body. Not only 
does the protagonist, Marian, start behaving in unusual, grotesque ways, but her body 
also refuses the intake of food as a means of resisting the inscription of femininity 
into her body. Echoing current research in new materialist feminisms, Marian’s eating 
disorder can also be understood in terms of a symptom of insidious trauma. Marian 
suffers from insidious trauma precisely because femininity is inscribed into her body, 
yet ideal femininity remains an illusion and an unreachable ideal. The novel 
exemplifies the subversiveness, agency and fleshliness of the body and thus in many 
ways precedes theoretical debates of decades to come. 
 Angela Carter’s Nights at the Circus (1984) foregrounds the experience of its 
grotesque main character Fevvers, the aerialist with wings. Even though Fevvers is 
clearly marked as grotesque because of her status as a bird-woman and her delight in 
earthy, bodily processes, the novel also establishes rarely commented on connections 
between grotesqueness, freakery, disability and femininity. In fact, it demonstrates 
how disability and femininity are mutually constituted. Moreover, Nights at the 
 
1 Some of the authors reject the label feminist, as Margaret Atwood does, for instance. However, that 
does not make her text any less feminist. 
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Circus illustrates the main character’s incorporation of a view of her own body in 
terms of the ‘objective body’ and traces a transformation of body images towards a 
newly obtained understanding of her ‘lived body,’ foregrounding embodied 
experience. Hence, the novel extends Butlerian notions of gender performativity and 
illustrates how the performance of gender leaves ‘real,’ material traces in bodies, 
which makes it possible to affiliate the novel with feminist phenomenological ideas of 
embodiment.  
 By means of the grotesque – in the very positive sense of ‘in a process of 
constant becoming’ – representation of its transgender characters, Shani Mootoo’s 
Cereus Blooms at Night (1996) reinforces a new materialist feminist understanding of 
the malleability of sex and provides a comment on the diversity of transgender 
experience. Moreover, the novel exemplifies how words affect and effect, speaking to 
the materializing power they have. Accordingly, the novel also hints at how gender is 
constituted by colonialism and how biological dimorphism is a result of colonialism 
rather than local knowledges. The novel further links the diverse struggles of Mala, 
who suffered years of abandonment, abuse and social ostracism, and her transgender 
nurse Tyler. It is Tyler who becomes the ‘translator’ of Mala’s story for they are the 
only person who understand Mala via their body. The novel puts emphasis on the 
communicative nature of bodies and thus undermines dominant ideas of the mind as 
central to human understanding. 
 Pauline Melville’s The Ventriloquist’s Tale (1997) revolves around the 
grotesque, incestuous relationship between the siblings Beatrice and Danny who 
exemplify that human bodies are inherently connected to other bodies, animals and 
plants, thus tapping into the imagery of the grotesque and feminist phenomenological 
ideas of the connection of body images. The novel foregrounds indigenous experience 
and complicates dominant western feminist readings. On the one hand, it puts forward 
a type of female sexuality that defies western conceptions of sexuality. On the other 
hand, the novel portrays a type of female agency that is not founded on western ideas 
of agency as linked to individuality and self-determination. Moreover, The 
Ventriloquist’s Tale addresses issues of racialization as a result of colonialism and 
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carves out the body’s resistance to racialization in the body’s uncanny 
unpredictability. 
 By virtue of their subject matter, these novels tap into earlier discourses of the 
‘female’ grotesque. Mary Russo’s The Female Grotesque: Risk, Excess and 
Modernity (1995) has paved the way for discussions of the, oftentimes biased, 
gendering of the grotesque. Yet, from today’s perspective her work seems somewhat 
outdated because it did not engage in more detail with re-evaluations of materiality 
and matter,2 which were beginning to take shape at the time of the publication of her 
book. However, as I argue in this thesis, discourses in new materialisms and 
embodiment theory are crucial for analyzing, scrutinizing and complicating the 
grotesque. Moreover, as the title of her book suggests, Russo’s study was not able to 
overcome the binary oppositions it set out to break down (Duggan 26). From today’s 
perspective, the lack of addressing issues of whiteness, which is so apparent in her 
choice of texts, presents a negligence. 
 Studies such as Robert Duggan’s The Grotesque in Contemporary British 
Fiction (2013), even though not specifically feminist in origin, have offered much 
more nuanced discussions of works by such authors as Angela Carter who employ the 
feminist grotesque. Maria Sofia Pimentel Biscaia’s Postcolonial and Feminist 
Grotesque: Texts of Contemporary Excess (2011) is a more recent and more 
successful attempt at a feminist reading of postcolonial texts. However, the focus does 
not only lie on feminist grotesques but also, or rather primarily, on postcolonial 
grotesques, which has the effect of somewhat downplaying the relevance of the 
feminist qualities of the texts discussed. Justin D. Edwards and Rune Graulund’s 
Grotesque (2013), though an introduction to the grotesque in literature, refers to the 
discussion surrounding the ‘female grotesque’ and dedicates a section to female 
authors who use it to express feminist ideas. All in all, as this brief review of the 
existing literature suggests, there have not yet been any book-length studies of the 
feminist grotesque taking a decidedly transcultural approach. 
 The aim of the current work, then, is to close this gap in research and further 
reframe and revisit some of the literary works that depict female, grotesque 
 
2 Here, I have new materialist feminist and posthumanist thinkers such as Donna Haraway in mind. 
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characters. Not only does this study challenge negative associations with the 
grotesque, which, incidentally, have found their way into modern, everyday uses of 
the term,3  but it also problematizes and extends some of the earlier analyses of 
feminist critics who, despite their feminist approaches, could not help but reaffirm the 
binaries they initially wanted to break down. Moreover, even though Atwood’s and 
Carter’s works have been analyzed through the lens of the grotesque, they have not 
yet been read through the lens of the grotesque in conversation with embodiment 
theory or feminist phenomenology. As Thomas J. Csordas contends, theoretical 
thinking, whether in the field of anthropology, philosophy or literary studies, has 
predominantly treated the body as a text – representative of this approach are phrases 
such as “the body as text,” “the inscription of culture on the body” and “reading the 
body” – and has not paid much attention to the body as a lived, embodied entity 
(“Embodiment and Cultural Phenomenology” 145-46). Likewise, earlier studies of the 
female grotesque have focused on the grotesque body in terms of its representation 
instead of its phenomenological dimension of being-in-the-world. Reading my corpus 
through the now well-established field of embodiment theory and feminist 
phenomenology does not only add surplus value to the interpretations of these texts, 
but – I would like to stress – leads to different results as regards the ‘feminism’ of 
these texts, as much greater emphasis is placed on the experience of and experiencing 
bodies. Moreover, (female) grotesques have often only been read within national 
contexts, which, on the one hand, overlooks transnational and transcultural links4 that 
these texts have and, most notably, similar feminist concerns. This is one reason for 
me to favour the term transcultural instead of postcolonial in this work. On the other 
 
3 Robert Storr notes that the grotesque can be defined by its “casually pejorative use as a synonym for 
the unsightly or the degraded” (13). Everyday use of the term also suggests that it has negative 
associations as it is used to refer to something “[i]ncongruous or inappropriate to a shocking degree” 
(OED). Notable here are the negative connotations of phrases such as ‘grotesque spectacle’ or 
‘grotesque betrayal.’ 
4 Even though my study is not comparative in the strict sense of the word, it is comparative in an 
indirect way. In the context of comparative history, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka show the 
benefits of a comparative approach. However, this approach – with minor adjustments – is equally 
applicable to literature. The benefits of a comparative approach are: first, “comparison allows scholars 
to identify problems and questions that would otherwise be impossible or difficult to pose” (3). Second, 
“comparison . . . helps to apply a clear profile to individual cases and often to a single, particularly 
interesting case” (3). Third, “comparison makes an important contribution to the explanation of 
[literary] phenomena” and “helps to find or check generalizations” (4). Forth, “comparison can help to 
de-familiarize the familiar. When examined in light of observable alternatives, a specific development 
can lose the ‘matter of course’ appearance it may have possessed before” (4). 
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hand, the focus on national contexts has led to a disregard of issues of race and 
whiteness in studies of the (female) grotesque. Yet, embodiment is, according to 
feminist phenomenologist Linda Martín Alcoff, “in important respects a racialized 
and gender-differentiated experience” (103). 
 The grotesque is a central concept in my thesis as it has certain characteristics 
that lend it particularly well for feminist analyses. Three of the most important 
characteristics of the grotesque are its defiance of traditional categories, its connection 
to the body, and its malleability. From the moment of its discovery in underground 
chambers in Roman palaces at the end of the fifteenth century, the grotesque has had 
the status of an ‘outsider.’ For Robert Storr, “it is . . . useful and . . . accurate to think 
of the grotesque as a full-fledged, multilayered countertradition, a powerful current 
that continuously stirs calmer waters, sometimes redirecting their flow” (13). Bakhtin 
stated that grotesque images “remain ambivalent and contradictory; they are ugly, 
monstrous, hideous from the point of view of ‘classic’ aesthetics” (25). As Frances S. 
Connelly shows, it is in fact the reader’s or viewers’ response that makes an image 
grotesque (Grotesque 14). African sculptures that became popular at the end of the 
nineteenth century were considered grotesque and monstrous by nineteenth century 
viewers. Yet, there was nothing in these carved figures or masks to suggest that they 
were inherently grotesque; rather, they “ruptured the boundaries between European 
fine art and so-called primitive art” (Grotesque 14), which made them grotesque to 
observers. Decades later they were regarded as classical and even beautiful 
(Grotesque 14). As a result, “the grotesque identifies a class of imagery that has never 
fit comfortably within the boundaries traditionally set by either aesthetics or art 
history for its objects of inquiry” (Connelly, Modern Art 5). 
 Second, what is central to the grotesque is its inherent and close connection to 
the ‘body.’ Whether it is in the early fanciful drawings that were found in 
underground chambers and that lusciously combined human, animal and plant 
elements or in the sense that Bakhtin envisioned it, with the consuming, bearing, 
vomiting, fornicating body, the grotesque is concerned with fleshliness and 
materiality. By virtue of its connection to the body, however, the grotesque is also 
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closely linked to the feminine, for western mainstream philosophy has mostly 
constructed the female or feminine as body. As Elizabeth Grosz explains,  
[i]t is not that female sexuality is like, resembles, an inherently horrifying 
viscosity. Rather, it is the production of an order that renders female sexuality 
and corporeality marginal, indeterminate, and viscous that constitutes the 
sticky and the viscous with their disgusting, horrifying connotations. (195) 
The grotesque is not feminine per se and it can in fact be used to challenge 
essentialized depictions of the female body. Even though the grotesque might have 
been used to re-affirm stereotyped and essentialized versions of femininity, it has also 
been used and continues to be used – and this is a point that this research stresses – to 
challenge precisely these archetypal constructions of female bodies. 
 Third, because the grotesque can describe a wide variety of, sometimes 
disparate, ideas, it “seems to render the category paradoxical, virtually teetering on 
unintelligibility” (N. Carroll 294). Yet, “[c]entral to the grotesque,” Connelly 
suggests, “is its lack of fixity, its unpredictability and its instability” (Modern Art 4). 
In fact, in spite of its malleability, there are different strands of the grotesque that can 
help make sense of the mode. According to Connelly, there are the ornamental, the 
carnivalesque and the traumatic strand of the grotesque (Connelly, “Grotesque” 242-
43). The carnivalesque strand, 5  profoundly shaped by Mikhail Bakhtin’s seminal 
study of François Rabelais’s work in Rabelais and His World (1965) is the one that is 
most relevant to this dissertation, even though it might occasionally overlap with 
other strands.  
 Feminist scholars have both advocated and criticized the Bakhtinian 
understanding of the grotesque body. As Sue Vice points out, Bakhtin did not 
consider the ‘body’ in grotesque realism as marked by gender, which runs the risk of 
simply reaffirming gender stereotypes. She detects “gender alignment” in grotesque 
realism because in Bakhtinian theory “[e]arth and the reproductive body are 
 
5 In his studies Rabelais and His World and Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Bakhtin uses the 
carnivalesque to describe the carnivalisation of literature: the depiction of real or imagined carnival 
acts, rites and festivities in literature and, by extension, art in general. Similar to carnival, the 
carnivalesque is understood as a suspension of official rule for the time of its celebration, a reversal of 
the normal order. In general, carnival and the carnivalesque are based on the idea of the world turned 
upside down or inside out. Thus, carnivalesque acts in literature, film and painting include mock 
crownings and decrownings; clowns and clowning; the wearing of masks and costume, especially drag 
performances which include the reversal of gender; human beings switching roles and behaviour with 
animals, and vice versa. 
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associated with the feminine; heaven and the rational body with the masculine” (Vice 
156). Moreover, as Kathleen Rowe puts it,  
[t]he grotesque body is above all the female body, the maternal body, which, 
through menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth, and lactation, participates 
uniquely in the carnivalesque drama of ‘becoming,’ of inside-out and outside-
in, death-in-life and life-in-death. (33-34, emphasis in original) 
Margaret Miles goes even further in stating that “an element of the grotesque is 
present in every woman” and that “the creature closest to the male subject, but 
innately, disturbingly different, is ultimately more grotesque than are exotic 
monsters” (85). Even more damning, the grotesque body is seen as female by some 
because of its association of the grotto, the cave, and womb and consequently as all 
that is “hidden, earthly, dark, material, immanent [and] visceral” (Russo 1).6  
 Duggan points out that the above-mentioned criticism, in particular by Russo, 
runs the danger of “circularity in reproducing at the level of [its] own critical 
discourse” (26). Even though these authors, as Duggan argues, try to question setups 
such as “male/female, mind/body, spirit/matter” (26), they end up consolidating them 
by maintaining these binary oppositions in their criticism. In this light, a concept such 
as Russo’s ‘female grotesque’ becomes particularly problematic. Russo argues that 
“[t]he frequency, intensity and salience of the association of these terms [female and 
grotesque] suggests a mutually constituted genealogy, but this is not to posit an 
exclusive or essential relationship between the terms” (Russo 12). By using the label 
‘female’ in the ‘female grotesque’ however, she undermines her own criticism of 
essentialism.  
 One should take into account that Bakhtin’s use of Rabelais’s work “draw[s] 
on a cultural and literary tradition used to having women as its objects” (Vice 177).7 
Consequently, the grotesque has been made “part of the historical arsenal of 
misogyny, a way of grounding women’s ‘aberrance’ in their distasteful corporeality” 
 
6 Julia Kristeva’s psychoanalytical approach to the grotesque body as ‘abject’ is not of interest to me 
here. The ‘abject’ is devoid of humour or mirth which does not make it compatible with a Bakhtinian 
reading of the grotesque and consequently the corpus presented here. 
7 Not only does Bakhtin ignore the female voices in Rabelais’s text and the fact that all the voices in 
the novel are men’s, as several authors object, but he does not even let these voices speak in his study 
Rabelais and His World and instead makes them the ‘objects’ of his analysis (Booth 165-66; Stam 162; 
Vice 179). The stress Bakhtin puts on parody is pointed out as problematic, too, as traditionally women 
are identified as the objects of laughter rather than the authors of their own comical visions. 
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(Shapira 53). Connelly confirms that “the grotesque is closely bound to the body and, 
consequently, to the feminine as it is constructed in Western culture” (Grotesque 2). 
The meaning of the grotesque is not ‘fixed,’ however. As Susan Stewart argues, we 
should keep in mind that we are confronted with images and representations of the 
grotesque body and that “[l]ike any art form, they effect a representation and 
transformation of their subject” (107).8 Erica McWilliam extends this argument by 
suggesting that the whole notion of the grotesque can be changed: “[W]hat women 
make of the grotesque body is dangerous, given what it can make of women. As a 
space of feminist possibility, it can ‘unmask’ much that is oppressive and objectifying 
for women” (220). 9  Vice, too, has identified “potential for reappropriation” of 
grotesque realism for feminist purposes (3-4).  
 Most importantly, reading Bakhtin’s understanding of the body alongside 
feminist phenomenology and embodiment theory reveals that what seems to be at 
stake in the discussion is not the grotesque body, but the prevalent notion of ‘the 
body.’ Dualistic thinking has resulted in a devaluation of the body and, by extension, 
a devaluation of its relevance for rationality and thought. It has been shown that the 
mind/body dualism is firmly linked to another set of terms, namely male/female and 
nature/culture. Men are largely associated with the positive, powerful term (mind, 
culture), whereas women are associated with the devalued term (body, nature). For 
centuries women have been identified with their bodies.10 At the same time, however, 
the ideal body, which is pictured as able, white and masculine, has been admired; the 
very opposite of ‘leaking’ female bodies. By virtue of drawing on the concept of the 
body, then, Bakhtin has also inherited the negative connotations it carries. It is not the 
grotesque itself that denotes negative femaleness but rather our common notion of the 
body. 
 
8 Kathleen Rowe raises an important issue in her discussion of laughter: “But because as women we 
cannot simply reject these conventions and invent new ‘untainted’ ones in their place, we must learn 
the languages we inherit, with their inescapable contradictions, before transforming and redirecting 
them toward our own ends” (4). 
9 Yael Shapira, along the same lines, contends that the female grotesque can be appropriated to express 
meanings that subvert misogyny and classical depictions of women and their bodies (52). And Vice 
admits: “Bakhtin’s own methodology can be used to reclaim gender within his own work, and . . . to 
use his work for feminist analysis” (177). 
10 Another link that has been firmly established is the link between corporeality and blackness (Alcoff; 
Fraser and Greco 2). 
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 Central to concerns in feminist phenomenology and consequently this thesis is 
that Bakhtin levels criticism against the classical body and offers a new conception of 
the grotesque body instead. He states that “[t]he confines between the body and the 
world and between separate bodies are drawn in the grotesque genre quite differently 
than in the classic and naturalist images” (Rabelais 315). First, Bakhtin’s notion of the 
grotesque body constitutes a re-evaluation of materiality, a praise of the material 
body. Images of “copulation, pregnancy, birth, growth, old age, disintegration, 
dismemberment” (Rabelais 25) are inherently grotesque for they “lend a bodily 
character to matter, to the world, to the cosmic elements, which become closer, more 
intimate, more easily grasped, for this is the matter, the elemental force, born from the 
body itself” (Rabelais 335). Similar to phenomenologists, who propose approaching 
the body not as an object, but rather as a lived body,11 what is vital in grotesque 
realism is that the body is not devalued and demoted to an object. The body is praised 
precisely for its activity and materiality. Moreover, Bakhtin criticizes an 
overemphasis on intellectualism, spirituality and abstraction. Thus, he provides a 
challenge to humanist and Enlightenment ideas of the primacy of the mind.12 
 Second, Bakhtin stresses the social dimension of the body: “[T]he grotesque 
body is not separated from the rest of the world. It is not a closed, completed unit; it is 
unfinished, outgrows itself, transgresses its own limits (Rabelais 26). While this refers 
to the individual body, which, by means of its orifices and bodily fluids establishes a 
connection with its outside world, this can also be interpreted as a connection between 
separate bodies, which then cease to be individualized. This transgressive body is 
highly evocative of a feminist phenomenological understanding of the body image, 
which reflects the connections between bodies. The body image accounts for the lived 
body at the intersections of biology and culture. As an ‘unconscious awareness’ of our 
bodily capabilities it is contingent on the experience of one’s body, one’s emotional 
investment in one’s body, but also on context and other peoples’ reactions to a body.  
 
11 By means of the lived body, perception, experience and feeling are foregrounded. I will engage with 
this concept in more detail in chapter 2.3. 
12 Bakhtin’s attention to laughter as a bodily source also questions the dominance of the mind and the 




  Feminist phenomenologists are indispensable for broadening Bakhtinian 
theory in their greater awareness of the gendering of bodies. Feminist 
phenomenologists have further extended Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on the 
lived body and in particular the body image in Phenomenology of Perception 
(1945/2012) to account for the influence of gender for human embodiment. Not only 
do feminist phenomenologists show that the dominant body image ideal is white, 
heterosexual, able-bodied, male (something Bakhtin implies with the classical body), 
but they also show that gender is inscribed into bodies and that this has material 
consequences. Nevertheless, as I will show in this thesis, Bakhtin’s concept of the 
grotesque body is highly compatible with feminist phenomenology and opens up 
space for criticism of the dominant western notion of the body. 
 In this thesis, I aim to investigate in what ways selected novels – both 
thematically and stylistically – challenge and subvert prevalent western ideas on and 
notions of gendered bodies. Based on my two main theories, Bakhtin’s grotesque 
body and feminist phenomenology, I will analyze the ways in which the texts 
represent the embodiment and inscription of gender as well as examine how 
depictions of grotesque characters challenge inscriptions and imagine (gender) 
identities differently. In terms of style, the texts display a distinct type of humour, 
closely connected to the use of parody and irony, and, most importantly, of double-
voiced discourse. Feminist transcultural grotesque writers’ use of double-voiced 
discourse, irony and parody not only allows for a challenge to notions of traditionally 
‘male genres’ but it also draws connections to questions of embodiment. By depicting 
grotesque bodies, these texts display an innovative conception of the body set free 
from dominant philosophical theories of a mind/body dualism. In fact, these texts 
demonstrate the inherent inseparability of mind from body and consequently 
undermine dominant ideas concerning gender identity. Thus, these novels are part of a 
wider feminist and cross-cultural project that revises understandings of gendered 
bodies. 
 Even though personal preferences have certainly played a role in the selection 
of the primary texts, I have applied the following criteria: The first and most 
significant criterion is that the novels portray female characters who transgress their 
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corporeal boundaries. While other markers, such as race, ethnicity and ability 
certainly play a role in my analyses, the focus of my study is primarily on gender as a 
marker, because “[g]ender has been established as one of the most all-encompassing 
binaries within dualistic society, and one which is fundamentally embodied” (Inckle 
102). Second, these novels challenge and subvert traditional notions of the sex/gender 
and, relatedly, mind/body binary. Third, I have chosen novels written by female 
authors. This is partly due to the continued underrating of female authors, a trend 
which I want to actively resist. Moreover, many representations of grotesque female 
characters by male authors have tended to reaffirm gender stereotypes. Fourth, I have 
selected authors from diverse cultural backgrounds, with varying degrees of 
prominence and works published in various decades to account for the diversity of 
manifestations of the feminist grotesque in novels from different Anglophone cultures 
in the second half of the twentieth century. I intend to show that while ‘national’ 
concerns are not central to these works, they display a transcultural awareness. Read 
alongside each other, these texts, as I want to argue, are representative of the mode or 
genre 13  of the transcultural feminist grotesque which they shape. Of course, the 
chosen works are only a limited selection of the many existing texts; but, in setting 
the tone for a wider corpus of the transcultural feminist grotesque, they are pioneering 
novels. What these works share is the fact that they all complicate discourses, 
specifically feminist discourses, about the body at the time of their publication.  
 The four novels, Margaret Atwood’s The Edible Woman (1969), Angela 
Carter’s Nights at the Circus (1984), Shani Mootoo’s Cereus Blooms at Night (1996) 
and Pauline Melville’s The Ventriloquist’s Tale (1997), employ the mode of the 
grotesque, albeit to varying degrees, as a means of voicing their feminist concerns. 
While these novels share certain continuities when it comes to their feminist agendas, 
 
13 Veronica Hollinger, in her discussion of whether Science Fiction can be considered a genre or mode 
suggests that “SF now signifies something more than a particular kind of narrative complex – generally 
understood to be an archive of stories with particular themes, motifs, and figures, a kind of storytelling 
oriented toward the future, closely related to the realist novel in its rhetorical verisimilitude, at once an 
estranged mirror of the present and an imaginative extrapolation of worlds to come. In contrast, mode 
implies not a kind but a method, a way of getting something done. In this instance, it is a way of 
thinking and speaking about contemporary reality” (139-40). Hollinger’s argument is equally 
applicable to the grotesque and is in line with Erica McWilliam and Margot Northey. In her study The 
Haunted Wilderness: The Gothic and Grotesque in Canadian Fiction (1976), Northey proposes “a 
working definition of the grotesque as an aesthetic term, referring to a mode of writing rather than a 
condition or attribute of nature” (7). As a result, in this study, I consider the grotesque an aesthetic or 
mode rather than a genre. 
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there are nevertheless also discrepancies worthwhile exploring. Some of these are 
connected to categories beyond gender, for instance disability, race, queerness, 
transgenderism and indigeneity. While the novels’ contexts are vastly different in 
terms of epochs and cultural backgrounds, these differences are in fact vital to the 
mode of the transcultural feminist grotesque, for they help to point to the diversity and 
flexibility of the mode. Applying a transcultural lens to these texts allows me to both 
trace the differences and similarities and thus provide a more nuanced reading of 
these novels (see section 2.1 for a definition of the term transculturality).  
 Margaret Atwood’s The Edible Woman is firmly grounded in the Canadian 
literary context. As Laura Moss notes, “[t]here has long been a debate over the 
legitimacy and utility of studying the literary culture of a nation like Canada in the 
same terms as the Anglophone literature of the more conventionally accepted 
postcolonial contexts of India, Trinidad, and South Africa” (2). Yet, while Canada’s 
postcolonial status is debatable, its transcultural and transnational links, which are 
often, but not exclusively, tied to a strong indigenous and Africadian presence, do put 
it into conversation with literatures from other transcultural nations. Admittedly, 
Atwood’s novel does not include other presences and is very much focused on 
unmarked, white femininity. Yet, it is precisely in its foregrounding of the 
insidiousness of gender and the harmful effects that the inscription of gender into 
bodies has that the novel unfolds its feminist potential. 
 Angela Carter’s Nights at the Circus is markedly transnational not simply 
because most of its plot develops outside of England, chiefly in Russia, but it is so, 
above all, because of the diversity of its central characters.14 Furthermore, the text 
itself is transcultural in its idiosyncratic merging of low and high culture and its 
varied intertextual references to French, German, Italian, Russian, Japanese, and 
Caribbean cultures, among others. While, similar to Atwood’s novel, issues of 
whiteness prevail, other markers start being included in the discussion of female 
embodiment, as Carter’s central character Fevvers is not only marked by her working-
 
14 Even though Angela Carter is often considered a typical English writer, her own life and works were 
much more transcultural than many scholars would grant. Not only did her extensive stay in Japan 
shape her approach to relationships, but it also, as she herself claimed, revealed to her “what it is to be 
a woman” and she “became radicalised” (Nothing Sacred 28). Moreover, Carter was a staunch critic of 
imperialism and in general was concerned with “decolonising our language and our basic habits of 
thought” (“Notes from the Front Line” 51). 
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class background, and in particular her upbringing in a brothel, but she is also marked 
in terms of disability. With Carter’s novel, then, we can see a transformation and in 
fact an opening up of the mode of the transcultural feminist grotesque. 
 This flexibility and diversity of the mode of the feminist grotesque  is further 
exemplified by Shani Mootoo’s Cereus Blooms at Night and Pauline Melville’s The 
Ventriloquist’s Tale. Even though both novels engage with diverse subjectivities, they 
demonstrate that the mode of the feminist grotesque can be used not only to remark 
on femininity but also to remark on race. Shani Mootoo’s setting of Cereus Blooms at 
Night on the fictitious Caribbean island Lantanacamara and the novel’s focus on the 
Indian diaspora on said island, strongly affiliate it with notions of transculturality. 
Even though Cereus Blooms at Night is often classified as a postcolonial novel and 
even as postcolonial grotesque (see Edwards and Graulund), there is a downside to 
the framing of the novel in terms of ‘postcolonial’ discourses. As Graham Huggan 
shows, “postcolonialism and its rhetoric of resistance have themselves become 
consumer products” (Postcolonial Exotic 6). Not only does the use of the term 
postcolonial in connection to Mootoo’s and other transcultural novels suggest a 
certain form of exoticism15 and thus “a particular mode of aesthetic perception . . . 
which effectively manufactures otherness even as it claims to surrender to its 
immanent mystery” (Huggan, Postcolonial Exotic 13), but it also deflects attention 
away from the novel’s feminist message, which might help explain why Mootoo 
herself rejects the label “postcolonial” (Jiwa n. pag.). As Christine Kim contends:  
Reading Mootoo’s novel through the lens of postcolonial discourse is a 
double-edged sword. Positioning Cereus Blooms at Night as postcolonial 
raises the visibility and marketability of the text but ultimately locates it 
within the cultural politics of the academy rather than the lesbian feminist 
politics of activism out of which it emerged. (159) 
 
15 Huggan notes: “One need only look at the reception of works from Amos Tutuola’s The Palm-Wine 
Drinkard (1952) to, more recently, Arundhati Roy’s The God of Small Things (1997), to recognize the 
prevalence of the word ‘exotic’ as a marker of metropolitan commercial appeal” (Postcolonial Exotic 
20). Huggan further establishes an important distinction between postcolonialism and postcoloniality. 
He explains: “[p]ostcolonialism, understood this way, becomes an anti-colonial intellectualism that 
reads and valorises the signs of social struggle in the faultlines of literary and cultural texts. . . . 
Postcoloniality, . . . is a value-regulating mechanism within the global late-capitalist system of 
commodity exchange” (Postcolonial Exotic 6). He argues that the two are intricately linked: “Yet a 
cursory glance at the state of postcolonial studies at Western universities, or at the worldwide 
marketing of prominent postcolonial writers like Salman Rushdie, is enough to suggest that these two 
apparently conflicting regimes of value are mutually entangled” (Postcolonial Exotic 6). 
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Framing Mootoo’s novel in transcultural terms instead allows for an examination of 
the key factors that the novel addresses, namely race and gender, and in particular 
transgender experience. 
 Similar to Cereus Blooms at Night, Pauline Melville’s The Ventriloquist’s 
Tale unfolds in the Caribbean. Set in Guyana on mainland South America,16 in an 
indigenous community in the Rupunini and Guyana’s capital Georgetown, the novel 
invites a transcultural reading not only because of the inherent transculturality of 
Guyana but also because it is concerned with indigeneity and de-colonization. To a 
comparable degree to Cereus Blooms at Night, critics have rejected ‘postcolonial’ 
readings of the novel because it presents an attempt to make the presence of 
Amerindian cultures known (Adair; Braz; Dabydeen; Misrahi-Barak; Shemak), yet 
“the overwhelming consensus is that postcolonialism has had little to offer when it 
comes to Indigenous issues” (Braz 30) (see section 6.3).17  
 While this is not to take away from postcolonial readings of literary texts – I 
consider postcolonial readings to be instructive and in fact vital for analyses in 
specific contexts – in regard to the novels discussed in this thesis, the transcultural 
lens offers the possibility of including a wider range of texts, which would be rejected 
if the label postcolonial were to be applied. Moreover, a transcultural lens more 
readily helps to trace similarities between the texts in spite of their vast cultural 
differences and their statuses within national contexts. According to Afef Benessaieh, 
“transculturality suggests departing from the traditional, yet very current view of 
‘cultures’ as fixed frames or separate islands neatly distanced and differentiated from 




16  Even though Guyana is part of mainland South America, due to its close cultural links with 
Caribbean islands, it is usually discussed in the context of Caribbean literatures. 
17 Thomas King has shown how the concept of postcolonial literatures is problematic in the context of 
Native literatures. He explains: “I was going to make the rather simple observation that in the case of . . 
pre-and post-colonial, the pivot around which we move is . . . colonialism” and he argues that “the full 
complement of terms – pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial – reeks of unabashed ethnocentrism 
and well-meaning dismissal, and they point to a deep-seated assumption that is at the heart of most 
well-intentioned studies of Native literatures” (11). See also Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang’s 
“Decolonization is not a Metaphor” in which they state that “relying solely on postcolonial literatures 
or theories of coloniality that ignore settler colonialism will not help to envision the shape that 
decolonization must take in settler colonial contexts” (5). 
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In addition, reading these novels through a transcultural lens  
captures more adequately the sense of movement and the complex mixedness 
of cultures in close contact, and better describes the embodied situation of 
cultural plurality lived by many individuals and communities of mixed 
heritage and/or experience, whose multifaceted situation is more visible under 
globalization. (Benessaieh 16, emphasis in original) 
While a postcolonial approach might focus on issues of race, a transcultural reading 
that pays attention to the embodied situations of individuals and groups allows for 
analyzing diverse experiences and their complex interplays and overlays. Moreover, 
because, as Bennessaieh hints at, it is the embodiedness of human beings that is 
foregrounded in a transcultural reading, a transcultural approach more readily 
encompasses discussions of fleshliness. A transcultural reading is both attentive to 
similarities and, as a consequence, is more prone to help tracing the diverse 
manifestations of the transcultural feminist grotesque. 
 In the chapters that follow I illustrate some of the central issues that the 
transcultural feminist grotesque raises. In chapter one, I develop a theoretical basis 
with which I analyze my corpus. On the one hand, chapter one introduces the concept 
of transculturality and traces the change from engagements with the body to ideas on 
embodiment which has been taking place since the 1990s and has arguably shaped 
discourse and criticism in the humanities. As an alternative to the traditional notion of 
the body, I draw on and develop concepts from phenomenology, specifically feminist 
phenomenology, such as the lived body and the body image. Here, I also delve into 
the question of how gender, and to a certain extent race, is embodied and lived. On 
the other hand, I examine the grotesque as an artistic and literary term, exploring its 
origins in fifteenth century art, briefly commenting on the problems of defining it due 
to its inherent malleability and its different offshoots. Drawing on Bakhtin’s notion of 
the grotesque body, but extending it by means of feminist phenomenological thinking 
and embodiment theory more generally, I also put forward a definition of what I 
consider the transcultural feminist grotesque. In chapters two to five, I demonstrate 
how the literary texts illustrate, discuss and apply the ideas, concepts and concerns 
discussed in the second chapter. 
 In chapter two, I begin by looking at an early example of the transcultural 
feminist grotesque, Margaret Atwood’s The Edible Woman (1969). While the 
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transcultural feminist grotesque is not fully developed in this narrative, the novel is 
nevertheless informative as it carves out the subversive role of the female body. The 
novel centres around Marian, who struggles with conforming to feminine ideals. Even 
though, on the surface, she conforms to ideals such as submissiveness and self-
silencing and actively gives in to them, her body powerfully counterbalances many of 
the conscious decisions she takes. Thus, she inadvertently runs away from her fiancé 
and friends, hides under a bed, starts a somewhat unenthusiastic relationship with the 
student Duncan, and, most importantly, develops an eating disorder. Her eating 
disorder is disconnected from any conscious decisions, however, and the text makes it 
abundantly clear that it is her body that decides not to eat, to Marian’s dismay. 
Marian’s eating disorder can thus be read as a symptom of insidious trauma, which 
she suffers because femininity has been incorporated into her body, making her 
conform to feminine ideals of the good roommate, well behaved tenant and obedient 
girlfriend, yet her body resists this inscription of femininity. The novel provides a 
resolution in the form of the grotesque consumption of a cake woman which Marian 
makes to brake off the engagement with her fiancé Peter, yet devours herself.  
 The novel I discuss in chapter three, Angela Carter’s Nights at the Circus 
(1984), is closely associated with the grotesque. Its main character Fevvers is not only 
grotesque in the art historical sense, as she is a hybrid between woman and bird, but 
she is also extremely grotesque in her exaggerated earthiness and vulgarity. However, 
what has been somewhat missing from readings of the novel are the resonances it 
creates with feminist disability studies. The novel addresses notions of freakery, but, 
more importantly, it tackles disabled, female sexuality by means of Fevvers. 
Moreover, the novel convincingly demonstrates how body images are shaped by 
one’s investment in one’s own body but also other people’s investment in it. Fevvers 
experiences painfully what it means to be deprived of bodily agency because she is 
only interested in monetary gain. However, she learns to disinvest certain body parts 
with cultural and financial value and thus regains bodily and consequently mental 
agency. The novel aptly demonstrates how gender as well as disability and in 
particular the objectification that is a side-effect of inhabiting the world as a female, is 
embodied and lived. My reading of the novel extends analyses of Judith Butler’s 
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concept of gender as performativity and demonstrates how gender leaves material 
traces in bodies, thus paralleling feminist phenomenological ideas of gender being 
embodied. 
 In chapter four I analyze how Shani Mootoo’s Cereus Blooms at Night (1996) 
links divergent struggles by means of its central characters and their lived bodies. 
While, on the surface, the novel engages with Mala’s story, whose grotesqueness, that 
is, her connection to her garden and animals, unabashed celebration of bodily 
processes and defiance of feminine, housewifely ideals, leads to other people’s 
detachment, the novel also provides a pertinent comment on transgender experience. 
It is through the ‘male’ nurse, who in fact is transgender as I argue, Tyler, and their 
bodily understanding that Mala’s story of abuse, abandonment and ostracism can be 
told. Equally, it is by way of Mala’s understanding of Tyler that their story finds an 
outlet. The novel foregrounds the communicative nature of bodies and consequently 
undermines dominant ideas of the mind as foremost channel of understanding. 
Moreover, it complicates straightforward readings of transgender characters and thus 
easily defined notions of sex, gender and sexuality by, first, having Tyler not conform 
to ideas of either masculinity, nor femininity, nor to ideas of a transgender character 
necessarily transforming into a ‘specific’ gender. Second, Otoh, the other transgender 
character in the novel, ostensibly conforms to straightforward male gender identity. 
Yet, he has moulded his body to become ‘male,’ which challenges ideas of the 
biological stability of sex. The novel connects the stories of three unlike characters 
and thus provides a pertinent comment on exclusionary feminism. Yet, it also hints at 
the construction of gender regimes as part of colonialism in the ambivalence it 
maintains concerning Tyler’s gendered and racialized identity as well as in its 
emphasis on the materialising effects of discourse. 
 The final chapter, chapter five, is devoted to Pauline Melville’s The 
Ventriloquist’s Tale (1997). Drawing on the concept of the postcolonial Gothic, I 
show how the novel relies on both grotesque and Gothic elements for its criticism of 
colonialism and patriarchy as well as dominant western feminisms. The novel 
challenges the humanist boundaries between humans and animals, humans and plants, 
humans and inorganic matter as well as individual human bodies by means of the 
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grotesque, incestuous relationship between the siblings Beatrice and Danny. 
Moreover, the Gothic surfaces in the form of a blend between the natural and 
supernatural, the material and immaterial as well as the representation of uncanny 
bodily reactions which provide a comment on the continuing and embodied effects of 
colonialism on indigenous bodies. The polyphonic character of the narrative 
establishes ambivalence and insecurity as regards the overall message of the narrative 
and thus defies readers’ attempts to read the incestuous relationship in any other than 
a sympathetic light, further adding to a positive sense of the unfamiliar.  
 This study offers a series of connected, yet independent, readings of 
transcultural texts in order to exemplify how contemporary female authors use the 
mode of the feminist grotesque to undermine dominant portrayals of women and their 
embodiment. The first part of this study establishes theoretical foundations which 
help situate the discussion of the texts in a wider context and provide the necessary 
tools for the literary analyses. Bakhtin’s concept of the grotesque body combined with 
a feminist phenomenological understanding of the lived body elucidate fundamental 
aspects that the novels address. The second, and larger part of this study is comprised 
of the readings of literary texts. The novels chronicle the shift in feminist analyses of 
the body which reached its peak in the 1990s. Consequently, they provide 
philosophical interventions in the role of embodiment more generally.  
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1. Transcultural, Feminist, and Grotesque 
 
“In its very existence, the literary field constitutes a challenge to the 
disciplining of embodied discourse and affect: for, . . . from the point of view 
of authority, literature is usually felt to be little more than an unruly waste 
product, a non-normative body, a leaky vessel or a bloated, flabby thing.”  
(Hillman and Maude 4-5) 
1.1 The Transnational and the Transcultural Turns  
In her presidential address to the American Studies Association in 2004, Shelley 
Fisher Fishkin firmly established the ‘transnational turn’ in American Studies. 
However, transnational approaches had already been present in earlier publications 
such as Donald Pease’s edited essay collection National Identities and Postnational 
Narratives (1994) or Robert A. Gross’s “The Transnational Turn: Rediscovering 
American Studies in a Wider World” (2000), among others, and “gave leverage to a 
rethinking of North American cultural and literary history across and beyond national 
boundaries” (Straub 2).18 In particular the idea of the nation has become a contested 
space (Straub 1) within the transnational turn, with Donald E. Pease and Yuan Shu 
suggesting that “[w]hile the twentieth century was a time when the nation and the idea 
of national culture predominated, the twenty-first century is marked by crossnational 
linkages and transnational processes” (2). However, instead of completely doing away 
with the nation, terms such as transnational and postnational remain linked to it and in 
fact require it for their raison d’être.19  
 
18  Several scholars have identified transnational turns beyond the US-American context, so that 
Canadian or South American literatures have also been read transnationally. See Heike Scharm and 
Natalia Matta Jara’s study on Postnational Perspectives on Contemporary Hispanic Literature (2017) 
or Transnational French Studies: Postcolonialism and Littérature-monde, edited by Alec G. 
Hargreaves, Charles Forsdick and David Murphy.  
19 Similar concepts that somewhat overlap with the transnational are postnational and transareal. In 
Postnational Perspectives on Contemporary Hispanic Literature (2017), Heike Scharm and Natalia 
Matta Jara argue, for instance, that “[w]ithout discarding the importance of the nation, the postnational 
aims to venture beyond borders, labels, and categorizations, well aware that we are still somewhat 
caught up within them” (5). Similar to the transnational and the postnational, TransAreal Studies 
remains tied to the concept of the nation. Ottmar Ette argues that “[t]he point, then, is not to deploy a 
(territorializable) counter-concept to the idea of national literature but, rather, to account for 
geocultural and biopolitical changes, and for the literary-aesthetic developments that accompany those 
changes. Neither the perspective of national literature nor that of world literature enables us to think 
through such transformations and describe them fully. My goal is to articulate practices of Writing-
between-Worlds that cannot be territorialized in any permanent (or settled) way” (8). 
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 In Global Matters: The Transnational Turn in Literary Studies (2010), Paul 
Jay points out that the organization into literatures based on nationalities is “in some 
senses an arbitrary decision” (73). However, he is not advocating for a complete 
erasure of the ‘national models’ but instead that they be “supplemented, complicated, 
and challenged by newer approaches” (73). Jay identifies the intersection of the 
emergence of postcolonial studies and the study of globalization as the single most 
important element which gave rise to the transnational turn in literary studies.20 
Accordingly, the transnational study of literature is an effect of globalization and a 
focus on multicultural, minority and postcolonial literatures. Relatedly, in their 
introduction to The Transnational Studies Reader: Intersections and Innovations 
(2008), Peggy Levitt and Sanjeev Khagram see societies and lives as “inherently 
transnational” (2). Accordingly, they state: “The task of Transnational Studies is to 
uncover, analyze and conceptualize similarities, differences, and interactions among 
trans-societal and trans-organizational realities, including the ways in which they 
shape bordered and bounded phenomena and dynamics across time” (10-11, original 
emphasis excluded).  
 Similar to the concept of the transnational, in recent years the term 
transculturality has gained prominence. There has been a discernible shift from 
postcolonial to transcultural issues, so much so that Graham Huggan speaks of a 
‘transcultural turn’ that postcolonial studies has taken (“Derailing the ‘trans’?” 56).21  
Transculturality is often discussed alongside apparently similar terms such as 
multiculturalism, transculturation and interculturality.22 Nevertheless, as Benessaieh 
underlines in her study Transcultural Americas/Amériques Transculturelles, “it is a 
 
20 For Jay and other scholars, globalization does not merely refer to a recent economic and cultural 
phenomenon situated in the twentieth and twenty-first century but can be traced at least to the 
beginning of the sixteenth century (Jay 3; Ette 11-12). 
21 Huggan is critical of the term, mostly because the “contested prefix ‘trans’ . . . much like the battle-
weary ‘post’ in ‘postcolonialism’ is being used to conjure up a far more positive picture of the world 
than a more historically informed and, particularly, a more economically driven argument would 
allow” (“Derailing the ‘trans’?” 59). What he implies is that it can gloss over differences as regards the 
economic and historic situation of human beings. However, transculturality accounts for “the same 
basic problems and states of consciousness today [that] appear in cultures once considered to be 
fundamentally different – think, for example, of human rights debates, feminist movements or of 
ecological awareness which are powerful cultural factors all over the world” (Welsch 223). 
22 For a good overview of arguments for and against using ‘postcolonial’ in the Canadian context see 
Laura Moss’s “Is Canada Postcolonial? Introducing the Question.” 
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separate concept that designates specific processes inadequately captured by these 
other terms [transculturation, multiculturalism, interculturality]” (12).23  
 For Wolfgang Welsch, one of the leading theorists and supporters of the 
concept, transculturality is a product of the inherent hybridization of cultures (223), 
its “internal multiplicity” (225). According to Welsch, cultures are always influenced 
by other cultures, they are “interconnected and entangled” (222). This parallels 
Kwame Appiah’s notion of contaminated cultures, that is, cultures that enter into 
productive contact with each other (107, 113). Welsch argues that “[s]trictly speaking 
there exists no longer anything absolutely foreign” (223). While this is even more so 
today, because of international networking that allows for certain lifestyles to move 
beyond national borders, he maintains that transculturality has always been a feature 
of human societies, albeit one that has been downplayed (226).  
 Transculturality is a process that takes place both on society’s macro-level and 
the individual’s micro-level (Welsch 225).24  Thus, the concept of transculturality 
represents a move away from a monolithic understanding of culture as clearly 
delineated, an understanding in which national identity determines cultural identity. 
Accordingly,  
[t]he concept of transculturality aims for a multi-meshed and inclusive, not 
separatist and exclusive understanding of culture. It intends a culture and 
society whose pragmatic feats exist not in delimitation, but in the ability to 
link and undergo transition. (Welsch 227)25  
Needless to say, this has wide-reaching consequences, because “[c]onceptions of 
culture are not just descriptive concepts, but operative concepts” (Welsch 227).  
 
23 For an in-depth delineation of transculturality from other terms see Benessaieh’s study, specifically 
the section entitled “Multiculturalism and Interculturality” (15-20). Wolfgang Welsch criticizes 
multiculturality and interculturality because they “remain bound to the traditional [culture] concept 
(220): cultures are still envisaged as separate, unrelated and homogenous entities (220-21). 
24 Welsch insists that cultural mixing happens both on the popular and high cultural level, as made 
apparent by McDonalds, Coke, Gauguin’s Tahiti and expressionism and African art (223). 
25 This does not lead to uniformization – as globalization does – however. Welsch contends that 
“[t]ransculturality does not mean simple uniformization. It is even intrinsically linked with the 
production of new diversity” (230): “Transcultural networks always have some elements in common 
while they differ in others, meaning that there exist between them not only differences, but at the same 
time overlaps. . . . So in terms of its structure the new type of difference favors coexistence rather than 
conflict . . . Transcultural identity . . . implies awareness of contingency and the acknowledgement of 
alternative elements of identity” (231-33). 
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 A transcultural, rather than postcolonial, analysis is much more prone to reveal 
similarities instead of differences. Benessaieh further links transculturality to 
embodiment. As she puts it, transculturality 
captures more adequately the sense of movement and the complex mixedness 
of cultures in close contact, and better describes the embodied situation of 
cultural plurality lived by many individuals and communities of mixed 
heritage and/or experience, whose multifaceted situation is more visible under 
globalization. (Benessaieh 16, emphasis in original) 
It is precisely the embodied situation of cultural plurality that allows for the 
acknowledgement of similarities without glossing over substantial differences in the 
lived experiences of people. Accordingly, “transculturality as multi-situatedness can 
be used to qualify cultural productions in music, literature, food, film, clothing, and 
more generally works of art that deal with inner and more distant diversity” 
(Benessaieh 27). According to Jacky Bouju, transcultural literature entails “‘la 
reconnaissance réciproque d’un univers de significations partagées’” [the reciprocal 
recognition of a universe of shared significations]” (cited in Benessaieh 25).  
 A transcultural, rather than a postcolonial, reading of literature, then, is 
concerned with both the awareness of difference and similarity.26 Similarly, according 
to Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan, transnational feminism is not a form of ‘global 
feminism’ which participates in “the relativistic linking of ‘differences’” (253) but its 
aim is “to compare multiple, overlapping, and discrete oppressions rather than to 
construct a theory of hegemonic oppression under a unified category of gender” 
(253). A transcultural and transnational framing of the literary texts discussed in this 
thesis has the advantage of offering a means of analyzing texts from distinct cultural 
backgrounds in dialogue with each other, including literatures, which under the label 
‘postcolonial’ are rejected. Moreover, it more readily reveals the similarities in 
feminist approaches, creating their own variety of what several authors have 
identified as transnational feminism.27 Having established the relevance of paying 
 
26 Frank Schulze-Engler provides a thorough and concise overview of the drawbacks of the term 
‘postcolonial’ and its application (20-26) and promotes ‘transculturality’ instead. 
27 There are innumerous publications on transnational feminisms, which take a decidedly social studies 
or political approach such as Margaret A. McLaren’s Decolonizing Feminism: Transnational Feminism 
and Globalization (2017), Jennifer Suchland’s Economies of Violence: Transnational Feminism, 
Postsocialism, and the Politics of Sex Trafficking (2015) and Inderpal Grewal’s Transnational 
America: Feminisms, Diasporas, Neoliberalisms (2005). My study, however, is concerned with how 
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attention to the embodied situation of cultural plurality for a transcultural analysis in 
this section, the next section will be dedicated to explaining what exactly embodiment 
refers to and how it has changed the ground in feminist analyses. 
1.2 From the Body to Embodiment 
For centuries, the body has been absent from Western theorizing (Alaimo and 
Hekman 1; Price and Shildrick 1; Fraser and Greco 1). Whenever it did surface, 
however, it was rarely considered a serious topic for philosophical discussion. This is 
so because in Western philosophy, which derived many of its ideas from 
Christianity,28 for almost as long as the discipline of philosophy itself has existed, a 
dualism between mind and body has prevailed. What this dualism has resulted in is, 
on the one hand, that it is exclusively the mind on which characteristics such as 
consciousness, communication, and thought were bestowed. On the other hand, this 
dualism has had negative repercussions for the body, because it was considered “a 
prison for the soul, reason, or mind” (Grosz 5), seen as a mere vessel, i.e. a passive 
material substance that failed to contribute to the intellectual or spiritual development 
of the human race. This ‘inanimate’ body is, in fact, in need of control in order for the 
individual to thrive intellectually. It is, as Janet Price and Margrit Shildrick remark, an 
“obstacle to pure rational thought” (2). In the Greco-Christian tradition, the body has 
been established as the devalued term.29  
 Dualistic thinking has resulted in a devaluation of the body and, by extension, 
a devaluation of its relevance for rationality and morality. It has been shown that the 
mind/body dualism is firmly linked to another set of terms, namely male/female and 
nature/culture (see Susan Bordo).30  Men are largely associated with the positive, 
 
the literary texts that I discuss create their own version of transnational feminism, which is why I do 
not engage with these publications in detail here but let the literary texts speak for themselves. 
28 Famous Whiteness scholar Richard Dyer argues, f.i.: “Christianity (and the particular inflection it 
gives to Western dualist thought) is founded on the idea – paradoxical, unfathomable, profoundly 
mysterious – of incarnation, of being that is in the body yet not of it” (14, emphasis in original). 
29 One need only consider some key philosophical thinkers’ notion of the body, such as Plato’s or René 
Descartes’s, to get a better notion of this unequal setup. For the sake of brevity, I simplify their 
understandings of the dualism between mind and body here. 
30  To be precise, connections between devalued terms do not only exist between the female and 
corporeality. In Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self, Alcoff cautions that the same 
associations apply to black people, an aspect sometimes overlooked by scholars. Miriam Fraser and 
Monica Greco expand the list of negative associations between dualisms by including working-class 
people, animals and slaves (2). 
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powerful term (mind, culture), whereas women are associated with the devalued term 
(body, nature). For centuries then, women have been identified with their bodies. 
 Feminism has brought the devaluation of females to their bodies into focus 
and has helped to highlight and pinpoint the negative effects the mind/body dualism 
has had for female subjects. Criticism of mind/body dualisms has been taken up by 
various strands of feminism at assorted times, in diverse contexts and has taken many 
different shapes. Nevertheless, it can be said to have taken primarily two forms: either 
a rejection of the materiality of the body in favour of emphasizing women’s 
intellectual capacities, or a praise of the materiality of bodies as something essential 
to female existence (Fraser and Greco 3). A third and alternative form has been 
surfacing in the last two decades with new materialist feminisms and feminist 
phenomenology. 
 New materialist feminisms have instigated a revaluation of the body as 
material entity and of matter more generally.31 From the new materialist feminist 
point of view, matter is not a passive substance or a fixed, unchanging quality, but 
rather active and “agentic” (Alaimo and Hekman 5; Coole and Frost 7). Matter is not 
simply a given but is always in a process of becoming (Coole and Frost 10). It is 
“active” (Alaimo and Hekman 4), “self-creative, productive, unpredictable” (Coole 
and Frost 9) and human bodies are equally active, malleable, adaptable, and volatile 
entities. Materialization, the process of becoming matter, is not a neutral process as 
matter is always immersed in culture; matter only ever becomes materialized within 
culture.32 
 
31 For a discussion of the criticism voiced at new materialisms and some of their major representatives 
see Samantha Frost’s “The Implications of the New Materialisms for Feminist Epistemology” and 
Maureen McNeil’s “Post-Millennial Feminist Theory: Encounters with Humanism, Materialism, 
Critique, Nature, Biology and Darwin.” 
32 New materialisms do not reject social constructivist arguments altogether – as some critics assume – 
but rather shift the focus. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost comment on this in the following way: “It is 
entirely possible, then, to accept social constructionist arguments while also insisting that the material 
realm is irreducible to culture or discourse” (27) and add that “our material lives are always culturally 
mediated, but they are not only cultural” (27). For new materialists, matter constitutes the basis of 
reality, but it does not exist separately from culture. Further, new materialisms do not deny cultural-
construction, but they argue that it cannot be separated easily from what we call matter. Thus, what can 
be defined as ‘nature’ and what can be defined as ‘culture’ is difficult, if not impossible, to pin down. 
Anne Fausto-Sterling’s research is a case in point. She demonstrates how ‘biological’ and ‘cultural’ 
aspects mutually influence each other. Fausto-Sterling puts it aptly: “we are always 100 percent nature 
and 100 percent culture” (“The Bare Bones of Sex” 1510). There is an apprehension that various 
factors ‘intra-act,’ as Karen Barad observes, within the discursive, material, human, non-human, and 
technological phenomena that shape our world. This is why Haraway speaks of the ‘material-semiotic’ 
 
 26 
 Phenomenology and in particular feminist phenomenology, while taking a 
different route, have also contributed to a reformed perspective on matter, albeit one 
limited to the human body. Be that as it may, both disciplines have contributed to the 
questioning of the notion of the human body and have helped shape the concept of 
embodiment. 33 Ever since the 1990s, embodiment has gradually gained importance in 
various disciplines of the humanities as a result of the criticism of the notion of ‘the 
body.’ 34  ‘The body’ is problematic in that it stipulates a universal standard that 
applies to all of humanity. Katherine N. Hayles, for example, defines the body as “the 
human form seen from the outside, from a cultural perspective striving to make 
representations that can stand in for bodies in general” (297).35 This is to say that 
there is only ‘one’ body and this body is representative of each and every human 
being. However, it is exactly because there is only one body that this body is 
imagined in a specific, normative way, and recurrently this entails that it is generally 
represented and conceived of as the able, male, white, heterosexual body. What is 
troublesome about this with regard to feminism and other disciplines, i.e. gender 
studies, race studies or aging studies, however, is that female as well as non-white, 
homosexual, bisexual, transsexual, disabled body experience is neglected.  
 Gail Weiss and Honi Fern Haber refer to the body as “a nongendered, 
prediscursive phenomenon” (xiii) and thus address another downside to attributing 
universal validity to ‘the body’: thinking of ‘the body’ in those oversimplifying terms 
– as one body that is representative of all bodies – conceals the fact that ‘the body’ is 
 
(Haraway, “Situated Knowledges 588) and Barad of the ‘material-discursive’ (Barad, “Posthumanist” 
810). As a consequence, meaning/signification is conceived as both material and cultural/semiotic. 
33 The focus on embodiment is also paralleled in other areas, namely visual art. Since the 1950s in 
particular when “body art” came into being (Sturm 16), female artists such as Carolee Schneemann, 
Louise Bourgeois, and Marina Abramovic, among others, started engaging with the female and in 
particular female sexual body in their works. As Jules Sturm points out, “[b]ody art was above all an 
activist art form, reflecting a new experience of subjectivity that was embodied rather than 
transcendental” (16). Similar to the literary texts I discuss here, body artists worked “[i]n opposition to 
Cartesian thought, which postulates a mind-body split and assumes knowledge to be stable and 
objective [and] reconceived the subject as being simultaneously non-coherent and embodied. The body 
was thus recognized as a central actor to challenge conventions of subjecthood” (16-17). 
34 Gail Weiss and Honi Fern Haber, for instance, note that ‘the body’ “has become problematized” 
(xiii). But it is not just the body that has been problematized but also the “discourses about the body,” 
because they have drawn attention away from materiality (Alaimo and Hekman 3).  
35 Eva Cherniavsky argues along the same lines that ‘the body’ is “the physical or material frame of 
human and other living beings” (26). 
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never merely a ‘neutral’ or ‘natural’ entity. 36 As a matter of fact, ‘the body’ is always 
implicated in medical, biological, ecological, political and other discourses. 
Moreover, these wide-ranging discourses even have the potential to shape bodies. As 
many new materialist thinkers emphasize, discourses have a direct impact on bodies 
because meanings are inscribed into bodies (Wuttig, Das traumatisierte Subjekt 
151).37  
 One need only have a look at modern day physical exercise to see the 
intertwining of real material bodies and discourses: Current medical discourses on 
physical health suggest that ‘normal’ weight contributes to fewer diseases such as 
Type 2 Diabetes, heart diseases, strokes and certain types of cancer. Current beauty 
ideals, distributed via various types of media, suggest that attractiveness is linked to a 
fit and slim body. Both medical and cultural discourses encourage individuals to do 
sports, follow a particular diet, and purchase specific clothes – either for the purpose 
of exercising or of covering certain ‘unattractive’ body areas. As a consequence, these 
individuals will put their ‘biological’ bodies to a different use; expose their bodies to 
altered conditions. In turn, the adjustments to diet and an increase in physical activity 
will modify the ‘natural’ body. In this way we can conclude that social-constructivist 
arguments prevail.   
 However, drawing on medical research, new materialists argue that these 
changes in exercise and diet will trigger an alteration that goes beyond superficial 
changes to outward bodily appearance, such as weight loss, stronger, more clearly 
defined muscles, etc. Instead physical exercise, for instance, increases bone density 
(Fausto-Sterling, “The Bare Bones” 1510) and can thus prevent diseases such as 
osteoporosis. So, even though someone might be born with a particular predisposition 
for a disease such as osteoporosis, physical exercise can outweigh genetic factors. 
Another example concerns diet: a change in diet does not simply result in a slimmer 
 
36 Wuttig insists: “Natur in ‚Reinform’ ist ‚uns’ nicht zugänglich. Sie bleibt immer eine Spekulation 
vor dem Hintergrund aktueller Wissensdispositive und gesellschaftlich erzeugter Rationalitäten” (Das 
traumatisierte Subjekt 218). Kay Inckle comments: “Thus, there is neither a purely “natural” 
essentialist body, . . . nor is the body simply a social construction” (76). 
37 In her discussion of Friedrich Nietzsche’s work, Wuttig comments on this in the following way: 
“Der Leib und seine Bedürfnisse sind für Nietzsche keine Metapher. Wenn er davon spricht, dass 
Wahrheiten sich in den Körper einschreiben, so meint er das nicht metaphorisch, sondern dass sie sich 
wortwörtlich ins Fleisch eingraben und einen materiellen Anker bilden. Einschreibung ist hier die 
‚Funktionsweise der Macht’ und ihre Modalitäten sind, wie Kalb zusammenstellt: ‘Einprägen, 
Einstempeln, Einbrennen, Einritzen, Einschneiden, Einzeichnen’” (Das traumatisierte Subjekt 151). 
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body. A transformed diet has an impact on the bacteria in the gut, which has, due to 
hormones, a considerable influence on the brain (which is why the gut can be 
considered our second brain, as Michael Gershon has shown).38 Significantly, some 
scientists have drawn connections between gut bacteria and mental diseases, such as 
depression (Gershon; E. Wilson).39  
 Another case in point is Elizabeth Wilson’s research who indicates that there 
exists are correlation between bulimia and depression. While there is uncertainty as to 
whether depression leads to bulimia or vice versa, the use of antidepressants with 
bulimic patients has produced positive results (“Gut Feminism” 82). Wilson maintains 
that “antidepressants alleviate bulimia because there is no radical (originary) 
distinction between biology and mood” (“Gut Feminism” 85) and “[t]he clinical data 
indicate extensive traffic among the body’s organs and between the gut and mood in 
ways that are not delimitable to the flat logic of traditional biological science” (84-
85). In Psychosomatic, Wilson takes this reasoning even further asserting, 
a psychologically barren ENS [enteric nervous system] becomes implausible 
when we consider one noteworthy aspect of the gut: that it is one of the most 
important means by which the outside world connects with the body . . . 
Maybe ingestion and digestion aren’t just metaphors for internalization; 
perhaps they are ‘actual’ mechanisms for relating to others. That is, perhaps 
gut pathology doesn’t stand in for ideational disruption, but is another form of 
perturbed relations to others. (Wilson, Psychosomatic 43-44, 45) 
These arguments make it extremely difficult to speak of a pure, ‘natural’ body 
because both genetic/biological and environmental/cultural factors influence bodies 
alike. 
 As has been established previously, ‘the body’ is problematic because of its 
claim to normativity. Due to its troublesome implications, the body’ has largely been 
replaced by the notion of embodiment.40 In contrast to ‘the body’ perceived as the 
 
38 This also complicates issues of mental disease, which can no longer be defined as ‘mental’ problems 
but are connected to physical process in the entire body, not just the brain. For more information on 
this topic see Giulia Enders’s Gut (originally published in German in 2014, English translation in 2015) 
or Michael Gershon’s The Second Brain (1998). 
39  Moreover, even though criticized by many, research in epigenetics suggests that certain 
environmental or cultural influences can cause epigenetic changes, and thus modify genes. Research in 
epigenetics suggests, for instance, that a poor diet will surface in the genes of an individual’s 
descendants. I have simplified this matter here. For a more in-depth discussion of this topic see Saini. 
40 Admittedly, new materialist feminism is not the only discipline that has replaced ‘the body’ with 
embodiment. For studies on embodiment in sociology see Inckle’s “Writing on the Body?” Thinking 
Through Gendered Embodiment and Marked Flesh (2007), Nick Crossley’s The Social Body: Habit, 
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physical, material human shape, embodiment is concerned with the way that different 
living bodies, i.e. different subjects, experience the world around them and engage 
with this world through sensations, feelings and emotions; or, as Nick Crossley puts 
it, embodiment encompasses “the sensuous nature of human perception, emotion and 
desire,” and it forms “the corporeal basis of agency, communication and thought” (3). 
Accordingly, Weiss and Haber describe embodiment as “a way of living or inhabiting 
the world through one’s acculturated body” (xiii, emphasis in original).41 As a result, 
“[h]uman beings are neither minds nor, strictly speaking, bodies,” as Crossley 
proposes; they are “rather mindful and embodied social agents” (3). Csordas clarifies 
the difference between the divergent foci of studies, stating that “studies under the 
rubric of embodiment are not ‘about’ the body per se. Instead, they are about culture 
and experience insofar as these can be understood from the standpoint of bodily 
being-in-the-world” (“Embodiment and Cultural Phenomenology” 143). Unlike the 
dominant mind/body dualism, embodiment theory puts emphasis on perception, 
feeling and emotion as experienced through the body and as mediated through the 
mind, recognizing the body’s inherent embeddedness in culture. In other words, 
embodiment theory attests that perception, emotion and feeling are singular corporeal 
experiences, influenced by the way culture responds to bodies; it is not simply 
concerned with the fact of human beings having and experiencing one’s body, rather 
it is concerned with having and experiencing one’s body within a culture, with all the 
possibilities and constraints this carries.42 It follows that communication, thought and 
agency are not simply made physically possible by the mere existence of bodies, but 
they are made possible because of a human’s environment and surroundings. This 
means, in turn, that depending on the environment, communication, thought and 
agency can take distinct forms. 
 
Identity and Desire (2001), and Gillian Bendelow and Simon J. Williams’s The Lived Body: 
Sociological Themes, Embodied Issues (1998). For anthropological studies see Thomas J. Csordas’s 
Embodiment and Experience: The Existential Ground of Culture and Self (1994). Many of these 
provide useful definitions of embodiment. 
41 Hayles’s claim that “[e]mbodiment is experienced from the inside” can be misleading as it might 
insinuate that embodiment is only about the inside, and hence only about consciousness. This is 
obviously not what she means as she also refers to “the feelings, emotions, and sensations” (297). 
Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty is helpful in this regard as he shows that consciousness is not purely a 
mental process but is dependent on the body. 
42 Wuttig’s quote from Merleau-Ponty is a case in point here: “What things and events mean is derived 
from the frame of ideas within which the person is situated. The act of giving meaning is an act of 
attribution” (Merleau-Ponty, qtd. in Wuttig, Das traumatisierte Subjekt 227). 
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1.3 Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology 
A welcome side effect of the criticism of the notion of ‘the body’ has been that 
several philosophers and their ideas on subjectivity have been submitted to a thorough 
re-evaluation. One such philosopher is Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose writing looms 
large in the literature on embodiment. He provides a valuable account of the 
embodied subject, and feminist scholars have found Merleau-Ponty to offer a more 
nuanced way of talking about female (and other marginalized people’s) experiences.43  
 Merleau-Ponty rejects Descartes’s understanding of the subject as being made 
up of two distinct substances and proposes an alternative instead. He refutes Descartes 
view of the body as an “object,” a “thing” (204), which serves solely as a shell or 
container to a soul that does the thinking, that has awareness and consciousness. In 
short, Merleau-Ponty questions Descartes’s hypothesis of the soul making the subject 
and criticizes his conception of the body as being completely disengaged from 
consciousness.44 For Merleau-Ponty it is simply not possible to conceive of mind and 
body as separate:45 “The union of the soul and the body is not established through an 
arbitrary decree that unites two mutually exclusive terms, one a subject and the other 
an object. It is accomplished at each moment in the movement of existence” (91). As 
a consequence, Merleau-Ponty proposes two distinct ways of conceiving of the body, 
the objective body and the lived body.  
 
43 This is not to say that other philosophers have not been useful in this regard. Wuttig and some new 
materialists draw heavily on Nietzsche’s notion of the subject. Others have turned to Spinoza, Darwin 
or Deleuze. 
44 Admittedly, Merleau-Ponty takes issue with both intellectualism’s and empiricism’s account of the 
body, not just Descartes’s. For a more in-depth discussion of intellectualism and empiricism see 
Thomas Baldwin’s Reading Merleau-Ponty. For the sake of clarity, brevity and because Descartes is 
the most representative of the mind/body dichotomy, I will only refer to Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of 
Descartes here. 
45  When discussing the phantom limb, Merleau-Ponty calls this strict division into question. The 
phantom limb is a condition due to which patients experience pain or other sensations in a body part 
that has been amputated. In many cases patients feel that the limb is still there. He shows that the 
phantom limb is not simply a result of entirely physiological phenomena, such as the actual loss of the 
limb or cerebral lesions. At the same time, he is eager to point out that it is neither the result of 
completely psychological circumstances. Instead of saying that the phantom limb is both the result of 
physiological and psychological circumstances, he suggests that it can be understood from the point of 
view of “being in the world” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology 83). He, therefore, offers a more 
nuanced and ultimately more organic or situated way of talking about and analyzing phenomena such 
as the phantom limb. 
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 Merleau-Ponty proposes two ways of envisioning the body, namely knowing it 
as an object and perceiving it as a living body.46 The objective body is the body that 
can be studied from a scientific perspective, as is done, for instance, in biology, 
physics or psychology.47 Merleau-Ponty is at pains to show that we ought to take up a 
third-person point of view with regard to our bodies, which then become one thing 
among many (Phenomenology 191). Thinking about ‘the body’ in this way reduces 
the body to an “idea” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology 74, 205) or an abstraction. As 
a consequence, thinking about the objective body neither takes account of individual 
bodies nor of individual experiences, creating a universal standard that applies to all 
of humanity. 
 By means of the ‘lived body,’ Merleau-Ponty provides an account of 
embodiment that is firmly grounded in corporeality.48 The body forms the basis of 
existence as a human being: the body is the starting point for perception, experience 
and thought. 49  Accordingly, he maintains that “I am my body” (Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology 151). In contrast to the objective body, the lived body50 implies that 
each human being experiences their body from a unique, individual perspective. The 
‘lived body’ is the first-person point of view, so to speak. The lived body includes the 
way that a subject experiences or feels its body in a certain state, such as pain or 
tiredness, and the way the subject perceives its body doing something (reading) or 
being able to do something (sitting in this chair for hours). More specifically, the 
lived body entails an awareness of what I can do with my body, the capacities I have 
for doing something.  
 This is achieved through what Merleau-Ponty calls the ‘body schema.’ He 
defines the body schema as “the global awareness of my posture in the inter-sensory 
world, a ‘form’ in Gestalt psychology’s sense of the word” (Phenomenology 102). 
 
46  Merleau-Ponty’s differentiation between the objective and the lived body is based on Edmund 
Husserl’s of Körper and Leib. 
47  Even though psychology is usually not considered a science, I have included it here because 
Merleau-Ponty refers to it as a science. 
48 Abby Wilkerson defines ‘corporeality’ as “the state of living in/through/as a body” (196). In contrast, 
‘embodiment’ is employed “in relation to phenomenology, the philosophical study of conscious 
experience from an individual person’s subjective perspective” (196-97). 
49 Many critics point out the primacy of perception in Merleau-Ponty’s theorizing. See Taylor Carman 
and Komarine Romdenh-Romluc for more detailed accounts of this idea. These critics consider 
perception a bodily phenomenon instead of a mental process (Carman 78-79; Romdenh-Romluc 167, 
183). 
50 Merleau-Ponty also uses the term ‘phenomenal body’ or ‘habit body’ to refer to the lived body. 
 
 32 
This does not only entail that we have an awareness of our position in space, in a 
room for example, but it also includes an awareness of what we can do with our body 
in that space, what tasks we can perform with it. Awareness here does not mean a 
mental or intellectual, conscious awareness or knowledge but rather an unconscious 
awareness of the habits and skills that the body can carry out. The body schema, then, 
is our preparedness to use the lived body’s skills and habits in order to be part of the 
world around us, access this world and make sense of it. Merleau-Ponty asserts that 
the “‘body schema’ is, in the end, a manner of expressing that my body is in and 
toward the world” (Phenomenology 103) and it becomes, according to Taylor 
Carman, representative of the interdependence between the self and its world (109).  
 These two ways of conceiving of the body do not have anything in common 
(Phenomenology 191). However, this is not to suggest that Merleau-Ponty reproduces 
the Cartesian dualism of mind versus body. Quite the contrary, he suggests that the 
objective and the lived body are not two distinct entities but rather different 
perspectives one can take up in regard to the body (Matthews 51).51 “What prevents 
[the body] from ever being an object or from ever being ‘completely constituted,’” 
Merleau-Ponty argues, “is that my body is that by which there are objects” 
(Phenomenology 94). The body cannot be solely an object, because it is the lived 
body that allows for our existence in the world and consequently our perception of 
and engagement with objects: “I have no other means of knowing the human body 
than by living it” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology 205). Arguably, then, Merleau-
Ponty refuses to demote the body to the objective body only and insists that a body is 
always lived. In fact, in order to be able to talk about the objective body and study it 
as a biological entity or as a “physico-chemical system” (Matthews 51), one needs to 
be embodied first, which is why he asserts that “the thinking subject must be 
grounded upon the embodied subject” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology 199). 
 Merleau-Ponty offers a novel way of approaching the body, in the sense that 
there is no such thing as only one body. The body can be seen from two different 
perspectives – the objective body and the lived body. What is more, one subject’s 
 
51 Eric Matthews suggests: “This distinction between the lived body of our experience and the objective 
body of science is not Cartesian dualism: these are not two bodies or two separate things, but the same 
body described from different points of view” (51). 
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body is never the same, it is always changing: “[T]here are several ways for the body 
to be a body, and several ways for consciousness to be consciousness” (Merleau-
Ponty, Phenomenology 125, emphasis in original).52 Since each and every situation 
we find ourselves in is unique, the way our body will find itself in that situation, i.e. 
be in the world and respond to its world, will be different.53  
 In contrast to dominant philosophical beliefs, Merleau-Ponty comprehends 
consciousness as manifold, too, because it does not necessarily refer to thought 
processes only, but to perception and an unconscious awareness of one’s skills. 
Consciousness, for Merleau-Ponty, is therefore not an exclusively mental 
phenomenon but is rather connected to the whole being and influenced by bodily 
workings. On the whole, he suggests that there is a multiplicity of bodies and a 
multiplicity of consciousnesses within one subject. 
 Merleau-Ponty challenges another dominant philosophical notion by 
proposing that the body is essentially social in character. To Merleau-Ponty, it is not 
only the mind or soul that, within dominant philosophical (and religious) beliefs, that 
makes human understanding and thus relationships possible, but the lived body. 
Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that “[i]t is the body that shows, that speaks” 
(Phenomenology 203).54 The lived body is vital for being able to communicate with 
the world and to ultimately connect with other people. More importantly, he 
elaborates, “I understand the other person through my body, just as I perceive ‘things’ 
through my body” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology 191-92). It is, therefore, by 
means of the lived body that we communicate amongst each other and convey 
meaning, be it intentional or not, since unconscious gestures or movements can betray 
someone’s true feelings.55 
 
52 This is an idea that can be found in Friedrich Nietzsche’s work, too, as he speaks of ‘Bewusstseins’ 
in the plural and a multiplicity of subjects.  
53 Wuttig highlights: “Gemäß Merleau-Ponty (1966) sind der Leib und die Bedeutung, die er für das 
Subjekt hat, ein offenes Zwischenergebnis innerhalb eines kulturellen und gesellschaftlichen Referenz- 
und Deutungsrahmens” (Das traumatisierte Subjekt 227). 
54 M. L. Lyon and J. M. Barbalet describe the body as “intercommunicative and active” (48). 
55 Interestingly, the body’s social character has a neurological basis in what Thomas Lewis, Fari Amini, 
and Richard Lannon in their study A General Theory of Love refer to as “limbic resonance.” These 
authors define limbic resonance as “a symphony of mutual exchange and internal adaptation whereby 
two mammals become attuned to each other’s inner states” (63). “It is limbic resonance,” they further 
explain, “that makes looking into the face of another emotionally responsive creature a multilayered 
experience. Instead of seeing a pair of eyes as two bespeckled buttons, when we look into the ocular 
portals to a limbic brain our vision goes deep: . . . Eye contact, although it occurs over a gap of yards, 
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 It consequently follows that emotions are integral to the body’s role as a social 
actant. 56 In fact, Merleau-Ponty considers “affectivity” an “original mode of 
consciousness” (Phenomenology 157).57 In an indicative passage in Sense and Non-
sense, Merleau-Ponty puts it thus: 
We must reject that prejudice which makes ‘inner realities’ out of love, hate or 
anger, leaving them accessible to one single witness: the person who feels 
them. Anger, shame, hate and love are not psychic facts hidden at the bottom 
of another’s consciousness: they are types of behaviour or styles of conduct 
which are visible from the outside. They exist on this face or in those gestures, 
not hidden behind them. (52)  
Emotions are not individual experiences; they are intersubjective. We acknowledge 
and understand other people primarily via their emotions, to be more specific, as 
Merleau-Ponty points out, through the way they use their bodies to express a 
particular emotion (Phenomenology 195).58 We understand emotions or can ‘read’ 
them because our own bodies respond in a particular way to emotions: they affect us, 
they trigger an emotional reaction in us. We do not need a conscious understanding of 
emotions in order to understand what they mean; our own emotions take on this task. 
We understand each other and each other’s emotions because we are part of the same 
culture. 59  We possess shared cultural knowledge of emotions and understand 
intuitively the ways a body is used to express that particular emotion.  
 As has been shown, Merleau-Ponty provides an account of the lived body, the 
embodied subject, which makes it possible to speak about bodily experience without 
 
is not a metaphor. When we meet the gaze of another, two nervous systems achieve a palpable and 
intimate apposition” (63). Furthermore, “[b]ecause limbic states can leap between minds, feelings are 
contagious, while notions are not . . . the limbic activity of those around us draws our emotions into 
almost immediate congruence” (64).  
56  Suzanne L. Cataldi maintains that “Merleau-Ponty did not draw distinctions between affective 
phenomena” (163) and Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, too, asserts that he does not distinguish between 
emotions and moods (172). I refrain from drawing clear distinctions between ‘affects’ and ‘emotions’ 
and in fact employing the term ‘affect’ in this study because of the misleading uses of said term in 
Affect Studies. For an excellent critical discussion of the shortcomings of affect theory see Ruth Leys’s 
“The Turn to Affect: A Critique” (2011). 
57 In his discussion of the phantom limb Merleau-Ponty includes emotions, because he contends: “A 
phantom limb appears for a subject not previously experiencing one when an emotion or a situation 
evokes those of injury” (Phenomenology 79). 
58 Similarly, Lewis, Amini and Lannon declare that “facial expressions . . . are the universal language 
of humanity” (39). 
59 Merleau-Ponty is very well aware of the fact that an emotion, or rather, the way individuals use their 
bodies to express a particular emotion, have not the same meaning across cultures: “[T]he 
gesticulations of anger or love are not the same for a Japanese person and a Western person. More 
precisely, the difference between gesticulations covers over a difference between the emotions 
themselves. It is not merely the gesture that is contingent with regard to bodily organization, it is the 
very manner of meeting the situation and of living it” (Phenomenology 194-95). 
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falling back into the dualism of mind and body, because he shows that these two 
cannot be conceived as separate entities. Moreover, Merleau-Ponty’s embodied 
subject opens up the possibility to talk about sexual difference in ways that do not 
subscribe to male/female and sex/gender dualisms.  
1.4 Feminist Phenomenology 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of embodiment is an indispensable one, 
on which a number of feminist theorists have drawn, most prominent among those are 
Elizabeth Grosz, Moira Gatens and Gail Weiss. While they all recognize the inherent 
potential of Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of embodiment for a feminist 
appropriation, they by no means fully subscribe to it. In fact, they accuse him of 
androcentrism in his theorizing and attempt to expose its shortcomings by claiming 
that it displays a latent disregard for any differentiation between the sexes. It is this 
absence of awareness, especially since virtually all the examples Merleau-Ponty 
employs are male, that Grosz and Weiss criticize. They are of the opinion that 
Merleau-Ponty is here unwittingly complicit in promoting the notion that the male 
body can be taken as the norm. Furthermore, Weiss argues that Merleau-Ponty 
overlooks significant factors such as race, ethnicity, age and (dis)ability.60  
 As a consequence, Grosz, Weiss and Gatens, as well as other theorists such as 
Iris Marion Young and Linda Martín Alcoff, have contributed to the development of a 
feminist phenomenology. 61  Through the lens of feminist phenomenology, 
embodiment can be defined “as a form of gendered experience” (Wilkerson 197). 
Feminist phenomenology sees gender as constitutive of experience because gender is 
understood as a variable that influences both individuals’ experiences and the way 
they perceive their surroundings. In this sense, feminist phenomenology is also 
concerned with the consequences this gendered outlook on the world leads to.62 Grosz 
shows: 
 
60 Admittedly, Merleau-Ponty does not explicitly refer to these features in his discussion, yet there is 
the pertinent implication that his theory and an inclusion of these factors are compatible. 
61 One of the first, if not the first, feminist phenomenologist is without doubt Simone de Beauvoir. 
62 According to the author of the Philpapers entry “feminist phenomenology holds the position that 
being-in-the-world is not an abstract condition – without sex or gender. At the most obvious level, this 
leads to a focus on gendered embodiment and its impact on subjectivity. From these beginnings, 
feminist phenomenology clarifies how sex and gender impacts one’s experiences and understandings of 
the world, broadening to explore the social political consequences” (“Feminist Phenomenology”). 
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If the mind is necessarily linked to, and perhaps is even a part of, the body and 
if bodies themselves are always sexually (and racially) distinct, incapable of 
being incorporated into a singular universal model, then the very forms that 
subjectivity take are not generalizable. (19) 
One way of approaching gendered subjectivity is by means of the body image. While 
Merleau-Ponty and other theorists differentiate clearly between the ‘body schema’ 
and the ‘body image’, many feminist phenomenologists partly do not maintain a clear 
distinction or even merge these two terms by using ‘body image’ to mean both.63 
Feminist phenomenologists have adapted and extended Merleau-Ponty’s concept of 
the body image instead to account for emotional investment in the formation of the 
body image. The body image refers to a ‘unconscious awareness’ of one’s body. This 
does not mean that the body image provides us with a mental map of our bodies that 
is disconnected from this body. 64  To be precise, it should be thought of as an 
unconscious awareness of our capabilities and bodily functions. As Kathleen Lennon 
explains, body images are “modes of experiencing our body, enabling or inhibiting 
our operation in the world” (n. pag.). The body image, then, rather than simply being 
formed through a cognitive representation of a body, is formed via the experience of  
but also the emotional investment in one’s body. Thus, the body image is necessarily 
flexible, and changes based on factors such as race, ethnicity, age and (dis)ability. For 
these are factors that tend to be more or less pronounced depending on a particular 
situation, time or place. However, the transformations a body undergoes due to aging 
or specific, deliberate or unintended situations (such as pregnancy or cancer) or 
 
63 As Stephan Käufer and Anthony Chemero highlight, ‘body schema’ and ‘body image’ are often used 
interchangeably as a result of ‘body schema’ being an appropriation of the German Körperschema. 
Unfortunately, however, Körperschema is often erroneously translated as ‘body image’ (104). As a 
matter of fact, the term ‘body image’ goes back to Paul Schilder who uses the term to refer to 
representations of bodies. Even contemporary discourses that are concerned with the negative effects of 
medially produced body images and their link to eating disorders go back to Schilder’s use of the ‘body 
image’ (Käufer and Chemero 105). A case in point for studies engaging with this type of body image 
are Maggie Wykes’s and Barrie Gunter’s The Media and Body Image: If Looks Could Kill (2005) and 
Beth Younger’s Learning Curves: Body Image and Female Sexuality in Young Adult Literature (2009). 
In contrast, ‘body schema’ is used by Merleau-Ponty, and others working in psychology, 
phenomenology and other disciplines, to refer to a position or stance a body takes up in space and an 
awareness of the capabilities this body has. Shaun Gallagher, for instance, differentiates between the 
body image and the body schema based on “conscious awareness” of one’s body (body image) and 
“non-conscious performance of the body” (body schema) (544). For the sake of the argument of this 
thesis, the distinction between ‘body schema’ and ‘body image’ is not relevant so that I will adhere to 
the use of ‘body image.’ 
64 Lennon, too, addresses this issue: “A danger with the concept of body image is that it can suggest 
something like an inner map or picture which we have of our bodies, a mental representation of the 
body and therefore separate from it” ( “Feminist Perspectives on the Body” n.p.). 
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social, cultural or psychical alterations can result in a different body image as well.	
Weiss emphasizes in this regard that each human being has “an almost unlimited 
number of body-images.” She suggests: “[T]hese images of the body are not discrete 
but form a series of overlapping identities whereby one or more aspects of that body 
appear to be especially salient at any given point in time” (1). This, in turn, also 
means that none of these factors “plays a determinative role” in the construction of 
body images (Weiss 167). That being said, a subject might not be aware of the 
prominence of one of these factors because as Weiss suggests, we are not always 
aware of a body image. She contends: “[O]ur body images . . . are not dependent upon 
our recognition of them as such” (166). Body images exist even though we might not 
consciously reflect on them. 65  Nonetheless, while a body image might be 
“un(re)marked,” it still plays a “constitutive role in the formation of . . . identity” 
(Weiss 166). According to Grosz, the body image 
mediates the mind/body polarization, [and it] necessarily entails input from 
both poles in order to function and be effective. This term signals the 
impossibility of conceiving the polar terms as binaries, as mutually exclusive. 
. . The body image . . . attests to the necessary interconstituency of each for the 
other, the radical inseparability of biological from psychical elements, the 
mutual dependence of the psychical and the biological, and thus the intimate 
connection between the question of sexual specificity (biological sexual 
differences) and psychical identity. (85) 
What the concept of the body image bears witness to is that the physical change of 
one’s body is always interlinked with the mind because it has implications for one’s 
emotions, consciousness and thought. Therefore, it presents a challenge to a clearly 
defined division between mind and body. 
 In addition, Weiss and Gatens concur with Merleau-Ponty as to the 
communicative function of the ‘lived body.’ Weiss, for instance, quotes Schilder on 
body images, which “communicate with each other either in parts or as wholes” (33). 
She arrives at the assessment that human beings constantly interact with each other. A 
person’s lived body causes other bodies’ reactions and responses in a specific way. 
By way of illustration, one will respond to each of the following bodies differently: “a 
woman’s body, a Latina’s body, a mother’s body, a daughter’s body, a friend’s body, 
 
65 This strongly resonates with critical whiteness studies. Dyer stresses that “white people are not 
racially seen and named” (1). 
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an attractive body, an aging body, a Jewish body” (Weiss 1).66 According to Weiss 
and Gatens, it is because the reactions to particular aspects of a lived body vary (such 
as gender) that the body image of this person in these situations differs, too. Different 
responses create different body images that are not separate but overlap. Gatens also 
recognizes this “social character of the imaginary body” (12) and the “intertwining 
system of bodies” (31) as she declares that “all human bodies are part of [a] system of 
exchange, identification and mimesis” (31). “To describe embodiment as 
intercorporeality,” Weiss explains “is to emphasize that the experience of being 
embodied is never a private affair, but is always already mediated by our continual 
interactions with other human and nunhuman bodies” (5). If we take into 
consideration the way a body is emotionally invested, then lived bodily experience is 
necessarily marked by sex, gender, race and (dis)ability.67 Feminist phenomenologists 
thus draw from the elements in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology that are compatible 
with a feminist re-evaluation of lived experience.68  
1.5 The Embodiment of Gender 
One of the issues new feminist materialisms and feminist phenomenology have 
addressed is the inscription of gender into bodies. Feminisms have long argued that 
gender is not inherent to bodies and certainly not biologically given. Pierre Bourdieu 
is probably best-known for having argued that social categories, such as gender, show 
in a person’s habitus, that is, in their “dispositions, reflexes and forms of behaviour” 
(Bourdieu 19). Social categories become incorporated and manifest in a person’s 
hexis; they show in visible physical differences, such as “one’s comportment, accent, 
manners and all other such visible markers of social standing” (Crossley 107). 
Crossley contends: “Social categories penetrate the flesh, manifesting as habitus and 
hexis” (6). 
 
66  This quote strongly resonates with Kimberlé Crenshaw’s theory of Intersectionality. For a 
comprehensive exposition of this concept, see her essay “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, 
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color.” 
67 Weiss also raises the issue of visibility: “For Merleau-Ponty . . . to develop a body image is to 
develop an image of my body as visible to others. There is no body image without this visibility of the 
body” (33). 
68 Lennon points out that “[a]ttention to body image/corporeal schemas opens the way for a crucial 
feminist move in relation to such phenomenological accounts: to suggest that it is such bodily schemas 
which serve to constitute us subjectively and socially as sexed, raced, (dis)abled, culturally and 
nationally positioned” (n.p., emphasis in original). 
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 However, as Bettina Wuttig points out, Bourdieu does not specify the bodily 
prerequisites that make incorporation possible (Wuttig, “Der traumatisierte Körper” 
357) and Crossley remarks that “Bourdieu’s account of hexis focuses very much upon 
the communicative function of such forms of comportment. It is important to note, 
however, that differences in bodily comportment are ‘lived’ too, with considerable 
consequences” (156-57). As Alcoff puts it: 
Both race and sex are social kinds of entities in the sense that their meaning is 
constructed through culturally available concepts, values, and experiences. But 
to say that they are social is not to say that they are some kind of linguistic 
rather than physical thing or to imply that meanings are conceptual items 
pasted over physical items. They are most definitely physical, marked on and 
through the body, lived as a material experience, visible as surface 
phenomena, and determinant of economic and political status. Social identities 
cannot be adequately analysed without an attentiveness to the role of the body 
and of the body’s visible identity. (102) 
Young has provided the most insightful analysis of how gender is lived and 
embodied. In her now classic essay “Throwing like a Girl,”69  Young scrutinizes 
observations concerning the difference in bodily comportment between men and 
women: “[T]here is a particular style of bodily comportment that is typical of 
feminine existence, and this style consists of particular modalities of the structures 
and conditions of the body’s existence in the world” (31). She identifies differences in 
the throwing of a ball, in the gait, and in sitting postures. “Not only is there a typical 
style of throwing like a girl,” she notes, “but there is a more or less typical style of 
running like a girl, climbing like a girl, swinging like a girl, hitting like a girl” (33). 
Furthermore, women often fail tasks that require coordinated strength, for instance, 
lifting a heavy parcel. While, previously, scholars put this down to differences in 
physical strength, Young argues that while there are differences in strength, the main 
reason for this imbalance is “the way each sex uses the body in approaching tasks” 
(33).  
 This also translates into women’s use of space. While there is objective space, 
available to both men and women, phenomenal/lived space refers to how this space is 
used, how the body moves within it. Here, again, a difference between men and 
women is discernible: “Feminine existence lives space as enclosed or confining, as 
 




having a dual structure, and the woman experiences herself as positioned in space” 
(39, emphasis in original). Young draws on an experiment by Erik Erikson to 
illustrate her point, who found that “girls typically depicted indoor settings, with high 
walls and enclosures, while boys typically constructed outdoor scenes” when asked to 
construct an imagined movie out of toys (39). While Erikson’s interpretation is 
psychoanalytical, suggesting that the girls’ focus on inner space is a “projection of the 
enclosed space of their wombs and vaginas [and] boys depict ‘outer space’ as a 
projection of the phallus” (39-49), Young claims that “it is far more plausible to 
regard this as a reflection of the way members of each sex live and move their bodies 
in space” (40). 
 Women use their bodies differently from men and Young contends that 
women lack complete trust in their bodies; they lack trust that their bodies will be able 
to accomplish a specific task, which almost automatically results in failure (34).70 
However, Young identifies another reason for women not to put their bodies fully into 
a motion or task, which is the fear of getting hurt (34). Women, much more than men, 
focus attention on the movement or task at hand, at the same time that they 
concentrate on not getting hurt, so that they experience their bodies “as a fragile 
encumbrance, rather than the medium for the enactment of [their] aims” (34). She 
explains: “We feel as though we must have our attention directed upon our bodies to 
make sure they are doing what we wish them to do, rather than paying attention to 
what we want to do through our bodies” (34, emphasis in original). As a result, 
women frequently develop a “feeling of incapacity, frustration, and self-
consciousness” (34) in their bodily capacities, in short, they develop feelings of 
disempowerment.  
 It is in particular this self-consciousness which leads to a different use of their 
bodies. From early on, “[t]he girl learns actively to hamper her movements. She is 
told that she must be careful not to get hurt, not to get dirty, not to tear her clothes, 
that the things she desires to do are dangerous for her” (43). Moreover, Young 
 
70 It is important to note here that Young makes an effort not to generalize: “None of the observations 
that have been made thus far about the way women typically move and comport their bodies applies to 
all women all of the time. Nor do those women who manifest some aspect of this typicality do so in the 
same degree. There is no inherent, mysterious connection between these sorts of typical comportments 
and being a female person” (35). 
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specifically states that girls and women are not encouraged “to use their full bodily 
capacities in free and open engagement with the world, nor are they encouraged as 
much as boys are to develop specific bodily skills” (43). This reflects in “a specific 
positive style of feminine body comportment and movement” which she acquires 
while she comes to understand that she is a girl (43). Women move differently for 
fear of attracting attention (gazes, stares) or for fear of physical advances by men. 
This is why women tend to make smaller movements and movements that require less 
space, Young suggests. In a sense, then, women feel doubly uncomfortable in their 
bodies. 
 Since women have to divide their attention between the task to be performed 
and how to bring their body to perform it as well as check their movements on the 
grounds that their bodies are being “looked at” (39, emphasis in original), they 
incorporate a view of their body as a thing: 
An essential part of the situation of being a woman is that of living the ever-
present possibility that one will be gazed upon as a mere body, as shape and 
flesh that presents itself as the potential object of another subject’s intentions 
and manipulations, rather than as a living manifestation of action and 
intention. The source of this objectified bodily existence is in the attitude of 
others regarding her, but the woman herself often actively takes up her body 
as a mere thing. She gazes at it in the mirror, worries about how it looks to 
others, prunes it, shapes it, molds and decorates it. (44) 
Even though the idea that women’s bodies are treated as a thing is not entirely novel 
(f.i. female slaves or Victorian marriage laws), Young points out that women 
incorporate this view of their bodies and as a consequence become limited in their 
movements. Young extends Bourdieu’s theory in that she emphasizes how cultural 
components leave bodily traces.  
 The reasons, then, for women’s difference in bodily motility do not lie in 
biology, but rather in culture: 
The modalities of feminine bodily comportment, motility, and spatiality . . . 
have their source, however, in neither anatomy nor physiology, and certainly 
not in a mysterious feminine essence. Rather, they have their source in the 
particular situation of women as conditioned by their sexist oppression in 
contemporary society. . . . Insofar as we learn to live out our existence in 
accordance with the definition that patriarchal culture assigns to us, we are 
physically inhibited, confined, positioned, and objectified. (42) 
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What is more, Young suggests that the lack of bodily freedom and feeling of limited 
bodily agency translates into mental agency as well: “I have an intuition that the 
general lack of confidence that we frequently have about our cognitive or leadership 
abilities is traceable in part to an original doubt of our body’s capacity” (45). Young’s 
account thus stresses that female embodiment is firmly grounded in women’s 
objectified experience in the world. This has consequences for their lived bodies, 
which they experience as having limited agency and also reflect in their social life as 
they underestimate their cognitive abilities, refrain from certain job positions or other 
senior positions. 
 Wuttig, in her outstanding study, Das Traumatisierte Subjekt, equally argues 
that gender is embodied and leaves traces in bodies. However, she links the 
inscription of gender directly to trauma. Wuttig contends that the cultural construct 
‘gender’ leaves traces in bodies; these traces form an inconspicuous coherence via 
traumatic dynamics and connections between somatic impulses, images, feelings and 
thoughts (Das traumatisierte Subjekt 275). These metonymic processes convey the 
impression of an authenticity of gender. As a result, individuals perceive coherent 
gender identity as a (painfully) felt entity; yet it remains an illusion. Coherent gender 
identity entails, time and again, both a socially required striving for authenticity and 
the suffering involved in failing to achieve this very authenticity (Das traumatisierte 
Subjekt 275). Wuttig draws on Ann Cvetkovich, who argues that “the normalization 
of sex and gender identities can be seen as form of insidious trauma, which is 
effective precisely because it often leaves no sign of a problem” (46).71 Hence, based 
on Judith Butler and Cvetkovich, Wuttig suggests that the need to assume one of two 
binary gender identities along with compulsory heterosexuality generates insidious 
 
71 Cvetkovich, in turn, bases her arguments on Butler. In “Melancholy Gender,” for instance, Butler 
maintains that “[h]eterosexuality is cultivated through prohibitions, and these prohibitions take as one 
of their objects homosexual attachments, thereby forcing the loss of those attachments” (“Melancholy 
Gender” 137). According to Butler, everyone suffers a psychic wound – not only those who do not fit 
neatly into sex and gender categories (Wuttig, Das traumatisierte Subjekt 261). This psychic wound 
consists in an “unresolved grief” (“Melancholy Gender” 146) – Butler calls this, drawing on Sigmund 
Freud, melancholia. As she explains, “[i]f we accept the notion that the prohibition on homosexuality 
operates throughout a largely heterosexual culture as one of its defining operations, then the loss of 
homosexual objects and aims (not simply this person of the same gender, but any person of the same 
gender) would appear to be foreclosed from the start (“Melancholy Gender” 139). Accordingly, 




trauma (Das traumatisierte Subjekt 260). 72 Trauma functions as a type of mediator 
between external and internal processes as it turns bodies into genders. Out of the 
material ‘body,’ trauma produces gender (Das traumatisierte Subjekt 276).  
1.6 Feminist Phenomenology and Racialization 
Feminism has often been criticized for its lack of representation of the experiences of 
black and indigenous women. 73  In its origins, many indigenous feminists and 
feminists of colour have argued, feminism was a predominantly white, middle-class 
movement (Huhndorf and Suzack 2). And, as Shari M. Huhndorf and Cheryl Suzack 
contend: “To a certain extent, feminism, especially in academia, remains white-
centered, despite the active involvement of women of colour in the second- and third-
wave feminist movements” (2). As Aileen Moreton-Robinson argues in her study 
Talkin’ up to the White Woman (2000), “white feminist discourse on ‘difference’ 
continues to be underpinned by a deracialized but gendered universal object” (xviii). 
The naturalization of whiteness via white feminisms thus remains a pertinent problem 
within feminism and actively contributes to the oppression of women of colour. 
Adrienne Rich has commented: “Marginalized though we have been as women, as 
white and Western makers of theory, we also marginalize others because our lived 
experience is thoughtlessly white, because even our ‘women’s cultures’ are rooted in 
some Western tradition” (“Notes” 374-75).  
 Likewise, several indigenous writers have raised concerns of an 
incompatibility between feminism and aboriginal or indigenous activism. “Aboriginal 
women cannot fit neatly into the feminists’ conceptions of human nature,” as Grace 
J.M.W. Ouellette explains, “because of different cultural values and beliefs, in other 
 
72  Many feminists, especially lesbian feminists, have challenged normative heterosexuality. Both 
Monique Wittig’s and Adrienne Rich’s work is a case in point. Monique Wittig has famously written 
about compulsory heterosexuality and argued that “[t]he discourses which particularly oppress all of 
us, lesbians, women, and homosexual men, are those which take for granted that what founds society, 
any society, is heterosexuality” (24). Likewise, in “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian 
Existence,” (1980) Rich declares: “The assumption that . . . for women heterosexuality may not be a 
‘preference’ at all but something that has had to be imposed, managed, organized, propagandized, and 
maintained by force, is an immense step to take if you consider yourself freely and ‘innately’ 
heterosexual” (322).  
73 From the very beginning of the women’s rights movement, black feminists such as Sojourner Truth 
have challenged the whiteness of the movement. Later, bell hooks, in publications such as Ain’t I a 
Woman (1981), addressed the marginalization of black women within the feminist movement. Yet, 




words, because of conflicting worldviews” (26). Joyce Green makes a similar point: 
“feminist analysis is widely considered to be divisive, corrosive of family and 
community, culturally inappropriate and even colonialist” (25),74 which is why it is 
sometimes rejected by indigenous women. The roles of mother and caregiver in 
particular are for many indigenous women at odds with a feminist commitment. 
Ouelette elucidates: 
Motherhood is an important concept in Aboriginal thought and is inherent in 
the Circle of Life philosophy. It is the women’s qualities that form the 
foundation of this belief. A woman gives and supports life through nurturing. 
She is important for the continuance of future generations . . . A woman’s role 
as childbearer, nurturer and custodian is perceived as central to survival. (90) 
Feminist phenomenology, too, has to face up to this criticism, as it could be said to 
emanate from a predominantly white and U.S.- and Eurocentric standpoint. However, 
the interrogation of different gendered, racialized or classed subject positions, which 
are brought about by one’s unique position in the world, are indispensable to feminist 
phenomenological analyses. Aside from gender, feminist phenomenologists actively 
raise concerns concerning racialization. Alcoff stresses that “the experience of 
embodiment is in important respects a racialized and gender-differentiated 
experience” (103), undermining Merleau-Ponty’s and other phenomenologists 
disregard of gender and racialization. However, she also draws attention to the 
benefits of a phenomenological approach because it “can render our tacit knowledge 
about racial embodiment explicit” (185). 
 According to Alcoff, race and gender are the most prominent factors shaping 
individuals and their life-choices. She explains that the difference between gender and 
race, and class and nationality as embodied identities lies for the most part in their 
visibility and the fact that class and nationality are “more easily alterable” and their 
“physical effects can often be overcome” (86). What differentiates race and gender – 
and I would add certain disabilities – from other identity categories is their operation 
as “visible marks on the body” (86).75  
 
74 Huhndorf and Suzack also comment: “Indigenous feminism frequently elicits accusations that it 
fractures communities and undermines more pressing struggles for Indigenous autonomy” (2). 
75 To be sure, intersex, transgender and mixed-race individuals put visible marks of gender and race 
into doubt. This results in insecurity, anxiety and, I would add, outright hostility in other people. “The 
truth of one’s gender and race,” Alcoff contends, “are widely thought to be visibly manifest, and if 
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 Furthermore, concerning the incompatibility of different roles, feminist 
phenomenology can be productive for indigenous feminists because it does not reject 
roles as mother or caregiver and, instead, challenges normative discourses that portray 
these as naturalized and eternal. For instance, Young suggests conceiving of 
pregnancy and childbirth less as a process of producing a baby and more “as a way of 
being-in-the-world with uniquely interesting characteristics” (10), thus making room 
for discussions of motherhood. I would argue that more than any other feminist 
strand, feminist phenomenology is able to reconcile roles that are seemingly opposed 
and can thus support indigenous studies. 
 Admittedly, feminist phenomenologists have taken different approaches to the 
question of racialization. Weiss undertakes a reading of Frantz Fanon’s discussion of 
the embodiment of race, entitled “Racial Epidermal Schemas and White 
Male/Masculine Body Image Ideals” (26-33),76 whereas Alcoff and Sara Ahmed bring 
whiteness into focus. Weiss shows that Fanon develops “his own understanding of the 
racialized body image” based on phenomenological and psychoanalytic analyses; yet, 
“he too, quite explicitly focuses on the situation of the male, the colonized black man 
in particular, leaving the unique situation of black women almost entirely out of 
account” (28). This is why in the following I will concentrate on Alcoff’s and 
Ahmed’s observations. 
 While I do not have the space to elaborate on their ideas here, as this study is 
primarily concerned with the embodying of gender, I would nevertheless like to 
comment briefly on important points these two authors make. Alcoff is incisive in her 
 
there is no visible manifestation of one’s declared racial or gendered identity, one encounters an 
insistent scepticism and an anxiety” (7). 
76 In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon’s feelings of inferiority are expressed in phenomenological terms: 
“I found that I was an object in the midst of other objects” (109) and “[i]n the white world the man of 
color encounters difficulties in the development of his bodily schema. Consciousness of the body . . . is 
a third-person consciousness” (110). Not only does Fanon consider his body the objective body in the 
Merleau-Pontian sense and consequently, his whole being is objectified – for ‘I am my body,” 
according to Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology 205) – but he also shows that he cannot develop his 
bodily schema satisfyingly because of this ‘third-person’ view of his body. He later explains that 
“[b]elow the corporeal schema I had sketched a historico-racial schema . . . Then, assailed at various 
points, the corporeal schema crumbled, its place taken by a racial epidermal schema” (111; 112). As a 
consequence, “[m]y blackness was there, dark and unarguable. And it tormented me, pursued me, 
disturbed me, angered me” (117). Fanon’s skin colour is inevitably connected to his body, his 
perception of it and consequently his entire self. Thus, Weiss contends, “as Fanon shows in his 
discussion of the historico-racial schema that underlies the body image, there is no way one’s blackness 
can be separated from one’s corporeality” (32). 
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analysis of gender and race and does not merely focus on the racialization of black or 
Latino/a bodies but specifically addresses whiteness as a racial category. According to 
Alcoff, gender and race are essential to one’s embodiment: 
Social identities may be relational, then, as well as contextually variable, but 
they remain fundamental to one’s experience of the world and to the 
development of one’s capacities. One’s racial and gender identity is 
fundamental to one’s social and familial interactions. It contributes to one’s 
perspective on events – to one’s interpretation of conversations, media reports, 
and social theories – and it determines in large part one’s status within the 
community and the way in which a great deal of what one says and does is 
interpreted by others. Thus, our ‘visible’ and acknowledged identity affects 
our relations in the world, which in turn affects our interior life, that is, our 
lived experience or subjectivity. If social identities such as race and gender are 
fundamental in this way to one’s experiences, then it only makes sense to say 
that they are fundamental to the self. (92) 
As she later remarks, the reasons for the pervasiveness of these visible identities is 
connected to the body: “[R]ace and gender consciousness produces habitual bodily 
mannerisms that feel natural and become unconscious after long use; they are thus 
very difficult to change” (108). This does not only apply to racialized bodies, 
however. Whiteness, too, is embodied, as Alcoff stresses. It exacts certain responses 
by people – often connected to a privileged position – and these responses feed back 
into the individual’s view of herself. 
 In “Phenomenology of Whiteness,” Sara Ahmed also addresses whiteness and 
white privilege. Whiteness, she notes “could be described as an ongoing and 
unfinished history, which orientates bodies in specific directions, affecting how they 
‘take up’ space” (150). Taking up space has repercussions for white people who are 
both privileged in their access to particular spaces and the space awarded to them. 
This, in turn, results in limited space and access to certain spaces for racialized 
individuals. Ultimately, Ahmed argues, phenomenology “helps us to show how 
whiteness is an effect of racialization, which in turn shapes what it is that bodies ‘can 
do’” (150). 
1.7 The Grotesque Aesthetic 
As numerous exhibitions in the past two decades attests to there is a continuing 
interest in the grotesque: “Grotesque!” (2003) at the Schirn Kunsthalle Frankfurt, the 
2004-2005 exhibition Disparities and Deformations: Our Grotesque at the SITE 
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Santa Fe, and The Grotesque Factor 2012-2013 at the Museo Picasso Málaga, to 
name but a few exhibitions. Aside from exhibitions, there have been ground-breaking 
publications in the field, such as Connelly’s The Grotesque in Western Art and 
Culture: The Image at Play (2012).77 Nevertheless, the interest in the grotesque in 
literature is not to be underestimated, either. Duggan’s The Grotesque in 
Contemporary British Fiction (2013), Justin D. Edwards and Rune Graulund’s 
Grotesque (2013), and The Grotesque in Contemporary Anglophone Drama by 
Ondřej Pilný (2016) all speak to the continuing interest and the need to scrutinize the 
term and aesthetic. 
 As is often the case with literary motifs or genres,78 the grotesque defies easy 
categorization or definition (Duggan 11; Connelly, Modern Art 2). Sometimes it is 
used to refer to artists’ particular styles, for instance the style of painters such as 
Brueghel or Goya or writers such as Rabelais, Dickens, Swift, Hoffman, or Poe. 
Entire artistic movements are characterized by their use of the grotesque, most 
notably surrealism. Greek and Latin mythological figures, most notably the Hydra, 
sphinxes, satyrs, griffins, minotaurs, centaurs and mermaids are strongly associated 
with the grotesque. In addition, there are innumerable examples of grotesque figures 
in modern day popular culture (e.g. Homer in The Simpsons or some comic book 
heroes and heroines). Last but not least, surprising or incongruent situations can be 
grotesque.  
 While the grotesque is a slippery and ambiguous term, there are nevertheless 
some discernible trends when it comes to defining it. According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary and contemporary uses, the noun ‘grotesque’ can describe either a “very 
ugly or comically distorted figure or image” or “[a] style of decorative painting or 
sculpture consisting of the interweaving of human and animal forms with flowers and 
foliage.” The first use derives from the second and goes back to the origin of the term. 
The term “grotesque” was first used to describe paintings that had been rediscovered 
at the end of the fifteenth century in Rome underground the Domus Aurea (also 
 
77 As the title suggests, Connelly’s study is firmly grounded in art history and provides indispensable 
discussions of the theoretical background and insights into the discourse on the term. 
78 Bakhtin identifies grotesque realism as a genre (Rabelais 20), and Harold Bloom suggests it is a 
trope (xi), whereas both Margot Northey and McWilliam identify it as an aesthetic.  
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known as a pleasure house) of the emperor Nero.79 These ornamental paintings were 
called “grotteschi” because they were found in what were then underground 
chambers, so-called “grotte” or “grottoes.”80 The word “grotto” (feminine in Italian, 
“grotta”) derives from the Greek and Latin word for ‘crypt,’ describing something 
hidden. What was so remarkable about these paintings was that they presented rather 
unusual figures at a time when realism, seriousness and high style were the norm: 
they were intricate fusions of human, animal and vegetable forms. These figures were 
fantastical and appealed to the senses, they “were painted in a light and playful 
manner” (Riccardi-Cubitt 699), and hence they presented a stark contrast to sober 
Roman architecture and sculpture. Wanting to escape classical themes, some of the 
best-known Renaissance artists, such as Raphael, Leonardo da Vinci and Albrecht 
Dürer, drew heavily on grotesque motifs.  
 In the seventh book of his De architectura, Vitruvius ardently criticizes the 
grotesque: 
We now have fresco paintings of monstrosities, rather than truthful 
representations of definite things. For instance, reeds are put in the place of 
columns, fluted appendages with curly leaves and volutes, instead of 
pediments, candelabra supporting representations of shrines, and on top of 
their pediments numerous tender stalks and volutes growing up from the roots 
and having human figures senselessly seated upon them; sometimes stalks 
having only half-length figures, some with human heads, others with the heads 
of animals.  
. . . Such things do not exist and cannot exist and never have existed . . . Yet 
when people see these frauds, they find no fault with them but on the contrary 
are delighted, and do not care whether any of them can exist or not. (211) 
While Vitruvius’s criticism has much to do with his desire for artistic works to be 
authentic and realistic, it is nevertheless revealing because it demonstrates that it is 
the combination of disparate elements that characterizes the grotesque. Moreover, 
other “people,” that is viewers, find these paintings “delightful,” which hints at a 
 
79 For a historical overview of grotesque art, literature, and criticism see Frances K. Barasch and 
Pimentel Biscaia and in particular Connelly’s entry on the “Grotesque” in the Encyclopedia of 
Aesthetics (2014). 
80 The name of these paintings does not make reference to their characteristics, however, which for 
some art historians results in the term being “problematic” as we are dealing with a misconception 
(Summers 5). Geoffrey Galt Harpham, too, recognizes this incongruity without considering it a 
misconception: “[T]his naming is a mistake pregnant with truth, for although the designs were never 
intended to be underground, nor Nero’s palace a grotto, the word is perfect . . . Grotesque, then, gathers 
into itself suggestions of the underground, of burial, and of secrecy” (Harpham 27). Harpham, instead 
of recognizing a certain arbitrariness in the term and its functions, sees a connection between the origin 
of the word and its meaning. 
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comic function of the grotesque. John Ruskin, too, found much fault with certain 
types of the grotesque. Yet, his criticism is also productive in terms of defining or at 
least delineating the meaning of the grotesque. He also identified a combination of 
disparate elements, usually a comic and a fearful element, which leads to two types of 
grotesque, the “sportive” and the “terrible” grotesque (115). Yet, he argues that there 
is always some element of fearfulness or ludicrousness in both types, as this 
combination is crucial to the grotesque. Incidentally, this parallels a twentieth century 
definition of the grotesque as “the unresolved clash of incompatibles in work and 
response” (Thomson 27, emphasis in original). 
 Centuries of grotesque writing and criticism have not done away with the need 
to define it. Many authors have tried to find one coherent and universally applicable 
definition of the grotesque. As a result, the grotesque has mainly been divided into 
two categories:81 a humorous-physical grotesque connected to the carnivalesque and 
laughter, predominantly associated with Bakhtin’s study of Rabelais’s work and a 
rather threatening grotesque, which is associated with alienation, unease, horror or 
fear, often affiliated with Wolfgang Kayser’s study of the grotesque or Julia 
Kristeva’s notion of the abject.82 
 However, more recently scholars have suggested that it might be more 
constructive to approach the grotesque not in terms of one single function, but in 
terms of its malleability. Noël Carroll, for instance, proposes a taxonomy of the 
different types of grotesques, which does not pin the term down to just one function. 
As he suggests, there exists a “genus” of the grotesque that can be identified 
“structurally,” and varying “species,” which can be classified “functionally” (N. 
Carroll 295, emphasis in original). The different types of the grotesque have 
structurally speaking something in common, namely that they all violate our 
 
81 Both Russo and Pimentel Biscaia recognize these two types of grotesque. For Russo’s distinction 
between these two types of grotesque see her “Introduction” to The Female Grotesque and especially 
the section “Two Kinds of Grotesque: Carnival and the Uncanny.” For Pimentel Biscaia’s discussion of 
the same issue see pages 10-11 in her Postcolonial and Feminist Grotesque: Texts of Contemporary 
Excess. 
82 Many scholars are also drawn to defining the grotesque only within one frame of reference. Northey 
maintains, for instance, that the grotesque is a “mode of the gothic” and that “[a]lthough … associated 
at times with comic exaggeration which is pure fun, the usual interpretation … insists upon a horrifying 
or fearful aspect, linking it with the gothic” (7). While it is certainly true that the grotesque as part of 
the Gothic genre and in other contexts can take on a fearful or horrifying aspect, it is by no means the 
dominant or usual interpretation. There are at least as many instances of the comic grotesque as there 
are of the horrific. 
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“standing categories or concepts” as they are subversions of our “common 
expectations of the natural and ontological order” (N. Carroll 296). However, they can 
be distinguished structurally in terms of their specific function because these 
grotesques trigger different emotional reactions, such as mirth, fear, horror, etc. 
 Connelly, too, has proposed a definition or rather description of the grotesque 
for visual art, which is equally applicable to literature, and does not pin it down based 
on whether it gives rise to humour or fear. She notes that there are different 
“processes at work in the grotesque image, actions that are both destructive and 
constructive” (Modern Art 2) and that 
[i]mages gathered under the grotesque rubric include those that combine 
unlike things in order to challenge established realities or construct new ones; 
those that deform or decompose things; and those that are metaphoric. These 
grotesques are not exclusive of one another, and their range of expression runs 
from the wondrous to the monstrous to the ridiculous. (Modern Art 2)83 
Instead of prescribing its meaning, Connelly offers a definition of the grotesque that 
accounts for its different varieties based on what they do, rather than what they aim at.  
1.8 Transcultural Feminist Grotesque 
Having discussed the shift in feminist theorising from the body to embodiment and 
the origins of the grotesque, in this chapter I will attempt to give a working definition 
of what I understand as the transcultural feminist grotesque. The novels that are 
examined in this thesis all draw to varying degrees on grotesque imagery. While the 
‘original’ understanding of the grotesque (established in art history) is relevant only to 
some novels, such as Carter’s or Melville’s, all four novels resonate strongly with a 
Bakhtinian understanding of the grotesque. Bakhtin’s central concepts can help 
elucidate some of the issues my primary texts raise in regard to the body. In the 
following paragraphs, I work out definitions of a feminist grotesque body based on 
Bakhtin’s conceptualizations. The four main characteristics of the grotesque body – 
 
83 Terms such as the fantastic, the Gothic, the sublime, the uncanny, the disgusting, the ridiculous, the 
monstrous, the abject or the freak are often used interchangeably with the grotesque or are employed to 
describe and define it. It is certainly the monstrous that is most often mentioned in discussions of the 
grotesque. Yet, as Pilný notes, “not everything that is monstrous is also grotesque” (4). Drawing on 
Barbara Creede’s work, I would like to suggest that the single-most important difference between the 
monstrous and the grotesque is their function. Whereas the monstrous primarily instils fear and is, 
according to Creede, connected to abjection, thus a rejection of bodily processes (Creede 9), the 
grotesque, from its very beginning in the underground vaults, is connected to laughter and mirth. The 
comic grotesque is life-affirming and embraces the body’s materiality. 
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its materiality, its transgressiveness, its ambivalence and its social aspect – help to 
clarify the conception of bodies that the novels in my corpus propose. 
 First, the four novels in my corpus portray characters who revel in their bodies 
and bodily processes. This is certainly one of the central themes in Bakhtin’s 
grotesque realism in which the grotesque body constitutes the human body shown 
eating, drinking, defecating, having sex (Rabelais 18). Bakhtinian depictions of the 
human body tend to be predominantly exaggerated, magnified, and boundless in 
nature. On the one hand, this is meant to create humour. On the other hand, Bakhtin’s 
conception of the grotesque body constitutes criticism of the classical body. The 
grotesque body stands in stark contrast to the classical body, which is the individual, 
self-centred body (Rabelais 19) with fixed, pre-set limits, limits that are never 
exceeded. 84 Bodily fluids never enter or leave the classical body. In contrast to the 
classical body, the grotesque body is a body that transgresses and is transgressed. 
Thus, Bakhtin provides an indispensable conception of the body that contributes to a 
re-evaluation of corporality. This is immensely important in the discussion of my 
primary texts, for they emphasise the materiality of bodies, while at the same linking 
Bakhtinian thinking to new materialist feminisms. 
 Second, transcultural feminist grotesque novels depict bodies that do not end 
at their skins, but instead extend beyond apparent bodily limits. The Bakhtinian 
understanding of the body has a transgressive body at its center, a body that extends 
its limits. Grotesque bodies establishes connections to other human beings and their 
surroundings. The body in grotesque realism is limitless, it opens itself, or is open, to 
the outside world. The ‘body’ either gives something to the outside world, or receives 
something from it: 
[T]he grotesque body is not separated from the rest of the world. It is not a 
closed, completed unit; it is unfinished, outgrows itself, transgresses its own 
limits. The stress is laid on those parts of the body that are open to the outside 
world, that is, the parts through which the world enters the body or emerges 
from it, or through which the body itself goes out to meet the world. (Rabelais 
26) 
 
84 Duggan explains that Bakhtin “is referring to a modern canon of ideas about the body that is classical 
in structure and not Classical, i.e. ancient Greek or Roman” (21). 
 
 52 
This is why in grotesque realism there is a strong emphasis on the major orifices: the 
mouth, the nose, the ears, the anus and genitals. The grotesque body represents “all 
the people, a people who are continually growing and renewed” (Rabelais 19). Hence, 
the body in grotesque realism, is, foremost, a social body (Jervis 18). For, as the 
human body is continually growing and renewed by food, drink, defecation, and sex, 
the social body is equally extending and revived by birth and death.  
 Grotesque realism stresses the social quality of bodies for they “could not be 
considered for themselves; they represented a material bodily whole and therefore 
transgressed the limits of their isolation” (Bakhtin, Rabelais 23). A grotesque body is 
not isolated, does not stand alone, but is in fact always connected to other bodies and 
its environment, and indeed shaped by it. It is a body that is connected to its outside 
world and is, thus, part of something bigger, part of a “cosmic” whole and “universal” 
(Bakhtin, Rabelais 19). This is highly evocative of the feminist phenomenological 
concept of the body image, which situates the lived body at the intersection of nature 
and culture and accounts for the experience of one’s body, one’s emotional 
investment in one’s body, but also on context and other peoples’ reactions to a body. 
In connection to the phenomenological concept of the body image, then, Bakhtin’s 
social body helps to explain connections between characters and in particular a type 
of corporeal understanding in my primary texts, which cannot be explained using a 
Cartesian understanding of the body. 
 Third, transcultural feminist grotesque novels include ambivalent 
representations of bodies, either breaking boundaries between human or animal, male 
and female or individual human bodies. In Bakhtinian theorising, the embodiment of 
this idea can be found in Kerch’s “pregnant hags.”85 The pregnant hags are figurines 
of females that, even though they should be infertile, are pregnant, and “laughing” 
(Bakhtin, Rabelais 25). Bakhtin explains: 
It is pregnant death, a death that gives birth. There is nothing completed, 
nothing calm and stable in the bodies of these old hags. They combine a 
senile, decaying and deformed flesh with the flesh of new life, conceived but 
as yet unformed. Life is shown in its twofold contradictory process; it is the 
epitome of incompleteness. And such is precisely the grotesque concept of the 
body. (Rabelais 25-26) 
 
85 Bakhtin connects the combination of opposed, contradictory elements to the “archaic grotesque” 
(26), that is, the grotesque as found in the paintings in underground chambers.  
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These figurines express a combination of decay and deformation with a new 
beginning and fertility (Bakhtin, Rabelais 25-26). For Bakhtin, this coming together 
of apparently irreconcilable elements is very positive, in fact “regenerating” (Rabelais 
21). In the grotesque image, “we find both poles of transformation, the old and the 
new, the dying and the procreating, the beginning and the end of the metamorphosis” 
(Bakhtin, Rabelais 24). It evidently reflects the life circle, the unfinished-ness of life 
and the impossibility of complete closure. 86 Needless to say, the underlying 
symbolism in grotesque realism is based on “fertility, growth, and a brimming-over 
abundance” (Bakhtin, Rabelais 19). The combination of seemingly opposed elements 
which Bakhtin addresses with this ambivalent body and which reflects new materialist 
feminist and feminist phenomenological concerns is central to my corpus in which 
several seemingly incompatible elements are combined such as body and mind, 
human and animal, male and female, as well as brother and sister.  
 As Vice points out, Bakhtin himself did not consider the grotesque body as 
marked by gender, which is interpreted by many scholars as a transcendence of 
gender stereotypes. Hence, grotesque realism is understood as an “androgynous” or 
“gender-free” realm (Vice 171). Accordingly, Robert Stam argues that “[r]ather than 
privilege sexual difference between bodies, with the phallus as ultimate signifier, 
Bakhtin discerns difference within the body” (162, emphasis in original).87 This, in 
fact, affiliates Bakhtin with new materialists who propose reading the body outside 
patriarchal notions of sex/gender, male/female.  
 Similar to feminist phenomenology, Bakhtin criticizes the ‘classical,’ 
idealized body and puts forward the grotesque body as an alternative. The grotesque 
body is understood as incomplete; it is a body that continually transgresses its 
boundaries; it thus undermines traditional conceptions of the body, especially an 
idealized male version. Moreover, in a footnote Bakhtin alludes to the embodied or 
lived aspect of the classical body:  
 
86 While Kayser has been criticized for defining the grotesque only in relation to horror and alienation, 
generally negative aspects, Bakhtin has equally been criticized for depicting the grotesque as solely 
positive and liberating. 
87 If we are to follow Stam’s reasoning, then Bakhtin is much closer to modern notions of sexuality, 
too: “Rather than envision sexuality exclusively as a ‘genital act,’ as a series of isolating close-ups of 
body parts, Bakhtin sees sexuality as a broad, multi-centered canvas . . . Sexuality per se is relativized 
and relationalized” (161). 
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Similar classical concepts of the body form the basis of the new canon of 
behavior. Good education demands: not to place the elbows on the table, to 
walk without protruding the shoulder blades or swinging the hips, to hold in 
the abdomen, to eat without loud chewing, not to snort and pant, to keep the 
mouth shut, etc.: in other words, to close up and limit the body’s confines and 
to smooth the bulges. (Rabelais 322) 
Far from being only an abstract idea, Bakhtin implies here that the classical body 
manifests corporeally; it shows in the behaviour, gait and posture of an individual. 
Here, Bakhtin comes very close to a modern understanding of embodiment and how 
social structures manifest by means of the body. As a result, Bakhtin’s grotesque body 
can be read as mirroring the new feminist materialist criticism of a universal and 
standardized notion of ‘the body’ and favouring an understanding of the body as 
active, malleable, adaptable and lived. In short, Bakhtin is much closer to new 
materialist feminist understandings of embodiment than has previously been assumed. 
  The main characteristics of the grotesque body, its materiality, its 
transgressiveness, its ambivalence and its social aspect in connection to feminist 
phenomenology help to elucidate the version of bodies that the four novels propose. 
However, what remains problematic in Bakhtin’s conception of the grotesque body is 
its emphasis on representation. Thus, I propose extending Bakhtin’s notion of the 
grotesque body by putting emphasis on experiencing bodies, as this has proven to be a 
central concern in my corpus. Adding to the re-evaluation of matter, the transgressive, 
ambivalent and social body, I would like to suggest that transcultural feminist 
grotesque novels do not simply engage with grotesque bodies in terms of 
representation, but that they also pay attention to the lived experience of bodies. 
Transcultural feminist grotesque novels foreground perception, emotion and bodily 
feeling and thus further revise the prevalent conception of the grotesque body.  
1.9 Feminist Grotesque Style 
While the transcultural feminist grotesque novels I discuss in this thesis engage with 
similar issues on the level of content, such as questions of the productive materiality 
of bodies, transgressive, ambivalent and social bodies as well as questions of 
embodiment, there are also some discernible similarities on the level of stylistics these 
novels display. Thus, in this chapter, I would like to propose some stylistic 
characteristics of transcultural feminist grotesque novels. The three main 
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characteristics I have identified are anti-realist elements, polyphony and double-
voiced discourse. 
 From the early grotesque paintings found at the end of the fifteenth century in 
Roman palaces to the gargantuan bodies that figured prominently in Rabelais’s 
writing and thus shaped Bakhtin’s further development of the meaning of the 
grotesque, the grotesque has had strong connections to the fantastic. These fantastic 
elements still figure prominently in writing that employs the mode of the grotesque 
today. However, while the genre of fantastic literature is often removed from the 
‘real’ world or realist writing, i.e. set in an imaginary world or universe, transcultural 
feminist grotesque texts operate predominantly within realism, but include non-realist 
or anti-realist elements. The first point I would like to make about transcultural 
feminist grotesque novels is that they include anti-realist elements and some, in 
particular Angela Carter’s Nights at the Circus, are considered to include strong 
magical realist elements.88  Yet, while there are pertinent similarities,89  I consider 
magical realism in most contexts a genre of fiction or even literary movement, 
 
88 There is, unsurprisingly, disagreement as to what magical realism exactly is, and whether it should 
be called magic or magical realism. Some scholars consider it part of postmodernist fiction (Faris, 
D’haen); for others it constitutes an entirely separate form, and, in fact, a genre of fiction. It has also 
been identified as a postcolonial literary practice in essence (Slemon), whereas some critics insist on it 
being not exclusive to the postcolonial world (Delbaere-Garant), more of an “international commodity” 
(Faris 2). Several critics also reject such generalizing labels as ‘magical realist writers.’ Moreover, for 
many authors it constitutes a literary mode, for others it is akin to a movement in the Latin American 
context (Camayd-Freixas). Christopher Warnes has suggested that magical realism is “a kind of 
modified, expanded or subverted realism” (155). However, I adhere to a definition of magical realism 
which refers to a genre that employs an overall realist narrative with anti-realist, i.e. magical, fantastic 
or marvellous, elements. Within the narrative, these anti-realist elements are not experienced as such, 
but are accepted as realist, as common, everyday events within the stories and thus merge with the 
overall narrative. Another point of contention is whether these elements merge into each other and 
form a symbiosis with the realist elements, or whether they oppose each other, creating tension and 
representing a battle between these two fictional worlds (Slemon). See Alejo Carpentier’s “On the 
Marvelous Real in America” (1949) and “The Baroque and the Marvelous Real” (1975), Roberto 
Gonzáles Echevarría’s “Isla a su Vuelo Fugitiva: Carpentier y el Realism Mágico” (1974), Stephen 
Slemon, “Magic Realism as Post-colonial Discourse,” Lois Parkinson Zamora and Wendy B. Faris’s 
anthology Magical Realism: Theory, History, Community (1995) and Warnes’s Magical Realism and 
the Postcolonial Novel: Between Faith and Irreverence (2009) for some of the major works of 
criticism. 
89 Jeanne Delbaere-Garant has suggested that grotesque realism is a subcategory or related genre of 
magical realism. In her discussion of magical realism, she defines grotesque realism as “a combination 
of North American tall tale, Latin American baroque, and Bakhtinian ‘carnivalesque’” (256) and 
suggests “‘grotesque realism’ be used not just for popular oral discourse but also for any sort of 
hyperbolic distortion that creates a sense of strangeness through the confusion or interpenetration of 
different realms like animate/inanimate or human/animal” (256). Aside from grotesque realism, 
Delbaere-Garant suggests two other related terms – psychic and mythic realism – in order to “leave 
more room for bordercases and help to situate any contemporary magic realist text, or part of a text, 
more accurately in a larger conceptual and terminological constellation” (256). 
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whereas the grotesque refers to an aesthetic or mode of writing. Accordingly, as a 
mode, the grotesque “is a way of thinking and speaking about contemporary reality” 
(Hollinger 139-40). What magical realism and the transcultural feminist grotesque 
certainly have in common is their questioning and even challenging of the mode of 
realism. Parkinson Zamora and Wendy B. Faris note in regard to magical realism:  
An essential difference, then, between realism and magical realism involves 
the intentionality implicit in the conventions of the two modes . . . realism 
intends its version of the world as a singular version, as an objective (hence 
universal) representation of natural and social realities – in short, that realism 
functions ideologically and hegemonically. Magical realism also functions 
ideologically but . . . less hegemonically, for its program is not centralizing but 
eccentric: it creates space for interactions of diversity. (3)90 
Accordingly, the anti-realist elements in the transcultural feminist grotesque novels 
provide a comment on precisely the realist elements and thus contribute to a 
questioning both of the mode of realism and of the ‘real’ consequences of some forms 
of gendered violence represented in the novels. 
 Second, transcultural feminist grotesque texts are polyphonic. Several scholars 
have discerned parallels between Bakhtin’s theorizations of carnival and the 
grotesque body and his explorations of heteroglossia and polyphony. Pimentel Biscaia 
observes that there exists an “intimate link joining together dialogism, polyphony, 
carnival and the grotesque” (41). Vice suggests that “the truly grotesque body is that 
of the text itself” (176).91 A grotesque text is “abundant, substantial, voluminous and 
rich in . . . verbiage,” it is “not a sleek, classical text placed on a pedestal but one with 
multiple protuberances and buds” (Vice 176). In addition, a grotesque text is 
“dialogic” and makes (extensive) use of irony (Vice 176). Bakhtin himself pointed out 
that it is not possible to separate content from style, arguing that “[f]orm and content 
in discourse are one, once we understand that verbal discourse is a social 
phenomenon” (“Discourse” 259). It is not surprising, then, that what happens on the 
level of content, namely the representation of grotesque bodies, is paralleled in the 
style of a text. 
 
90 Linden Peach makes a similar point: “Social realist fiction ‘naturalises’ what it portrays so that we 
trust what we are reading. Non-realist fiction distances, or even alienates, us so that we are disturbed, 
puzzled, confused and possibly critical of what we are reading” (6). 
91 Even though Vice refers to another novel in her analysis, Life-Size by Jenefer Shute, her observations 
are equally applicable to The Ventriloquist’s Tale and the other novels in my corpus. 
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 Polyphony refers to ‘multi-voicedness,’ an “autonomy of the characters’ 
voices” (Vice 112). The term originates in music, where it describes the “style of 
simultaneously combining a number of parts, each forming an individual melody and 
harmonizing with each other.” Bakhtin claims that it was Dostoevsky who created the 
polyphonic novel and that it is another device that creates heteroglossia in the novel.92 
In Dostoevsky’s and in fact, all properly polyphonic novels, the author and the 
characters, including the narrator, are on the same level; the author is not superior in 
regard to a character or the characters in general and is a “participant in the dialogue 
without retaining for himself the final word” (Bakhtin, Problems 72).93 According to 
Vice, “[t]he equality of voices in the polyphonic novel is realized dialogically, as 
being on the same plane means they can hear and respond to each other” (56).94 I 
would also like to suggest that polyphony and the texts’ high ambiguity on the level 
of narration are related. The novels often include unreliable narrators, the focalization 
is difficult to pin down, and they hamper with the readers’ attempts to mark the 
narrator as homodiegetic or heterodiegetic. Likewise, these texts undermine 
distinctions between covert and overt narrators.  
 Third, transcultural feminist grotesque novels employ what Bakhtin calls 
double-voiced discourse,95 that is, the presence of two distinct voices in one utterance 
 
92 Heteroglossia refers to the mixing of different linguistic varieties, or as Vice describes it, ‘multi-
languagedness’ (113). Vice describes heteroglossia [raznorečie, raznorečivost'] as “differentiated 
speech” (18). Bakhtin’s concept of heteroglossia is very similar to sociolinguistic notions of language, 
which, at the time of writing, were “unavailable” to him (Vice 18). Moreover, in his understanding of 
heteroglot languages, words do not have one fixed meaning, but their meaning changes depending on 
the context (Bakhtin, “Discourse” 293), similar to notions of contextual meaning in pragmatics. 
93 In Introducing Bakhtin, Vice explains that “[w]here Bakhtin . . . says ‘author’, it is often clearer to 
replace this with ‘narrator’ (126). According to Vice, for Bakhtin, the ‘author’ does not refer to the 
actual, real, historical person but rather to the literary work as a whole. In contrast to this, the ‘narrator’ 
is “an identifiable voice in the text” (Vice 145). 
94 While Bakhtin himself uses the term ‘dialogism’ ambiguously, to refer both to linguistic as well as 
novelistic dialogue, in the context of the latter it is thought to describe “double-voicedness.” 
95 Bakhtin also distinguishes between the different types of discourse in the novel. The first is direct 
discourse, which is “directed exclusively toward its referential object” (Bakhtin, PDP 199), meaning 
that it is directed at the object or subject matter at hand. This discourse is usually authorial discourse as 
its function is to describe, name, inform, express, represent. The second type is represented or 
objectified discourse, which predominantly takes the form of the direct speech of characters (Bakhtin, 
PDP 186). Objectified here means that it is the object of authorial understanding (Morris 102). This 
type of discourse has direct referential meaning, too, but is not on the same level as the author’s; it 
retains a certain degree of distance, for it is understood as someone else’s discourse. Both the first and 
the second type of discourse are regarded as single-voiced because they stand for one “voice,” one 
intention and ultimately one consciousness (Bakhtin, PDP 189). The third type of discourse is double-
voiced discourse. Sometimes the boundaries between these types are not easily drawn as Bakhtin 
points out that at its “outer limit” one type can transform into another (PDP 198). 
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(Vice 45), often with the result of creating humour and irony. 96  Double-voiced 
discourse “incorporat[es] a relationship to someone else’s utterance as an 
indispensable element” (Bakhtin, PDP 186). Bakhtin refers to three main varieties of 
double-voiced discourse. The first variety of double-voiced discourse refers to 
instances in which two voices exist alongside each other, without creating any 
tensions or contradictions. Types of this variety are stylization, first-person narrations, 
and stories narrated other than by the author.  
 Parody and irony fall into the second variety of double-voiced discourse 
(Bakhtin, PDP 199). In these cases, however, “[d]iscourse becomes an arena of battle 
between two voices” (Bakhtin, PDP 193). The two voices or discourses do not merely 
exist alongside each other but actually oppose each other and clash. As a 
consequence, the original intention and meaning is transformed. In the first two 
varieties discourse is “a passive tool in the hands of the author wielding it” (Bakhtin, 
PDP 197). The third variety, which Bakhtin describes as the “active type” (PDP 199), 
differs from the first two in that the author does not use someone else’s words but that 
his/her discourse is affected instead: “the other’s words actively influence the author’s 
speech, forcing it to alter itself accordingly under their influence and initiative” 
(Bakhtin, PDP 197). Bakhtin refers to internally polemical discourse and “word[s] 
with a sideward glance at someone else’s hostile word” (Bakhtin, PDP 196) in this 
context. All in all, in my analyses of the four novels I will pay attention to their use of 
anti-realist elements, polyphony and double-voiced discourse. 
  
 
96 Humour is particularly important because laughter affirms the connection between mind and body. 
Laughter in grotesque realism “degrades and materializes” (Bakhtin, Rabelais 20). As a consequence, it 
is connected to the body and does not purely serve mental or intellectual purposes. As has been shown 
recently, laughter is both an intellectual and a physical phenomenon. For Plessner laughter unmasks 
“the essence of the conditio humana, which consists in the fact that human beings not only have a 
body, but at the very same time also are a body” (qtd. in Horlacher 24, emphasis in original). When 
laughing, the body takes control and “counteracts the instrumentalization and subjugation it suffers in 
daily life” (Horlacher 41). Thus, laughter should be treated as an expression of the interconnectedness 
between mind and body and, ultimately, as an expression of the embodied nature of human life.  
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2. Body Knowledge in Margaret Atwood’s The Edible Woman 
 
“Sometimes men put women in men’s novels but they leave out some of the 
parts: the heads, for instance, or the hands.”  
(Atwood, “Women’s Novels” n. pag.) 
 
Marian, the protagonist of Margaret Atwood’s The Edible Woman (EW), leads a 
seemingly ‘normal’ life. She graduated from university, works in the office of a 
market research company, Seymour Surveys, where she revises questionnaires, shares 
an apartment with her roommate Ainsley and has a boyfriend, Peter. In some way or 
another, she bides her time until she can have what all her friends have settled for, 
namely family and children. For this is, ostensibly, what Marian desires. Her 
“abnormaly normal” (EW 211) life begins to change, however, when her body gets 
out of hand. Marian’s body starts behaving in unexpected, grotesque ways. 97 She 
starts crying without any apparent reason, involuntarily runs away from her boyfriend 
and friends, hides under a bed the night that Peter proposes to her, or inadvertently 
touches and kisses Duncan, a self-absorbed student whom she meets when conducting 
research for her company and who does not even like Marian very much (EW 188). 
Moreover, she develops an eating disorder.98 First, she is unable to finish a steak. 
Then all kinds of meat become off-putting. Next, eggs come off her list of edibles, 
then carrots and other vegetables, and finally even rice pudding so that she is left with 
vitamin pills as her only source of nutrition. Marian’s body, then, is grotesque in its 
sheer unpredictability. 
 While most critics connect Marian’s eating disorder to the major themes in the 
novel, which are consumerism and the role of women as consumable objects, and 
Marian’s rejection of food to her identification with an object to be consumed, in this 
chapter I would like to suggest instead that the novel carves out the agentic role of 
 
97 Many of Atwood’ later texts are considered prime examples of the grotesque, such as her short story 
“Hairball” (1991) or her novel The Year of the Flood (2009). 
98 Elspeth Cameron argues that Atwood did not even know what anorexia nervosa was when she wrote 
the novel (45). Ellen McWilliams notes that Marian’s bodily reactions could also be read in terms of a 
hunger strike. However, as the author argues, “Marian’s case defies a number of the key motives and 
symptoms in either case” (69). I find the concept of anorexia more fitting in Marian’s case, for the 
disorder itself cannot only be considered in terms of a mental disorder, whereas a hunger strike is the 
result of a deliberate choice. 
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Marian’s body.99 Marian’s anorexia is a form of agentic resistance to the inscription 
of gender. The novel presents Marian’s body as matter that has agency, an agency that 
is not dependent on the mind. It is Marian’s body that refuses the intake of food, 
which Marian – try as she might – cannot control. Thus, the novel undermines 
readings of anorexia as exercising control over one’s body (with one’s mind) and, 
accordingly, the related idea that eating disorders are merely psychological events,100 
which feeds back into discourses that blame anorexics for their ‘disorder.’  
 However, the novel also provides a pertinent comment on the connection 
between gender and insidious trauma. According to Wuttig, gender and (insidious) 
trauma are intimately linked. She notes that the cultural construct ‘gender’ leaves 
traces in bodies; these traces form an inconspicuous coherence via traumatic 
dynamics and connections between somatic impulses, images, feelings and thoughts 
(Das traumatisierte Subjekt 275). Thus, Wuttig suggests that the need to assume one 
of two binary gender identities along with compulsory heterosexuality generates 
insidious trauma (Das traumatisierte Subjekt 260). In Marian’s case, insidious trauma 
surfaces in the form of her bodily comportment and eating disorder. Marian’s 
anorexia can be interpreted as a symptom of the insidious trauma she suffers as a 
result of having to fit into a feminine gender ideal, yet never being able to reach this 
ideal. Reading Marian’s anorexia as a form of agentic resistance to the inscription of 
gender and a manifestation of insidious trauma, extends previous analyses of the 
 
99 Commentators seem to mostly agree that The Edible Woman illustrates consumerism, in particular 
women “as passive objects for male consumption” (Bouson 65). Alice Palumbo, Nathalie Cooke and 
Margaret Griffith read the novel in terms of consumerism: Griffith contends that Marian “gradually 
withdraws from her role in the consumer plot by refusing to eat” (87). Palumbo goes even further in 
arguing that Marian develops anorexia as a result of rejecting the role of the consumer: “Marian’s 
increasing identification with the object consumed (her over-identification as a victim) leads to her 
becoming a victim of her own body” (74). While I agree that consumerism is a dominant theme in the 
novel, especially the construction of women as consumable goods, Marian’s anorexia cannot be 
interpreted solely in terms of consumerism. The notion of “victim of her own body” is also problematic 
as it reaffirms a mind/body dualism, which the novel clearly challenges. Heidi Slettedahl Macpherson 
makes a better point: “Marian’s refusal to eat may be a cry for help, but it is a cry more that she herself 
needs to recognize than anyone outside her needs to hear. Indeed, it does not manifest itself into ‘real’ 
anorexia (a disease, in 1969, without the high profile it has today), but is, rather, a symbolic gesture of 
refusal to conform, even whilst apparently doing so” (28). I agree that Marian’s anorexia is a cry for 
help directed at herself rather than at other people. It is in fact her subjectivity’s cry for help expressed 
through her body.  
100 In fact, even the Oxford English Dictionary defines an eating disorder as “[a]ny of a range of 
psychological disorders characterized by abnormal or disturbed eating habits (such as anorexia 
nervosa).” Elizabeth Wilson’s research calls into question such definitions, for she refers to a 
correlation between bulimia and depression. Depression is nowadays not thought of as a purely mental 
problem either because it often goes hand in hand with bodily, chemical processes.  
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novel and demonstrates how deeply concerned it is with matters of corporeality and  
fleshliness and thus in many ways precedes the theoretical thinking of decades to 
come that did indeed contribute to a re-evaluation of matter. Thus, in the following 
analysis, I will concentrate on five aspects: first, the advertising and inscription of 
femininity, second, subversive materiality; third, the agentic body; forth, a rejection of 
the mind, and, fifth, subversive thoughts.  
2.1 “Every woman should have at least one baby:” The Advertising of 
Femininity 
While one of the central themes in The Edible Woman is the role of women as 
products of consumption, the novel also exemplifies how gender is memorized, that 
is, how gender is memorized and thus internalised bodily. This illustrates the point 
that Alcoff makes that “[r]acial and sexual difference is manifest precisely in bodily 
comportment, in habit, feeling, and perceptual orientation” (126). Marian is 
constantly confronted with idealized versions of femininity and masculinity, which 
leave permanent traces in her subjectivity. And it is in particular via other women that 
Marian learns what femininity entails. The novel illustrates how consumerism and 
especially advertisements leave a trace on subjects. The beer advertisement for which 
Marian has to run a pre-test at the beginning of the novel depicts clichéd masculinity, 
with its references to a “real man” on a “real man’s holiday” who drinks beer while 
going hunting, fishing or “old-fashioned relaxing,” and generates associations of 
masculinity with “wilderness,” ‘tanginess,’ and ‘sturdiness.’ Equally, Marian sees an 
advertisement on the bus of “a young woman with three pairs of legs skipping about 
in her girdle” (EW 95). Marian admits that she is, “against her will,” “scandalized” by 
advertisements such as these.  
 Aside from these obvious advertisements, Marian is confronted with gender 
identities in her work and private life. At Seymour Surveys, the company she works 
for, gender hierarchies are clear: there are the “men upstairs, since they are all men,” 
below Marian’s department are “the machines” (where women work, albeit in a much 
lower position) and in the middle, the “link between the two,” taking care of the 
“human element” (EW 18) – in an ironic hint to women’s supposedly superior 
emotional intelligence – is Marian’s department, which is comprised of “housewives 
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working in their spare time and paid by the piece” (EW 18). Marian states that “[t]hey 
don’t make much, but they like to get out of the house” (EW 18), thus implying that 
being a housewife and mother might not be as entirely fulfilling as dominant 
narratives would have it. Needless to say, the men upstairs “have carpets and 
expensive furniture and silk-screen reprints of Group of Seven paintings on the walls” 
(EW 18), a clear indicator of their higher status but also of the fact that status is 
represented by means of material objects in capitalist societies. There is a strict 
separation between the men and the “motherly-looking women” (EW 18) and the 
office parties used to be mixed but were separated, too, “in the interests of allover 
office morale” when “parties started to get out of hand” (TEW 167). Incidentally, the 
washroom in Marian’s department is “pink” (EW 19), as if to remind women of their 
colour preferences, and thus their position, as women. Marian is aware that there is 
not much choice for a woman within the company, as this is not simply a spatial 
separation but in fact a categorical one: “What, then, could I expect to turn into at 
Seymore Surveys? I couldn’t become one of the men upstairs” (EW 19). On the one 
hand, this is Marian’s realization that she cannot acquire the same status as men have. 
On the other hand, however, this also connotes that the men’s status is linked to their 
corporeality. It is impossible to turn into one of these men, simply because Marian 
does not have the necessary biological setup, or does not seemingly have the 
necessary biological setup.  
 The colleagues Marian is closest to, the so-called “office virgins,” also 
‘advertise’ femininity: 
They aren’t really very much alike, except that they are all artificial blondes – 
Emmy, the typist, whisk-tinted and straggly; Lucy, who has a kind of public-
relations job, platinum and elegantly coiffured, and Millie, Mrs. Bogue’s 
Australian assistant, brassy from the sun and cropped – and, as they have 
confessed at various times over coffee-grounds and the gnawed crusts of 
toasted Danishes, all virgins – Millie from a solid girl-guide practicality (“I 
think in the long run it’s better to wait until you’re married, don’t you? Less 
bother.”), Lucy from social quailing (“What would people say?”), which 
seems to be rooted in a conviction that all bedrooms are wired for sound, with 
society gathered at the other end tuning its earphones; and Emmy, who is the 
office hypochondriac, from the belief that it would make her sick, which it 
probably would. They are all interested in travelling: Millie has lived in 
England, Lucy has been twice to New York, and Emmy wants to go to 
Florida. After they have travelled enough they would like to get married and 
settle down. (EW 20-21, emphasis in original) 
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While there are, on the surface, differences between these young women, prompting 
Marian to say that they “aren’t really very much alike,” her descriptions of them and 
their goals show how alike they in fact are. They are all blond – implying that they all 
strive to fulfil the ideal of western feminine beauty – they are all virgins; they share 
an interest in travelling and their ultimate goal in life is the same: getting married and 
settling down. The ironic tone of this episode suggests that Marian is aware of their 
similarity, for in fact, in spite of superficial differences, all three represent femininity, 
albeit slightly different versions of it.  
 Moreover, the performances of femininity by women who are close to Marian, 
such as Clara and Ainsley, are even more insidious than sexist advertisements or the 
setup of the company. Even though Ainsley seems to be a type of ‘man eater’ or at 
least sexually progressive (EW 22), she conforms to the feminine ideal because she 
firmly believes that having a child will complete her and make her a ‘proper’ woman:  
‘Every woman should have at least one baby.’ She sounded like a voice on the 
radio saying that every woman should have at least one electric hair-dryer. 
‘It’s even more important than sex. It fulfills your deepest femininity.’ (EW 
40) 
The reference to an advertisement on the radio is a comment on the insidiousness and 
naturalization of cultural notions of gender, especially as regards motherhood. In the 
same way that some products are being advertised, feminine roles are also being 
‘advertised’ by other women. Marian’s friend Clara also represents traditional 
feminine gender: in school she was “everyone’s ideal of translucent perfume-
advertisement femininity” (EW 35), exempt from physical education because so thin 
and fragile. She married Joe and gave up her studies to be a mother.  
 Marian, even though aware of many of the constricting and manipulative 
mechanisms at play in real advertisements and her social circles, conforms to 
femininity and her prescribed heterosexual role. In line with traditional female gender 
roles and the traditional romance plot (Bouson),101 she is in a relationship with a man 
and plans a life with him, which entails marriage and children. At the start of the 
novel, Marian is presented as compliant with her roommate, at work and her 
relationship with Peter. When a senior colleague encourages her to sign a pension 
 
101 Bouson reads The Edible Woman alongside the traditional romance formula and shows how it 
upsets the traditional plot. 
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plan, which she does not want to sign, she does so nevertheless because she does not 
want to offend: “I signed it, but after Mrs. Grot had left I was suddenly quite 
depressed; it bothered me more than it should have” (EW 19). Marian is careful not to 
displease her landlady, which is why she cleans up after her roommate Ainsley. In her 
dealings with her roommate, she also simply accepts facts such as splitting the costs 
for alcohol which Ainsley consumes on her own. 
 Above all, Marian’s submissiveness comes to the fore in her relationship with 
Peter. Marian represses her real thoughts and comments (EW 64) and watches her 
tone when speaking with Peter (EW 116). Marian cooks for Peter because “he is made 
irritable by errands” (EW 57). At the beginning of the novel, she has sex with him in 
the bathtub, even though it is “too small and uncomfortably hard and ridgey” (EW 
60). However, she does not object because she feels she “should be sympathetic” as 
one of his friends is getting married, making him the only bachelor of his group of 
friends, which leads to his moodiness. However, when Peter asks her how she liked 
their sex, she thinks to herself “[r]otten” (EW 63). In addition, Marian increasingly 
allows Peter to take decisions for her: “He could make that kind of decision so 
effortlessly. She had fallen into the habit in the last month or so of letting him choose 
for her . . . Peter could make up their minds right away” (EW 150). Moreover, Marian 
frequently thinks about what Peter would like: “‘Peter will probably like it. Anyway,’ 
she reflected, ‘it will go with the dress’” (EW 216). She even tries to convince herself 
that Peter, his life and his friends are more important than her own life and friends: 
“Clara and Joe were from her past, and Peter shouldn’t be expected to adjust to her 
past; it was the future that mattered” (EW 185). Elspeth Cameron argues that Marian 
is afraid of turning into an old maid (52), which is why she does not show more 
resistance. Yet, things are more complicated. Marian embodies the notions and 
conceptions of femininity. She has internalized the bodily mannerisms, the behaviours 
and ideas that are part of her gender identity, which is why it is so difficult for her to 
actively resist.  
 In addition to being confronted with different kinds of femininities, Marian is 
also confronted with the female body as inherently grotesque. It is in Marian’s 
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thoughts at the office party that the connection between the grotesque and the female 
body is established and problematized.102 
She looked around the room at all the women there, at the mouths opening and 
shutting, to talk or to eat . . . They could have been wearing housecoats and 
curlers. As it was, they all wore dresses for the mature figure. They were ripe, 
some rapidly becoming overripe, some already beginning to shrivel; she 
thought of them as attached by stems at the tops of their heads to an invisible 
vine, hanging there in various stages of growth and decay… (EW 171, ellipsis 
in original) 
The description of these women’s bodies as growing from stems, just as vines do, and 
their bodies as representative of the stage of growth they are in is highly reminiscent 
of the original meaning of the grotesque as “[a] style of decorative painting or 
sculpture consisting of the interweaving of human and animal forms with flowers and 
foliage” (OED) because they are figures that combine human and vegetal elements. 
The stages these fruits are in, i.e. these bodies are in, ripe, overripe, shrivelling, some 
even decaying, resonate negatively not in a grotesque sense, however, but rather in a 
cultural sense, for these are fruits that cannot be sold anymore, they are inadequate for 
the market. Hence, women who are overripe, ‘mature,’ which is to say, old or older 
cannot be ‘consumed’103 anymore, cannot be put on offer. Here, the text establishes a 
clear analogy between women and consumer goods. Incidentally, the only way these 
women can be saved from this ‘fate,’ saved from the humiliation of not being 
consumable anymore is, ostensibly, by marriage.104  
 The novel reveals by way of Marian’s observations the associations between 
the grotesque and the female body: 
 
102 According to T. D. MacLulich, Marian has a grotesque, “distorted” point of view (MacLulich 
n.pag.). 
103 At the office Christmas party, Marian does not feel gluttonous by the food itself but is rather made 
to feel gluttonous by how it looks and by the sheer abundance and proliferation of it: “The loaded table 
made her feel gluttonous; all that abundance, all those meringues and icings and glazes, those 
coagulations of fats and sweets, that proliferation of rich glossy food” (169). Taste is not addressed but 
rather sight. Food stands in for material goods, glossy, pretty material goods; it represents 
consumerism. Just as food becomes a matter of consumerism and capitalism – instead of a ‘simple’ 
alimentary supply – so do women come to occupy consumerist roles, both as consumers and as 
products to be consumed. It is the women Marian describes who are the main consumers when it comes 
to anything household- or family-related. A case in point is the demonstration of a grater with an apple-
coring attachment in a department store, which Marian passes. The viewers of this demonstration are 
all female. Moreover, these women represent “lower-middle income domesticity” (217). 
104 Gayle Rubin makes a similar argument, albeit more elaborate, in her essay “The Traffic in Women” 
(1975). To be precise, women can have ‘meaning’ outside of marriage, but it is limited to roles as 
prostitutes and other outcasts. 
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She examined the women’s bodies with interest, critically, as though she had 
never seen them before. And in a way she hadn’t, they had just been there like 
everything else, desks, telephones, chairs, in the space of the office: objects 
viewed as outline and surface only. But now she could see the roll of fat that 
pushed up across Mrs. Gundridge’s back by the top of her corset, the ham-like 
bulge of thigh, the creases around the neck, the large porous cheeks; the blotch 
of varicose veins glimpsed at the back of one plump crossed leg, the way her 
jowls jellied when she chewed, her sweater a woolly teacosy over those 
rounded shoulders; and the others too, similar in structure but with varying 
proportions and textures of bumpy permanents and dune-like contours of 
breast and waist and hip; their fluidity sustained somewhere within by bones, 
without by a carapace of clothing and makeup. (EW 171) 
Marian notices these bodies for the first time; previously, she had merely registered 
them as objects, as neutral, value-free containers. However, her awareness has 
changed and now she attaches social value to them. All of a sudden, she notices their 
unattractiveness, their lack of appeal.105 All of a sudden, she has become aware of 
their social worth within the patriarchal system. 106  Marian has thus not only 
internalized ideas of femininity, which she applies to herself, but she also applies 
these idea(l)s to other women. Moreover, women’s bodies are characterized by 
fluidity and volatility – the very opposite of the closed, finished, classical body. This 
is why their bodies have to be kept in check by clothing and makeup, or else they will 
‘spill over.’ Marian further imagines these women as grotesque in the Bakhtinian 
sense: 
What peculiar creatures they were; and the continual flux between the outside 
and inside, taking things in, giving them out, chewing, words, potato chips, 
burps, grease, hair, babies, milk, excrement, cookies, vomit, coffee, tomato-
juice, blood, tea, sweat, liquor, tears, and garbage… (EW 171-72) 
This passage constitutes a prime example of the Bakhtinian grotesque because the 
contact with the outside world is emphasized: the grotesque body receives something 
from the outside world and it returns something to it, in this case excrement, etc. 
Bakhtin explains: “The body discloses its essence as a principle of growth which 
exceeds its own limits only in copulation, pregnancy, childbirth, the throes of death, 
eating, drinking, or defecation” (Rabelais 26). Even though the quote from Atwood’s 
novel might potentially refer to all bodies – with the possible exception of babies – 
 
105 Bouson argues that Marian “is both fascinated with and repulsed by” these bodies and that this 
derives from “matrophobia” (22). 
106 Here, Atwood makes clear that Bakhtin’s grotesque “has both conceptual and historical ties to 
women” (Shapira 52). 
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the context makes this description applicable only to female bodies. What the text 
implies is that the female body has culturally been envisioned as grotesque, despite 
the fact that the grotesque in itself does not refer to a particular set of bodies. As 
Connelly suggests: “the grotesque is closely bound to the body and, consequently, to 
the feminine as it is constructed in Western culture” (Grotesque 2). All bodies are 
potentially grotesque, but it is the female body in patriarchal cultures that is 
constructed as grotesque, because it is the grotesque body that is uncontrollable and 
thus potentially dangerous. The following passage makes clear what is at stake for 
Marian: 
For an instance she felt them, their identities, almost their substance, pass over 
her head like a wave. At some time she would be – or no, already she was like 
that too; she was one of them, her body the same, identical, merged with that 
other flesh that choked the air in the flowered room with its sweet organic 
scent; she felt suffocated by this thick sargasso-sea of femininity. She drew a 
deep breath, clenching her body and her mind back into her self like some 
tactile sea-creature withdrawing its tentacles. (EW 172) 
Once more, this is reminiscent of the grotesque body in its social dimension, “her 
body the same, identical, merged with that other flesh” in the sense that the grotesque 
body is not “an individual body. . . ; it [is] the drama of the great generic body of the 
people, and for this generic body birth and death are not an absolute beginning and 
end but merely elements of continuous growth and renewal” (Rabelais 88). However, 
her negative feelings do not derive from picturing the grotesque body but rather from 
the ascription of femininity and her fear of becoming just like ‘these other women.’ It 
is the “flowered room” with a “sweet organic scent” and the “sargasso-sea of 
femininity” that produces a ‘choking’ and ‘suffocating’ in Marian. In short, it is 
femininity which confines and constrains and deprives her of her ‘self’ – and which 
ultimately leads to Marian’s anorexia. Marian is unable to evade it, she is, in fact, like 
these women. Her gender identity has already been ascribed to her: their identities and 
substance “pass over her head like a wave” (EW 172). Marian knows that she cannot 
escape her pre-defined gender identity – she cannot turn into a man – and she is thus 
meant to fail, for her body will turn into a grotesque body. The only way Marian 
thinks she can be ‘saved’ is by having “something solid, clear: a man” (EW 172). 
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2.2 “I let go of Peter’s arm and began to run:” Subversive Materiality  
In spite of devoted and self-sacrificial enactments of femininity, there are moments 
when the text casts some doubt on Marian’s wholehearted compliance with her 
gender role. Even though Marian seems to conform to femininity and seems to have 
internalized it, she does not always act according to a pre-set feminine script. In fact, 
Marian’s bodily (re)actions are ‘incoherent’ at times and this suggests that she does 
not ascribe to femininity as unreservedly as it might look at first. In fact, Marian 
“[speaks] a kind of body language” (Bouson 21) with a strong subversive undertone. 
However, Marian’s grotesque or “incongruent” (OED) behaviour can also be 
interpreted as a response to the insidious trauma she suffers. Marian suffers insidious 
trauma because she has to fit into a feminine gender role; she has to live up to the 
ideal of the housewife, lover, mother, yet knows that this is an unreachable ideal. As 
Wuttig explains, coherent gender identity entails, time and again, both a socially 
required striving for authenticity and the suffering involved in failing to achieve this 
very authenticity (Das traumatisierte Subjekt 275). Marian’s bodily reactions, then, 
represent a form of resistance to both femininity and the inability to ever achieve the 
feminine ideal. 
 At the beginning of the novel, Marian and Peter go out to meet her friend Len, 
who had been abroad. Ainsley, who is looking for a suitable sperm-donor, joins them 
unexpectedly as she suspects that Len might be exactly the type of man she is looking 
for. During their get-together, Marian starts feeling uneasy and tries to will herself 
into self-control because she assumes that her reaction is related to the effects of 
alcohol (EW 70): 
After a while I noticed with mild curiosity that a large drop of something wet 
had materialized on the table near my hand. I poked it with my finger and 
smudged it around a little before I realized with horror that it was a tear. I 
must be crying then! (EW 71) 
Marian’s bodily reactions and her feelings are disconnected in this episode. She has 
started crying without realizing it and she does not even understand the reasons for 
her reaction. She is taken by surprise and even shocked by what she is experiencing; 
she is uneasy instead of sad because she has lost control over her body. As soon as 
she realizes that she is crying, she goes to the bathroom where she spends several 
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minutes crying without access to her emotions: “I couldn’t understand what was 
happening, why I was doing this; I had never done anything like it before and it 
seemed to me absurd” (EW 71). The idea of absurdity of her reaction derives from an 
outward perspective she occupies in regard to her body. It is only absurd for an 
outsider who does not know where these emotions come from and who does not 
appreciate emotive reactions. Marian occupies exactly this outsider position for she 
does not have access to her lived body at this moment, she can only see her body and 
her reactions as other people do. At the same time, she knows that she is doing this; 
the implication being that her body makes her do it. Marian even chastises herself by 
saying “Get a grip on yourself” and “Don’t make a fool of yourself” (EW 71). She has 
internalized cultural values to such an extent that any sign of emotion is considered to 
be negative. Moreover, when she returns to the table, Len gives her “a quick peculiar 
look, as though he was disappointed with [her]” and Peter, she comes to realize, is 
treating her like a “stage-prop; silent but solid, a two-dimensional outline” because he 
depends on her (EW 72).107 
 As a result, she has an immediate urge to escape this situation and when 
Marian and her friends have to leave the bar, her body in fact takes over and it starts 
running: “I let go of Peter’s arm and began to run. . . . I was running along the 
sidewalk. After the first minute I was surprised to find my feet moving, wondering 
how they had begun, but I didn’t stop” (EW 73). It is not a conscious decision Marian 
takes but rather a bodily reaction to her mental feeling of wanting to “get out” (EW 
72). Needless to say, the others, and in particular Peter, stalk and capture Marian. 
According to J. Brooks Bouson, this is evidence of “the sexual hunt as a form of 
predation” (19).108 As is to be expected, not only do Peter and Len physically capture 
Marian, but they also put her back into her place. Peter is noticeably annoyed with 
this “public” display (EW 73) and Len even suggests that Marian is the “hysterical 
type” (EW 75). As soon as a woman acts, in fact displays some agency, she is 
punished. Marian’s flight at the beginning of the novel is the first indication that her 
 
107 Because there have been a number of analyses of the figure of Peter and his function (Bouson f.e.), I 
will limit myself to some selected passages for the sake of my argument. Bouson argues convincingly 
that Peter “embodies society’s repressive forces” (17). 




body plays an important role within the narrative and that her subjectivity relies as 
much on her body as it does on her mind.109 Marian’s escape is an indication that 
despite her mental conformity, her body does not conform. 
 Even so, Marian’s attempted escape is not over. At Len’s place, where the 
four, or rather Peter and Len, continue drinking and socializing, Marian hides between 
the bed and the wall:  
I began to find something very attractive about the dark cool space between 
the bed and the wall.  
It would be quiet down there, I thought; and less humid. . . .  
A minute later I was wedged sideways between the bed and the wall, out of 
sight but not at all comfortable. This will never do, I thought; I’ll have to go 
right underneath. . . . But the semi-darkness, tinted orange by the filter of the 
bedspread that curtained me on all four sides, and the coolness and the 
solitude were pleasant. (EW 77) 
First, Marian has an urge to escape, then, she wants to literally disappear.110 Marian 
hides in a “dark cool space.” She disappears into a place where there is no-one. 
“Though I was only two or three feet lower than the rest, I was thinking of the room 
as ‘up there.’ I myself was underground, I had dug myself a private burrow. I felt 
smug” (EW 77). When Marian disappears under the bed, her behaviour could be 
described as grotesque in the modern sense of the word: she behaves in a manner that 
is “[i]ncongruous or inappropriate to a shocking degree” (compare absurd or 
hysterical), which shows in the others’ reactions (EW 79) who treat her “like a sulking 
child who has locked itself in a cupboard and has to be coaxed” (EW 79). 
Furthermore, she is underground where it is dark, or almost dark – with an orange 
tint, alluding to dim light – and cool, which creates a sense of ease and even 
dominance. Thus, the burrow evokes the image of the rabbit and predation once more 
(Bouson). However, it also conjures the grotto; Marian quite literally creates her own 
grotto.  
 Finally, Marian realizes what has gotten her there, i.e. into her own, private 
grotto: her “prevailing emotion” is rage (EW 79). Rage is important, for it makes 
Marian act. According to Rowe, “anger remains the most unacceptable of emotions 
 
109 To be precise, many embodiment theoreticians argue that the mind is embodied, i.e. that the mind is 
not separate from the body. 




for women” because, ultimately, similar to laughter, it is a “strategy of danger” (7). 
While the reader does not know what this rage is directed at – the reader assumes 
Peter – on the next page the reader learns that motivation is not central: “Once I was 
outside I felt considerably better. I had broken out; from what, or into what, I didn’t 
know. Though I wasn’t at all certain why I had been acting this way, I had at least 
acted. Some kind of decision had been made, something had been finished” (EW 80). 
Without grasping what exactly motivated her and what precisely she wants to free 
herself from, the very fact that she has done something, that her body has acted, 
creates a sense of agency in Marian.  
 In their ensuing fight, Peter accuses Marian of “rejecting [her] femininity” 
(EW 82), is “forgiving, understanding, a little patronizing” (EW 84) and proposes to 
her. His proposal can be read as an attempt to capture her in another way. Marian 
does not respond decidedly and consequently consents to marrying him indirectly. 
Neither does she retract the next day when she has a chance to (EW 90). Marian’s 
bodily reaction after his proposal, however, suggests that this is not what she wants. 
Her body “would not stop shivering” and she draws “back from him” (TEW 84). 
Moreover, the thunderstorm and the “tremendous electric blue flash” function as an 
ironic premonition in regard to their relationship.111 What is most notable is Marian’s 
view of herself: “I could see myself, small and oval, mirrored in his eyes” (EW 84).112 
Here, not so much the male gaze is at stake,113 but rather Marian’s body image. Body 
images “communicate with each other either in parts or as wholes” (Schilder qtd. in 
Weiss 33) and body images are impacted by other people’s reactions to them. In 
Peter’s eyes, Marian sees a diminished, distorted (“oval”) version of herself. In her 
relationship to Peter, then, Marian’s body image is diminished and distorted.  
2.3 “Her body had cut itself off:” The Agentic Body  
While the will of her body is only insinuated at first, it manifests in Marian’s 
relationship with Duncan and her eating disorder. Marian’s relationship with Duncan 
should be seen in the context of her body asserting itself. She meets him while 
 
111 Several critics point to the Gothic elements in TEW (f.i. Bouson). 
112 The prevalence of eyes and reflections in mirrors is also a defining feature of much of Angela 
Carter’s work. 
113 Bouson explains this only in terms of the male gaze: “as the object of male desire, Marian is 
subjected to the male gaze which seeks to assimilate, and thus erase, the female self” (20). 
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conducting an interview for her company and runs into him unexpectedly several 
times afterwards. How she reacts in their encounters is revealing: 
When we were outside the laundromat we turned, both at once so that we 
almost collided. We stood facing each other irresolutely for a minute; we both 
started to say something, and both stopped. Then, as though someone had 
pulled a switch, we dropped our laundry bags to the sidewalk and took a step 
forward. I found myself kissing him, or being kissed by him. I still don’t know 
which. Apart from that taste, and an impression of thinness and dryness, . . . I 
can remember no sensation at all. (EW 103) 
In this episode, as earlier, Marian’s body takes over. Marian does not seem to take 
conscious decisions anymore. Instead, she simply acts. Yet, these actions, because 
they are unknown to Marian, do not produce any sensations, do not seem to give her 
joy. This also parodies the ‘romantic’ kiss which tends to be emotionally charged. 
 Furthermore, when, by coincidence, both Marian and Duncan are in the same 
cinema hall, she experiences the following: “[S]he noticed a peculiar sensation in her 
left hand. It wanted to reach across and touch him on the shoulder. Its will seemed 
independent of her own: surely she herself wanted nothing of the kind” (EW 128).114 
It is interesting how Marian’s thoughts seem to be completely opposed to her bodily 
movements and reactions. Her hand seems to have a will of its own and wants to act 
accordingly. Even though she suggests that she wants nothing of the kind, the 
“surely” turns this into a double-voiced remark, casting doubt on Marian’s conscious 
decisions. This is also in line with Heidi Slettedahl Macpherson who notes that 
“Duncan acts as a foil for Marian, expressing her inexpressible desires” (27). 
 The agentic role of Marian’s body is expressed most clearly in her eating 
disorder. Whereas Cameron argues that Marian is on a “self-imposed diet” (52), 
controls her intake of food (55) and strives for a thinner version of herself, I contend 
that the very opposite is the case. Contrary to the idea that women (and increasingly 
men) develop eating disorders because of conscious decisions that then get out of 
hand (mentally), Marian’s eating disorder seems to be a purely physical decision, a 
bodily reaction. I argue that instead of her actions being governed by the mind, 
Marian’s body displays an organic, somatic intentionally. It represents subversive and 
active materiality. However, as mentioned previously, her eating disorder is also a 
 
114 As Pamela Bromberg observes, Marian’s relationship with Duncan is defined by tactility, instead of 
the relationship to Peter which is characterized by sight (19). 
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reaction to the insidious trauma she experiences. This becomes all the more apparent 
because the phases which she passes through in the course of her eating disorder are 
linked to experiences in her life.  
 First, she is unable to eat meat and blames something outside of her. 
“Whatever it was that had been making these decisions, not her mind certainly” (EW 
156, emphasis added). Initially, it is not Marian who decides not to eat, but this 
“thing”115 which is pictured in terms of an infectious disease that “spreads;” a disease 
such as cancer, which is “malignant” (EW 157). Slowly but surely, this bodily ailment 
prevents her from eating certain products, such as eggs: 
The next morning, however, when she opened her soft-boiled egg and saw the 
yolk looking up at her with its one significant and accusing yellow eye, she 
found her mouth closing together like a frightened sea-anemone. It’s living; 
it’s alive, the muscles in her throat said, and tightened. She pushed the dish 
away. Her conscious mind was used to the procedure by now. She sighed with 
resignation and crossed one more item off the list. (EW 165, emphasis added) 
Not Marian, but the muscles in her throat react, they ‘say,’ they have a life of their 
own, they take the decision to not eat the egg. It is not Marian’s “conscious mind” 
(EW 165) that decides here, but rather her body. Her ‘conscious mind’ and her ‘body’ 
are at odds. When her eating disorder worsens, she even tries to force her body to 
subject to her will, but she is unsuccessful: “She was becoming more and more 
irritated by her body’s decision to reject certain foods. She had tried to reason with it, 
had accused it of having frivolous whims, had coaxed it and tempted it, but it was 
adamant; and if she used force it rebelled” (EW 182). Her body literally takes on 
qualities of an individual. Marian refers to her body as if to a person, whom she has to 
reason with, whom she can accuse, whom she can coax and tempt. And “she faced 
each day with the forlorn hope that her body might change its mind” (EW 183). 
Marian’s body takes over and seems to provide a mode of resistance as regards 
gender identity/femininity. Everything she is unable to express openly because of 
negative repercussions, her body acts out. Cameron and other scholars see this as 
proof that Marian’s disorder exemplifies the mind/body split which is common in 
anorexics. Yet, the novel complicates the mind/body split because Marian has no 
 
115 Later Marian asks: “why had this thing chosen to attack her?” (EW 212, emphasis in original). 
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mental control over her body.116 Finally, after crossing meat, eggs, vegetables and rice 
pudding off her list, she only ‘eats’ vitamin pills. 
 The different stages in Marian’s eating disorder parallel certain events in the 
narrative and her life and thus provide a clue as to why her body reacts in such an 
extreme way. Marian’s first negative encounter with food occurs after Peter proposes 
to her (TEW 84). It is at this point of the narrative, incidentally – after Peter and 
Marian decide to get married and Marian meets Duncan and they kiss (EW 203) – that 
the narrative switches from first- to third-person narration. During dinner, Peter 
belittles Marian and tells her she does not have the necessary expertise when it comes 
to matters of the education of children (EW 151). However, he does not only belittle 
her but he, in fact, asserts his ownership rights over Marian by putting his hand over 
hers (EW 150) and by taking the decision of what to eat and what to drink. 
(Admittedly, Marian lets him take these decisions.) Moreover, during their dinner 
Marian has a ‘vision’ of her body: “Marian gazed down at the small silvery image 
reflected in the bowl of the spoon: herself upside down, with a huge torso narrowing 
to a pinhead at the handle end. She tilted the spoon and her forehead swelled, then 
receded” (EW 150). According to Bouson, this “recalls Marian’s fantasy of the 
pregnant Clara as body” (23), Clara as “a swollen mass of flesh with a tiny pinhead” 
(EW 117). For Bouson this reflects Marian’s “disintegration fears” and “a threat to the 
self” (EW 24). However, it should instead be understood as the fear to be associated 
with the body only. Clara’s and her own shape make her think of a “queen-ant, 
bulging with the burden of an entire society, a semi-person” (EW 117). The text 
illuminates what is problematic about constructing women as bodies: they lose 
intellectual capabilities and thus a sense of individuality. During, the, what Marian 
considers “more vegetable stages” of Clara’s pregnancy, Marian “had tended to forget 
that Clara had a mind at all or any perceptive faculties above the merely sentient and 
 
116 Nowadays scholars argue that the mind/body split in the disorder is not as straightforward as it 




sponge-like” (EW 133).117 Clara becomes her body because she is only defined in its 
terms, in its productivity.  
 Furthermore, Marian realizes that Peter has started watching her. She 
comments: “Lately he had been watching her more and more. . . . Frequently . . . she 
would open her eyes and realize that he had been watching her like that” (EW 153). 
Peter’s gaze makes Marian “uneasy” because it is an expression not of affection, but 
rather ownership: What is usually considered an intimate touch, the hand that runs 
“gently over her skin” is done “without passion, almost clinically” (EW 153). Not 
only is this highly evocative of Laura Mulvey’s concept of the male gaze, but Peter’s 
attitude towards Marian and her body is reminiscent of the Sartrean sense of 
possession. Penelope Deutscher explains that  
[d]esire is narrated by Sartre as a strategy, part of our impossible but constant 
struggle to appropriate the other’s freedom. I wish to grasp the other’s 
freedom, but I can only grasp the other’s body. Desire is a wily ruse to 
incarnate a body with consciousness and then possess it. (143)  
Peter wants to possess Marian and to mould her as he pleases. As a result, during the 
dinner, Marian is unable to finish the steak she is eating and thereafter her body 
refuses “anything that had an indication of bone or tendon or fibre” (EW 156).  
 Her body’s inability to consume meat is thus not her subconscious fear of 
consuming something that is alive because it reminds her of pregnancy, as Cameron 
suggests, but might instead be understood as her identification with the product to be 
consumed. Marian literally identifies with flesh. This becomes apparent through the 
choice of words, as the cow is referred to as “someone waiting for a streetcar.” 
She looked down at her own half-eaten steak and suddenly saw it as a hunk of 
muscle. Blood red. Part of a real cow that once moved and ate and was killed, 
knocked on the head as it stood in a queue like someone waiting for a 
streetcar. (EW 155) 
The cause of her anorexia is, initially, framed in terms of vegetarianism, even though 
this is used ironically, for, as a matter of fact, Marian herself is none too happy about 
 
117 This contrasts with the sea creature metaphors that Marian uses in regard to herself. She pictures 
herself as a “sea-anemone” (EW 165) and a “tactile sea-creature” (EW 172), which emphasizes her auto 
image as malleable and flexible instead of fixed and passive. 
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turning into “a vegetarian . . . one of those cranks” (EW 157).118 In the next stage of 
her eating disorder, Marian becomes unable to eat eggs after Len recounts an episode 
from his childhood in which he was forced to eat an egg with a chicken inside it (EW 
164). Marian’s inability to eat her egg the next morning might be read as her fear of 
pregnancy, albeit not from a psychoanalytical standpoint but rather from the 
perspective of ultimate fulfilment of her gender identity and thus dependence and 
entrapment within the heterosexual matrix. Yet, it can also be read as a response to 
the disparaging comment Len makes: “That’s what we get then . . . for educating 
women. They get all kinds of ridiculous ideas” (EW 161-62). This remark by one of 
her oldest friends leaves a trace on Marian, not simply a verbal trace, but in fact a 
bodily one.  
 When Peter starts taking “pride in displaying her” (EW 180), Marian reaches 
another stage of her eating disorder: she becomes unable to eat vegetables (EW 
183).119 Next, she crosses cake off her list after Peter uses her as an ashtray holder 
(EW 213), i.e. an actual object. After the episode at the hairdresser, where she goes in 
order to please Peter, Marian is unable to eat anything but vitamin pills. The scene at 
the hairdresser is interesting, for Marian feels completely objectified. She feels “as 
passive as though she was being admitted to a hospital to have an operation” (EW 
215).120 The attendant is “nurse-like” and the hair dresser is “the doctor . . . set to 
work.” Marian is put on an “operating-table”, the doctor has all the necessary 
equipment: “surgical cloth,” “clamps,” “gleaming instruments and bottled medicines” 
(EW 215). It comes as no surprise that Marian feels like “a slab of flesh” and an inert 
object (EW 215). The medical metaphors are telling because of the disparity between 
 
118 Cameron states that Marian’s rejection of ‘living things’ is rooted in her fear of pregnancy, thus 
carrying a living thing herself. I find this explanation highly unsatisfying considering the overall 
message of the novel.   
119 Marian starts displaying ‘real’ symptoms of anorexia; she takes “a perverse delight in watching 
other people eat” (EW 159). When she goes to see her parents to organize the wedding, she avoids 
eating in front of other people but binge-eats later on: “She had said she wasn’t hungry, and had eaten 
huge quantities of cranberry sauce and mashed potatoes and mince pie when no one was looking” (EW 
178). Moreover, she does not talk to anyone about her problem, except to Duncan, not realizing the 
extent of the disease herself. She also puts considerable effort into the planning for menus because she 
is afraid of being found out (EW 181). Towards the later stages of her anorexia, when she has stopped 
eating solids, her body reacts with what might be symptoms of the lack of calorie intake, such as 
dizziness: “She ought to have her eyes examined, things were beginning to blur” (EW 223). 
120 Interestingly, the body’s objectification is often put in medical terms, as for instance when Peter 
touches her “without passion, almost clinically”: “she would begin feeling that she was on a doctor’s 
examination table” (EW 153). 
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female patients and male doctors, which can make women feel uncomfortable, but it 
also alludes to the increasing objectification of patients in doctor-patient interactions. 
The medical metaphors not only serve as a comment on the beauty industry, which 
increasingly uses medical procedures to alter women’s physiques, but it also resonates 
with the medical profession’s history, which “leaves out the subjectivity of the 
woman” (Young 54). When, finally, the “stitches [are] taken out,” Marian is not 
exactly happy with the result, she says that it is a little “extreme” and thinks to herself 
that she looks like a “callgirl,” but decides not to have it changed because “‘Peter will 
probably like it. Anyway,’ she reflected” and “‘it will go with the dress’” (EW 216). 
 After the episode at the hairdresser Marian feels that her body is not her own 
anymore and is afraid of “dissolving.” When she takes a bath before Peter’s party, she 
becomes acutely aware of her body as ‘other:’ 
Looking down, she became aware of the water, which was covered with a film 
of calcinous hard-water particles of dirt and soap, and of the body that was 
sitting in it, somehow no longer quite her own. All at once she was afraid that 
she was dissolving, coming apart layer by layer like a piece of cardboard in a 
gutter puddle. (EW 224) 
Picking up on her nightmare, in which body parts start dissolving (EW 43), this scene 
demonstrates that Marian finally feels disembodied; her body is no longer her own. 
While it might seem that Marian loses control over her body, even to herself, she, in 
fact, loses a unified body image. The text illuminates what Bernadette Wegenstein 
contends, namely that “anorexia, hysteria, and other (often female) illnesses can be 
seen as mourning for the loss of a unified body [schema]” (28).121 She slowly but 
surely loses a unified version of herself, that is, a unified body image – which, 
incidentally, does not equal a mind/body split.122 
 The penultimate phase of the development of her eating disorder is related to 
Peter’s party, where she does not eat anything anymore but only drinks something. 
Before the party, Peter wants to take pictures of Marian, which makes her feel uneasy 
 
121 As I have pointed out in the theory chapter, body image can refer to two separate ideas. It can either 
refer to what the phenomenologists call body schema, Körperschema, i.e. the position of one’s body in 
time, space and culture, or as Merleau-Ponty puts it, “a manner of expressing that my body is in and 
toward the world” (Phenomenology 103). In the context of media studies, the body image refers to 
representations of bodies. 
122 This is also why Marian feels threatened by the dolls sitting on top of her dresser, who “[b]y the 
strength of their separate visions . . . were trying to pull her apart” (EW 226). 
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and, later, he wants to take a group picture. Peter wants to take a couple of “shots” 
(hunting analogy)123 of Marian before the guests of his party arrive, but Marian feels 
uneasy, the “suggestion had made her unreasonably anxious” (EW 238). This 
pointedly shows in her body language, for Peter tells her to “stand less stiffly,” to 
“relax,” to not “hunch [her] shoulders,” to “stick out [her] chest,” to not “look so 
worried,” “look natural” and “smile” (EW 238, emphasis in original). Even though 
Marian herself does not realize what is happening,124 her body is expressive in that it 
“had frozen, gone rigid. She couldn’t move, she couldn’t even move the muscles of 
her face as she stood and stared into the round glass lens pointing towards her, she 
wanted to tell him not to touch the shutter-release but she couldn’t move…” (EW 
238). Marian’s inability to move is a sign that she has internalized subordination and 
that her social role as a female has left real, material traces on her body, impeding her 
from reacting in certain situations. Even though the original context this quote refers 
to is not a literary one, the quote fits Atwood’s text passage perfectly:  
Die Unterordnung ist als Inkorporierung in den Körper eingeschrieben und 
wirkt als körperreflexive Praxis, da auch die (Nicht-)Reaktion als Handeln in 
der sozialen Welt gedeutet wird. Sie äußert sich als körperliche Fixierung in 
der Unmöglichkeit, aus der Erstarrung zu entfliehen. (Budde qtd. in Wuttig 
272) 
Subordination, too, becomes inscribed into the body and becomes manifest as 
Marian’s inability to move and to react in this situation. Because there is a knock on 
the door and Peter opens it, Marian is saved from becoming the object of Peter’s 
fancy. However, she can still feel the physical impact: “Marian came slowly from the 
corner. She was breathing quickly. She reached out one hand, forcing herself to touch 
it” (EW 238-39). As Marian’s quick breathing suggests, this is a stressful and trying 
situation for her.  
 When the guests start arriving, Marian plays her assigned role as fiancée, 
welcomes them and engages in conversation. One of these is with Joe, who comments 
on his wife’s role: 
 
123 Bouson argues that “[t]he fact that Peter’s grisly hunting story about killing a rabbit prefaces his 
pursuit of and proposal to Marian underlines the narrative’s view of the sexual hunt as a form of 
predation” (15). Further references in the text to stalking and being followed can be read in line with 
this hunting analogy. 
124 In fact, she asks herself “What’s the matter with me? . . . It’s only a camera” (EW 239). 
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I think it’s a lot harder for her than for most women; I think it’s harder for any 
woman who’s been to university. She gets the idea that she has a mind, her 
professors pay attention to what she has to say, they treat her like a thinking 
human being; when she gets married, her core gets invaded. . . .’ 
. . . ‘Her feminine role and her core are really in opposition, her feminine role 
demands passivity from her. . . .’ 
. . . So she allows her core to get taken over by the husband. And when the 
kids come, she wakes up one morning and discovers she doesn’t have 
anything left inside, she’s hollow, she doesn’t know who she is any more; her 
core has been destroyed. (EW 242) 
While, according to Bouson, this passage “contains a political message – through Joe 
Bates, Atwood is telling her women readers to avoid such a fate” (Bouson 21), it also 
aptly shows that ‘progressive’ men such as Joe are, in fact, quite traditional in their 
views of their wives. While “meditating on the life of the mind and doing the dishes” 
(EW 243), they seem to be unable to grasp that women such as Clara are not 
encouraged to pursue studies within their culture because motherhood and a 
career/university education are not compatible.125 Joe seems to be ambivalent, for 
even though he encourages his wife to pursue her studies, he does not understand why 
she gives him a funny look (EW 243). He even suggests that women refrain from 
going to university because “then they wouldn’t always be feeling later on that 
they’ve missed out on the life of the mind” (EW 242-43). Here, the text provides its 
most obvious feminist comment: It is not women’s university education that is the 
problem and that makes women feel discontent, but it is a system in which women are 
encouraged to go to university (or not) and pursue a career, but never to choose this 
over a family. Family and career, or both, remain incompatible within patriarchal 
culture.  
 Interestingly, it is at the moment at Peter’s party, when Joe talks about his 
wife’s ‘feminine role’ which requires her to be passive, that Marian has a “vision of a 
large globular pastry, decorated with whipped cream and maraschino cherries, 
floating suspended in the air above Joe’s head” (EW 242). The vision of the pastry 
suggests that not until Marian is able to reject the feminine role that is characterized 
by sacrifice, especially of intellectual capabilities, does she regain her appetite. Yet, it 
is also a humorous element that undermines Joe’s pseudo-philosophical ruminations. 
 
125 When Atwood’s text was written and published (in the 1960s) this was a dominant theme. Yet, it 
remains pertinent in many cultures to this day. 
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 Marian has another vision, which is even more revealing. While leaning in the 
doorway, she examines everyone present at the party. Peter reminds her of “home-
movie ads” and this gives rise to her imagining or seeing several rooms with their 
possible married future: 
She opened the door to the right and went in. There was Peter, forty-five and 
balding but still recognizable as Peter, standing in bright sunlight beside a 
barbecue with a long fork in his hand. He was wearing a white chef’s apron. 
She looked carefully for herself in the garden, but she wasn’t there and the 
discovery chilled her.  
No, she thought, this has to be the wrong room. It can’t be the last one. And 
now she could see there was another door, in the hedge at the other side of the 
garden. She walked across the lawn, passing behind the unmoving figure, 
which she could see now held a large cleaver in the other hand, pushed open 
the door and went through. (EW 250) 
Her absence from the scene chills her and gives rise to her feeling that this is not the 
right scenario. Moreover, the Peter in this room holds a cleaver in his hand, alluding 
to possible danger. This is not the last possibility, however, for she notices a door on 
the other side of the garden. In Alice-in-Wonderland like fashion,126 she enters the 
next room which brings her back to the present.  
She was back in Peter’s living room with the people and the noise, leaning 
against the doorframe holding her drink. Except that the people seemed even 
clearer now, more sharply focused, further away, and they were moving faster 
and faster, they were all going home, a file of soapwoman emerged from the 
bedroom, coats on, they teetered jerkily out the door trailing husbands, 
chirping goodnights, and who was that tiny two-dimensional small figure in a 
red dress, posed like a paper woman in a mail-order catalogue, turning and 
smiling, fluttering in the white empty space…This couldn’t be it; there had to 
be something more. She ran for the next door, yanked it open. (EW 250, 
ellipsis in original). 
While these are all familiar faces and people, who are preparing to leave as the party 
is apparently coming to an end, Marian’s perception has changed. The people seem 
“clearer” and “more sharpely focused” yet “further away” and “moving faster” at the 
same time. And she notices another figure but cannot connect that figure to herself. 
She finally notices that this “tiny two-dimensional small figure in a red dress, posed 
like a paper woman in a mail-order catalogue, turning and smiling, fluttering in the 
white empty space” (EW 250) cannot be herself. This is not the possibility of the 
 
126  The novel is replete with references to Alice in Wonderland. For an analysis of some of the 
dominant Alice-in-Wonderland themes see Sharon Rose Wilson’s third chapter “Cannibalism and 
Metamorphosis in The Edible Woman” in Margaret Atwood’s Fairy-Tale Sexual Politics (1993). 
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future she wants, for she states that “[this] couldn’t be it; there had to be something 
more” (EW 250). Marian still seems to think that she is in a (day-)dream. She panics 
and runs to the next door only to find Peter in it:  
He had a camera in his hand; but now she saw what it really was. There were 
no more doors and when she felt behind for the doorknob, afraid to take her 
eyes of him, he raised the camera and aimed it at her; his mouth opened in a 
snarl of teeth. There was a blinding flash of light. 
“No!” she screamed. She covered her face with her arm. (EW 250-51) 
In her dream-like state, Marian does not recognize the camera as a camera and instead 
“saw what it really was.” Even though the text does not specify what this might be, it 
is likely, given her reaction, that the camera represents a fixing of her image in a 
material way. Marian is afraid of being fixed, of being confined in an image of 
someone she cannot identify with. Yet, she realizes that she can still opt out as Peter 
did not take a picture of her but of his friend Trigger instead: “She was still safe then. 
She had to get out before it was too late . . . She could not let him catch her this time. 
Once he pulled the trigger she would be stopped, fixed indissolubly in that gesture, 
that single stance, unable to move or change” (EW 251-52). It is in fact the fear of 
being fixed in an image and an identity that she does not feel herself to embody that 
she is running from. 
 Because of her fear of being confined by Peter, Marian escapes Peter’s party 
and looks for Duncan with a particular aim in mind, namely sleeping with him. They 
book into a cheap hotel room where, after some initial problems, they have sex. The 
next morning Marian has some doubts, even though the previous night it had seemed 
“resolved” and she had some “simple clarity rather than joy” (EW 263). The next day, 
“[w]hatever decision she had made had been forgotten, if indeed she had ever decided 
anything” (EW 264). She is faced with the need to talk to Peter and break off with 
him, yet not necessarily to tell him about Duncan: “There was no real reason to 
explain because explanations involved causes and effects and this event had been 
neither. It had come from nowhere and it led nowhere, it was outside the chain” (EW 
264).  
 As a result of her transgressive act, she is also faced with a complete inability 
to eat: “It had finally happened at last then. Her body had cut itself off” (EW 264). 
Thus, her extreme state reaches its climax after she sleeps with Duncan. This is not 
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due to guilt, as one might assume. Even though, according to Butler, 
“[h]eterosexuality is cultivated through prohibitions” (“Melancholy Gender” 136) 
which applies primarily to the prohibition of homosexuality, other prohibitions apply 
as well, namely the prohibition of incest, the prohibition of abortion/childlessness, 
and the prohibition of polygamy or polyamory. By sleeping with Duncan, Marian 
defies the prohibition of polygamy.127  It also signifies agency on Marian’s part, 
however, for it is she who drives it forward. And this is an agency that is achieved 
through her body.128 Marian’s body cutting itself off can rather be interpreted as the 
need to take the final step, that is, break off the engagement with Peter. Her body 
literally forces her to take this last step so that she can eat and thus live. 
2.4 “It’s mostly the head:” Rejecting the Mind  
Marian regains her embodiedness and consequently a unified body image via a 
grotesque, and consequently liberating act, namely through the consumption of the 
cake she bakes for Peter.129 The cake is a smaller version of herself, underlined by its 
vamped up look – the same flashy colours – exactly how Peter wants her to be. “‘You 
look delicious,’ she told her. ‘Very appetizing. And that’s what will happen to you; 
that’s what you get for being food’” (EW 277-78).130 Marian bakes the cake for Peter 
because she intuits that this is what he wants: 
“You’ve been trying to destroy me, haven’t you,” she said. “You’ve been 
trying to assimilate me. But I’ve made you a substitute, something you’ll like 
much better. This is what you really wanted all along, isn’t it? I’ll get you a 
fork,” she added somewhat prosaically. 
Peter stared from the cake to her face and back again. She wasn’t smiling. 
His eyes widened in alarm. Apparently he didn’t find her silly. (EW 279) 
 
127 Duncan is the very opposite of Peter because he is not interested in appearances and looks but in 
intellect to an exaggerated degree. He is self-involved but not in the same way that Peter is. 
128 Bouson suggests that “Atwood uses the conventional love triangle plot both as a weapon and as a 
device to rescue Marian from her relationship with Peter. Invoking and parodying the male fantasy of 
the split good/ bad woman, the text casts Marian, who has shunned the culturally scripted roles of wife 
and mother, as a prostitute” (29). The text subverts such roles as the nurse and prostitute and thus 
ascribes Marian dominance. In fact, “The Edible Woman acts out a fantasy of female sexual 
domination and male subordination” (30).  
129 This scene is read differently. Some scholars do not see a liberating potential in the eating of the 
cake. For Robert Lecker, for instance, Marian “re-enacts her female as food role” (179). Others read 
the ending in more positive terms as Bromberg does: Marian “is quite literally joining her subject and 
object selves . . . She has become active again, an agent, a subject, a consumer, rather than a 
consumable object of exchange traded on the marriage market” (18). For more information on these 
divergent positions see Bouson (35-37). 
130 This establishes a connection to the office party during which the abundance and the look of the 
cakes make Marian “feel gluttonous” and women are compared to consumable goods. 
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Previously, Marian has a moment of doubt in which she has “a swift vision of her 
own monumental silliness” (EW 278) and fears that if Peter thinks she is silly, she 
will believe him, that is, fall back into seeing her body and herself as others do. The 
passage above illustrates that she has realized what Peter wanted all along, namely a 
woman he can possess, one he can mould to his own liking. For Marian, however, this 
equals destruction of her subjectivity. For despite her apparent compliance with 
gender identity, she does not want to marry Peter and have children with him. What is 
so forceful in this confrontation is not so much the words but Marian’s lack of a smile 
and her matter-of-factness.  
 Peter’s eating of the cake would have meant that Peter’s version of Marian as 
silly, Peter’s version of reality, would have prevailed and that they would have stayed 
together. Instead, Marian eats or rather devours the cake herself: 
Suddenly she was hungry. Extremely hungry. The cake after all was only a 
cake. . . . She considered the first mouthful. It seemed odd but most pleasant to 
be actually tasting and chewing and swallowing again. Not bad, she thought 
critically; needs a touch more lemon though. (EW 279) 
Marian can experience eating as pleasurable again. Thus, Marian recovers the 
experience of her lived body. She can feel and taste again. By devouring the cake, 
Marian engages in a grotesque act: “In the act of eating . . . the confines between the 
body and the world are overstepped by the body” (Rabelais 282). And it is the more 
grotesque because there is an implication of “symbolic cannibalism” (Bouson 15). It 
comes as no surprise that Ainsley is scandalized: “You’re rejecting your femininity!” 
(EW 280).131 After breaking off her engagement with Peter, Marian returns to her 
‘normal’ eating behaviour. 
 As is to be expected, critics are divided about the final scene. Macpherson 
conjures up the author on the ending: “Atwood herself has noted that Marian is really 
no better off now than she was before: her prospects are limited, and she has, even if 
metaphorically, offered herself up to be consumed” (29-30). However, at another 
point Atwood states the very opposite: Marian is “acting, she’s doing an action. Up 
until that point she has been evading, avoiding, running away, retreating, 
withdrawing” (Gibson 25). As Bouson and others argue, “[t]hrough the cakewoman 
 
131 Peter accuses her of the same thing at an earlier point (EW 82). 
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‘text,’ she signifies her own transformation into a consumable object” (32).132 Rather 
than offering herself up to being consumed, what Marian puts on offer to be 
consumed is her femininity. First, the cake is a vamped-up version of herself – the 
way she decorates the cake is reminiscent of how she is handled at the hairdresser. 
However, the cake’s meaning changes from symbol to real cake, underlined by the 
statement that the cake was only a cake and that it “needs a touch more lemon,” which 
stresses materiality. It is an actual, material cake, it is something to be eaten and not 
just a representation or symbol:133 “As a symbol it had definitely failed” (EW 279). 
While the text blurs the lines between metaphor and reality,134 materiality seems to 
prevail over metaphor. Marian stresses that “‘[i]t’s only a cake’ (EW 280) and before 
offering the cake to Duncan, she herself devours part of it. The cake is a ‘real’ cake; it 
is real food. Pamela Bromberg suggests, and I agree, that Marian “has become active 
again, an agent, a subject, a consumer, rather than a consumable object of exchange 
traded on the marriage market” (18). This is also why in part three of the novel, in the 
very last pages, the focalization returns to Marian and the narrative is told from a 
first-person perspective once more.135 Moreover, scholars rarely comment on the fact 
that what Marian offers Duncan is “mostly the head” (EW 287). She has “sever[ed] 
the body from the head” (EW 280) and devoured the body. This is hardly a 
coincidence. Marian regains a sense of being in touch with her body, a unified body 
 
132 Bouson elaborates on the whole process of the making of the cake: “Asserting active mastery over 
passive suffering, Marian does to the cakewoman what was done to her. She begins ‘to operate’ on the 
cakewoman, just as she was operated on at the hairdresser’s; she scoops out part of the cake and makes 
a head with it, repeating her feeling that the contents of her head had been ‘scooped out’ after she 
became engaged to Peter; and she uses icing to draw ‘masses of intricate baroque scrolls and swirls’ of 
hair on her creation, reenacting what was done to her when her hair was decorated like a cake” (32-33). 
133 Atwood moves to a metafictional level at this point by implying that there are real Marians out there 
in the real world, who struggle with eating disorders: “And they all wore clothes of real cloth and had 
real bodies: those in the newspapers, those still unknown, waiting for their chance to aim from the 
upstairs window; you passed them on the streets every day. It was easy to see him as normal and safe 
in the afternoon, but that didn’t alter things. The price of this version of reality was testing the other 
one” (EW 279). 
134 Bouson makes as similar point: “Yet the ending remains puzzling. In a maneuver meant to entice 
and frustrate literary interpreters, the closure indicates that the cake is a ‘symbol’ and insists that it is 
‘only a cake’ . . . Because the closure both tells and refuses to tell what it knows, readers are left with 
the uneasy sense that they have not mastered the text but rather that the text has mastered them” (34-
35). 
135 The shift from first-person to third-person narration “serves not only to emphasize Marian’s self-
alienation and threatened loss of self as she is objectified by the culture” (Bouson 21) but it also 
suggests that Marian’s “sense of herself as sexual object makes her the object of someone else’s 
discourse” (Greene 27). 
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image, because, without realizing it, she rejects the head: the humanist ideal of the 
mind as constitutive of consciousness. 
2.5 “I’ve chopped Peter up into little bits:” Subversive Thoughts 
Even though Marian and other female characters conform to femininity and their 
heterosexual roles, things in The Edible Woman are not always what they seem. 
Atwood employs double-voiced discourse and irony to undermine some of Marian’s 
voluntary acts and thus questions her adherence to feminine ideals as well as the other 
female characters’ very ‘unfeminine’ life choices. While, initially, Ainsley sets out to 
be a single mother – which undermines the traditional nuclear family – she returns to 
the ideal of the heterosexual couple because she believes that her baby will become a 
homosexual if she raises it without a father figure (EW 186).136 As a result, at the end 
of the novel, she marries Duncan’s roommate Fischer and spends a stereotypical 
honeymoon at the Niagara Falls, reaffirming the ideal of the heterosexual couple. 
Ainsley subverts traditional gender roles, however, by tricking Len, the prototypical 
womanizer, into getting pregnant. Not only does this underline an anti-marriage 
attitude, which, admittedly, changes in the course of the narrative – initially she 
believes that “[t]he thing that ruins families these days is the husbands” (EW 39) – but 
it also ironically reverses roles and the concomitant power setup. As Bouson shows, 
“the Ainsley/Len seduction plot reverses the gender hierarchy and acts out female 
desires for power and revenge” (31). Len is surprisingly shocked by Ainsley’s 
behaviour:  
All along you’ve only been using me. What a moron I was to think you were 
sweet and innocent, when it turns out you were actually college-educated the 
whole time! Oh, they’re all the same. You weren’t interested in me at all. The 
only thing you wanted from me was my body! (EW 163, emphasis in original)  
The narrative deliberately – for obvious humorous and ironic purposes – puts ‘female’ 
accusations into Len’s mouth, “you’ve only been using me,” “The only thing you 
wanted from me was my body” and Ainsley accuses Len, correspondingly, of “uterus 
envy” (EW 163-64). However, what is striking is the negative status Len ascribes to 
education. Previously he says: “That’s what we get then . . . for educating women. 
 




They get all kinds of ridiculous ideas” (EW 162). Educated women are a particular 
threat to men like Len because they are smart enough to trick them. So, while, in the 
end, Ainsley’s character seemingly represents conformity to the heterosexual ideal 
and thus a return to the traditional romance plot (Bouson), Atwood herself has 
commented: “In my book the couple is not united and the wrong couple gets married. 
The complications are resolved, but not in a way that reaffirms the social order” 
(Sandler 13).  
 Clara, too, cannot be associated with the traditional role of a mother easily. 
The children were not planned (EW 36) and Clara is not particularly good at taking 
care of the household with two and later three children, so that Joe takes over most 
household chores (EW 32-33, 34-35, 133). Clara does not represent the idealized 
mother either because she swears frequently (EW 131) and refers to her children with 
all kinds of not-so-endearing terms: “little leech” (EW 31), “stinking little geyser” 
(EW 32), “little bastard” (EW 33, 37), “little demon” (EW 33), “little bugger” (EW 33, 
131) and “turd” (EW 184), to name but a few. “Her metaphors for her children,” 
Marian comments, “included barnacles encrusting a ship and limpets clinging to a 
rock” (EW 36). Furthermore, Clara almost revels in the ‘unpleasantness’ of human 
bodies, making Marian wish that “Clara had a few more inhibitions. Clara didn’t deny 
that her children stank, but neither did she take any pains to conceal it. She admitted 
it, she almost affirmed it; it was as though she wanted it to be appreciated” (EW 184). 
Neither is Clara idealistic about motherhood nor giving birth. After bearing her third 
child she admits that giving birth is “messy, all that blood and junk” (EW 131) and 
that “it hurts like hell” (EW 132). She tells Marian to “[n]ever believe what they tell 
you about maternal instinct” (EW 32).  
 Critics are especially divided about Marian’s attitude towards femininity: for 
some commentators she resists a complete consent to femininity (Bouson), for others, 
the novel is “metaphorically circular” because, despite resistance to feminine ideals, 
Marian ends up where she started (Lecker 203). Yet, in particular at the beginning of 
the novel, before Marian starts displaying the first traces of an eating disorder, her 
thoughts reflect a non-conformity to her feminine role. In fact, Atwood uses double-
voiced discourse and irony to complicate some of Marian’s utterances and 
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thoughts.137 When Marian and Peter talk about his proposal, Marian’s ambivalence 
concerning their engagement is brought to light:  
“You know,” he said, “I didn’t think I was intending – what happened last 
night – at all.” I nodded: I hadn’t thought I was, either.  
“I guess I’ve been running away from it.” 
I had been, too. (EW 91) 
Marian’s echoing of Peter’s words in her mind in the first line suggests that she does 
not feel the way he does. Moreover, the echoing of Peter’s words in the third line is 
humorous because she literally ran away from him. Yet, she does not voice these 
thoughts as she is aware that they might be understood in the way she thinks them, 
namely ironically. When Peter asks her about their prospective marriage date, Marian 
thinks: 
My first impulse was to answer, with the evasive flippancy I’d always used 
before when he’d asked me serious questions about myself, ‘What about 
Groundhog Day?’ But instead I heard a soft flannely voice I barely 
recognized, saying, ‘I’d rather have you decide that. I’d rather leave the big 
decisions up to you.’ I was astounded at myself. I’d never said anything 
remotely like that to him before. The funny thing was I really meant it. (EW 
92) 
It is notable here that the double-voicedness does not exist between the voices of the 
distinct characters, but rather between Marian’s two voices. This has a strong parodic 
element, for “[d]iscourse becomes an arena of battle between two voices” (Bakhtin, 
PDP 193) and Marian’s two voices in fact clash. As a result, Marian is surprised by 
her own reaction, her own submissiveness. Even though she says she means it, her 
surprise reveals that there is something at odds in her thoughts and her actual 
behaviour. She does not recognize herself with the “soft flannely voice” (EW 92). 
Although Marian is aware of the, oftentimes, ridiculous demands of femininity and 
aware of her own thoughts and usual reactions to it, she does not resist them actively, 
as the feminine habitus and bodily mannerisms have been deeply ingrained in her 
consciousness and she believes this is really what she wants. She comments at another 
point: “Of course I’d always assumed through highschool and college that I was going 
to marry someone eventually and have children, everyone does” (EW 104). This 
sentence carries some ambivalence though. It is in the past tense and includes the verb 
 
137 According to Bouson, Marian occasionally “speaks in an oppositional voice” (18). 
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‘to assume,’ potentially suggesting a different view in the present. And when Ainsley 
asks Marian at the beginning of the novel whether she is going to the laundromat, 
Marian replies: “I’ve chopped Peter up into little bits. I’m camouflaging him as 
laundry and taking him down to bury him in the ravine” (EW 94). Marian’s use of 
irony is not appreciated by her roommate who does not even smile, but the reader 
realizes that Marian does not take everything as seriously as is expected of her. 
Moreover, she imagines Peter to be the ‘Underwear Man’ who calls women 
pretending to conduct a survey for her company and requiring after their underwear.  
 Even in the second part of the novel, which is told from a third-person point of 
view, thus reflecting Marian’s alienation from her body image, there are pertinent 
examples of irony. When Ainsley and Len fight about Ainsley’s misleading Len into 
believing that she is an innocent girl, the narrator comments on Marian’s reaction: 
“Marian walked out to the kitchen. She was coldly revolted: they were acting like a 
couple of infants. Ainsley was getting a layer of blubber on her soul already, she 
thought; aren’t hormones wonderful” (EW 164). Marian ironically praises the power 
of hormones, yet Ainsley’s behaviour is not so much influenced by hormones as it is 
by the “layer of blubber on her soul.” This implies that it is the identification with 
motherhood that makes Ainsley act in this way. Moreover, it is not only Ainsley who 
behaves like an infant, but Len, too, who certainly is not affected by prenatal 
hormones. And Marian is “coldly revolted” because she can see through all of this. A 
comment by Peter about Marian’s look for his party is equally revealing:  
‘Darling, you look absolutely marvellous,’ he had said as soon as he had come 
up through the stairwell. The implication had been that it would be most 
pleasant if she could arrange to look like that all the time. . . . Now she 
wondered whether or not she did look absolutely marvellous. She turned the 
phrase over in her mind: it had no specific shape or flavour. (EW 235)  
Even though the sentence “[t]he implication had been that it would be most pleasant if 
she could arrange to look like that all the time” might well be expressing the 
narrator’s point of view, it is also possible that Marian thinks this herself, for she 
questions its real meaning. She realizes that it has “no specific shape of flavour” and 
thus does not produce the desired reaction in her, which, in the case of other women, 
would probably be joy. So, while on the surface, Marian coheres with her gender 
identity and feminine role, her utterances and thoughts often suggest otherwise. 
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Marian displays an internal double-voicedness that serves a humorous function, but 
also reveals that authentic femininity is an illusion. 
2.6 “Then I stopped for lunch:” Summary of Results 
This chapter has shown that Margaret Atwood’s The Edible Woman resonates both 
with the Bakhtinian grotesque and new feminist materialist ideas on insidious trauma. 
The novel displays an awareness of the cultural construction of the female body as 
inherently grotesque and it undermines this cultural construction precisely by means 
of Marian’s ‘unruly’ body. To start with, Marian incorporates different versions of 
femininity by means of her friends and colleagues. She unconsciously embodies these 
modes of feminine behaviour and thought. As a result, she tries to comply with 
certain ideals of femininity even though this goes against her independence and 
agency and even though she realizes that she will never be able to aspire to the ideal. 
This realization that the ideal is unreachable, that her striving for an authentic gender 
identity is in vain, leads to insidious trauma. 
 However, her body opposes these inscriptions of feminine gender identity and 
the unreachability of the ideal by means of its agency. In the course of the novel, 
Marian starts displaying unusual bodily reactions: she starts crying without any 
apparent reason, she runs away from her friends, hides under a bed, kisses and 
touches Duncan, all without having taken any (conscious) decision to do so. 
Moreover, Marian’s body rejects the intake of food: First, she is unable to finish a 
piece of steak, then she cannot bring herself to eat eggs, following vegetables, cake 
and rice pudding, until she is unable to eat anything anymore. While Marian’s body’s 
rejection of food is related to certain events in her private life, for instance Len’s 
scene after he realises that Ainsley ‘tricked’ him into getting pregnant or Peter’s use 
of her as an ashtray-holder, her body can be said to possess an organic intentionality, 
which her mind clearly lacks. Marian’s body is active, volatile and independent; it 
actively resists cultural constructions of femininity both by behaving in ‘unfeminine’ 
ways and by rejecting food.  
 The feminist phenomenological concept of the body image, and in particular 
the distinction between the objective and the lived body is instructive for reading 
Marian’s behaviour. Marian is increasingly estranged from her own body as she 
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internalizes the way Peter sees her, namely as an object. This is also reflected on the 
narratological plane as the initial first-person narration switches to a third-person 
narration in the main part of the novel. Her eating disorder can thus also be read as a 
result of this estrangement from her on body and the internalization of the objective 
body. The final scene of the grotesque devouring of the cake (it is grotesque because 
it represents an exaggerated consumption as well as symbolic cannibalism), 
reconnects Marian with her lived body. It is a grotesque act, then, which allows 
Marina to fully experience her own body again.  
 The novel’s reliance on grotesque themes is further made manifest in the use 
of double-voiced discourse. Double-voiced discourse permeates the text and creates 
irony as well as serves a specific humorous function. It frequently undermines 
Marian’s but also other character’s utterances and opinions. It thus creates 
ambivalence as regards Marian’s and other characters’ wholehearted compliance with 
femininity and the social role ascribed to them. 
 Because Atwood’s novel is such an early example of the transcultural feminist 
grotesque – and in fact her first novel – some of the ideas are not as fully developed 
as they are in the later texts. The Edible Woman somewhat maintains a mind/body 
split, with the mind and the body presented as warring parties in the fight for 
consciousness. Moreover, the use of double-voiced discourse is relatively subtle 
compared to other feminist grotesque novels, which employ it much more frequently 
with the result of creating a much greater sense of ambivalence and also unease.  
 In terms of the transcultural feminist grotesque, the novel helps to shed light 
on the beginnings of the mode, which were very much focused on white, able, 
middle-class, heterosexual and thus ‘unmarked’ femininity. Even though Atwood’s 
text leaves out the experiences of the other cultural, in particular indigenous and 
Africadian, presences in Canada, it is nevertheless helpful to consider this type of 
female embodiment alongside the other forms of female embodiment I discuss in the 
chapters to come. Notwithstanding its representation of unmarked femininity and 
whiteness, the novel presents problems for a dominant reading of the female body and 
has broken new ground for more complex analyses. For it is the traumatic results that 
the inscription of gender has on individuals that the novel wants to foreground. It is in 
 
 91 
particular in its emphasis on the traumatising and in fact fleshly traces that gender 




3. Disabled Embodiment in Angela Carter’s Nights at the Circus 
 
“[T]here’s a materiality to imaginative life and imaginative experience which 
should be taken quite seriously”  
(Carter qtd. in Haffenden 85) 
 
Angela Carter’s exuberant narrative in Nights at the Circus (NC) accompanies 
Fevvers, the famous aerialist with wings, on her quest for agency at the end of the 
nineteenth century in London, St. Petersburg and Siberia. The novel tells Fevvers’s 
story and the stories of those she encounters on her journey in a highly intertextual 
manner, with references ranging from the picaresque, 138  the Gothic, romance, 
speculative fiction, magical realism, fairy tales to the carnivalesque. Resembling the 
structure of a three-act play, the novel takes us from Fevvers’s dressing room of the 
Alhambra Music Hall in London to the Circus in St. Petersburg and finally to the 
Siberian wilderness. The stories Fevvers and Lizzie, surrogate mother and ex-whore, 
tell the young and enthusiastic American journalist Walser at the beginning of the 
novel and the story the reader follows via the text itself can hardly be disengaged 
from Fevvers’s exceptional physique.  
 The tour starts in London, Fevvers’ and Lizzie’s home, where they both meet 
Walser during an interview in Fevvers’ dressing room of the Alhambra Music Hall. 
During this interview, which turns out to be puzzling intellectually and physically for 
Walser, the two ‘women’ construct Fevvers’ life story, which takes them from her 
‘birth,’ to life in Ma Nelson’s brothel, to a museum of female monsters and a 
dangerous encounter with a religious fanatic who wants to gain immortality by means 
 
138 According to the biographer Edmund Gordon, Carter felt that the picaresque was “gender-and-class-
neutral compared to other modes of writing” (176). In “Toward a Definition of the Picaresque,” 
Claudio Guillén proposes eight main characteristics of the picaresque novel. However, J. A. G. Ardila 
reduces these eight characteristics to three because he claims that some of the features proposed by 
Guillén are the results of other features. Thus, according to Ardila, the three main characteristics of the 
Picaresque novel are: firstly, it is a narrative that explains a final situation; secondly, it has a dogmatic 
message (which results in irony); and thirdly, the main character is a picaro, a rogue (4). However, 
generally speaking, one has also to distinguish, firstly, between the picaresque genre; secondly, the 
picaresque novels which are constructed according to the model of the Spanish picaresque novels and 
thus can also be called picaresque; thirdly, novels which are considered picaresque in a very broad 
understanding of the genre – some authors refer to them as quasi-picaresque or semi-picaresque – and 
finally, novels which are part of the picaresque myth (Guillén 71). 
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of desecrating and sacrificing Fevvers. The journey continues with both Fevvers and 
Walser’s engagement as performers in Colonel Kearney’s circus on its “Grand 
Imperial Tour” in Petersburg. The circus they join is comprised of a company of 
clowns, a talking pig, educated apes and a princess with dancing tigers, to name but a 
few. Walser follows Fevvers to St. Petersburg because, initially, he wants to prove 
that Fevvers is a “hoax” but falls in love with her instead. In the course of their work 
at the circus, both Walser and Fevvers have near-death experiences: Walser is 
attacked and almost killed, first by a tiger, and later by a clown, and Fevvers is in 
danger of being turned into a miniature version of herself by a Grand Duke but 
manages to escape miraculously.  
 In the third part of the novel, on their way to the East, the circus’ train crashes 
in Siberia, which results in Fevvers and Walser’s separation. While Fevvers, Lizzie 
and the other members of the circus are taken hostage by a gang of male outcasts, 
Walser, after suffering from amnesia due to a head injury, briefly encounters a group 
of runaway female convicts and wardresses and becomes an apprentice to a shaman in 
his native village. After episodes that include the blowing off the earth of both the 
outcasts and the clowns, tigers on a roof of a Conservatory in the middle of the 
Siberian wilderness, Fevvers and Lizzie’s rescue of a young mother and her child, and 
the fight with the Shaman for a sacrificial bear cub, Fevvers and Walser are (sexually) 
reunited. 
 The fabulist quality of the novel does not come short of providing a comment 
on more serious and realist issues, however. The novel is replete with stories of 
oppressed women, either in the form of individuals like Mignon and the Babushka, or 
groups such as the prostitutes in Ma Nelson’s brothel as well as the community of 
female convicts. Yet, the most intriguing engagement with the role of women in 
western society is conferred through the figure of Fevvers, whose exceptional 
physique provides much food for thought. Fevvers is a grotesque character similar to 
the drawings found in underground chambers at the end of the fifteenth century: she is 
a fusion figure combining elements of a woman and a bird. Yet, Fevvers’s body is 
also portrayed as grotesque in the Bakhtinian sense, as a body that is open to the 
outside world, a body grounded in its materiality. Fevvers relishes food, drink and 
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bodily processes. She is thus closely connected to “the material bodily principle” 
replete with “images of the human body with its food, drink, defecation, and sexual 
life” (Bakhtin, Rabelais 18). It is by means of Fevvers that the novel provides its most 
pertinent feminist comment. Yet, as I will demonstrate in this chapter, Nights at the 
Circus far extends notions of gender as a mere performative act, which has been 
central to scholarly criticism of the novel.  
 Discussions of Carter’s feminism have almost exclusively been limited to 
notions of ‘gender as performance,’ ‘femininity as masquerade’ or ‘theatricality’;’139 
so much so that Joseph Bristow and Trev Lynn Broughton speak of an “after-the-fact 
Butlerification” (19) of Carter’s oeuvre. Since Fevvers treats herself as a commodity 
and performs female roles, scholars have criticized Carter for her depiction of ‘gender 
as performance.’ Paulina Palmer, for instance, takes for granted that Carter 
“associates gender with performativity” (“Gender as Performance” 29) and argues 
accordingly that Carter does not “explore its problematic aspects” in her works 
(“Gender as Performance” 32). Christina Britzolakis is even more critical of Carter’s 
depiction of gender as a performative act in Nights at the Circus. According to 
Britzolakis, Fevvers is a character who engages in gender performance – who uses 
performance to her own advantage “to demonstrate that femininity is culturally 
produced” – but is fetishized because she treats herself as a commodity (186). She 
argues that Carter, by using “masquerade-like tactics in order to expose the fictional 
and inessential character of femininity” in fact reproduces constricting structures by 
depicting fetishized characters such as Fevvers (185). In general, critics have found 
fault with Carter’s depiction of Fevvers’s unreflected use of masquerade, because 
Fevvers is “forever staring at reflections in mirrors or reflecting back the gaze of 
others in the bottomless abyss of eyes that open up universes” (Waugh 195).  
 However, what might be at stake in this type of discussion of the novel is not 
so much Carter’s use of the notion of gender as performance, but rather the 
shortcomings in Butler’s theory or critics’ reading of it. Wuttig shows that materiality 
 
139  See Paulina Palmer, “Gender as Performance in the Fiction of Angela Carter and Margaret 
Atwood,” Christina Britzolakis’s “Angela Carter’s Fetishism” and Sarah Sceats’s “Performance, 
Identity and the Body.” 
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is sidelined in Butler’s theory and she extends Butler’s argument by exemplifying that 
gender does something materially speaking to a body. Wuttig explains:  
Butlers starker Teil besteht darin, die Macht der Geschlechternormen als 
Grausamkeit zu erkennen, und darin Geschlecht als soziale Kategorie zu 
begreifen, die ihre Legitimation über die wissenschaftstheoretische 
Behauptung von Natürlichkeit des sex (biologisches Geschlecht) erhält. . . .  
Problematisch ist Butlers theorieimmanente Annexion von Materialität, von 
der Dimension ‚Natur’ hin zu einer Form der Grammatik. (Das traumatisierte 
Subjekt 131) 
While Wuttig draws on the strengths in Butler’s theory, she also points to its 
weaknesses, which she identifies as an annexation of materiality. And she carves out 
that “Butler . . . zwar ein potenziell gewaltsames/verletzendes kulturelles System der 
Zweigeschlechtlichkeit kennzeichnet, aber keinen hinreichenden Ort, auf den diese 
Verletzungen treffen können – der Körper – das Somatische bleibt eine Leerstelle” 
(Das traumatisierte Subjekt 90, emphasis in original). In other words, according to 
Wuttig, Butler does not dedicate sufficient attention to the body’s fleshliness. Yet, it 
is precisely this fleshliness which provides a space on which gendered meanings are 
inscribed.  
 I read Nights at the Circus as an example of what Wuttig identifies as a gap in 
Butler’s theory, then, and I would suggest that while the novel engages with 
performativity because Fevvers performs gender, the novel in fact adds to Butler’s 
theory in exemplifying how gender is embodied and thus puts emphasis on the 
materializing effects of gender. Nights at the Circus engages with notions of gender 
as performative act, yet also demonstrates how gender leaves lasting, material traces 
in bodies. Thus, by drawing on feminist phenomenological thinkers and in particular 
their notion of the body image, my reading of the novel offers fresh insights into the 
pivotal role that the material, fleshly body plays for gendered consciousness and 
subjectivity. In order to substantiate my reading of Nights at the Circus, I will focus 
on four aspects: first, grotesque sexuality, second, the embodiment of objectification, 
third, a renewed access to the lived body, and, fourth, degrading humour.  
3.1 “Like Lucifer, I fell:” Grotesque Sexuality 
Fevvers’s excessive size, her vulgarity, her insatiable appetite and thirst, her bodily 
functions, in short, her grotesqueness is what characterizes her. According to Bakhtin, 
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the “material bodily lower stratum of the grotesque image (food, wine, the genital 
force, the organs of the body) bears a deeply positive character. This principle is 
victorious, for the final result is always abundance, increase” (Rabelais 62). This is 
why Fevvers is described as extraordinarily big, frequently in terms of a “giantess” 
(NC 51, 143, 205) and with adjectives and nouns that refer to excessive size: “big 
girl” (NC 7); “bullish nape” (NC 57); “bulk” (NC 52). 140  Fevvers’s is firmly 
established as grotesque in the Bakhtinian sense because she is insatiable food-wise 
and drink-wise: she displays an “enormous appetite” (NC 22, 51), devours food with 
“gargantuan enthusiasm” (NC 22), has a propensity for alcohol (NC 8, 12, 13, 80, 
171) and, moreover, eats in a very unladylike manner: 
She gorged, she stuffed herself, she spilled gravy on herself, she sucked up 
peas from the knife; she had a gullet to match her size and table manners of 
the Elizabethan variety. Impressed, Walser waited with the stubborn docility 
of his profession until at last her enormous appetite was satisfied; she wiped 
her lips on her sleeve and belched. (NC 22) 
Furthermore, Fevvers farts (NC 11) and belches (NC 22, 51) openly. She is connected 
to matter in that she does not pay attention to cleanliness: Her dressing room stands 
out through its “feminine squalor” (NC 9) and “dirty underwear” lying around (NC 
11), she herself through a “fishy” smell (NC 8), having “stale feet” (NC 9), wearing a 
“baby-blue satin dressing-gown” (NC 8) with “soiled quilting” (NC 7), “rancid silk” 
(NC 19) and having “lips smeared with grease” (NC 53).  
 Moreover, Fevvers does not refrain from addressing topics that would usually 
be left unsaid, such as farting (NC 11), urinating (NC 52), inebriation (“Can’t have the 
ladies pissed on their lonesome, can we?” NC 13), giving birth (“normal channels” 
NC 7), menstruation (NC 23), breasts (NC 22, 23), genitalia and backsides (“more the 
colour of that on my private ahem parts,” NC 25; “whore’s bum,” NC 26) and 
pregnancy (“another in the pot,” NC 54). Her eyes are “indecorous” which is just 
another way of saying that she is (NC 7). She frequently makes lewd comments and 
jokes: 
‘Not his mind as interests me,’ said Fevvers. 
‘Oh, Sophie, you’re a devil for a pretty face.’ 
‘Not his face as interests me –’ (NC 172, emphasis in original) 
 
140  Anne Fernihough points out that “Fevvers’ fleshy presence, her corporeality, is insisted on 
throughout the text” (89). 
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However, I read Fevvers also as a feminist grotesque character because she 
undermines a clearly defined gender binary.141 Even though Fevvers is marked as 
female through names, other people’s descriptions, and bodily features such as 
breasts, her behaviour evokes masculinity. Fevvers is frequently described as 
‘unfeminine’ and, at one point, one of her movements is even described as 
“disturbingly masculine” (NC 166). She has “[a] strong, firm, masculine grip” and her 
voice evokes a man’s, too, as it is compared to “dustbin lids” (NC 7); it is “raucous 
and metallic” (NC 13), “rusty” (NC 43), and her laugh is like a guffaw (NC 7). 
Walser, at the beginning of the novel, even asks himself: “Is she really a man?” (NC 
35). While these might simply seem provocative aspects of Fevvers that are meant to 
catch the reader and his expectations off-guard, Fevvers’s ‘masculinity’ in fact alludes 
to the impossibility of fixed borders, in particular male/female. Similar to the border 
between the classical and the grotesque body as well as human and animal that 
Fevvers crosses, she equally transgresses borders of masculinity and femininity. 
 While these grotesque aspects have been discussed in quite some detail,142 
little attention has been paid to sexuality in the novel, which is a vital element of the 
grotesque. The representation of sexual intercourse is indeed one of three “main acts 
in the life of the grotesque body” (Bakhtin, Rabelais 353).143 Aside from obvious 
references to Fevvers’s infertility and her vulgarity, references to sexuality are usually 
overlooked in discussions of the text. The story of Fevvers’s breaking out of her 
wings is, in fact, a story of an awakening of female sexual desire, a story traditionally 
untold. In this novel, a ‘disabled’ woman does have sexual urges and indeed fulfils 
them.144 Fevvers’s “peculiar inheritance” thus provides an indirect critique of the 
 
141 Grosz, agreeing with Gatens, shows that “the ‘masculinity’ of the male body cannot be the same as 
the ‘masculinity’ of the female body, because the kind of body inscribed makes a difference to the 
meanings and functioning of gender that emerges” (58). Fernihough argues that Fevvers blurs the 
boundaries between feminine and masculine (92), selfhood and performance (92) but also between the 
grotesque and the classical (98-99). She cites Fevvers masculinity as an example of drag (Fernihough 
92). She argues accordingly: “Inevitably, Fevvers’ overstated femininity makes Walser think of 
masculinity, of drag,” similar to Mae West, who Fernihough argues is one of the sources Fevvers is 
based on. However, I argue that it does not make Walser think of drag, but rather masculinity. 
142 See, for instance, Abigail Dennis’s article “‘The Spectacle of her Gluttony’: The Performance of 
Female Appetite and the Bakhtinian Grotesque in Angela Carter’s Nights at the Circus,” Anne 
Fernihough’s “‘Is She Fact or is She Fiction?’: Angela Carter and the Enigma of Woman” or Robert 
Duggan’s chapter on Carter’s work in The Grotesque in Contemporary British Fiction. 
143 The other two are death throes and the act of birth (Bakhtin, Rabelais 353). 
144 At the end of the novel Fevvers in fact reveals that she is not a virgin. 
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‘asexual objectification’ of disabled women (Garland-Thomson, “Integrating 
Disability” 267; Hahn 30).  
 Even though Rosemarie Garland-Thomson comments that “much current 
feminist work theorizes figures of hybridity and excess such as monsters, grotesques, 
and cyborgs to suggest their transgressive potential for a feminist politics,” she 
nevertheless points out that this “metaphorical invocation” of disability fails to 
acknowledge the existence of “actual bodies of people with disabilities” (“Integrating 
Disability” 261). Accordingly, “[e]rasing real disabled bodies from the history of 
these terms compromises the very critique they intend to launch and misses an 
opportunity to use disability as a feminist critical category” (ibid.). I argue that the 
narrative of Nights at the Circus bridges a gap between what Garland-Thomson 
understands as ‘metaphorical invocations’ and ‘actual bodies.’ Reading Fevvers’s 
body as an ‘actual body’ provides insights into the harmful effects of objectifying 
encounters. One way of analyzing ‘actual bodies’ in the novel is by means of the 
‘lived’ body and ‘body images.’ The narrative puts emphasis on Fevvers’s lived body 
as it represents the way Fevvers ‘becomes’ a bird-woman, comprising the breaking 
out of her wings, the first time she flies and later in the narrative the fracture of one of 
her wings. Thus, my reading of the grotesque elements in the novel is informed by 
disability theory. Similar to the marker gender, dis/ability in feminist 
phenomenological terms is also understood as embodied. According to Anne 
Waldschmidt, “disability does not denote an individual’s feature, but an always 
embodied category of differentiation. Disability is taken as ‘true’ because it is not a 
natural fact but a naturalized difference” (25), which rings equally true for 
‘femaleness.’145 
 In spite of or rather because of Fevvers’s infertility, her sexuality is frequently 
stressed in the novel. Associations with the earth, fertility and reproduction are 
frustrated, however, because Fevvers was hatched: “I never docked via what you 
might call the normal channels, sir, oh, dear me, no; but, just like Helen of Troy, was 
hatched” (NC 7). Furthermore, her “father and . . . mother, [are] both utterly 
 
145 Even though there has been an attempt at an intersectional reading of Nights at the Circus (see Erin 
Douglas’s “Freak Show Femininities: Intersectional Spectacles in Angela Carter’s Nights at the 
Circus”), it has overlooked disability as a category.  
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unknown” (NC 21) and she is, allegedly, the “only fully-feathered intacta in the 
history of the world” (NC 294). This means that she is not able to produce offspring 
and defies associations with fertility. Thus, Helen Stoddart claims:  
Fevvers’ weightiness connects her to the Earth, but the fecundity that would 
make this ‘regenerative’ in Bakhtin’s terms is symbolic rather than actual. . . . 
Fevvers’ peculiar combination of weight, flight and symbolism (the 
conception of ideas and history) mean that she is, all the time, linked both to 
Earth and regeneration and to the upward, heavenward movement that Bakhtin 
situates with males and masculinity. (30) 
Yet, Fevvers’s account of becoming a bird woman is, incidentally, reminiscent of a 
sexual awakening: 
I was yet more moved and strangely puzzled by what, at first, manifested itself 
as no more than an infernal itching in my back. . . . ‘At first, but a small, 
indeed, an almost pleasurable irritation, a kind of physical buzzing, . . . ‘And 
the itch increased. If it started in small ways, soon it was as if my back was all 
on fire and they covered me with soothing lotions and cooling powders and I 
would lie down to sleep with an ice-bag on my back but still nothing could 
calm the fearful storm in my erupting skin. ‘But all this was but the herald to 
the breaking out of my wings, you understand; although I did not know that, 
then. (NC 23-24) 
Not only does Fevvers’ breaking out of her wings coincide with the growth of her 
breasts (NC 24) – already a reference to sexuality – but the text also features terms 
reminiscent of sexual urges. “The pleasurable irritation” and “physical buzzing” are 
expressions of a newly awakened sexual desire that grows as time goes by and, not 
too surprisingly, results in “erupting skin,” a reference to ejaculation. Fevvers 
continues her description of her changing body: 
‘I spread,’ said Fevvers. ‘I had taken off my little white nightgown in order to 
perform my matutinal ablutions at my little dresser when there was a great 
ripping in the hindquarters of my chemise and, all unwilled by me, uncalled 
for, involuntarily, suddenly there broke forth my peculiar inheritance – these 
wings of mine! Still adolescent, as yet, not half their adult size, and moist, 
sticky, like freshly unfurled foliage on an April tree. But, all the same, wings. 
(NC 24) 
The adjectives “moist” and “sticky,” more specifically, allude to genital fluids. And as 
is to be expected, the reaction to this newly awakened growth (sexuality) leads to 




 Fevvers’s first attempt to use her wings and fly is also highly reminiscent of 
sexual intercourse (NC 30). Phrases such as ‘the closing of eyes’ and ‘precipitate’ hint 
at the sexual act itself. Yet, this is not discussed further, and after a brief pause, 
Fevvers moves on to describe how she fell. Interestingly, religious terms feature once 
again: Fevvers falls like Lucifer, which evokes cultural associations of the sexual act 
as sinful. And the ‘fall’ conjures Eve’s ‘fall from grace.’ Fevvers’s choice of words 
when describing the great distance between the mantelpiece and the floor is 
suggestive of female genitalia: “[Y]et it yawned before me like a chasm, and, indeed, 
you might say that this gulf now before me represented the grand abyss, the poignant 
divide, that would henceforth separate me from common humanity” (NC 29). The 
“chasm,” “abyss” and “divide” stand in for female genitals. Thus, the divide that will 
separate her from common humanity might not simply be her physiognomy, her 
‘freakishness,’ but rather her femaleness. 
 It is not surprising that when Fevvers recounts the first time she flies, 
metaphorically speaking the first time she has sexual intercourse, Walser feels 
immensely attracted to her. Fevvers entices Walser physically, albeit not through her 
femininity: 
At that, she turned her immense eyes upon him, those eyes ‘made for the 
stage’ whose messages could be read from standing room in the gods [sic]. 
Night had darkened their colour; their irises were now purple, matching the 
Parma violets in front of her mirror, and the pupils had grown so fat on 
darkness that the entire dressing-room and all those within it could have 
vanished without trace inside those compelling voids. Walser felt the strangest 
sensation, as if these eyes of the aerialiste were a pair of sets of Chinese 
boxes, as if each one opened into a world into a world into a world, an infinite 
plurality of worlds, and these unguessable depths exercised the strongest 
possible attraction, so that he felt himself trembling as if he, too, stood on an 
unknown threshold. (NC 29-30) 
Walser is drawn to Fevvers’s huge eyes whose messages, on the surface, can be read 
easily. However, her eyes also pose problems of interpretation. Not only do her irises 
change colour, but they also turn purple, which is an ambiguous colour. Moreover, 
her pupils have grown so “fat” as to devour the entire room; they are “compelling 
voids” and their mise-en-abyme quality suggests infinity and “unguessable depths” – a 
hint at the culturally invested idea of the vagina as a mysterious place. Thus, 
Fevvers’s eyes signify ambiguity and uncertainty. Yet, her eyes stand in for her whole 
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being and especially her sexuality, which is unguessable for Walser because it defies 
traditional concepts. Thus, Walser, too, encounters an unknown threshold and 
responds physically, unconsciously, with trembling.  
 Walser’s attraction to Fevvers serves several functions in the narrative. On the 
one hand, it is a reminder of the materiality of bodies and hence their grotesqueness. 
On the other hand, instead of presenting sexuality as a ‘base’ human and animal need, 
it establishes sexuality in embodiment theoretical terms as both a physical and a 
mental phenomenon. For, according to Merleau-Ponty, sexuality is ambiguous 
because it is impossible to separate the physical from the emotional: “Sexuality, then, 
is not an autonomous cycle. It is internally linked to the whole thinking and acting 
being” (Phenomenology 160). This is exemplified in an episode in which Walser 
reacts to Fevvers’s body: 
Fevvers yawned with prodigious energy, opening up a crimson maw the size 
of that of a basking shark, taking in enough air to lift a Montgolfier, and then 
she stretched herself suddenly and hugely, extending every muscle as a cat 
does, until it seemed she intended to fill up all the mirror, all the room with 
her bulk. As she raised her arms, Walser, confronted by stubbled, thickly 
powdered armpits, felt faint; God! she could easily crush him to death in her 
huge arms, although he was a big man with the strength of Californian 
sunshine distilled in his limbs. A seismic erotic disturbance convulsed him – 
unless it was their damn’ champagne. He scrambled to his feet, suddenly 
panicking, scattering underwear, grazing his scalp painfully on the 
mantelpiece. ‘Ouch – excuse me, ma’am; the call of nature –’ (NC 52)  
This passage describes Fevvers as a grotesque figure on several levels. First, her 
excessive size is underlined repeatedly. It is not only conveyed by means of the words 
“huge” or “bulk” but also by way of big animals or objects such as the shark and a 
hot-air balloon. Second, references to animals such as the shark or cat – and in this 
context the maw – her sudden movements and her “stubbled” armpits, increase 
associations with animality, and, since these animals are predators, voracity, 
especially sexual voracity.146 Third, Fevvers’s taking up of space can be read as 
grotesque in terms of her size but also in terms of dominance, for, traditionally, it is 
usually men who take up more space than women do, which is an embodied reflection 
of their position of power. Fevvers, by taking up space, also takes up the position 
 
146 Carter frequently challenges a straightforward division between human and animal characters, as 
she does, for instance, in her fairy tale rewrites of such classics as “The Beauty and the Beast” and 
“Little Red Riding Hood.” 
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awarded to men and, as a result, denotes masculinity. Walser is not put off by Fevvers 
grotesqueness, even though he is slightly scared of Fevvers’s excessive size: “God! 
she could easily crush him to death in her huge arms,” making him feel “faint.” 
Instead, he is taken by surprise by what he experiences. Blaming this “erotic 
disturbance” on the champagne, but nevertheless realizing that it might not only be 
that, he panics, tries to flee this situation, in the process of which he hurts his head. 
Consequently, his reaction to this situation is both emotional and physical and this is 
doubled by the pain he feels after hurting his scalp.  
3.2 “This bright, pretty, useless thing, myself:” Embodying 
Objectification 
The novel presents us with a paradox in regard to Fevvers. Fevvers, in spite of her 
exceptional physique, which provides her with strength and the ability to fly, and thus 
agency, nevertheless has only limited agency because she is objectified and she 
objectifies herself. She is objectified by other, especially male, characters, because of 
her physical exceptionality. She is described as having a “deformity” and being a 
“cripple” (NC 19). Fevvers is objectified because she is a ‘wonder’ and a ‘woman.’ 
First, she is incarcerated in the “museum of woman monsters” (NC 55). Then, Mr 
Rosencreutz purchases her because her wings in connection to her female genitals are 
vital to his immortality. And finally, the Grand Duke almost turns her into one of his 
objets d’art. Second, she objectifies herself both intentionally and unintentionally. 
Her wings being her most prominent trait, Fevvers learns that her most distinctive 
bodily marker can open doors for her. She learns to turn her ‘mutation’ into physical 
capital because she becomes a famous trapeze artist and even creates her own brand, 
based on her slogan “Is she fact or is she fiction?” (NC 7). She ‘uses’ her ‘disability’ 
or added ability to her advantage,147 both physically and financially. In the process, 
however, she incorporates a view of her body as object, so that her attitude towards 
her own body is, initially, one of self-objectification. However, she overcomes her 
self-objectification by means of her lived body.  
 
147 The term differently-abled has received considerable criticism, which is why I refrain from using it 
in my study. See Susan Wendel’s chapter “Toward a Feminist Theory of Disability” (251). 
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 As Anne Fernihough states, “the transgressive body, the body that subverts 
cultural stereotypes, . . . is always at risk of being read as freakish” (99). Fevvers is 
incarcerated in the ‘museum of women monsters’ because, as a ‘freak,’ she is 
considered an object.148  In fact, the term ‘freak’ was first introduced to describe 
human beings with exceptional or anomalous bodies. As Stewart explains, freaks 
were considered and treated like objects (110); a common practice was to capture 
them and give them as a gift to persons of higher rank or exploit them in shows for 
economic purposes.149 Russo argues along the same lines: “Freaks are, by definition, 
apart, as beings to be viewed. In the traditional sideshow, they are often caged and 
most often they are silent while a barker narrates their exotic lives” (79-80). Hence, 
freaks, similar to women or racially marked people, are not granted a subject status. In 
addition to that, while the freaks’ corporeal exceptionality was heightened through 
staging, narrative, pseudo-medical explanation and costume – a process David Hevey 
describes as ‘enfreakment’150 – freaks would often be grouped into one category, ‘the 
freak,’ despite major physical and intellectual differences (Garland-Thomson, 
Freakery 10). 
 As Garland-Thomson has pointed out, exceptional bodies have always been 
part of society, but the ways in which they are depicted or treated vary according to 
contemporary intellectual concerns (Freakery 2). While ‘freaks’ used to be 
“[d]omesticated within the laboratory and the textbook,” studied for scientific or 
exploited for entertainment purposes, ‘abnormalities’ nowadays require “genetic 
reconstruction, surgical normalization, therapeutic elimination, or relegation to 
pathological specimen” (Garland-Thomson, Freakery 4). Thus, Garland-Thomson 
argues, the ‘freak’ comes to represent a reflection of Western society’s questions, 
necessities and insecurities (Freakery 2). Walser ponders over this process: 
 
 
148 There are several intertextual links between Nights at the Circus and the 1932 movie Freaks. One 
pertinent parallel is the trapeze artist Cleopatra, who, after an attack by the ‘freaks’ of the company she 
is part of, turns into a ‘grotesque’ human duck. 
149 For a discussion of the use of freaks as spectacle in shows see Garland-Thomson and Bogdan. For 
the link between freak shows and pornography, see Stewart. 
150 See Hevey’s The Creatures Time Forgot: Photography and Disability Imagery, in particular his 
chapter on “The Enfreakment of Photography” (53-74). 
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[I]f she were indeed a lusus naturae, a prodigy, then – she was no longer a 
wonder. She would no longer be an extraordinary woman, no more the 
Greatest Aerialiste in the world but – a freak. Marvellous, indeed, but a 
marvellous monster, an exemplary being denied the human privilege of flesh 
and blood, always the object of the observer, never the subject of sympathy, 
an alien creature forever estranged. (NC 161) 
Part of Fevvers’s allure to the audience is that she appears to be fake, that she seems 
to be a “hoax” (NC 17). (Even in the brothel Nelson insists during exchanges with 
customers that Fevvers’s wings are not real but simply attached with glue.) Her 
identity as a performer, but also as a woman and a human being, depends on keeping 
up the appearance of her wings not being real. Not only does the novel resonate with 
the notion of ‘passing,’ but the text also refers to the process of cultural construction 
of an exceptional body. If Fevvers’s wings turn out to be real, she will be objected to 
stereotyping, which will deny her a subject status. She will be “denied the human 
privilege of flesh and blood” and will thus be disembodied. As soon as a body 
deviates from the norm, it is connected to something negative, here a freak or even 
monster. What Walser ponders over, then, is in fact what many scholars have 
commented on, namely that ‘freaks’ are not granted a subject status but are instead 
treated in a similar way to objects. However, the insecurity Nights at the Circus 
addresses by conjuring the notion of the freak does not just concern non-normative 
bodies and ‘disabilities’ but also sex and gendered ‘abnormalities.’ As Fevvers and 
other ‘freaks’ such as the Wiltshire Wonder whose story is characterized by men 
mistreating her (NC 68), exemplify, for Carter freakishness and femininity (or sexual 
non-normativity) are closely linked. 
 Garland-Thomson highlights that there is an ‘inherent’ connection between the 
marker ‘female’ and the marker ‘disabled.’ As she argues: “Western thought has long 
conflated femaleness and disability, understanding both as defective departures from a 
valued standard” (“Integrating Disability” 260). In fact, “both women and the 
disabled have been imagined as medically abnormal […] Sickness is gendered 
feminine” (Garland-Thomson, “Integrating Disability” 262). Her examples range 
from Aristotle who “defined women as ‘mutilated males’” to more recent reflections 
of the “general American public,” which considers “housewives, disabled people, 
blind people, so-called retarded people, and the elderly” as “similarly incompetent” 
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(ibid.). Relatedly, Susan Wendel claims that “[s]ome of the same attitudes about the 
body which contribute to women’s oppression generally also contribute to the social 
and psychological disablement of people who have physical disabilities” (243). To 
add to this, Robert McRuer has shown that there is a mutual interdependence between 
compulsory able-bodiedness and compulsory heterosexuality (2). 
 Especially feminist phenomenology has been crucial in uncovering that as a 
result of gender roles and norms, limited mobility and restricted space, women 
become “physically handicapped . . . physically inhibited, confined, positioned, and 
objectified” (Young 42). The devalued manner of ‘throwing like a girl’ is not the 
result of an inherent, biological predisposition, but rather the result of a sexist society 
that polices women’s bodies and their movements (ibid.). 151  Moreover, feminist 
phenomenology calls attention to the connection between disability and femaleness, 
which is closely linked to the normative body. According to Weiss, “the body image 
ideal” entails the white, male, able, heterosexual body, making it impossible for 
women, racialized people and disabled people to ever reach this ideal.  
 While Fevvers’s status as an object is imposed on her from the outside, she 
also internalizes it. Young has shown how women acquire a view of their body as 
object: 
An essential part of the situation of being a woman is that of living the ever-
present possibility that one will be gazed upon as a mere body, as shape and 
flesh that presents itself as the potential object of another subject’s intentions 
and manipulations, rather than as a living manifestation of action and 
intention. The source of this objectified bodily existence is in the attitude of 
others regarding her, but the woman herself often actively takes up her body 
as a mere thing. She gazes at it in the mirror, worries about how it looks to 
others, prunes it, shapes it, molds and decorates it. (44) 
Fevvers grows up and grows into a bird-woman at Ma Nelson’s brothel.152 It is in “a 
certain house” (NC 21, emphasis in original) that her wings break out and she flies for 
the first time in her life. However, it is also in the brothel that Fevvers incorporates 
 
151 This resonates strongly with Michel Foucault’s notion of the ‘disciplining of bodies.’ 
152 Not only does the setting – the brothel – serve as an ironic comment, but the fact that Fevvers grows 
up with prostitutes also resonates with Lennard J. Davis: “The problem for people with disabilities was 
that eugenicists tended to group together all allegedly ‘undesirable’ traits. So, for example, criminals, 
the poor, and people with disabilities might be mentioned in the same breath” (8-9). Prostitutes, as both 
‘criminals’ and sexually active ‘women,’ are, arguably, closely associated with disability. 
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some bodily mannerisms that come to shape her body image later on. Fevvers’s time 
in the brothel is characterized by ‘posing’ as a mythological figure with wings: 
‘So, with my wreath of roses, my baby bow of smouldering gilt and my 
arrows of unfledged desire, it was my job to sit in the alcove of the drawing-
room in which the ladies introduced themselves to the gentlemen. Cupid, I 
was.’ . . . ‘So there I was . . . I was a tableau vivant from the age of seven on . 
. . and for seven long years, sir, I was nought but the painted, gilded sign of 
love, and you might say, that so it was I served my apprenticeship in being 
looked at – at being the object of the eye of the beholder. (NC 23, emphasis in 
original) 
Fevvers learns from early on to regard herself as an object and she incorporates this 
view physically. Fevvers is a tableau vivant from the age of seven until the age of 
fourteen. She internalizes and embodies immobility. Moreover, she connects it to 
financial benefits, for this is how she “first earned [her] crust” (NC 23). Despite being 
‘promoted,’ at the age of fourteen, to pose as the “Winged Victory” with a sword (NC 
37), she nevertheless remains immobile in this role.  
 Admittedly, in her role as Cupid Fevvers does act (subversively) on occasion: 
“[S]ometimes, out of childish fun, [she] sprung off her toy arrows amongst them [the 
customers], hitting, in play, sometimes an ear, sometimes a buttock, sometimes a 
ballock” (NC 38).153 Furthermore, the Winged Victory or Nike, the Greek goddess of 
victory whom Fevvers impersonates, is based on the marble sculpture “Winged 
Victory of Samothrace.” Incidentally, the female sculpture does not have a head and 
arms. On the one hand, this is ironic, for how does Victory fight without arms?  
Ma Nelson put it out that I was the perfection of, the original of, the very 
model for that statue which, in its broken and incomplete state, has teased the 
imagination of a brace of millennia with its promise of perfect, active beauty 
that has been, as it were, mutilated by history. (NC 37)  
The female body without a head and without arms is the one patriarchy encourages, 
for it cannot think and only has restricted ability of action. Fevvers defies this by way 
of her physiognomy; she has wings and arms and (a head), and in addition to that, is 
even equipped with a sword.   
 




 Moreover, similar to the women in the brothel, Fevvers learns that she must 
‘sell’ a particular body part – in her case her wings, in the women’s their genitals – in 
order to make a living. As Crossley contends: 
Different bodily markers, including genitalia and skin colour . . . effectively 
become tokens of physical capital, opening (or shutting) doors and shaping 
life trajectories and, in this way, habits. Social categories penetrate the flesh, 
manifesting as habitus and hexis. (6) 
Fevvers decides to make a living by ‘selling’ her extraordinary body and thus joins 
Madame Schreck’s “museum of woman monsters” (NC 55). There she meets fellow 
sufferers: “Fanny Four-Eyes; and the Sleeping Beauty; and the Wiltshire Wonder, 
who was not three foot high; and Albert/Albertina, who was bipartite, that is to say, 
half and half and neither of either; and the girl we called Cobwebs” (NC 59-60). As is 
to be expected, these women make a living by providing sexual pleasure to men: “It 
cost another hundred guineas to have the Wiltshire Wonder suck you off and a cool 
two fifty to take Albert/Albertina upstairs because s/he was one of each” (NC 62). 
Fevvers is miraculously spared this fate because she merely has to re-enact the “Angel 
of Death” (NC 70), unlike her fellow convicts who have to provide sexual 
gratifications.  
 Even though Fevvers joins the ‘museum’ voluntarily in order to secure an 
income, she quickly realizes that she is not allowed to leave, Madame Schreck having 
blocked all the windows and thus all the escape routes there are. Fevvers rebels 
against being held a prisoner by Madame Schreck and finally decides to collect the 
money that is due to her. Having rid herself of the Madame by using her wings and 
hooking her on the end of a curtain rail, she has a chance to flee. Held back by money, 
however, she does not escape and is then immediately taken prisoner by “two great 
louts with gallows-meat all over them” with a fishing net (NC 73).154 As it turns out, 
these two men kidnap her for Mr Rosencreutz, who had been a customer of Madame 
Schreck’s and secretly purchased Fevvers from Madame Schreck because he 
considers her “Azrael, Azrail, Ashriel, Azriel, Azaril, Gabriel; dark angel of many 
names” (NC 75) and believes she will bestow him with eternal youth.155  
 
154 The fishing net clearly underlines associations of Fevvers with animals. 
155 These men have the power to name, to categorize, to represent, which exercises symbolic violence. 
See Stuart Hall’s subchapter on “Representation, Difference and Power” (259), in which he speaks 
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 While, initially, Fevvers thinks that Mr Rosencreutz simply wants to have 
intercourse with her and will compensate her financially, which is why she goes along 
with his plan, when the time approaches, she realizes that he wants to sacrifice her to 
gain eternal youth. Fevvers manages to startle Mr Rosencreutz by drawing the toy 
sword that she used for posing as Cupid in Ma Nelson’s brothel and thus gains time to 
escape by flying through a window and hiding in a tree. When she reaches home, she 
is “so weary, so bedraggled, so hungry” and her “nerves so much on edge” that she 
breaks down and cries (NC 84). In both episodes, at Madame Schreck’s and in Mr 
Rosencreutz’s mansion, Fevvers escapes due to her physical superiority. Her body, 
then, provides her with agency. Fevvers’s agency is firmly linked to her ability to use 
her wings, for it is her wings that guarantee her freedom, they ensure escape. Thus, 
Fevvers’s subjectivity is firmly grounded in her wings and thus a particular part of her 
body. However, Fevvers ends up in these situations because she is easily lured by 
money and because she overinvests in her wings (and breasts) as a means of capital.  
 Fevvers narrates these occurrences to Walser in the first part of the novel, 
while they are still in her dressing room of the Alhambra. At this point, she has 
succeeded in having a career as “the most famous aerialiste of the day” (NC 7). As a 
performer Fevvers relies heavily on female symbols. Her nickname ‘Fevvers’ 
contains a direct reference to her exceptional physiognomy and she is eager to point 
out that she is not simply any human or any bird, but an ‘updated’ version of Helen of 
Troy.156 Similar to Helen, Fevvers has been hatched from an egg, yet, unlike Helen, 
both her parents are “utterly unknown” (NC 21). One of the first things she says, in 
fact, is the following: “Not billed the ‘Cockney Venus,’ for nothing, sir, though they 
could just as well ’ave called me ‘Helen of the High Wire’” (NC 7), thus actively 
putting forward associations with Helen of Troy.157 In addition to Helen of Troy, 
 
about regimes of representation and racial stereotyping. His ideas are equally applicable to sexist 
stereotypes.  
156  Many mythological figures are original forms of the grotesque because they represent fusion 
figures. In the case of Helen of Troy, the fusion is between human and swan. 
157 According to Greek mythology, Helen is the daughter of Zeus and Leda. She was born from an egg 
(“Helen,” OED) and is renown for her exceptional beauty, which is said to have triggered the Trojan 
War. Readers familiar with Carter’s oeuvre will also be aware that the story of Leda and the Swan is a 
recurring motif, most prominently dealt with in The Magic Toyshop. Leda is connected to a much more 
sinister story. According to myth, she was the wife of Tyndareus, king of Sparta. Zeus fell in love with 
her and one night, in the disguise of a swan, raped her. As a consequence, Leda laid two eggs, one of 
which is the egg Helen hatched from. 
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Fevvers tries to call to mind associations with the English Angel (NC 8), which she 
cites as one of her nicknames. Fevvers’s use of these recognizably ‘positive’ female 
characters seems to provide her with some agency as regards her image, counteracting 
negative images imposed by men.158 As Paulina Palmer states: “Fevvers, in Nights at 
the Circus, engages in an exuberant version of [‘playing with mimesis’]. She 
playfully mobilizes and parodies the images of womanhood available in nineteenth-
century culture” (“Gender as Performance” 31). Helen is positive because she is 
beautiful and desirable; the Winged Victory is a symbol of success; the English Angel 
or any Angel carries connotations of divinity, purity and beauty.159 However, Sandra 
Bartky argues in a different context: “Female stereotypes threaten the autonomy of 
women not only by virtue of their existence but also by virtue of their content” (24). 
In fact, the narrative reveals how these apparently ‘positive’ images are just as 
harmful as the ‘negative’ ones because they do not grant Fevvers a subject status. The 
narrative problematizes Fevvers’s use of female symbols as it reveals how 
constricting they are, even when they appear to provide agency. By taking on 
nicknames of stereotypical and mythical women, Fevvers also incorporates their 
passivity, for these women are fixed in their roles, with limited ability to change. As a 
result, she considers herself a “bright, pretty, useless thing” and she correctly observes 
that this has nothing to do with her “value as such” but rather with her status as a 
rarity (NC 185). Fevvers frequently receives gifts from male admirers, and at the 
beginning of the novel Walser notes that despite her sexual “inaccessibility,” she is 
willing to make certain exceptions for favours in return. In her professional dealings, 
she uses her body as a commodity. While she believes that this will result in wealth 
 
158 Agency refers to the “ability to act or perform an action” (Ashcroft 6) or to “make choices . . . and 
to carry through with these choices within existing social structures” (Nayar 5). The question this has 
raised especially in postcolonial theory is whether individuals are always entirely free to take choices 
or whether agency is limited by the way particular identities (such as gender or race) are constructed. 
Moreover, new materialism further complicates traditional understandings of agency, for it is not only 
humans who can have agency, but animals and other non-human entities, too. Barad suggests, for 
instance, “[a]gency is a matter of intra-acting; it is an enactment, not something that someone or 
something has. Agency cannot be designated as an attribute of “subjects” or “objects” (as they do not 
preexist as such). Agency is not an attribute whatsoever – it is “doing”/“being” in its intra-activity. . . 
Particular possibilities for acting exist at every moment, and these changing possibilities entail a 
responsibility to intervene in the world’s becoming, to contest and rework what matters and what is 
excluded from mattering” (“Posthumanist” 826-27). 
159 Fevvers certainly tries to evoke associations with the Victorian ideal of the ‘Angel in the House.’ 
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and consequently power, she learns that the very opposite is the case, for by 
objectifying herself, Fevvers deprives herself of agency. 
 This has given rise to criticism of Carter’s depiction of Fevvers and in 
particular her association with performativity (see the section at the beginning of this 
chapter). What is problematic about Britzolakis’s and Palmer’s argument quoted at 
the beginning of this chapter, is that they consider Fevvers’s self-objectification at the 
start of the novel as a given that rings true for the entire text.160 Fevvers does indeed 
fetishize herself and treat her body as a commodity, as these critics argue. However, 
this is due to the cultural and social meanings she has incorporated. Initially, she 
considers herself from the point of the objective body, yet the value she attaches to 
her body and consequently her body image change throughout the narrative.161 
 Towards the end of the second part of the novel, when the narrative seizes to 
be dominated by Fevvers and Lizzie’s story, Fevvers accepts an invitation by a Grand 
Duke. There are several details that make Fevvers uneasy at the beginning of the 
encounter with the Grand Duke: there are no servants present, yet there is a life-size 
statue of herself in ice, which is slowly melting (NC 186), the Duke knows her 
christened name, Sophia, (NC 187) and he shows her a clockwork orchestra “almost 
full-grown,” which includes a bird puppet (NC 187). The Duke comments that he is a 
“collector of all kinds of objets d’art and marvels. Of all things, I love best toys – 
marvellous and unnatural artefacts’” (NC 187, emphasis in original). Throughout the 
course of their encounter, Fevvers feels “less and less her own mistress” (NC 190) – 
an indication that her loss of bodily control starts effecting her subjectivity. 





160 It is highly unlikely that a complex and multi-faceted author such as Carter – an author who was 
very well versed in literature and literary theory at that – would subscribe to notions of ‘gender as 
performance’ or ‘femininity as masquerade’ wholeheartedly and unquestioningly. The treatment of 
carnival and the circus in Nights at the Circus is another case in point because Carter is critical of 
carnival’s liberatory function and its safety-valve mechanism. See Palmer’s essay “From ‘Coded 
Mannequin’ to Bird Woman,” Peach or Britzolakis. 
161 This is also reflected through changes in narrative perspective, as will be shown later. Moreover, the 




All the same, since fair is fair and he deserved something for going to so much 
trouble, she reached round behind her and unfastened the hooks and eyes at 
the back of her dress. There was a swishing rush of released plumage and the 
Grand Duke exclaimed softly under his breath. Nuzzling away, he begged her 
to spread a little more and she did, whilst, although he did not ask her to, a 
deep instinct of self-preservation made her let his rooster out of the hen-coop 
for him and ruffle up its feathers, as he was ruffling hers.  
Yet it was then, as her eyes went round the shadowy, two-tiered room, that she 
saw there were no windows anywhere and, when the Grand Duke’s arms 
tightened around her, she realised he was a man of quite exceptional physical 
strength, sufficient to pin even her to the ground. (NC 191) 
Fevvers seems to feel an obligation to provide certain services because the Grand 
Duke has ‘paid’ for her, reflecting her internalized objectification. Thus, she shows 
him her wings and masturbates him. Not only does Fevvers realize that there are no 
windows, but following this scene, the Duke finds her toy sword and destroys it. She 
is “defenceless [and] could have wept” (NC 191). By losing the sword, Fevvers loses 
phallic power. The wider implication is that adopting patriarchal tools can only result 
in a temporary liberation but does not lead to long-term emancipation. It leaves one, 
in Audre Lorde’s terms “inside the walls of the master’s house” (332).  
 The Grand Duke invites Fevvers so as not to shower her with gifts but in order 
to add her to his collection of miniature eggs. When Fevvers’s notices a miniature tree 
and bird inside one of his collector’s egg, she realizes that he wants to turn her into an 
object. Fevvers manages to escape otherwise, however. She distracts the Grand Duke 
by continuing to masturbate him, takes out one of the miniatures, a model train with 
the legend “The Trans-Siberian Express” (NC 191), and boards it.162 Once again, 
Fevvers manages to escape a dangerous and possibly life-threatening situation, but 
this time it is magic that helps her instead of her wings or a sword. While, in terms of 
the overall narrative, this is a favourable and necessary outcome, it does raise 
questions concerning the mistreatment of women, for it compels the reader to reflect 
on situations in which women are mistreated and abused yet from which they cannot 
escape magically.163 
 
162 Needless to say, this is one of a number of magical realist elements in the novel. Stoddart maintains 
in regard to Nights at the Circus: “Use of magical realism, then, enables Carter to make observations 
about society, gender and the power of myth, and she is particularly sceptical about any construct that 
has been naturalized and accepted without question” (36). 
163 According to Andrzej Gasiorek, “Nights remains in the realm of the imaginary – it is a narrative that 
‘does not belong’ to ‘authentic history’” (131). While I agree that the text is highly parodic and that 
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3.3 “[M]y body was the abode of limitless freedom:” A Return to the 
Lived Body 
It does not come as a surprise that Fevvers’s incarcerations and near-death 
experiences, the physical manifestations of objectification, leave a permanent mark on 
her subjectivity. As was delineated in the theory chapter, “social categories penetrate 
the flesh, manifesting as habitus and hexis” (Crossley 6). The experience at the Grand 
Duke’s palace has had a lasting effect on Fevvers for never before has she come so 
close to losing complete control over her body. This episode represents a turning 
point for Fevvers because she realizes what her self-objectification and self-
fetishizing entails: namely being turned into a literal object. On the train, she says that 
she has learned her lesson, rips off the diamond bracelet and earrings and gives them 
to little Ivan (NC 192-93). Consequently, when Walser sees her, he is “struck dumb to 
see Fevvers, raddled with tears, hair coming down, again, gypsy dress ripped and 
clotted with semen, trying as best she could to cover her bare breasts with a filthy but 
incontrovertible tangle of pin feathers” (NC 193). This is not grotesque, regenerating 
filth; neither is the dress clotted with semen a sign of sexual pleasure but rather of 
sexual abuse. Fevvers’s loss of bodily control almost translates directly into how she 
looks. Aside from her torn dress, she cannot control her hair, which keeps coming 
down, and her feathers are starting to moult. Moreover, her gesture of protecting her 
breasts indicates shame of displaying this body part openly because it is culturally and 
emotionally invested. In this case, as in the former episode with Mr Rosencreutz, 
Fevvers’s female genitals in connection to her wings have made her a potential victim 
of sexually motivated murder. These episodes disclose that the abuse and the palpable 
threat of rape/death that Fevvers was exposed to are part of the lived experience of 
 
fantasy – or rather magical realism – plays a significant role, I consider Gasiorek’s view representative 
of the criticism of anti-realist literature that has often been directed at Carter’s work and especially 
Nights at the Circus. Anti-realist literature is often considered inferior to realist literature because it 
does not represent ‘real’ issues, as realist literature is believed to do. However, realist literature is 
highly ideological and can, in this respect, not be considered superior to anti-realist literature. Peach 
contends, for instance: “Social realist fiction ‘naturalises’ what it portrays so that we trust what we are 
reading. Non-realist fiction distances, or even alienates, us so that we are disturbed, puzzled, confused 
and possibly critical of what we are reading” (6). This type of criticism also misses the point that 
Nights at the Circus, while it does not represent ‘real’ historical events and facts, is still very much a 
‘real’ narrative in that it represents the lived abuse and oppression of women. 
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many women, especially women who are marked otherwise by disability, race or 
ethnicity. 
 Incidentally, after the aforementioned experience with the Grand Duke, 
Fevvers breaks one of her pinions. At the beginning of the third part of the novel, 
while the circus is on board the Trans-Siberian Express, there is an explosion on the 
train. The train wrecks and as a result Fevvers is stuck between the debris: 
The giantess found herself trapped under the collapsed table . . . Her first 
emotions were surprise and indignation. Nearby in the dark, her foster-mother 
expostulated eloquently in her native dialect but none of Lizzie’s tricks could 
get them out of this hole. Only the strength of the muscles Fevvers now 
stretched to their fullest extent would shift the wreckage and let them and their 
bruises scramble out into the open air which in itself was hazardous, filled 
with flame and flying debris. The wind, now risen to a gale, scorched them.  
I have broken my right wing. As the first shock passes, I feel the pain. It hurts. 
Hurts as much as a clean fracture in the forearm. But no more. A lot to be 
thankful for. I can still keep the use of my right arm, even though the wing is 
broken. God, it hurts. Could be worse. Keep a stiff upper lip, girl; keep on 
telling yourself how it could be worse! (NC 205) 
This episode is initially told from a third-person narrative perspective and the narrator 
comments on Fevvers’s emotions, which are surprise and indignation. The narrative 
situation switches from a third-person omniscient narration to a first-person narrative 
perspective so that the reader gets an insight into Fevvers’s experience. She voices the 
pain she feels and can locate it in her right wing. What is compelling here is that 
Fevvers explains that it hurts as much as a clean fracture in the forearm. Not only 
does this create authenticity within the story world of Nights at the Circus, 
substantiating the ‘realness’ of Fevvers’s wings, but this also provides the reader with 
a reference point so that she can empathize with Fevvers’s pain. Conjuring the 
experience of pain comments on the embodiment of human beings and the 
vulnerability of bodies. As Kristin Lindgren points out: “In health it may be possible 
to ignore the body, but in illness it demands acknowledgement and attention” (146). 
 The narrative frequently alternates between omniscient narration and figural 
narrative situations, in which the reader gets an insight into Fevvers’s thoughts and 
feelings, albeit mediated through the narrator. This is to indicate that Fevvers’s 




She knew she had truly mislaid some vital something of herself along the road 
that brought her to this place. When she lost her weapon to the Grand Duke in 
his frozen palace, she had lost some of that sense of her own magnificence 
which had previously sustained her trajectory. As soon as her feeling of 
invulnerability was gone, what happened? Why, she broke her wing. Now she 
was a crippled wonder. Put on as brave a face as she might, that was the long 
and short of it. (NC 273) 
Fevvers’s “vital something” and the sense of her “own magnificence” refer to agency. 
There appears to be a direct correlation between her loss of agency and her broken 
wing. Losing her agency in the episode with the Grand Duke manifests physically in 
her broken wing. Moreover, Fevvers’s mental state shows physically otherwise 
because she has a disheveled look, the Colonel thinks her “shabby” because her 
plumage has lost colour, as has her hair, she has spots and rashes; and the lack of a 
corset makes her shape sag (NC 276-77). Fevvers correctly associates the loss of her 
sword to the Grand Duke with her feeling of lack or the loss of her magnificence. Yet, 
it is not the loss of the sword itself which causes these feelings but rather her body 
image which has been transformed; her body image has incorporated her experience 
of losing control over her body and she retains a feeling of being confined and 
inhibited.164 
 At the end of the novel, Fevvers and Lizzie come to the village where Walser 
lives with the Shaman after the latter picks him up at the site of the train crash. 
Having lost his memory due to a blow to his head, Walser does not recognize Fevvers 
and, to Fevvers’s dismay, has turned her brand song “Only a bird in a gilded cage” 
into “same kind of charm, some kind of dirge . . . meant to do her harm” (NC 289). 
Fevvers felt that shivering sensation which always visited her when mages, 
wizards, impresarios came to take away her singularity as though it were their 
own invention, as though they believed she depended on their imaginations in 
order to be herself. She felt herself turning, willy-nilly, from a woman into an 
idea. (NC 289) 
Fevvers reacts physically to the fear of losing control of her singularity, that is, her 
subjectivity. This is why she feels she is turning from a ‘woman’ into an ‘idea.’ 
 
164 At one point, Fevvers remarks that not only does she suspect that her wing but also her heart is “a 
little broken” (NC 234), because she assumes Walser is dead. Walser, and the feelings Fevvers 
develops for him, play a considerable part in her transformed body image, for it is due to Walser that 
she stops striving for financial gain and revises the view of her body. Lizzie remarks: “And perhaps it 
is a sign of moral growth in you, my girl . . . that you pursue this fellow only for his body, not for what 
he’ll pay you” (NC 282). 
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Woman here refers to an actual, material body, Fevvers’s body, characterized by 
certain biological and social traits, yet in the eyes of men, a woman can turn from 
real, material, individual body into the abstract idea of ‘woman,’ which becomes 
disengaged from its materiality and thus easily controlled and subjugated. Fevvers 
even comes to doubt the existence of herself:  
She felt her outlines waver; she felt herself trapped forever in the reflection in 
Walser’s eyes. For one moment, just one moment, Fevvers suffered the worst 
crisis in her life: ‘Am I fact? Or am I fiction? Am I what I know I am? Or am I 
what he thinks I am?’ (NC 290) 
On the one hand, this is an ironic, metafictional comment on the construction of 
Fevvers as a literary figure and the seemingly central question in the narrative of 
whether Fevvers wings are real or not. As Aidan Day remarks in regard to Fevvers: 
“She has been constructed and has constructed herself; she’s been composed or 
written into being and in that sense is fictional” (181). On the other hand, this is a 
comment on identity construction and in particular the identity category woman. 
‘Woman’ is a constructed category, contingent on the category ‘man’ – in the same 
way that ‘disability’ is contingent on ‘ability’ – hence Fevvers’s doubts about her 
realness and her identity and the fear that she might be trapped within this category by 
means of a man. That being said, Fevvers’s fear of being trapped in Walser’s eyes is 
also connected to the power men have of categorizing and representing women. 
Fevvers’s justifiably worries about a man’s power to confine her within a particular 
role, one that does not coincide with her subjectivity necessarily, which is why she 
speaks of the “reflection in Walser’s eyes.” When Fevvers and Lizzie arrive in the 
village, Walser and the Shaman are about to conduct a ceremony, during which they 
mean to sacrifice a bear cub. Having freed the bear cub, Lizzie urges Fevvers to show 
the Shaman and Walser her wings in order to distract them:  
Fevvers, with a strange sense of desperation, a miserable awareness of her 
broken wing and her discoloured plumage, could think of nothing else to do 
but to obey. She shrugged off her furs and, though she could not spread two 
wings, she spread one – lopsided angel, partial and shabby splendour! No 
Venus, or Helen, or Angel of the Apocalypse, not Izrael or Isfahel . . . only a 
poor freak down on her luck, and an object of the most dubious kind of reality 
to her beholders . . . She felt their eyes on her back and tentatively fluttered the 
one whole wing at them. She was hesitant, uncertain, at first; but then her 
plumage – yes! it did! – her plumage rippled in the wind of wonder, their 
expelled breaths. Oooooooh! (NC 290) 
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There are two main points to be made about this passage. First, the narrator firmly 
establishes Fevvers as anything but Venus or Helen here, she is not an ideal and no 
mythical woman, nor is she a ‘negative’ harbinger, no Angel of the Apocalypse, 
Izrael or Isfahel. Fevvers, in fact, is none of these constructed images. She is ‘only’ a 
‘freak.’ Her ‘freakishness’ is a physical fact, the physical fact she is left with after she 
is stripped of these images, or to put it in Fevvers’s terms, the ‘essence’ of herself, the 
‘essence’ of her body.165 Instead of carrying negative connotations of objectification, 
in this episode freakishness denotes a specific materiality and exceptionality of the 
body which is a physical fact. Fevvers’s plumage rippling in the wind constitutes 
physical, lived experience, something she can feel and hear, and which becomes vital 
to her sense of self. Second, this passage provides a meta-fictional comment on the 
construction of the text and Fevvers as an impossible, grotesque figure. Her status as 
an “object of the most dubious kind of reality to her beholders” refers to the Shaman 
and Walser, who will think she is a vision or some mythical creature. Yet, this also 
refers to the reader who knows that Fevvers is unrealistic. The narrator continues 
describing the encounter: 
She cocked her head to relish the shine of the lamps, like footlights, like stage-
lights; it was as good as a stiff brandy, to see those footlights, and, beyond 
them, the eyes fixed upon her with astonishment, with awe, the eyes that told 
her who she was. . . . Hubris, imagination, desire! The blood sang in her veins. 
Their eyes restored her soul. She rose up from her kneeling position on 
Walser’s chest. She put on a brilliant, artificial smile, extending her arms as if 
to enfold all present in a vast embrace. She sank down in a curtsey towards the 
door, offering herself to the company as if she were a gigantic sheaf of 
gladioli. Then she sank down in a curtsey towards Walser . . . She batted her 
lashes at him, beaming, exuberant, newly armed. Now she looked big enough 
to crack the roof of the god-hut, all wild hair and feathers and triumphant 
breasts and blue eyes the size of dinner plates. (NC 290-91) 
 
165 Carter frequently plays with ideas on identity construction and undermines essential identity while 
at the same time alluding to an ‘essence’. Fevvers comments: “‘My being, my me-ness, is unique and 
indivisible. To sell the use of myself for the enjoyment of another is one thing; I might even offer 
freely, out of gratitude or in the expectation of pleasure – and pleasure alone is my expectation from 
the young American. But the essence of myself may not be given or taken, or what would there be left 
of me?’” (NC 280-81). Statements such as these have given rise to criticism of Carter’s work, because 
some scholars argue that Carter puts forward an essentialist view of sex and gender (see Palmer, 
“Gender as Performance” 29 and Sceats, “Performance”). Paulina Palmer argues in regard to The 
Passion of New Eve – even though she seems to apply this to all of Carter’s later work – that Carter 
“sometimes slips inadvertently into an essentialist position” by displaying “the true self” (“Gender as 
Performance” 29). While the discussion of this issue is covered elsewhere (see Bristow and 
Broughton), suffice it to say that this does not imply an essentialist point of view. As Fernihough 




Fevvers appears to be performing here, as she “put[s] on a brilliant, artificial smile” 
and extends her arms and curtseys, underlining some scholars’ criticism of Carter’s 
use of the notion of gender as performance or masquerade. However, in this passage, 
Fevvers remains a ‘poor freak’ and a ‘crippled wonder.’ In fact, she does not create an 
illusion here of being excessively feminine, of having colourful wings but instead 
presents her ‘essence,’ making her ‘performance’ paradoxical if not ironic. This 
episode draws attention to two further aspects. First, it is other people, the audience, 
who take part in restoring Fevvers’s agency. It is the others’ eyes that tell her who she 
is, “their eyes restored her soul.”166 As Grosz has shown: “[T]he body image is the 
result of shared sociocultural conceptions of bodies in general and shared familial and 
interpersonal fantasy about particular bodies” (84). We gain a sense of self and revise 
this sense of self through other people. Body images are in constant interaction with 
each other and our body image is transformed by other people’s reactions to it, which 
the text aptly demonstrates by means of Fevvers. Second, reclaiming agency also 
results in a revised body image. Fevvers looks “big enough to crack the roof of the 
god-hut,” so in her body image she has increased in size and she is “all wild hair and 
feathers and triumphant breasts and blue eyes the size of dinner plates.” Her mental 
state mirrors her physical appearance and vice versa. Because she has regained a 
sense of self and agency, the way she perceives and values her own body has changed 
too – which is why her discoloured plumage, the brown at the roots of her hair and 
her sagging shape are not of immediate relevance to her any longer. After 
disempowering experiences, Fevvers regains agency by shedding a view of her body 
as an object and by recovering access to her lived body. She, ultimately, regains 
agency through her body. 
 
166 This is not the only passage in the novel in which the perception of other people is central for 
subject formation. Fevvers, for instance, realizes: “When she thought how it was the presence of the 
other that made Mignon so beautiful, little tears pricked the backs of her eyes for she, Fevvers, was 
growing uglier every day” (NC 276); “And she would see, once again, the wonder in the eyes of the 
beloved and become whole. Already she felt more blonde” (NC 285). Even Lizzie comments on the 
change Fevvers experiences: “for, in the light of his grey eyes, her foster-daughter was transformed 
back into her old self again, without an application of peroxide, even” (NC 293). The last quote in 
particular demonstrates that Fevvers’s transformation ‘back’ into her ‘old self’ is nevertheless an 
alteration, for Fevvers does not rely on appearance as much as she did. 
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3.4 “Let me tell you something about Fevvers:” Degrading Humour 
As discussed above, Nights at the Circus is a novel that engages with the grotesque 
thematically by way of its protagonist Fevvers, her hybridity as bird-woman and her 
gargantuan traits. However, Nights at the Circus cannot only be considered a 
grotesque novel in terms of theme or content, but also in terms of its style. The 
mixing of character’s voices, intertextual167 references that establish links between 
‘high’ and ‘low’ art, the incorporation of other literary genres, the inclusion of 
vernacular language and narratorial comments all participate in a combination of, at 
times, opposed elements and thus make Nights at the Circus a novel that is 
stylistically speaking grotesque, too.168 Even though Mikhail Bakhtin never directly 
defined a grotesque style, scholars have found clear parallels between grotesque 
realism and the carnivalesque, heteroglossia, polyphony and double-voiced discourse 
(see Pimentel Biscaia and Vice and the section on “Feminist Grotesque Style” in this 
thesis).169 Fernihough, for instance, argues that “the text of Nights at the Circus is 
itself a carnivalesque body, which has ingested the whole of European culture and, in 
its bloated and uncontainable state, released it in all manner of reconfiguration, 
inversion and parody” (97).  
 What makes Nights at the Circus a grotesque text stylistically is its use of 
humour. Laughter is central to grotesque realism as it “degrades and materializes” 
(Bakhtin, Rabelais 20). During laughter the body takes over and thus undermines an 
overemphasis on intellectuality. Laughter, Brian Poole suggests, “marks a breaking 
point in man’s control of his anatomy as a machine for the expression of logical or 
 
167 The term “intertextuality” was coined by Julia Kristeva (see Orr) and, by and large, refers to the 
relationship one text establishes with other texts. Mostly, intertextuality manifests itself in references to 
other texts, which might be explicit (quotes, pastiche, parody, etc.) or implicit (i.e., one writer’s 
influence on another in terms of style). 
168 Bristow and Broughton consider Carter’s “a distinctly democratic aesthetic” (9) due to her reference 
to a wide variety of cultural products, including ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture. 
169 Nights at the Circus displays many of the characteristics that Bakhtin discerns when discussing 
dialogic discourse in the novel. “Direct authorial literary artistic narration” finds its expression in the 
omniscient, at times judgmental, narrator. Skaz, the “[s]tylization of the various forms of oral everyday 
narration” and “the stylistically individualized speech of characters” (Bakhtin, “Discourse” 262) is 
represented in the idiosyncratic vernacular ways that Fevvers, Lizzie or the Colonel speak. And the 
“stylization of the various forms of semiliterary (written) everyday narration” (Bakhtin, “Discourse” 
262) is to be found in the form of letters (Toussaint’s letter NC 84-85), poems (“So we’ll go no more a-
rowing”, NC 255), folk songs, classical music (Wagner, 18; “The Ride of the Valkyries”, 16; the ballad 
“A Bird in a Gilded Cage” 14) and fairy tales, to name but a few. These elements create what Bakhtin 
calls a heteroglot dialogue within the novel, as many different voices – the voices of characters and 
texts – communicate in the novel. 
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consciously intended content. It overrides the Cartesian dualism of res cogitans and 
res extensa and the Platonic dualism which subjugates the body to the control of the 
mind” (197). Humour in Nights at the Circus is created by means of degrading and 
parodic narratorial comments. The narrator, by way of humorous, ironic and parodic 
asides, undermines Fevvers’s unreflected reliance on symbolic women in her 
construction of her identity. Moreover, the comments partly give away the ‘real’ 
Fevvers or at least one of her rather more negative character traits.  
 Before taking a closer look at some of the comments the narrator makes, the 
question of who the narrator might be should be addressed. While several critics have 
argued that Walser is the narrator (based on the narratorial voice in the “Envoi”), it is 
to be doubted that Walser alone is the narrator of the story. Carter herself commented: 
“People babble a lot nowadays about the ‘unreliable’ narrator . . . so I thought: I’ll 
show you a really unreliable narrator in Nights at the Circus!” (Haffenden 90, 
emphasis in original). In the first part of the novel, Fevvers is indisputably the 
narrator, yet Lizzie intervenes and there are “two Scheherezades” (NC 40) who lure 
Walser into believing that they can perform magic tricks with clocks. In the second 
part of the novel, the narratorial voice cannot be ascribed to any one character and the 
focalization switches between Walser, Fevvers and an omniscient third-person 
narrator. In the third part this is even amplified by frequent switches to Fevvers’s 
first-person perspective. And to add to the confusion, Walser is indeed invoked as 
narrator at the end of the novel: 
Jack, ever an adventurous boy, ran away with the circus for the sake of a bottle 
blonde in whose hands he was putty since the first moment he saw her. . . . All 
that seemed to happen to me in the third person as though, most of my life, I 
watched it but did not live it. And now, hatched out of the shell of unknowing 
by a combination of a blow on the head and a sharp spasm of erotic ecstasy, I 
shall have to start all over again. (NC 294) 
However, as Beth A. Boehm shows in her excellent reading of Carter’s novel, Nights 
at the Circus defies androcentric readerly conventions, which is why the narrator 
cannot be pinned down as easily. She observes that 
when Fevvers ceases her narration and the point of view is no longer Walser 
as reader of Fevvers but instead alternates between a third-person account of 
the sometimes separate wanderings of Walser and Fevvers, Walser’s 
journalistic writings, and Fevvers’s interior monologue, the novel becomes 
difficult to decode according to comfortable readerly conventions. (40) 
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The assignment of the role of the narrator to any one character is constantly frustrated 
in the novel so that one is left with the feeling of ambivalence and ambiguity. 
Whoever the narrator might be, it is clear that s/he does pass judgement on the 
characters.170 The narrator is frequently critical of Fevvers and indeed ‘brings her 
down to earth.’  
Fevvers, the most famous aerialiste of the day; her slogan, ‘Is she fact or is 
she fiction?’ And she didn’t let you forget it for a minute; this query, in the 
French language, in foot-high letters, blazed forth from a wall-size poster, 
souvenir of her Parisian triumphs, dominating her London dressing room. . . . 
pinions large enough to bear up such a big girl. And she was a big girl. 
Evidently this Helen took after her putative father, the swan, around the 
shoulder blades. (NC 7, emphasis in original) 
First, the narrator stresses Fevvers’ persistence in maintaining the indeterminacy in 
regard to her genuineness by commenting: “And she didn’t let you forget it for a 
minute” and thus introduces Fevvers as a character who is self-centred and in constant 
need of attention. At the same time, however, the narrator consolidates that Fevvers is 
a genuine bird-woman. There is no doubt cast on her origins. Instead, the narrator 
simply remarks that Fevvers’s pinions match her size – her size being one of the 
indicators of her Gargantuan traits and a harsh contrast to the stereotypical aerialist, 
who tends to be slim and tiny. 171  While there are no doubts raised concerning 
Fevvers’s genuineness, the last sentence, with its ironic tone and reference to Helen of 
Troy, expresses doubt over Fevvers’s construction as a female performer by drawing 
 
170 I would like to suggest that the narratorial comments in Nights at the Circus serve primarily three 
functions: first, they are intertextual references which create a heteroglot dialogue within the novel 
which brings ‘classical’ literature and ‘low’ art together, shows how they feed off and enrich each other 
and consequently serve a democratizing aim. Second, the narratorial comments are used to express 
criticism of the unreflected reliance on theories. Third, and most importantly, they function as 
degradation, bringing down to earth specific characters and their idealized or distorted self-images, in 
particular Fevvers’s. While it is mainly Fevvers who is degraded, other characters are not exempt from 
the narrator’s comments. In the second part of the novel in the circus in St. Petersburg, when one of the 
tigers escapes, Walser is momentarily paralyzed by fear but recovers control over his body. In order to 
save Mignon from the blood-thirsty tiger, he acts as is to be expected of a ‘real man:’ “Involuntary as 
his heroics, Walser let rip a tremendous, wordless war-cry: here comes the Clown to kill the Tiger! Kill 
it, how? Strangle it with his bare hands, perhaps?” (NC 112). This vignette derives its humour from 
several incongruences. First, Walser, at this point of the narrative, is not a reporter but a clown, thus, 
the very opposite of a tiger-slayer. Second, in spite of his masculinity as expressed through his “war-
cry,” Walser is unable to defeat a beast without a weapon. Not only does he overestimate his own 
power but his attempt at masculinity (heroics) is touching at best. 
171 Stoddart argues that “Fevvers in Nights at the Circus sends up the long-standing myth about circus 




on images of mythical women. “Evidently,” as a ‘weasel word,’172 refers to her claim 
of being a ‘version’ of Helen of Troy. Her wings and feathers are an inheritance from 
her putative father, the swan. The statement is weakened through the use of the word 
‘evidently’ and the information that Fevvers resembles him only “around the shoulder 
blades,” instead of the face or her figure. Is it not rather difficult to trace her origins if 
the only resemblance lies in the shoulder blades? What is called into doubt then is not 
her feathers and wings, but rather that these wings are an inheritance from a famous 
swan-father. What the narrator implies is that rather than being the offspring of a god 
in disguise, Fevvers is the biological result of someone less glamorous.  
 In the course of the novel the narrator becomes increasingly critical of 
Fevvers: 
At close quarters, it must be said that she looked more like a dray mare than an 
angel. At six feet two in her stockings, she would have to give Walser a couple 
of inches in order to match him and, though they said she was ‘divinely tall,’ 
there was, off-stage, not much of the divine about her unless there were gin 
palaces in heaven where she might preside behind the bar. Her face, broad and 
oval as a meat dish, had been thrown on a common wheel out of coarse clay; 
nothing subtle about her appeal, which was just as well if she were to function 
as the democratically elected divinity of the imminent century of the Common 
Man. . . . You’d never think she dreamed, at nights, of bank accounts, or that, 
to her, the music of the spheres was the jingling of cash registers. Even Walser 
did not guess that. (NC 12)173 
This description is anything but flattering. The narrator describes Fevvers as rather 
plain, ordinary and not beautiful at all and strips her of all the extraordinary and 
beatific associations she is trying to establish for herself. There is a stark contrast 
between the feminine ideals Fevvers herself evokes and her actual body. Her size is a 
feature that is stressed frequently, and which, in Noël Carroll’s terms, makes her 
“anomalous” (296) because deviant from the ‘norm.’ Even though Fevvers’s looks 
seem to be aligned with classical beauty ideals, her proportions disrupt this ideal.  
Duggan claims:  
 
172 A ‘weasel word’ is a superfluous word that seems to intensify the meaning of a statement but in fact 
weakens it. The OED defines weasel words as follows: “Words or statements that are intentionally 
ambiguous or misleading.”  
173 The narrator’s comment that “Even Walser did not guess that” puts into doubt theories of Walser 
being the narrator here. Would Walser as a third-person narrator be likely to make a comment such as 
this one about himself? Unlikely. I argue that, in most of the novel, there is a hetero-diegetic 
omniscient narrator who passes judgement on the characters. 
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Carter reveals how Fevvers’s perceived vulgarity is located in her excessive 
size rather than in a particular feature. Instead of having a locatable defect, 
Fevvers by her size alone violates canons of moderation and decorum 
associated with female beauty in Western culture, creating a degree of 
aesthetic disorientation for Walser. (69) 
The result is a harsh contrast to the beautiful, symbolic, mythical women Fevvers is 
drawing on in her construction of her performer identity. However, from a feminist 
disability studies perspective, Garland-Thomson suggests that  
the differences of disability are cast as atrophy, meaning degeneration, a [sic] 
hypertrophy, meaning enlargement. People with disabilities are described as 
having aplasia, meaning absence or failure of formation, or hypoplasia, 
meaning underdevelopment. All these terms police variation and reference a 
hidden norm from which the bodies of people with disabilities and women are 
imagined to depart. (261) 
Not only does Fevvers’s size disrupt ideals of beauty, but she also disrupts the idea of 
a normative body. By virtue of being both a woman and having a disability though, 
Fevvery is doubly marked and doubly disruptive. 
 Moreover, not only is she not extraordinarily beautiful but beauty is not what 
truly matters. The narrator is quite explicit: If she is meant to be “the democratically 
elected divinity of the imminent century of the Common Man,” the century in which 
“all the women will have wings” (NC 285), “the New Age in which no women will be 
bound down to the ground” (NC 25), which Fevvers actively promotes, then beauty 
should be obsolete because it should not be a defining feature for women anymore. 
Furthermore, in this paragraph, the narrator’s comments tend towards criticism. The 
narrator is particularly ironic and critical of her illusion of being ‘divine’ and the only 
possibility of fulfilling this by joining “gin palaces in heaven.” Not only is the 
narrator critical of Fevvers’ drinking habits, but s/he also provides us with an insight 
into Fevvers’s mind-set as someone who is extremely greedy.  
 When Fevvers accepts the Grand Duke’s invitation because he gives her 
diamond earrings as gifts and promises more, which he knows Fevvers cannot resist, 
the narrator steps in with his/her comments. Fevvers enters the Grand Duke’s palace 





Always the same! thought Fevvers censoriously. Money is wasted on the rich. 
For herself, if she’d been as Croesus-wealthy as her host, she’d have fancied 
something like the Brighton Pavilion to call home, something to make each 
passer-by smile, a reciprocal gift to those from whom the wealth had come.  
And, conversely, she went on to herself, sneering at the Grand Duke’s palace, 
poverty is wasted on the poor, who never know how to make the best of 
things, are only the rich without money, are just as useless at looking after 
themselves, can’t handle their cash just like the rich can’t, always squandering 
it on bright, pretty, useless things in just the same way. 
Let me tell you something about Fevvers, if you haven’t noticed if for yourself 
already; she is a girl of philosophical bent. 
Since money it is that makes us rich or poor, why, then: abolish money! she 
sometimes said to Lizzie. For all that money is, is a symbolic means of 
facilitating exchanges that should, by rights, be freely made or not at all. (NC 
184-85, emphasis in original) 
The irony is that Fevvers is critical of others but not of herself. She is, first of all, very 
much interested in “bright, pretty, useless things.” In fact, diamonds are the reason for 
why she meets the Grand Duke hoping to receive some more, or as Lizzie aptly 
identifies her reason for going: “sheer greed” (NC 181). Her greed makes her 
oblivious to clear signs: “But Fevvers saw no death in the snow. All she saw was that 
festive sparkle of the frosty lights that made her think of diamonds” (NC 184). Not 
only is she greedy, but she does not seem to be someone who shares readily, she can 
be “less generous” (NC 19) than she portrays herself, for her reciprocal gift would be 
to make people smile by owning Brighton Pavilion instead of sharing the money that 
would go into building it. The narrator’s insertion “[l]et me tell you something about 
Fevvers, if you haven’t noticed if for yourself already; she is a girl of philosophical 
bent” is ironic, because the reader knows by now that Fevvers’s ruminations are, if 
anything, pseudo-philosophical or naive at best. According to Fevvers, neither the 
rich, nor the poor know how to handle money, thus, no one can, and, consequently, it 
should be abolished. This shows Fevvers’ naivety because she does not realize, as 
Lizzie does, that it is impossible to abolish money in a world in which capitalism is 
the reigning force, especially when one profits from it personally, as Fevvers does.174  
 As Magali Cornier Michael shows, Lizzie and Fevvers reflect diverse feminist 
approaches, an engaged Marxist feminism and a subversive utopian feminism, which 
 
174 See Cornier Michael’s essay on “Angela Carter’s Nights at the Circus: An Engaged Feminism via 
Subversive Postmodern Strategies.” 
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becomes especially apparent in episodes such as the following. In fact, Lizzie corrects 
Fevvers: 
But Lizzie would whistle through her moustache at Fevvers’s naivety and 
reply: the baker can’t make a loaf out of your privates, duckie, and that’s all 
you’d have to offer him in exchange for a crust if nature hadn’t made you the 
kind of spectacle people pay good money to see. All you can do to earn your 
living is to make a show of yourself. You’re doomed to that. You must give 
pleasure of the eye, or else you’re good for nothing. For you, it’s always a 
symbolic exchange in the marketplace; you couldn’t say you were engaged in 
productive labour, now, could you, girl? (NC 185) 
Lizzie is quite pragmatic about Fevvers’s role: Fevvers’s exceptionality in terms of 
her physique is something she must sell. Not only is this a reference to freak shows 
but it also comments on women’s roles within capitalism. If Fevvers did not have 
wings, she would have to sell another part of herself, namely her genitals. Moreover, 
Lizzie is equally ironic about Fevvers’s newly awakened political enthusiasm. Again, 
this does not just put Fevvers’s enthusiasm and her ‘prophetic role’ into perspective, 
but it also creates humour. Fevvers’s utopian vision of a new world in which “all the 
women will have wings, the same as I” and in which “[t]he dolls’ house doors will 
open, the brothels will spill forth their prisoners, the cages, gilded or otherwise, all 
over the world, in every land, will let forth their inmates singing together the dawn 
chorus of the new, the transformed –’” is only met by Lizzie in the following manner: 
“It’s going to be more complicated than that” (NC 285-86). Again, Lizzie rebukes 
Fevvers’s for her naive idealism. Partly, this is because Lizzie has a much better 
awareness of people’s material needs, such as the simple need for food or shelter. 
Lizzie’s and Fevvers’s disputes add a further layer of humour to the narrative, for 
their political opinions could not be more opposed. In another intertextual reference, 
Lizzie invokes the romance plot:  
‘And, when you do find the young American, what the ‘ell will you do, then? 
Don’t you know the customary endings of the old comedies of separated 
lovers, misfortune overcome, adventures among outlaws and savage tribes? 
True lovers’ reunions always end in a marriage. . . . Orlando takes his 
Rosalind. She says: “To you I give myself, for I am yours.” And that,’ she 
added, a low thrust, ‘goes for a girl’s bank account, too.’ . . . ‘The Prince who 
rescues the princess from the dragon’s lair is always forced to marry her, 
whether they’ve taken a liking to one another or not. That’s the custom. . . .  




While Rebecca Munford believes that the ending reaffirms traditional plots or 
structures in her reading of the novel as Gothic narrative that includes “traditional 
notions of marriage and the domestic” (252), I contend that even though the text 
alludes to Walser as a “deceived husband” (NC 295), it does so ironically and with 
Fevvers’s infertility and her feminist commitment in mind. Thus, the traditional 
“happy ending” as depicted in fairy tales (NC 281) that Lizzie cautions Fevvers 
against is more of an unconventional union. Boehm insists that “[a]lthough Carter’s 
‘happy ending’ does reunite the lovers (but not in marriage), it does so in a self-
conscious, metafictional way by drawing explicit connections between marriage as a 
literary device and marriage as a social convention” (42). Episodes such as the above 
suggest that Carter is employing the romance plot ironically and the ending, while 
indeed a happy ending, does not end in marriage but in a sexual union instead.  
 The novel ends with Fevvers’s and Walser said sexual union and Fevvers 
admitting to Walser that she fooled him concerning her status as the “only fully-
feathered intacta in the history if the world” (NC 294), resulting in her laughter that 
spreads over the globe, “until everything that lived and breathed, everywhere, was 
laughing” (NC 295).175 While the end of the novel seems to be the ‘biggest joke,’ 
providing a meta-fictional comment on a literary text such as Nights at the Circus and 
implying that the reader has been fooled into believing that the seemingly central 
question of Fevvers’s genuineness will be answered at the end of the novel, it reveals 
that questions such as these are, in fact, irrelevant. The last sentence in particular 
seems to be of relevance: “‘To think I really fooled you!’ she marvelled. ‘It just goes 
to show there’s nothing like confidence’” (NC 295). It refers to Fevvers’s claim of 
being the only fully feathered intacta in the world.176 Carter herself commented on the 
ending: “Her boast is partly a celebration of the confidence trick, among other things, 
as well as a description of her way of being: she’s had the confidence to pull it off, 
 
175  Some critics (Palmer and Peach) read this in terms of the carnivalesque with Fevvers’s final 
laughter defying traditional, social order. Sceats, for instance, reads it as “truly comic inasmuch as it 
stresses fertility, continuance and the restorative power of laughter; the spirit Fevvers embodies is none 
other than that of libido” (Sceats, Food 60). Other critics challenge precisely the use of carnivalesque 
laughter for it does not provide the necessary means to change oppressive structures; it only represents 
temporary liberation – something Carter criticizes herself. Thus, Gasiorek argues that Fevvers’s 
“weapons are those of mockery and laughter rather than of silence and cunning” (134) and that the 
novel “adopts a carnivalesque mode that undermines gender hierarchies but also deflates its own 
messianism” (135). 
176 It also refers to Fevvers’s “self-confidence as a narrator,” as Miriam Wallraven argues (392). 
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after all” (Carter qtd. in Haffenden 1985, 90).177 Yet, it also refers to her trajectory, 
from apparent confidence in her worth, her lack of it due to being objectified and 
objectifying herself, and her regaining of confidence (agency) through her lived body. 
Yes, there is nothing like confidence as Nights at the Circus illustrates, but confidence 
can only be gained by means of the body. 
3.5 “I’m not in the mood for literary criticism:” Summary of Results 
This chapter has demonstrated that in its invocation of the grotesque, Nights at the 
Circus provides a critical examination and reflection on the response to non-
normative female bodies. By means of engaging with histories of disability ingrained 
in terms such as the ‘grotesque,’ ‘freak’ or ‘monster,’ the novel exemplifies 
innovative insights which recent disability theory and in particular feminist disability 
theory has brought to the fore. The novel is concerned with uncovering the mutual 
construction of the female and the disabled body which becomes especially apparent 
in episodes in which Fevvers is objectified both because of her exceptional body and 
her femaleness. As exemplified through the various images Fevvers assumes and 
which are imposed on her, femaleness and disability in the text are represented as 
embodied and not naturally given. Thus, Fevvers’s experience of ‘becoming’ a bird-
woman – in the Beauvoirian sense of “[o]ne is not born, but rather becomes, woman” 
(The Second Sex 293) – can be read as a metaphor for female bodily experience in 
general. 
 Nevertheless, Carter also employs the grotesque in the way Bakhtin 
conceptualized it in order to undermine the dominant body image ideal, which is 
pictured as male, white, heterosexual and able-bodied. Hence, Fevvers is presented as 
an excessive and transgressive character in terms of food, drink, bodily processes and, 
most importantly, sexual urges. This challenges the “asexual objectification” 
(Garland-Thomson, “Integrating Disability” 267; Hahn 30) of disabled women and 
adds a twist to the notion of the grotesque as representative of fertility and thus 
inherently linked to the female.  
 
177 Cornier Michael maintains: “Fevvers’s subjecthood is assured through Walser’s question, since it 
proves that she has the power to construct her own version of herself” (517). 
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 Furthermore, Nights at the Circus engages with the notion of female agency 
by way of tracing the adaptation of Fevvers’s body image: Initially Fevvers invests 
heavily in her exceptional body, in particular her wings, and thus internalizes a view 
of herself as a (fetish) object. As she is brought up in a brothel where she also has to 
help out occasionally, Fevvers embodies self-objectification. She learns to actively 
take advantage of her exceptional body, of her most prominent bodily markers – her 
wings and her genitals – and thus becomes complicit in her own objectification. Due 
to her own identification with the objective body and her interest in monetary gain, 
she is exposed to and willingly participates in harmful and life-threatening encounters 
with men who want to possess her – notable episodes are her incarceration at Madame 
Schreck’s, her near-death experience as a sacrificial victim at the hands of Mr 
Rosencreutz and, finally, the objectification at the Grand Duke’s place.  
 In these encounters Fevvers experiences physically what it means to be 
deprived of agency and bodily freedom. She is made aware of the limited agency she 
has as a ‘disabled’ woman in spite of her assumed prominence. When she breaks one 
of her wings at the beginning of the third part of the novel, this is emblematic of the 
harm that has been done to her by men such as Mr Rosencreutz or the Grand Duke. 
The emotional harm which she suffers and the lack of agency she experiences 
translates directly into physical harm, namely a broken wing. However, it is by means 
of precisely this broken wing that Fevvers starts recovering a sense of her lived body, 
which results in a renewed sense of agency.	 Unlike many critics who regard Fevvers’s 
self-fetishization to be representative of the whole novel, this chapter has shown that 
Fevvers’s perception and point of view in regard to her own body, i.e. her body 
image, change throughout the narrative and that, as a consequence, she sheds this 
view of her body as fetish object. 
 Nights at the Circus also draws heavily on the grotesque mode in terms of its 
style. Laughter is central to the narrative not only because it features so prominently 
at the end of the novel but also because of the text’s humour and irony. The narrator’s 
ironic and sarcastic comments serve a degrading function and reveal Fevvers’s 
essential motivation in her work and her transactions with other people, especially 
men. While these degrading comments serve clearly humorous purposes, they also 
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establish ambivalence in regard to the narrator of the novel. While Walser is invoked 
as the narrator at the end of the novel, the first part of the novel is clearly in the hands 
of Fevvers and Lizzie. In the second part of the novel, the narratorial voice switches 
between Walser, Fevvers and an omniscient third-person narrator, and in the third 
part, the reader frequently encounters a first-person focalisation through Fevvers. The 
difficulty in ascribing the role of the narrator to any one character does not only hint 
at the possibility of polyphony in writing, but it also defies traditional (male) readerly 
conventions. 
 In its emphasis on the fleshliness of Fevvers’s body, the novel extends the 
notion of the performativity of gender and puts emphasis on what material traces the 
performance of gender leaves in bodies, thus somewhat paralleling the concerns 
raised in Atwood’s novel. Unlike Atwood’s novel, however, Nights at the Circus puts 
greater emphasis on femaleness as connected to another marker, namely disability.178 
Even though whiteness seems to remain mostly unremarked, the novel, in conjuring 
concepts such as the grotesque (in terms of the paintings found in underground 
chambers), the ‘freak’ and the ‘monster,’ alludes to the marker disability and in 
particular female disability and thus hints at the impossibility of only focusing on the 
factor gender. For, as the novel shows, disability is always already gendered and, 
relatedly, femaleness is always already associated with disability. Thus, in terms of 
the diversity of female embodiment, Carter’s novel makes an important contribution 
by linking gender to another identity marker. 
  
 
178 Even though I have not focused on this aspect in this chapter, Fevvers’s working class background 
marks her as well, albeit not as strongly as her disability. 
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4. Transgender Embodiment in Shani Mootoo’s Cereus Blooms at 
Night 
 
“I am painfully aware that as a writer I am making things up for a kind of 
entertainment – but the situations that I put my characters in, actually exist in 
the real world and they happen to real people.”  
(Mootoo qtd. in Jiwa n. pag.) 
 
Cereus Blooms at Night, set on the fictitious Caribbean island Lantanacamara, 
intertwines the lives of Mala Ramchandin, her nurse Tyler and Mala’s only friends, 
Ambrose and Otoh Mohanty. At the beginning of the novel, Mala is committed to the 
Alms House where Tyler works – based on her assumed madness and the rumour that 
she has killed her father even though she cannot be tried for lack of proof. Mala and 
Tyler form almost immediately a strong bond even though Mala is not able to 
communicate via words anymore. It is Tyler, in fact, who tells Mala’s story.  
 Mala’s father Chandin, whose father was an indentured laborer from India, is 
educated in a white missionary family and, to the Reverend’s dismay, falls in love 
with his ‘sister’ Lavinia. Both the Reverend and Lavinia reject him, and he marries 
Sarah, a woman from his community, instead, with whom he has two daughters, Mala 
and Asha. When he learns of his wife and Lavinia being lovers, catastrophe is rife. 
The two women escape leaving Mala and her sister Asha behind, who then become 
the victims of verbal and sexual abuse at the hands of their father. While Asha runs 
away from home in her teens, Mala stays and becomes a substitute for her mother, 
suffering emotional and physical abuse. Her relationship with her childhood friend 
Ambrose leads to the violent climax of the story in which Mala is raped and beaten by 
her father, yet fights him and finally locks him up in a basement room. This is 
followed by years of social ostracism, during which Mala has barely any contact to 
other people. Mala’s seclusion is only interrupted when Otoh, Ambrose’s son, wants 
to get to know her but instead triggers the police’s search of the house, the discovery 
of Chandin’s corpse and consequently Mala’s transferal to the Alms House. While 
Mala’s story is marked by her mother’s and later her sister’s flight, abuse at the hands 
of her father followed by decades of social ostracism, the narrative also provides a 
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subtle, yet powerful, comment on transgender experience by way of the representation 
of Tyler and their lover-to-be Otoh. The cereus plant, which surfaces as the central 
image in the novel, traces the histories of the main characters and unites their diverse, 
yet similar, struggles.  
 According to Edwards and Graulund, Cereus Blooms at Night is representative 
of the postcolonial grotesque because of its depiction of “[g]rotesque violations” 
(130), because it engages with “conceptions of margin and centre, normality and 
abnormality” (130) and because it is “fraught with transgressions and taboos” (131). 
While this cannot be denied, Cereus Blooms at Night cannot only be classified as 
grotesque because it engages with various forms of transgressions.179 Instead, I argue 
that it reflects important grotesque themes because of its emphasis on materiality. In 
fact, critics have noted Cereus Blooms at Night’s resonance with embodiment theory 
and new materialisms. In her chapter on “Intergenerational Witnessing in Shani 
Mootoo’s Cereus Blooms at Night,” Donna McCormack focuses on embodied acts of 
witnessing and trauma and contends that “the body is central to the possibility of 
achieving change (and to maintaining the status quo)” (65). In the most 
comprehensive new materialist analysis so far, Tania Aguila-Way shows how the 
novel “prefigures” many new materialist concerns and how  
by highlighting the need to engage with biological bodies and material 
processes in order to challenge the epistemic violence generated by 
colonialism, Mootoo’s novel opens up possibilities for a different kind of 
engagement with scientific ways of knowing, even if it does not fully realize 
this materialist vision within its own narrative space. (53) 
Yet, both McCormack’s and Aguila-Way’s analyses focus on Mala’s connection to 
materiality, sidelining the novel’s transgender characters and overlooking the 
materializing effects of language.180  
 Moreover, the representation of transgender characters in Cereus Blooms at 
Night is not only vital for discussions of new materialism but it also complicates 
 
179 There is a separate field dedicated to the study of transgression, as publications such as Julian 
Wolfreys’s Transgression: Identity, Space, Time and Chris Jenks’s Transgression attest to. 
180 Chen points out that the criticism directed at social constructivism and its emphasis on language and 
discourse has virtually led to a complete rejection of language discussions in new materialist writing 
(51). Language is not “dematerialized” (51) as Chen argues and should indeed figure in discussions of 
the materializing of matter. 
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certain conceptions of feminism and especially the notion of a “lesbian feminist 
novel” (Kim 155). Susan Stryker shows how 
‘Woman’ typically has been mobilized in ways that advance the specific class, 
racial, national, religious, and ideological agendas of some feminists at the 
expense of other women; the fight over transgender inclusion within feminism 
is not significantly different, in many respects, from other fights involving 
working-class women, women of color, lesbian women, disabled women, 
women who produce or consume pornography, and women who practice 
consensual sadomasochism. Just as in these other struggles, grappling with 
transgender issues requires that some feminists re-examine, or perhaps 
examine for the first time, some of the exclusionary assumptions they embed 
within the fundamental conceptual underpinnings of feminism. Transgender 
phenomena challenge the unifying potential of the category ‘woman,’ and call 
for new analyses, new strategies and practices, for combating discrimination 
and injustice based on gender inequality. (7) 
Similar to the exclusions that women of colour have faced, and still face within 
feminism, transgender activists, too, have been and are still being rejected within 
certain feminist groups. Cereus Blooms at Night (CN) actively questions this 
exclusionary thinking by having a transgender character narrate the story of a 
heterosexual woman who has been abused for most of her life. The novel does not 
equate their struggles yet shows that the cause of sexual abuse and transphobia 
springs from the same source. Thus, in my analysis of the novel, I place emphasis on, 
first, the materializing effects of words; second, the embodied grotesqueness of 
Mala’s body; third, the communicative potential of bodies; fourth, the double-
voicedness of the narration; and, fifth, transgender embodiment. 
4.1 “You cannot, you must not have desire:” The Materializing Effects of 
Discourse 
This section takes a closer look at the materializing effects of language.181 For, as Mel 
Chen observes: “Words more than signify; they affect and effect. Whether read or 
heard, they complexly pulse through bodies (live or dead), rendering their effects in 
feeling and active response” (54). I am in particular interested in, first, how words 
 
181 According to Chen, “animacy is much more than the state of being animate, and it is precisely the 
absence of a consensus around its meaning that leaves it open to both inquiry and resignification” (4) 
and “[u]sing animacy as a central construct, rather than, say, ‘life’ or ‘liveliness’ – though these remain 
a critical part of the conversation . . . – helps us theorize current anxieties around the production of 
humanness in contemporary times” (3). 
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affect Chandin Ramchandin and trigger his turn into a violent and abusive individual 
and, second, in the physical effects of words, more specifically so-called ‘gossip.’ 
 Mala’s story, or rather the story of how she got to the Alms House, as told 
through Tyler’s perspective, begins with her father Chandin and his upbringing in a 
white missionary family. Chandin is the son of an “indentured field laborer from 
India” (CN 26). Wishing to leave behind his “karmic destiny as servant labourer” (CN 
26) old man Ramchandin agrees to convert so that his son can be adopted by the 
white Reverend Thoroughly and his wife who are from the “Shivering Northern 
Wetlands” (CN 27). Chandin becomes part of the Reverend’s household and thus 
gains a sister, Lavinia. However, even though he is adopted, he is not truly treated as 
the Reverend’s son. First, when Chandin’s name change is discussed, which Chandin 
does not have a say in, Mrs Thoroughly thinks that “a Christian, if not Wetlandish 
name was more suitable for a son of theirs” (CN 30). The Reverend, however, 
believes that if Chandin keeps his name, he can more easily “win his people’s trust” 
(CN 30). While this might be a reasonable decision in terms of what the Reverend 
wants Chandin to do, namely become a teacher of the gospel, it in fact betrays his 
rejection of Chandin as his ‘son.’ The Reverend does not want Chandin to have a 
Christian name, because this would entail fully accepting him into his family. Second, 
Chandin has a specifically allocated place in the household, a “straight-back 
upholstered chair had come to be marked as his,” which Chandin himself considers 
“an antidote to the chaos of his uprootedness” (CN 31). Yet, again, it betrays the 
Reverend’s hypocrisy in not allowing Chandin to close to the Reverend’s own family 
and to choose his own place and thus exercise his ‘rights as a son’ independently. 
Third, when the Reverend informs Chandin of an impending family journey, he does 
not include Chandin in his family:  
“Before the term starts up again, I have decided to take the family to spend the 
next few months back home in the Wetlands. You know we have not been 
back in a long time.” 
Chandin’s heart leapt, thinking he was to be included in the family journey. 
“Mrs. Thoroughly, Lavinia and I will leave in a matter of days,” said the 
Reverend. (CN 40) 
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The Reverend’s exclusion of Chandin from his family gives an indication as to his 
‘real’ feelings towards Chandin and his inability to accept someone into his family 
who is racially marked.  
 When Chandin falls in love with his ‘sister’ Lavinia, who does not share his 
feelings, Chandin, instead of losing interest, begins to hate himself. Chandin’s 
attachment to Lavinia transforms and “what sprang up were flames of anger and self-
loathing. He began to hate his looks, the colour of his skin, the texture of his hair, his 
accent, the barracks, his real parents and at times even the Reverend and his god” (CN 
33). As a result, he decides to change “what he had the power to change. Chandin 
took note of the Reverend’s rigid, austere posture, so unlike his own father’s 
propensity to bend or twist or fold his body whichever way the dictates of comfort 
tipped him” (CN 34). Chandin becomes a colonial “mimic man,” who copies the 
Reverend and later his white classmates at the seminary. Yet, he is ‘[a]lmost the same 
but not white’ (Bhabha 130). The white, able-bodied, heterosexual, male body image 
ideal is unattainable for Chandin simply because of his skin colour and thus his racial 
marking. While he mimics the Reverend and his white classmates, his body image, 
which is also formed by responses to his body by other people, in this case the white 
Reverend and classmates, remains defined by a racial dynamic. 
 When the Reverend is made aware of Chandin’s attachment being more than a 
brotherly one, he imposes a prohibition:  
Your attentions have not been unnoticed by my wife and me. . . . You are to be 
a brother to Lavinia and nothing more. A brother. She is your sister and you 
her brother. . . . You cannot, you must not have desire for your sister Lavinia. 
That is surely against God’s will. Do you understand? Do you understand me, 
Chandin! Otherwise, otherwise…” (CN 37, ellipsis in original).  
When the Reverend pronounces his shattering prohibition, it is based on a paradox: 
Even though Chandin is officially ‘adopted’ by the Reverend, he is not truly treated as 
Lavinia’s brother or in fact the Reverend’s son. The Reverend insists on Chandin and 
Lavinia being siblings yet is unable to produce good reasons against Chandin’s desire 
for Lavinia as indicated by his lack of words, “Otherwise, otherwise…” (CN 37, 
ellipsis in original). The text clarifies that it is not the fear of ‘incest’ that motivates 
the Reverend, but rather his fear of miscegenation, for Lavinia later becomes engaged 
to her cousin who is “not a true relation” but who is financially better off than 
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Chandin (CN 44), adding to Chandin’s confusion and alienation. It is in particular the 
Reverend’s pronouncement (“You cannot, you must not,” CN 37) that shows that 
Chandin has been dispossessed “of humanist self-determination, self-definition, and 
agency” (Chen 50).182 
 While Chandin has not been directly insulted by the Reverend’s words, they 
nevertheless have an impact because they put into doubt his worldview: “His world 
seemed suddenly to have shrunk” (CN 37); “Chandin’s world spun and blackened as 
if the sun had suddenly been switched off” (CN 45). Consequently, when Chandin is 
confronted with Lavinia and Sarah’s love affair and resulting escape, the core notions 
his life is based on are destroyed. Not only has his Christian upbringing taught him 
that relationships ought to be heterosexual, but owing to the Reverend he has also 
implicitly incorporated the view that relationships between individuals of different 
‘races’ are not to be accepted. 183  Prohibitions do not merely constitute words, 
however, as this illustrates. Chandin has embodied these prohibitions (the prohibition 
against miscegenation and the prohibition against queerness), that is, they have 
literally become part of his flesh. This exemplifies that words have a profound impact, 
an impact that extends beyond the superficial. The novel thus illustrates that words 
leave physical traces in bodies that shape the individual. 
 The materializing effects of language can also be discerned in the aftermath of 
Lavinia and Sarah’s elopement. While the story is not discussed openly, “during the 
evenings when villagers congregated in the shade of their favourite trees to take in the 
breeze, talk out their problems and hear a little gossip,” it nevertheless “spread across 
the island with the swiftness of a brush fire and the quietness of ripples in a sugar-
factory pond” (CN 64). In the aftermath of Sarah and Lavinia’s escape, Chandin starts 
abusing his daughters. Even though the community is aware of Chandin’s abuse of his 
daughters, it does not intervene: 
 
182  Interestingly, Mootoo refrains from constructing Chandin as animalistic in his attacks on his 
children and, in particular, Mala. This is clearly meant to not put Chandin on a lower position of the 
animacy scale (see Chen). All in all, she does not wish to de-humanize Chandin and thus re-affirm 
constructions of the colonial other as savage. 
183 Aguila-Way makes a similar point: “Sarah and Lavinia’s subsequent elopement . . . completely 
shatters the prohibitions against miscegenation and same-sex desire that Chandin first internalized 
through his cultivation as a colonial mimic man and has now remobilized within the framework of his 
own Indo-Trinidadian household” (Aguila-Way 65). McCormack suggests that “Chandin’s attachment 
to the Reverend’s teachings is both intellectual and bodily” (60). 
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While many shunned him there were those who took pity, for he was once the 
much respected teacher of the Gospel, and such a man would take to the bottle 
and to his own child, they reasoned, only if he suffered some madness. And, 
they further reasoned, what man would not suffer a rage akin to insanity if his 
own wife, with a devilish mind of her own, left her husband and children. 
Whether they disliked him or tolerated his existence, to everyone Chandin was 
Sir. (CN 195) 
First, Lavinia’s and Sarah’s relationship and escape – incidentally, they transgress 
national borders – is seen by many as the cause of Chandin’s ‘mental’ state. 
According to the community, it is Sarah who is to blame for Chandin’s behaviour; her 
disappearance is used as an explanation for Chandin’s “madness.” Because of her 
“devilish mind” (CN 195), Chandin abuses his children. “The romantic relationship 
between Sarah and Lavinia,” Kim argues, “is the ultimate transgression because it 
contradicts the authority of church and father” (160). However, not only do Lavinia 
and Sarah cross racial and heteronormative boundaries, but by leaving the children 
behind, Sarah also severely undermines an idealized image of motherhood. Sarah 
leaves her daughters in order to be with her female lover and thus undoes a self-
sacrificial version of motherhood. It is Sarah’s transgression of norms of motherhood 
rather than her queerness that people object to. Accordingly, equating Chadin’s abuse 
of his daughters with Sarah’s transgression assuages collective guilt. 
 Second, while many members of the Lantanacamaran community seem to be 
connected to the church and its teachings, they do not dare to intervene in what some 
must consider to be morally wrong. It is not simply moral righteousness that is at 
stake here, but a man’s status in society. Even though he clearly does not enjoy this 
status anymore, Chandin used to be “the much respected teacher of the Gospel,” yet 
he remains “Sir” to “everyone” (CN 195). This betrays Lantanacamaran society’s 
adherence to social status and in particular the status of a man. However, it also 
betrays a reliance on words and the status and consequently power they confer.  
 Chandin’s “perversion” has also direct and long-lasting implications for Asha 
and Mala because they are socially ostracized. At the end of the novel we learn that 
Asha tried to contact Mala and sent her several letters but “[n]one of Asha’s letters 
were ever delivered because the righteous postman, deeming the Ramchandin house 
to be a place of sin and moral corruption, refused to go up there” (CN 243). Once 
again, since Chadin behaves in a sinful way and is morally corrupt, his children are 
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deemed to be sinful and corrupt, too. Here, the text even insinuates that 
Lantanacamaran society might believe these perversions are hereditary. Again, words 
in the form of rumours or gossip have a direct impact on Mala’s well-being, for, had 
she received the letters, things might have turned out differently. Mootoo thus 
exemplifies that far from having no impact, ‘gossip’ can have a direct bearing on the 
psychological and physical wellbeing of individuals. 
 The materializing effects of discourse further exert influence beyond the 
characters involved, however, as Tyler’s struggle with his queer desire suggests: 
Over the years I pondered the gender and sex roles that seemed available to 
people, and the rules that went with them. After much reflection I have come 
to discern that my desire to leave the shores of Lantanacamara had much to do 
with wanting to study abroad, but far more with wanting to be somewhere 
where my “perversion,” which I tried diligently as I could to shake, might be 
either invisible or of no consequence to people to whom my foreignness was 
what would be strange. I was preoccupied with trying to understand what was 
natural and what perverse, and who said so and why. Chandin Ramchandin 
played a part in confusing me about these roles, for it was a long time before I 
could differentiate between his perversion and what others called mine. (CN 
47-48) 
Society’s conflation of Chandin’s perversion with queerness has an impact on Tyler 
and, arguably, other members of society, most notably those who deviate. Initially, 
Tyler is confused by the equation between Chandin’s perversion and his own, for he 
senses that they are not the same. Moreover, the gender and sex roles available to 
people are always connected to “rules” which Tyler knows may vary. Thus, Tyler 
goes abroad so as not to be defined by his sexual orientation but rather by his 
“foreignness.” The crossing of a national border carries the hope of simultaneously 
crossing a sexual one as well. As he realizes, however, he can only momentarily break 
free from being sexually marked, for there is no complete getting away from gender 
hierarchies.  
4.2 “[E]very fibre was sensitized:” Grotesque Embodiment 
The cereus plant, which establishes a material connection between the main 
characters in the novel, is the novel’s leading grotesque motif: It is an “unruly” and 
“gangly” (CN 5), unremarkable cactus, which blooms only once a year with huge 
white (CN 134) and crimson flowers (CN 152). Not only is its rare, night-time bloom 
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almost immediately followed by the flowers’ withering, but its characteristic smell 
with its “vanilla-like sweetness” and “curdling” (CN 152) is both pleasant and 
repelling.184 The cereus plant speaks to the ambivalence at the heart of the grotesque, 
where “we find both poles of transformation, the old and the new, the dying and the 
procreating, the beginning and the end of the metamorphosis” (Bakhtin, Rabelais 24). 
 The cereus is only one of many grotesque motifs in the novel. The character 
most easily identified with the grotesque is Mala Ramchandin. First, she is closely 
connected to ‘nature,’ earthiness and matter and thus represents “the material bodily 
principle, that is, images of the human body with its food, drink, defecation, and 
sexual life” (Bakhtin, Rabelais 18). Tyler describes her as having “an aroma 
resembling rich vegetable compost” (CN 11) and “a curiously natural smell” (CN 12) 
when he first meets her. Indeed, the novel presents her as closely connected to nature 
and other non-human beings: 
The wings of a gull flapping through the air titillated her soul and awakened 
her toes and knobby knees, the palms of her withered hands, deep inside her 
womb, her vagina, lungs, stomach and heart. Every muscle of her swelled, 
tingled, cringed or went numb in response to her surroundings – every fibre 
was sensitized in a way that words were unable to match or enhance. (CN 126-
27) 
Mala responds physically to an animal’s movement, something as minute as the 
flapping of wings. Her body is attuned to her environment to such an extent that it 
directly responds to what happens around her. Interestingly, words are unable to 
perform this kind of communication. Not only does the text imply that the body has 
other means of communicating aside from verbal language, but it insinuates that this 
material form of communication is much more precise and pays more attention to 
detail, for “every fibre was sensitized.”  
 Second, Mala can be associated with the grotesque because she performs 





184  Aguila-Way and Hong trace the novel’s engagement with Linnaean botany (Aguila-Way) and 
natural history (Hong). 
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Many of her sounds were natural expansions and contractions of her body. She 
grunted when lifting something heavy. She dredged and expelled phlegm. She 
sighed melodiously. Cried and belched unabashedly. She coughed and sneezed 
and spat and wiped away mucus with no care for social graces. She laughed, 
sometimes as quietly as a battimamselle flapping its wing tips against water in 
an old drum, or as raucously as a parrot imitating it. She farted at will, for 
there was no one around to contradict her. . . . She fed herself when she 
needed to, voided when and where the impulse knocked. (CN 127) 
Through grotesque acts such as farting, belching, laughing, expelling phlegm, 
spitting, coughing, sneezing, crying and defecating, Mala’s body overcomes its 
boundaries and becomes part of her surroundings. In its contractions and expansions 
her body is connected to the world. Moreover, some of her bodily sounds are 
described in comparison to animals, which underlines her connection to ‘nature.’ 
However, one grotesque element is missing, namely Mala’s connection to other 
human bodies. Bakhtin argues that  
the body and the bodily have here a cosmic and at the same time an all-
people’s character; this is not the body and its physiology in the modern sense 
of these words, because it is not individualized. The material bodily principle 
is contained not in the biological individual, not in the bourgeois ego, but in 
the people, a people who are continually growing and renewed. (Rabelais 19)  
Mala performs these bodily functions “unabashedly” with “no care for social graces” 
as “there was no one around to contradict her” (CN 127). The text implies that it is her 
role as a social outcast that allows her to behave in such an unrestricted way. Yet, 
Mala does establish a connection to Tyler and thus is partly reintegrated into society, 
with Tyler, Otoh and Ambrose representing a community that is able to incorporate 
an individual such as Mala – unlike her former community that rejected her.  
 Furthermore, it is the role of a social outcast that frees her from culturally 
formed disinclinations: 
She paid no attention to the odour rising out of the bucket. The scent of decay 
was not offensive to her. It was the aroma of life refusing to end. It was the 
aroma of transformation. Such odour was proof that nothing truly ended, and 
she revelled in it as much as she did the fragrance of cereus blossoms along 
the back wall of the house. (CN 128) 
Mala does not distinguish between pleasant and unpleasant, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ smells; 
all smells are the same to her because she considers decay simply an extension of life, 
a transformed version of life. For Mala, growth and decay go hand in hand and she 
has a bodily awareness that one cannot exist without the other. 
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 The above-quoted passages establish Mala as connected to ‘earthiness.’ She is 
depicted as ‘in touch’ with nature and the animals in her garden: “Mala’s companions 
were the garden’s birds, insects, snails and reptiles” (CN 127). Mala cohabits the 
garden with “moths, centipedes, millipedes, cockroaches and unnamed insects,” with 
“Aves, Hexapoda, Gastropoda and Reptilia” (CN 128) and she does not intervene in 
their lives: “Mala permitted them to roam boldly and multiply at leisure throughout 
her property” (CN 128). Mala’s life revolves around the garden, which she inhabits 
instead of the house.185 However, the narrative establishes a connection between Mala 
and ‘nature’ only to undermine it. Otoh’s “dreams of meeting Mala [are] filled with 
the scent of frilly herbs and potions, potpourri and balms, and nothing so oppressive 
as what choked him now” (CN 153). Otoh falls victim to cultural imagination that 
envisions nature as pure, beautiful and benign and ‘ideal’ women as barer of these 
attributes. What he encounters is, in fact, the very opposite of what he imagined. The 
novel comments on the juxtaposition between nature and culture, and the concomitant 
association of women with nature and men with culture. 
 Indeed, the text undoes associations of women and benign nature by 
presenting Mala, in line with the feminist grotesque, as a female character who defies 
feminine ideals, especially ideals of purity and cleanliness. Several scholars have 
commented on Mala’s queerness as a result of her non-conformity to feminine gender 
ideals (see Howells; Wesling; Wallace; Hong). As Gayatri Gopinath states,  
Mootoo’s text. . .  imagines queerness as residing not solely in particular 
bodies that are specifically marked as ‘lesbian.’ Mala, for instance, is 
explicitly named as queer in the novel in the sense that she extricates herself 
from the terms of heterosexual domesticity. (184) 
Moreover, the text undermines associations with women as the makers of homes.186 
Instead of keeping house, Mala lets it decompose. She lets nature take over, and it is 
the plants that keep the house from falling apart completely (once again underlining 
the agentic aspect of non-human organic matter). Mala strips furniture of its intended 
 
185 According to Edwards and Graulund, Mala is “reduced to living in a ‘cave of abjection,’ a grotto-
like space” (132). The key problem with this explanation is that Mala, in effect, does not live in the 
house (230). She lives outside of it, in the garden.  
186 For more exhaustive analyses of ‘home’ in Cereus Blooms at Night see Meg Wesling’s article 
“Neocolonialism, Queer Kinship, and Diaspora: Contesting the Romance of the Family in Shani 
Mootoo’s Cereus Blooms at Night and Edwidge Danticat’s Breath, Eyes, Memory,” Gopinath’s chapter 
“Nostalgia, Desire, Diaspora: Funny Boy and Cereus Blooms at Night” and Helff’s study Unreliable 
Truths: Transcultural Homeworlds in Indian Women’s Fiction of the Diaspora. 
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function because she uses it to build walls (CN 129): “The individual shapes of the 
furniture were all but obliterated by the density of dust” (CN 129). She does not cook 
or prepare food, which is why Ambrose and later Otoh deliver food to her house once 
a month and she only consumes pepper sauce to dull her pain; it does not serve as 
nourishment. Being the very opposite of a homemaker, then, Mala undermines 
feminine stereotypes. Thus, the novel complicates the nature/culture and equally the 
male/female binary, which assigns a passive role to nature and matter (female) and an 
active role to culture and thought (male). 
 As discussed above, Mala lives in the garden, instead of the house. Kim 
considers the garden a space of contradiction (162). Indeed, while it connects Mala to 
fertility and femininity (Helff 99), these associations are weakened by her 
grotesqueness.187 Moreover, many scholars consider the garden an “alternative space” 
(Gopinath 183). Sissy Helff, for instance, maintains that “the garden represents a 
fertile ground for the cultivation of an alternative society or system, a society with a 
vital, transcultural spirit in which transformation is daily business” (100). According 
to Helff, the garden is too close to the ancestral house and thus its oppression, so that 
the garden (or matriarchy) is not a viable alternative to the house (patriarchy), which 
is why it is destroyed at the end. Aguila-Way also points out that  
Mala’s garden [is] a place of disorientation which, more than simply 
disrupting the racial and sexual hierarchies constructed by Linnaean botany 
and other related scientific discourses, enacts modes of interrelation and 
affiliation that cannot be described through the knowledge systems produced 
by colonial or postcolonial discourse. (54, emphasis in original)  
Yet again, the garden’s destruction at the end of the novel signifies “that the novel 
ultimately cannot support the materialist possibilities it sets in motion” (Aguila-Way 
91).  
 I read Mala’s garden primarily as a grotesque space where life and death 
combine and intermingle. In the Bakhtinian sense, it is a place of ambiguity, for it is 
both paradisiacal and hellish, a place of death and regeneration. When Otoh enters the 
garden, he is overcome by the smells: there is a “pungent stagnancy,” “full-bodied 
foulness of an overflowed latrine,” “putridity,” “miasma” (CN 153) and “stench” (CN 
 
187 In her outstanding reading of the novel, Aguila-Way also draws attention to its Gothic elements. In 
Cereus Blooms at Night, then, the grotesque and the Gothic conceptually overlap. 
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154). On entering the garden, Otoh is reminded of a smell,188 “the memory of an 
outdoor latrine far behind his grandmother’s house, down by the edge of the cane 
field” (CN 153). The reference to cane fields conjures associations with slavery and 
indentured labor: “In Caribbean plantation societies, where sugar was the dominant 
economic resource,” Donette Francis points out, “the cane fields have long been seen 
as a site of labor violations” (80). The cane field, then, conjures a shared past, a 
shared heritage of slavery and the inhumane conditions people were subjected to and 
connects directly to the sexual abuse Mala was exposed to. However, the strong 
emphasis on olfactory perception is also an implied criticism of the reliance, or 
overreliance, on visual proof, which might be faulty or insufficient. What Otoh sees in 
the garden is in direct contrast to what he smells: Not only does he see a mudra tree 
that is exceedingly large and in which peekoplats live which he had “[n]ever before . . 
. seen . . . in the open” (CN 155) – both of which are fictitious, magical species – but 
“[i]t was as though he had stumbled unexpectedly on a lost jungle, and except for the 
odours he would have sworn he was in paradise” (CN 155). Thus, Otoh’s olfactory 
and visual perceptions are at odds in Mala’s garden, undermining the colonial and 
patriarchal emphasis on sight.  
 Similarly, the decaying house symbolizes the remains and the decay of 
patriarchy and colonialism. This is also why it serves as food for the animals, insects 
and plants in the garden. It is Chandin’s corpse, moreover, which provides 
nourishment to moths: “Thousands of tiny white moths had so tightly packed 
themselves side by side that the tiny hooks on the edges of their wings had locked 
together, linking them to form a heavy sheet that was slowly devouring the corpse 
underneath” (CN 184). This is literally “death feeding life” (CN 130). 189  The 
representation of the garden and Chadin’s corpse thus connects to the idea of renewal 
and what Bakhtin calls the “reproductive lower stratum, the zone in which conception 
and a new birth take place” (Rabelais 21). At the same time, it connects to new 
feminist materialisms because matter is considered agentic and active. In fact, as 
 
188 McCormack suggests that “[s]mells are an embodied access to memories that might otherwise 
remain inaccessible” and that “[s]mell is the body’s way of remembering” (52, emphasis in original). 
189 For Edwards and Graulund, Mala’s unwillingness and inability to “discern incongruity, excess, 
disproportion or disgust” signify that she is “post-grotesque” (133). However, I argue that there is no 
such thing as the “post-grotesque” because, as an aesthetic mode, the grotesque is timeless. 
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Chen shows, animacy can illustrate “how matter that is considered insensate, 
immobile, deathly, or otherwise ‘wrong’ animates cultural life in important ways” (2). 
The novel illustrates that negative experiences and an abusive heritage can initiate 
change, can give rise to something new, without leaving this abusive heritage behind 
completely. The “ghost[s],” “remnants” and “memory” mentioned in this episode 
allude to the remains of such a heritage, which can never be completely wiped out. As 
a grotesque space, the garden offers ways of resisting dominant culture. It is a 
grotesque space where the world is turned upside-down or inside out. The destruction 
of the garden then would not necessarily suggest a failure of this ‘alternative space’ 
but rather the possibility of a ‘regeneration’ of the social structure.  
4.3 “I could feel the fear trapped in this woman’s body:” 
Communicating Bodies 
Another element that affiliates Mala with the grotesque is her way of communicating 
with her body. As McCormack maintains: “Mala speaks with and through her body” 
(43). It is through her body that she establishes a connection to the outside world and 
to other people, at least those people who are willing and able to understand her. I 
suggest that Tyler and Mala’s connection is first and foremost bodily. When Tyler 
and Mala first meet, Mala does not talk, or to be more precise, she does not use words 
to communicate with others. Speaking out has only brought Mala misery because she 
has been taken from her house as a result of it (CN 185-86). 
 Mala communicates via her body with Tyler, and Tyler understands not 
simply intellectually, but he rather understands by means of his body. The novel 
illustrates that body images “communicate with each other either in parts or as 
wholes” (Schilder qtd. in Weiss 33). When Mala is brought to the Alms House, Tyler 
is assigned to her care because the other sisters and nurses are afraid of Mala. Tyler 
describes seeing Mala’s body for the first time in the following manner: 
For such a tiny spectre of a being, the new resident breathed deeply and loudly 
in her drugged sleep. I squatted at the side of the canvas stretcher, peering at 
her. I expected her facial skin to be grey but it was ochre, like richly fired clay. 
Her skeletal structure was clearly visible, her thin skin draped over protruding 
bones and sagged into crevices that musculature had once filled. Even so, it 
did not take much imagination to realize that she must have once had a modest 
dignity. She slept on soundlessly. (CN 11) 
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Tyler watches Mala sleep and examines her body. He reads the signs Mala’s body 
gives: the thinness, the colour, the movement of breathing. Even though Mala is tiny 
and thin, resulting in clearly visible bones, thin skin and a lack of muscles, she has a 
certain presence through her deep and loud breathing. Thus, Tyler detects a ‘modest 
dignity’ simply by reading Mala’s body. However, it is not simply Mala’s body that 
Tyler reads but rather her lived body, that is, the way Mala inhabits this body, even 
while asleep. Without having spoken to her, Tyler already establishes a strong bond 
with Mala and even touches her. 
The urge to touch overcame me. I rested my palm gently on her silver hair. I 
expected it to be coarse and wiry, qualities that would have fit the rumours. 
But her hair, though oily from lack of care, was soft and silken. This one touch 
turned her from the incarnation of fearful tales into a living human being, an 
elderly person such as those I had dedicated my life to serving. (CN 11) 
Tyler has heard of the rumours surrounding Mala that construct her as a madwoman. 
However, one simple touch is sufficient to turn Mala from “the incarnation of fearful 
tales” into a “living human being.” Interestingly, Tyler is surprised by the quality of 
Mala’s hair, which is “soft and silken” (CN 11). This is a type of knowledge that is 
only accessible to him because of touch. Hence, this episode emphasizes the 
importance of human touch, the acknowledgement of someone else’s lived body and 
materiality, which produces another, a different kind of epistemology.  
 Moreover, touching Mala leads Tyler to an understanding of what she might 
have experienced. He comments: “I could feel the fear trapped in this woman’s 
body.” Later he adds that “I felt as though I were witnessing a case of neglect” (CN 
11) and that he can feel the “symptoms of trauma” (CN 13). Tyler has to clean up 
Mala and it is then that he comes even closer to understanding Mala’s past: 
Miss Ramchandin did not help me turn her body. I understood and did the job 
quietly, trying to be as invisible as is possible when working on her private 
parts. She was beginning to perturb me, not because I feared her but rather 
because I felt an empathy for her clenched fists, defiant stare, pursed lips and 
deep, slow, calculated breathing – an empathy that words alone cannot 
describe. (CN 19) 
Tyler ‘understands.’ The reader, at this point of the narrative, does not know what 
Tyler understands, for it is only later that we learn what type of abuse Mala suffered 
from. Yet, the mention of private parts and her tense body, “her clenched fists, defiant 
stare, pursed lips and deep, slow, calculated breathing” (CN 19) alludes to the sexual 
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abuse at the hands of her father. Needless to say, Mala’s bodily stance while being 
cleaned up by Tyler parallels her bodily comportment during her father’s abuse (CN 
65). Tyler feels empathy for Mala, but it is not simply emotional/mental, but bodily 
empathy he feels for her. He understands Mala via his own body and reacts with his 
body to Mala’s distress: by smoothing back her hair (CN 16), taking her face into her 
hands (CN 21) and by holding her (CN 23). Thus, their bodies, or body images, 
interact and communicate. Moreover, their bodies establish a grotesque connection 
that overcomes “the biological individual” (Rabelais 19), a connection which 
“represent[s] a material bodily whole and therefore transgresse[s] the limits of their 
isolation” (Bakhtin, Rabelais 23). 
 Tyler is assigned the duty of taking care of Mala at night but is not allowed to 
take off the straps because the nurses are afraid of Mala. She gives Tyler an 
“indication of her will” by turning her “head away slightly” when she is bound up, so 
that her “muscles around her mouth twitched” (CN 16). As a result of being strapped 
to her bed, Mala makes a “frightful sound” (CN 18) at night, which wakes everyone. 
When Tyler enters the room, “[t]he wailing halted abruptly, only to be replaced with 
breathless gasps of fright” (CN 18). Tyler notes that “[t]here was nothing to be 
alarmed about” but that he can equally detect “a fighting spirit” in Mala’s “clenched 
fists” (CN 18). Tyler understands that what upsets Mala is being confined. Even 
though the sister does not agree to removing the straps, she offers Mala to remove 
them the next day if she remains quiet during the night, to which Mala responds 
physically as her “breathing deepened to a low growl” (CN 19).  
 While Tyler initially thinks that Mala only makes sounds such as “crying, 
moaning, wailing and sighing” (CN 23), he realizes that Mala imitates animals. First a 
parrot, then a cricket and then “bird, cricket and frog calls” (CN 24). On the one hand, 
this reflects Mala’s connection to nature and grotesqueness, for she becomes, 
metaphorically, a hybrid between human and animal. On the other hand, it is her way 
of communicating and showing Tyler that she is doing better. Thus, while Mala’s 
withdrawal from language can be read as a symptom of her trauma, it can also – and I 
am more inclined towards this reading – be interpreted as an active withdrawal from 
the patriarchal and colonial order. When Mala imitates the sound of the cricket, “[s]he 
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looked directly and proudly back, for the first time a hint of a smile lighting her face” 
(CN 24), Tyler comments. Certain sounds are Mala’s means of talking to Tyler and 
showing him how she feels. And these animal sounds are affirmative instead of a sign 
of psychological distress. 
4.4 “Ole lady walk, ole lady fall:” Double-Voicedness 
Tyler establishes themselves as narrator at the beginning of the novel with the words: 
“By setting this story down, I, Tyler, – that is how I am known, simply as Tyler, or if 
you wanted to be formal, Nurse Tyler – am placing trust in the power of the printed 
word to reach many people” (CN 3). This appears to be a straightforward introduction 
by the narrator, which is reminiscent of many beginnings of novels told by a first-
person narrator, in particular the Bildungsroman. Tyler’s subjective experience and 
his beliefs (“am placing trust in the power of the printed word to reach many people”) 
seems to be foregrounded from the very beginning of the narration. 
 This is why Aguila-Way problematizes Tyler’s role in the narration of Mala’s 
story as she contends that Tyler “engages in narrative practices that inadvertently 
reinforce the standards of authorship, as well as the gender and sexual binaries, 
produced by colonial epistemology” (70). According to Aguila-Way, Tyler constructs 
himself as a ‘modest witness’ to Mala’s trauma which “threatens to appropriate 
Mala’s story and thus silence her for a second time” (73). However, the role of the 
narrator cannot be ascribed to Tyler exclusively, for the novel is polyphonic and parts 
of the narration are not easily attributed to any one character. There are passages in 
Cereus Blooms at Night that are clearly narrated by Tyler, such as part I and V of the 
novel as the narratorial ingressions at the beginning of these parts and the use of the 
personal pronoun ‘I’ and ‘me’ throughout the narration suggest. The second part is 
also told by Tyler as the narratorial ingression at the beginning of that part imply, yet, 
with fewer insertions by the narrator than in the first part. However, these narratorial 
insertions are missing from the beginning of the third and fourth part. I suggest that 
these parts are told by an omniscient heterodiegetic narrator, who has access to 
knowledge that Tyler could not possibly have, as these parts predominantly revolve 
around Ambrose’s and Otoh’s stories in connection to Mala. Moreover, even within 
specific parts there are stories within stories that are told by other characters. Tyler 
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hears the story of Chandin from his Cigarette Smoking Nana (CN 46), for instance, so 
that either the entire section is narrated by her or constitutes a reproduced story of her 
story by Tyler. Whichever it is, this is a clear instance of double-voiced discourse in 
the text where two characters’ speeches come together in one utterance, and the 
boundaries between who narrates what cannot be easily drawn.  
 As Aguila-Way shows, “Cereus Blooms at Night highlights the need for 
modes of witnessing that attend to questions of materiality and embodiment” (75). 
Yet, according to her, the novel does not fulfil this potential. I would suggest instead 
that Tyler’s close bodily connection and understanding of Mala outweighs his 
ostensibly complicit role as narrator. The “shared queerness” Tyler identifies between 
himself and Mala is primarily based on their roles as outsiders. This shared queerness 
is a bodily queerness that resides in their ability to communicate bodily, as has been 
shown in the previous section. Tyler is the only one who can tell Mala’s story, 
because he is the only one who understands her bodily. Accordingly, Vivian May 
contends that “by filtering Mala’s voice through Tyler (a different form of bilingual, 
two-tongued speaking), Mootoo enacts a strategic movement  . . . Cereus’s form 
highlights how this two-tongued speech is more adequate to narrating 
marginalization” (126). This two-tongued speech, or double-voiced discourse in 
Bakhtinian terms, makes it possible for Mala’s story to be told without having her 
being ridiculed or not taken seriously, as occurs when the police come to her house. 
However, this also enables Tyler to tell their own story, which otherwise might not 
find the necessary means of expression either. 
 Aside from the narrator(s), 190  another pertinent case in point for double-
voicedness in Cereus Blooms at Night is the childhood ditty that Mala starts singing at 




190  Bakhtin’s “[s]tylization of the various forms of oral everyday narration” and “the stylistically 
individualized speech of characters” is often to be found in Cereus Blooms at Night when characters 
communicate in their vernacular language, for instance, when Chandin’s future is debated by the 
community (27-28) or when neighbors assemble in front of Mala’s house after Otoh sees Chandin’s 
corpse and bolts (166). While not as present as the other types, the “[s]tylization of the various forms of 
semiliterary (written) everyday narration” and the “[v]arious forms of literary but extra-artistic 
authorial speech” surface in Cereus Blooms at Night in the form of letters (244-46) and, in the latter 
case, in the form of scientific language (128). 
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Ole lady walk, ole lady fall 
Hit she belly. “Lord!” She bawl. 
Crick crack, all say oops! 
Brick brack, break she back, 
Le we go tief pom-er-ac. (CN 71, 74-75) 
When Mala sings this for the first time, she is at the Alms house and Tyler identifies it 
as “a ditty that children sing and play games to” (CN 71). In fact, this leads the 
narrator a few pages later to an episode from Mala’s childhood when in fact children 
sang it (CN 84), including a child called Walter, who tormented Mala, Asha and 
Boyie (Ambrose) and later turns out to be the judge put on Mala’s case. When Mala 
chants the song, it is not only double-voiced because it goes back to childhood 
memories and to other children chanting it but also because it connects to 
Lantanacamaran and thus Caribbean culture. “This technique of narrating,” Helff 
notes,  
intimates that the act of storytelling is an important cultural element and 
resource, especially in the case of allusions to Caribbean and Indian oral 
traditions. By combining these various narrative styles and genres, the novel 
generates transcultural narrative modes. (98) 
In a sense, the song represents traces of past meaning. In the same way that Mala has 
a story to tell, this song, too, derives from the story of the Caribbean which is not 
always a story characterized by joy but rather hardship. 
 Another important element of double-voicedness in Cereus Blooms at Night is 
the split that Mala experiences as Mala/Pohpoh. When the police come to search her 
house, Mala is sitting in her garden, imagining one of Pohpoh’s nightly excursions. 
Pohpoh, out on a mission to explore a house in the neighbourhood, is spotted by the 
night-watchman and runs back to her/Mala’s house. The closer the police get to the 
room where Chandin’s corpse is, the closer Mala/Pohpoh gets. Yet, when the police 
arrest Mala, she, wanting to save Pohpoh, encourages her to run away. Pohpoh does 
not only get away from the house, but in fact flies away from the entire island. It is 






At the top of the hill Pohpoh bent her body forward and, as though doing a 
breast stroke, began to part the air with her arms. Each stroke took her higher 
until she no longer touched the ground. She soon found herself above even the 
tallest trees. High enough, calmed, she glided, dipping to the left, angling to 
the right. She made a wide circle trying to make out familiar gardens, to 
pinpoint the cricket pitch and the yard with the rabbits’ hutch. Before long her 
village was swallowed up in an unfamiliar coagulation of green, brown and 
yellow. She did three more breast strokes and soared higher before gliding 
again, basking in the cloudless sky. She practised making perfect, broad 
circles, like a frigate bird splayed out against the sky in an elegant V. Down 
below, her island was soon lost among others, all as shapeless as specks of 
dust adrift on a vast turquoise sea. (CN 186) 
While this split in subjectivity might be and, in fact, has been read as a sign of trauma, 
it can also be read as a liberating act of internal double-voicedness. “It is possible,” 
notes May, “to read Mala’s psychic split into Mala/Pohpoh as a result of incest and 
her subsequent abilities to talk and commune with nature as simply evidence of a 
flight into ‘madness’” (120). However, May also suggests that this can be read as 
“double consciousness” and, in fact, a practice of disobedience or disloyalty, and 
Mootoo’s refusal to dissolve this split in consciousness as a “subversive potential in 
interstitiality, in ‘splittedness’” (120). I agree with the latter, for the novel clearly 
establishes this double-voicedness in Mala which frees her both mentally and bodily. 
In fact, the above episode suggests peace and calm, for the cloudless sky and 
turquoise sea, as well as verbs such as ‘basking’ and ‘gliding’ refer to ease and a 
benign atmosphere. By experiencing this split, Mala can somewhat find resolution in 
Pohpoh’s escape. 
4.5 “My body felt as if it were metamorphosing:” Transgender 
Embodiment 
The notion of ‘queerness’ has received considerable critical attention in discussions of 
Cereus Blooms at Night. Even though, as Stryker argues, “[t]he emergence of 
transgender studies has closely paralleled the rise of queer studies,” the relationship 
between the two has been “close” yet sometimes also “vexed” (7). While queer 
usually encompasses “all forms of sexual minority[;] homosexual men, lesbian 
women, bisexuals, transvestites, transsexuals, transgender folk, bdsm/leatherfolk, and 
others who simply identify with nonnormative sexual practices or interests” (Chen 
68), I find it nevertheless instructive to think about characters such as Tyler and Otoh 
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in terms of transgender instead of queer. 191 There is a danger in subsuming different 
kinds of bodily and political experiences under the banner of ‘queer,’ as several 
transgender studies theorists have pointed out (Halberstam; Stryker and Whittle). 
Moreover, transgender more readily encompasses bodily states that are unfinished, in 
a process of becoming in the terms of Bakhtin, as transgender experience often 
refuses “a destination, a final form, a specific shape, or an established configuration 
of desire and identity” (Halberstam 4).  
 The representation of transgender characters in Cereus Blooms at Night has 
been the focus of attention of several articles and book chapters and has been praised 
either for its ‘radicalism’ (Donnell) or ‘ordinariness’ (McCormack). However, 
relatively little attention has been paid to how the novel’s representation of its 
transgender characters corresponds to the developments in new materialist feminism 
that followed the novel’s publication. In fact, Mootoo’s text exemplifies innovative 
insights which recent embodiment theory and new feminist materialism have brought 
to the fore. As regards my overall reading of the novel as a transcultural feminist text, 
I consider transgender bodies to be inherently grotesque, for, first, they more readily 
cross boundaries of maleness and femaleness, queerness and straightness and put into 
question naturalized meanings of the body, and, second, because they represent 
bodies in perpetual transition. 
 Even though the cover of the novel by Granta Books192 refers to Tyler as “a 
gay male nurse” – as many scholars such as Edwards and Graulund (131), Howells 
(149) and Gopinath (178) do – Tyler’s gender and sexual identity throughout the 
novel is much more uncertain, as his gender ambiguous name indicates. He is indeed 
the “only Lantanacamaran man ever to have trained in the profession of nursing,” 
which is considered unusual by his peers. Further, he is sexually attracted to men. 
Admittedly, people refer to him as “pansy” (CN 10) and “funny” (CN 73) and in the 
text itself “queerness” is used, albeit in regard to a “shared queerness” with Mala in 
the sense of strangeness or status as an outsider. Yet, he considers himself to display 
an “unusual femininity” (CN 71), which Mala detects. In one of the most memorable 
 
191 For a comprehensive overview of the etymology and uses of the term ‘queer’ see Chen’s Animacies: 
Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect. 
192 The novel was first published by the small feminist Press Gang. 
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episodes in the novel, Mala steals a nurse’s uniform for Tyler and indicates to him to 
put it on. Even before changing into the dress, Tyler comments:  
My body felt as if it were metamorphosing. It was as though I had suddenly 
become plump and less rigid. My behind felt fleshy and rounded. I had thighs, 
a small mound of belly, rounded full breasts and a cavernous tunnel singing 
between my legs. (CN 76) 
This is an apt description of how Tyler’s body image changes in the course of his 
encounter with Mala. He does not simply imagine his body transform; this is not a 
cognitive representation of his body, but he, in fact, experiences this change, he feels 
his flesh take on a different form. And this is not any form, but in fact akin to a female 
form. Tyler continues to describe changing into the nurse’s uniform in the following 
way: 
I unbuttoned my shirt and felt an odd shame that my mammary glands were 
flat. I dropped my pants. My man’s member mocked me yet was a delight to 
do battle with when pulling the stockings up against my thighs. I had no corset 
to hold them up, but it was enough to see the swirl of hairs on my calves and 
thighs trapped under nylon. There was something delicious about such 
confinement. I held up the dress and slowly stepped into it, savouring every 
action, noting every feeling. I powdered my nose, daubed rouge on my checks 
and carefully smeared a dollop across my lips. (CN 76-77) 
I would like to comment on two ideas in this passage. First, while Tyler’s penis serves 
as an uncomfortable reminder of her193 ‘biological’ maleness and she is ashamed of 
her lack of breasts, Tyler does not feel estranged from her body, that is to say, she 
does not want to actively change it; change the fact that she has a penis and hairy 
thighs. Her body itself is not the source of the problem. She is not in the ‘wrong 
body.’ 194  While socially Tyler’s body’s lack of a clear gender identity poses a 
problem, her body is a source of pleasure to her; even confining her male parts is 
framed as a pleasurable experience (“There was something delicious about such 
confinement,” CN 77). This leads me to my second point. Mala’s lack of reaction 




193  I deliberately alternate between female and male pronouns here to underline the text’s 
indeterminacy in regard to Tyler’s gender identity. 
194 As Jack Halberstam points out, this is a phrase that was frequently used in the media in the 1980s to 
describe transgender and transsexual embodiment (1). 
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When I stepped out from behind the curtain, I saw that Miss Ramchandin had 
made herself busy. She was piling furniture in front of the window. She 
glanced at me, made no remark and kept right on building the tower. I walked 
over to her and stood where I was bound to be in her vision. At first I felt 
horribly silly, like a man who had put on women’s clothing for sheer sport and 
had forgotten to remove the outfit after the allotted period of fun. I felt flat-
footed and clumsy. Not a man and not ever able to be a woman, suspended 
nameless in the limbo state between existence and non-existence. She had 
already set a straight-back chair on the table in front of the window. On top of 
that she placed a stool and was now preparing to stand on her bed and place an 
empty drawer on a pinnacle. 
Just as I was hoping the tower would come crashing down and extinguish me 
forever, a revelation came. The reason Miss Ramchandin paid me no attention 
was that, to her mind, the outfit was not something to either congratulate or 
scorn – it simply was. She was not one to manacle nature, and I sensed that 
she was permitting me its freedom. (CN 77) 
Initially, Tyler invests the nurse’s uniform and the make-up with an almost magical 
power to transform him. However, when he realizes that it does not transform him, he 
feels “silly,” “flat-footed and clumsy” (CN 77). He feels as if he were merely cross-
dressing and is disappointed that the uniform does not provide him with the clarity he 
desires, at first. This desire to fit into binary, normative gender is conditioned by his 
society, which, as mentioned previously, puts great stock in normative gender roles. 
“The truth of one’s gender and race,” to quote Alcoff again, “are widely thought to be 
visibly manifest, and if there is no visible manifestation of one’s declared racial or 
gendered identity, one encounters an insistent scepticism and an anxiety” (7). Tyler 
feels that without a clear, that is to say, binary gender identity she is demoted to 
nonexistence: “Not a man and not ever able to be a woman, suspended nameless in 
the limbo state between existence and nonexistence” (CN 77). This is why she hopes 
that the tower Mala is constructing with furniture will crash down and kill her. What 
is vital in this passage, then, is not gender or the representation of gender via the 
nurse’s uniform and make-up, but rather emotional investment in her body. Or, to put 
it in Jasbir Puar’s words, “how the body is materialized, rather than what the body 
signifies” (n. pag.). It is not the uniform, or make-up, that ultimately enables a 
changed body image, but emotional investment in her body and the support she 
receives from Mala. As Weiss states: “For Merleau-Ponty . . . to develop a body 
image is to develop an image of my body as visible to others. There is no body image 
without this visibility of the body” (33). Tyler’s visibility of his body mostly leads to 
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disapproval, or at least this is what she experiences/feels, which is why he hopes that 
Mala will at least approve. Yet, it is precisely the lack of response from Mala that 
exemplifies that there is no need to respond to something that is inherent to Tyler, or, 
as he puts it, in his ‘nature.’ While nature refers to character here, it also refers to the 
physical world, biology, but the novel establishes nature as always already tied up 
with culture. Mala’s refusal to comment on Tyler’s body triggers a renewed body 
image, one more accepting of his own ‘nature.’ Thanks to Mala, then, Tyler slowly 
builds up self-confidence. He explains later: “I had never felt so extremely ordinary, 
and I quite loved it” (CN 78). While, at this point, Tyler takes off the uniform because 
of fear of negative repercussions, he becomes bolder and more open about applying 
makeup (CN 125, 246, 247), so that at the end of the novel she “defy[s] caution” and 
“present[s] [her]self like a peacock in heat” (CN 246), wearing the nurse’s uniform in 
front of everyone (CN 247-48). 
 Before turning to the novel’s second transgender character, Otoh, I would like 
to comment briefly on Tyler’s racialized identity. The novel itself is vague about 
Tyler’s heritage, but Carol Ann Howells suggests that he is “a gay Afro-Caribbean 
male nurse” (149) and Grace Kyungwon Hong is more reserved and calls him 
“presumably Afro-Caribbean” (89). Based on the cultural and social context the novel 
is set in, which resembles Mootoo’s ‘home’ Trinidad and in which slavery and 
indentured labor are used as points of reference, Tyler might well be Afro-Caribbean, 
but the text is quite deliberate in not pinning this down. Incidentally, Tyler, in his 
function as the narrator, does not feel the need to spell this out. However, Tyler’s 
racialized identity is not commented on because, according to the text, Tyler’s sexual 
in-betweenness does not bring him together in shared relationships of sociability that 
are based on a similar lived experience of race. Quite on the contrary, he mentions 
how he is often not just ridiculed but discriminated against by members of his cultural 
or ethnic group. Moreover, the refusal of marking Tyler racially illustrates an 
important point Jack Halberstam makes: 
The fact that current definitions and uses of the term ‘queer’ proceed without a 
clear sense of the centrality of bodies of color to the production of its meaning 
suggests that one function of sex/gender classifications is the occlusion of the 




Thus, by maintaining vagueness in regard to Tyler’s racial identity, Cereus Blooms at 
Night provides a subtle comment on the intricately linked workings of 
heteronormativity and (colonial) racial discourses. Moreover, this also illustrates what 
Jessica Berman refers to as a ‘trans’ text. According to Berman, the ‘trans’ text 
“challenges the normative dimensions of regimes of nationality and disrupts the 
systems of embodied identity that undergird them” (218). The prefix ‘trans’ of both 
transgender and transnational (as well as transcultural) entails the idea of movement 
and a continuous unfinishedness. Thus, “the prefix ‘trans’ can work to destabilize 
discourses of both nationality and gender without erasing their specific nuances or 
foreclosing their possibilities of divergence” (220). In both its emphasis on Tyler’s 
indeterminacy as regards binary gender and their indeterminacy concerning their 
racial identity, the novel hints at the close connection between regimes of gender and 
regimes of colonialism. This echoes Maria Lugones’s concept of “the 
modern/colonial gender system.” Lugones demonstrates how gender is constituted by 
colonialism and how “biological dimorphism, the patriarchal and heterosexual 
organizations of relations – is crucial to an understanding of the differential gender 
arrangements along ‘racial’ lines” (190). 
 Not only does the novel complicate culturally reinforced gender and sexual 
identity by means of Tyler, but it also comments on the malleability of biological 
matter through its character Otoh. In contrast to Tyler’s, Otoh’s “transformation” goes 
unnoticed (CN 110). Born a girl, Ambrosia becomes Ambrose at the age of five (CN 
109). Otoh complies with heteronormative masculine gender: he has female lovers 
and does not remove his trousers when he is intimate with them (CN 141), which does 
not betray his ‘real’ sex. Otoh, unlike Tyler, is “the object of desire of almost every 
Lantanacamaran woman, regardless of her age. (It is also noteworthy that a number of 
men were shocked and annoyed by their own naggingly lascivious thoughts of him)” 
(CN 135). While Tyler has to control his ‘performance of gender,’ “for the most basic 
level of survival” (CN 78), Otoh does not have to fear such things. While Alison 
Donnell argues that “the union between Tyler and Otoh is radical precisely because it 
is anatomically normative but socially queer” (176), by means of Otoh, the novel 
undermines clear-cut readings of anatomical normativity or stability. In Cereus 
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Blooms at Night, Otoh’s body is not presented as passive biological matter, as this 
passage exemplifies: 
Hours of mind-dulling exercise streamlined Ambrosia into an angular, hard-
bodied creature and tampered with the flow of whatever hormonal juices 
defined him. So flawless was the transformation that even the nurse and doctor 
who attended the birth, on seeing him later, marvelled at their carelessness 
having declared him a girl. (CN 110) 
Donnell reads this passage as “epitomiz[ing] Judith Butler’s argument that ‘gender is 
always doing’” (173). I would like to suggest, however, that Mootoo goes even 
further here, showing that the ‘doing’ of gender has real, material consequences.195 As 
new materialist feminisms insist, the social construct gender does not simply lead to 
external, superficial changes to bodies but in fact has an impact on our ‘biological’ 
setup ranging from hormones, to gut bacteria, to the hardwiring of our brains. Otoh 
actively inscribes male sex into his body by “mind-dulling exercise” in the course of 
which he transforms the processes – hormonal exchanges – within his body. It might 
seem unrealistic, if not Utopian, that Otoh can be so successful in his transformation 
as to change his body’s sex from female to male, leading Gopinath to conclude that 
“Otoh’s seamless transformation . . . speaks to an antirealist system of logic the text 
sets forth” (184). Otoh’s transformation nevertheless alludes to something that is very 
‘realistic:’ a body and its sexual organs are not given, unchanging, or barely changing, 
biological facts, but rather variable, dynamic. Anne Fausto-Sterling argues: 
Not only does sexual physiology change with age – so, too, does sexual 
anatomy. . . . We take for granted that the bodies of a newborn, a twenty-year-
old, and an eighty-year-old differ. Yet we persist in a static vision of 
anatomical sex. The changes that occur throughout the life cycle all happen as 
part of a biocultural system in which cells and culture mutually construct each 
other. (Sexing the Body 242) 
According to Cereus Blooms at Night, sex is as malleable as gender. The novel thus 
reflects that “[t]ransgender phenomena,” as Stryker contends, “call into question both 
the stability of the material referent ‘sex’ and the relationship of that unstable 
category to the linguistic, social, and psychical categories of ‘gender’” (9). There is 
no pure ‘maleness’ or ‘femaleness,’ only gradations of fictitious extremes, as 
exemplified by the cereus plant. “The cereus, like all cactus plants,” according to 
 
195 The materializing effects of gender are not spelled out in Butler’s work as Wuttig shows. 
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Isabel Hoving, “is a hermaphrodite; it can boast of both a stamen and an ovary, parts 
usually designated as respectively male and female” (162). It is no coincidence that it 
is Otoh who brings Mala a clipping of the cereus plant from her garden, which in turn 
was given to her by Lavinia. Thus, the plant does not only connect the central, ‘queer’ 
characters in the novel but it also symbolizes the malleability of matter.196  
 The representation of Otoh not only reveals the malleability of biological 
matter but also the multiplicity and ‘inconsistency’ of transgender, and in fact all 
gendered, experiences. Otoh’s transformation, while flawless to the outside world, 
might not be as flawless on the ‘inside’ as one episode suggests. Otoh longs to share 
his secret with Mala, puts on one of his mother’s dresses one night (CN 121) and sets 
out to Mala’s house. The scene parallels Tyler’s changing into the nurse’s uniform. 
Yet, the way Otoh experiences this is entirely different from Tyler: “In the mirror of 
his armoire he watched himself pull on the blue-and-white-flowered garment, half 
expecting to resemble his mother, but there was no resemblance” (CN 121). There is 
no metamorphosis of his body image from masculine towards feminine, no mention 
of the pleasure of confining one’s body parts. This is a much more pragmatic act. The 
only thing Otoh imagines is looking like his mother, which is not the case. However, 
“[w]earing a dress made Otoh carry himself gracefully” (CN 121). It is not the dress 
that makes his movements more graceful but rather the associations he has with 
dresses as signifiers of femininity. As a consequence, readying himself for action, “he 
gathered the skirt of his dress in one hand and tied the cloth in a knot high up his 
thigh” (CN 121). Moving in his usual, masculine manner requires more freedom of 
his limbs and a lack of grace, for “[h]e raced home with much less grace than he had 
set out” (CN 122). There are differences in bodily comportment between men and 
women, which Otoh, as a heteronormative masculine character reflects. These 
differences are not the result of biological difference, however, but rather embodied 
cultural notions of what male and female bodies can or should do, or as Young puts it, 
“they have their source in the particular situation of women as conditioned by their 
sexist oppression in contemporary society” (42). Because women are not supposed to 
 
196  I understand and use the term ‘queer’ here in Chen’s sense as describing “exceptions to 
the conventional ordering of sex, reproduction, and intimacy” (11) and “as probing beyond the bounds 
of normativity, taking on the load of rejection, resistance, negativity, indiscretion, quirkiness, 
and marginalization” (68). 
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master the world, they are not encouraged to use their body freely. The text 
demonstrates amply that sex does not reside in bodies, but that instead bodies are 
moulded based on societal roles and that this moulding leaves permanent traces in 
bodies. 
 Incidentally, Otoh’s mother Elsie remarks: “every village in this place have a 
handful of people like you. And is not easy to tell who is who. How many people here 
know about you, eh? I does watch out over the banister and wonder if who I see is 
really what I see” (CN 238, emphasis in original). Queerness and transgenderism are 
established as common, indeed ordinary, occurrences on this fictitious Caribbean 
island. Furthermore, while people comply with normative gender identities from an 
outsider’s perspective, they might have body images that digress from normative 
body image ideals, and sexualities that are not based on gender identities. Otoh’s 
mother Elsie inquires whether Otoh really desires women and thus acknowledges 
desire as diverse. Thus, the novel illustrates, as McCormack calls it, the “diversity of 
queer identities” (73), that is, the multiple ways of living in a transgender body, some 
of which are apparently more ‘gender-conforming’ and others which are not, without 
fixing the differences that exist between these forms of having and being a 
transgender body.  
4.6 “Her body remembered:” Summary of Results 
This chapter has clarified that Cereus Blooms at Night is pronounced in its attention 
to and re-evaluation of matter. On the one hand, the novel establishes Mala as a 
grotesque character in the Bakhtinian sense. Mala’s body is connected to the world; 
she is intricately linked to the insects, animals and plants in her garden, is 
characterized by ‘earthiness’ and revels in bodily processes. On the other hand, 
Mala’s body as communicating matter speaks to an epistemology that is not based on 
the mind and consequently patriarchal structures. Mala communicates bodily with 
Tyler as she does not use words to communicate anymore. Yet Tyler understands her 
by means of her body and the way she incorporates it. When Tyler and Mala 
communicate via their bodies and Tyler learns to read Mala’s body for the signs of 
suffering inflicted on her, this is implicitly juxtaposed with the mind as the seat of 
consciousness. It is because of their corporeal rather than verbal communication that 
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Mala’s story finds an outlet through Tyler. Even though Tyler’s narrating of Mala’s 
story might pose problems of ‘appropriation’ (see the section on “Double-
Voicedness” in this chapter), I consider it an important element which underlines the 
interconnection between disparate characters in the novel and the similar problems 
they face in patriarchal culture. 
 The novel further speaks to a re-evaluation of matter by means of its emphasis 
on a diversity of transgender experiences. Not only do we learn that Tyler’s body 
image changes throughout the narrative without a specific, ideal gender as its ‘final’ 
goal, but by way of Otoh, the novel also exemplifies the malleability of biological 
matter. While Tyler, at the beginning of the novel, refers to himself as a man, his 
body image transforms and becomes increasingly feminine, which, rather than 
suggesting that Tyler is a gay man, suggests that they might be transgender. Similar to 
Tyler’s racialized identity, which is not clearly delineated in the narrative, their 
gender identity is also treated ambivalently. Relatedly, Otoh’s ‘biological’ gender is 
female, yet he manages to transform his body to such as extent that it becomes male. 
This is not an antirealist logic that the text addresses, as Gopinath suggests, but rather 
illustrates embodiment theoretical understandings of the body as matter into which 
meanings are inscribed, in particular gendered meanings. The text demonstrates that 
the social construct gender does something real and material to bodies but that more 
traditional inscriptions can also be resisted. 
 The novel’s polyphonic nature is revealed in its ambiguity concerning the 
narrator of the story. While Tyler establishes themselves as narrator, certain passages 
in the novel are most likely narrated by other characters, as Tyler cannot have these 
insights. For instance, the reader is told Chandin’s story by Cigarette Smoking Nana 
and thus learns of the prohibition imposed on Chandin that leaves a permanent mark 
in him. Yet, the episodes that Tyler does narrate, instead of running the risk of 
appropriating Mala’s story, render it possible that her story is told, for she is unable to 
tell it herself.  
 Language is further foregrounded in the novel by means of an emphasis on the 
materializing effects of discourse. Discourse, especially in the form of prohibitions, 
rumours and gossip has real, material consequences for the characters in the novel, 
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above all Chandin, Mala and Asha. Because Chandin embodies the notions he has 
been taught by his white missionary foster father, the prohibitions that the latter 
pronounces shatter Chandin’s worldview. These meanings have become part of 
Chandin’s body and subjectivity so that Sarah and Lavinia’s elopement does not just 
shatter his ideas of heteronormativity but also miscegenation and leads to his extreme 
violence and abuse. Mala and Asha, too, are made to suffer because of the 
materializing effects of language. While their father’s transgression is projected unto 
them, which is why they are ostracized, the community does maintain a certain level 
of respect towards Chandin, which frustrates any attempt of help, as, for instance, 
when the postman does not deliver the letters Asha sends Mala. 
 Unlike the first two novels that I have analyzed in this thesis, Cereus Blooms 
at Night does not merely include the oftentimes neglected experience of transgender 
characters, but it also addresses issues of racialization. The novel demonstrates that 
issues of gender are always already embroiled with issues of colonization and 
consequently racialization. However, this does not only refer to the dual oppression 
that women suffer from within colonial systems – the abuse Mala suffers from as a 
result of her father’s experience of racism, for instance – but it also extends to issues 
of biological dimorphism. Thus, Tyler’s experiences and in particular difficulties with 
‘fitting in’ can be traced to colonialist notions of binary sex and gender. In terms of 
the transcultural feminist grotesque, then, the novel is an example of both how the 
mode can function in a culturally diverse and non-European context and how it can 





5. Indigenous Bodies(’) Matter in Pauline Melville’s The 
Ventriloquist’s Tale 
 
“Being a writer is like being a window-cleaner in a house or a castle where the 
windows are obscured by dirt and grime. Writing is like cleaning the windows 
so that people can see a view of the world they have never seen before.”  
(Melville qtd. in Metcalfe n. pag) 
 
Pauline Melville’s The Ventriloquist’s Tale (VT) traces three generations of a 
Scottish-Amerindian family and their transcultural exchanges. The reader is greeted 
by the ventriloquist of the novel’s title in an “Prologue,” who proclaims that he is the 
narrator of the entire novel and that he “must put away everything fantastical that 
[his] nature and the South American continent prescribe and become a realist” (VT 9). 
The “tales of love and disaster” (VT 9) begin with the frame narrative in modern-day 
Guyana at the end of the twentieth century and revolve around Chofy, a Wapisiana 
Indian who lives in the Rupununi with his wife, son and elderly aunt. Having lost 
most of his cattle and going through a marital crisis, Chofy seeks work in the capital 
Georgetown and takes his aunt Wifreda with him who needs eye surgery. In 
Georgetown, Chofy meets and falls in love with the Jewish-British literary scholar, 
Rosa Mendelson, who conducts research on the English writer Evelyn Waugh and his 
fictional stay with the McKinnons in the savannahs in 1933. Rosa seeks to speak to 
Chofy’s aunt Wifreda, who met the English writer, but Wifreda is reluctant to discuss 
Evelyn Waugh and her past because it brings back memories of her sister and 
brother’s incestuous affair and her role in ending it. 
 In the second part of the novel, the embedded narrative, set at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, we are introduced to Chofy’s ancestor, Scottish “free-thinker” 
Alexander McKinnon who comes to the Rupununi “determined to get as far away 
from civilisation as possible” (VT 96). He ‘goes native,’ marries two Wapisiana 
sisters, Maba and Zuna, with whom he has ten children and engages in all sorts of 
enterprises, many of which include crossing over to Brazil on a regular basis. The 
novel’s main plot revolves around the incestuous affair between his children Danny 
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and Beatrice, however. While their relationship is considered part of Wapisiana myth 
and accepted for the most part, it poses problems for their Scottish father and the 
English Father Napier, who has come to evangelize the savannahs and keeps falling in 
love with young male charges. When Danny and Beatrice’s relationship is brought to 
light by their sister Wifreda, they run away. As soon as the priest learns that Danny 
and Beatrice are committing a “mortal sin” (VT 214), he sets off to find them. He 
convinces Danny to separate and return to their community. Danny eventually gets 
married to the Brazilian girl Sylvana and has children, whereas Beatrice bears a son 
who is the result of the incestuous union, but finally immigrates to Canada because 
she is suspected of being a kanaima (the spirit of revenge) and having poisoned the 
priest. In the end, McKinnon leaves realizing “he did not belong” (VT 219), the priest 
goes mad and burns all the chapels he has erected, and Danny turns into an alcoholic.  
 In the third part, the story returns to the frame narrative to modern-day 
Guyana in the 1990s, where Chofy’s affair with Rosa is brought to an abrupt end 
when his wife Marietta arrives in Georgetown due to their son having been fatally 
injured in an explosion. As a result, Chofy returns to his native lands and Rosa to 
England set on writing her thesis “Evelyn Waugh – a Post-colonial Perspective” (VT 
351). Yet, the frame narrative ends on an optimistic note with the grotesque image of 
“[f]ertility and growth” (VT 352), for Marietta is pregnant. And the narrator reappears 
in the “Epilogue” and outs himself as the mythical figure Macunaima only to 
disappear and “take up residence once more in the stars” (VT 357). 
 The Ventriloquist’s Tale emphasizes and exaggerates the transgression of 
borders and boundaries. The novel incessantly blurs the boundaries between myth and 
reality, the natural and supernatural, humans and animals, humans and organic, 
humans and inorganic matter, and borders between individual bodies and thus, 
unsurprisingly, has been read through a posthumanist lens. 197  Even though a 
posthumanist reading would somewhat overlap with a new feminist materialist one 
and consequently provide invaluable insights into the novel, I will rather highlight the 
 
197 In “Indigenous Posthumanism: Rewriting Anthropology in Pauline Melville’s The Ventriloquist’s 
Tale,” Gigi Adair provides an important reading of some of the posthumanist themes in the novel. As 
Adair notes, the posthuman is not a particularly recent, nor an exclusively Western phenomenon (175). 
Yet, posthumanism, as Julie Livingston and Jasbir Puar note, often operates behind a veiled Euro-




grotesque resonances in the novel, as these have rarely been noticed, yet are central to 
understanding some of the major themes that the novel addresses. The grotesque can 
be particularly instructive when it comes to the novel’s central theme: consensual 
sibling incest.  
 The incest theme in The Ventriloquist’s Tale has been interpreted differently 
by scholars but a number of them agree that it provides a comment on endogamy and 
exogamy in the novel (Shemak 363; Ness 62). According to Tanya Shields, incest in 
The Ventriloquist’s Tale functions as a comment on the – ultimately unviable – 
position of endogamy: “incest is . . . a pathway to one’s ancestors, the ultimate retreat 
to one place and one bloodline” (“Rehearsing” 161) and it “fractures the family and 
community, [and] it functions, in the novel, as an effective vehicle to engage with 
questions and rivalries of nations coming to terms with complicated histories forged 
in desire, conflict, and taboo” (“Amerindian” 283-84). However, Lydia Kokkola and 
Elina Valovirta argue that incest in the novel reflects “fiction’s need for thwarted 
romances” (121). According to Kokkola and Valovirta, The Ventriloquist’s Tale is 
one among a number of novels which “use the couple’s fraternal relation to engender 
an abject response from the audience” (122). However, none of these readings does 
explain sufficiently the ambivalent treatment of the incest theme. For the text is 
neutral, if not sympathetic, in its representation of the theme. Admittedly, the novel 
does not present the incestuous relationship between Beatrice and Danny as a viable 
alternative to non-incestuous relationships, as the bond between them is broken up 
(thus commenting on the impossibility of endogamy). Yet, the novel does not clearly 
condemn their incestuous acts and instead shows how they are not the worst of 
transgressions in the Wapisiana community. Moreover, the novel neither encourages 
endogamy nor exogamy but rather represents an intertwining of different actors. 
 I read the incest motif as a grotesque intertwining that questions dominant 
western notions of subjectivity. It provides a challenge to hegemonic western ideas of 
the body and sexuality. Yet, it also comments on female embodiment and in particular 
how Beatrice’s character reveals problems in dominant western feminist approaches. 
Moreover, in its emphasis on unexplainable bodily reactions, the novel constructs 
bodies that are grotesque in their unpredictability. This serves to point to racialization 
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and past and continuing colonization. In order to support my reading of The 
Ventriloquist’s Tale, I will focus on five distinct yet interrelated aspects: first, the 
sexually deviant female body; second, the grotesque intertwining of individual bodies; 
third, bodily traces of racism; fourth, grotesque distortions; and, fifth, the polyphonic 
entanglements in the text. 
5.1 “[M]aking love with ghosts:” Sexual Deviance 
Even though the novel traces various characters and their struggles, it is Beatrice who 
stands out. As one reviewer puts it, “Beatrice . . . is unusual by any culture” (B. King 
669). As a teenager, Beatrice is daring, bathes in the part of the river where men 
usually bathe or lies about her period so that she can continue bathing and fishing in 
the river (VT 129). Beatrice is known for breaking rules: “She did not only break the 
rules of the Church. She broke all the rules. . . . She just seemed to follow her own 
impulses” (VT 129). Not only does Beatrice present an unusual female character 
because she engages willingly in an incestuous relationship, but her sexuality is also 
more generally speaking extraordinary or grotesque because, similar to the concept of 
the grotesque, it “fits uneasily within the field of Western aesthetics [and philosophy] 
and art history” (Connelly, “Grotesque” 241). Prior to the relationship with her 
brother, Beatrice has non-human and non-organic sexual partners. In fact, “she 
remembered that her first sexual experiences had not come about through human 
agency” (VT 126). The first time Beatrice feels sexual pleasure is when she is about 
eleven years old and standing in the sun: 
The heat was making her newly sprouted breasts tingle and the hotter the sun 
became, the more she became aware of an incandescent darkness at the bottom 
of her belly, between her legs, in a mysterious place that she had hardly been 
aware of before. 
She vaguely heard the others shouting as they played but they seemed to be 
calling from a distance, some faraway place. The sun burned even more 
fiercely and as the sun grew in intensity, so the darkness inside her turned into 
a delicious fizzing feeling that just teetered on the edge of an explosion and 
then died away again. She just stood there. The other children had stopped 
playing and were collecting their arrows and bows to go fishing. (VT 126) 
Beatrice’s body has begun to change (“sprouted breasts”), yet her perception has 
started to change too, implying that physical and mental changes go hand in hand. Not 
only do external influences lose their impact at this very moment (“they seemed to be 
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calling from a distance, some faraway place”), but she notices things she had not 
noticed before. All of a sudden, she becomes aware of her tingling breasts and this 
‘mysterious place’ between her legs, which seems to be stimulated by the intensity of 
the sun. Moreover, this immaterial place can turn into something akin to material, as it 
becomes a ‘fizzing feeling’ and even explosion. Not only does this imply that female 
sexuality is real, that is, material, but it also alludes to the possibility of female 
sexuality not being dependent on the male or in fact the human. 
 In addition to presenting female sexuality as independent, the novel also 
explicitly addresses masturbation:  
Experimenting more, she found that, if she was patient and lay in her 
hammock and rubbed herself for long enough, there would first of all come 
that sensation of warmth spreading through the bottom half of her body and 
then an increase of intensity that built up to a burst of pleasure followed by 
deep, pulsing pulls that only gradually subsided. She learned how to control 
the bursts of pleasure. (VT 127) 
This description of Beatrice’s pleasuring herself displays her knowledge of her own 
body which she gradually gains. Beatrice quite ‘naturally’ learns what gives her 
sexual pleasure, actively strives for understanding what arouses her and even 
understands how to ‘control’ this. The novel thus dispels with the taboo of sexual 
pleasure and female masturbation. In the Wapisiana community masturbation is not a 
taboo and neither is it a source of shame:  
Beatrice discovered that the intense colours of certain flowers had the same 
effect on her as the sun. Branching off on her own to look for bark, taking all 
the usual precautions to mark her trail, she came across some scarlet flowers 
under a ceiba tree. The shade from the huge trees prevented much plant life on 
the ground. But these flowers seemed to burn the air around them. She stared, 
fascinated. The flowers blazed like sores. She could not take her eyes off 
them. First came the familiar tingling in her nipples and then the other feeling 
started up in the bottom of her belly. She lay down on her back under the huge 
tree and began to play with herself, her hand diving between her legs like a 
duck’s head.  
Her older cousin Gina followed her trail and came back to look for her, a 
warishi full of bark slung on her back. She saw Beatrice gasping and panting 
under the tree and thought for a moment she had been poisoned.   
‘What are you doing?’ she asked and then said, matter-of-factly: ‘Oh I see. 
You’re making love with ghosts.’ (VT 128) 
Beatrice’s arousal has clearly organic reasons: “Certain blossoms with a particular 
vibrating wavelength of colour affected her sexuality like that” (VT 128). The scarlet 
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flowers she sees are reminiscent of female genitalia (“blazed like sores”), suggesting 
an autoerotic element. Both the sun and intense colours of flowers give Beatrice 
pleasure, which underlines the independence of female sexuality from human 
influence. According to Helen Scott, “the women experience sexual pleasure in 
Guyana’s natural environment, following in the long tradition of literary associations 
between the landscape and women’s bodies. Here, again, the women become active 
desiring subjects rather than the passive recipients of male fantasy” (115). The novel 
underlines that female sexuality is not dependent on male sexuality and male desire, 
but can exist independently of it. The novel thus puts into doubt androcentric notions 
of sexuality. 
 Moreover, her cousin is not shocked by what she is doing but instead calls it 
by what it is known as in the community, namely ‘making love with ghosts.’ Her 
cousin’s neutral and practical reaction suggests that there is no moral judgement 
involved. Later still, Beatrice rubs her pelvis against a tapir, when it happens to be in 
a bed (VT 129). In the above-mentioned scene, ghosts do not refer to frightening or 
haunting elements, but a crucial part of Wapisiana culture. While ghosts and spirits 
can have negative associations, such as the kanaima, the spirit of revenge, other 
ghosts and spirits have a positive meaning. In fact, Maba consults her father’s bones, 
i.e. intends to communicate with her father’s spirit when confronted with her 
children’s incestuous relationship.198 
 The relevance of Beatrice’s sexual pleasure as being caused by natural 
elements, such as the sun or plants, lies in the questions it poses in regard to female 
sexuality. According to Thomas Bonnici, “it seems that the sexual awakening of 
Beatrice immerses her in a more fundamental aspect of nature. Besides, sexuality is 
given an ecological dimension that the Western world has never had or has lost” (18). 
Beatrice’s ‘unusual’ female pleasure and incestuous relationship question western 
notions of (female) sexuality, which are predominantly connected to other human 
beings. Any behaviour that does not include a human sexual partner, or the 
appropriate human sexual partner, is deemed not only deviant, but abnormal. 
 
198  Adair shows how Maba’s reading of the bones represents “a communication technology” and 
constitutes a form of reading media, which is similar to McKinnon’s reading of newspapers. Yet, “both 
read media . . . difficult to decipher, unreliable, and rather old” which puts “the efficacy of both 
characters’ reading (and writing) practices . . .  into doubt” (180). 
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 This criticism of dominant western ideas of sexuality is intensified when 
Beatrice engages in an incestuous affair with her brother. The affair begins when she 
returns from the convent after three years of schooling. Danny visits her one night and 
makes love to her – thus paralleling the Amerindian myth of the sun and the moon. 
Initially, she thinks that the man who has come to her is Raymond, a man who is part 
of the group of black coastlanders employed by McKinnon, whom she is attracted to 
initially. Beatrice and Danny’s first intercourse takes place in complete darkness and 
thus emphasizes touch rather than sight: 
A warm hand began to move gently over her left breast, cupping and kneading 
it while the thumb stroked her nipple. After a while, the hand moved to the 
other breast and explored that in the same way, as if making a careful map of 
her body. She could hear somebody’s slow and regular breathing. 
Then she felt a mouth on hers, lips pressing down firmly and methodically as 
if they had a job to do, printing something all over her face. The hand moved 
down her body, seeking the underground entrance, and played with her there 
for a while. The hammock swayed a little.  
Darkness and anonymity relieved her of any shyness. . . . 
The back which she held on to with both arms was as smooth as Aishalton 
rock. She felt him nuzzling into her neck. Something about the head brushing 
against her ear puzzled her for a moment but she concentrated on twisting 
herself sideways, letting one leg hang over the edge of the hammock so that he 
could come inside her more easily. The weight of both of them wriggling to lie 
slantwise rocked the hammock making her feel as though she were flying 
through the night. She clung on tightly; the top half of her body arced 
backwards over the side. Her hair brushed the floor. As he fucked she felt a 
dark, aching pain mingled with the far-off intimations of that familiar 
pleasure, but she was too alert and too curious to lose herself in the sensation 
and it faded away. (VT 162-63) 
Even though the beginning of the episode might suggest that Danny takes possession 
of her body by trying to map her “as if making a careful map of her body” reminiscent 
of colonial mapping, and by trying to mark her body as his, “lips pressing down 
firmly and methodically as if they had a job to do, printing something all over her 
face,” the overall emphasis in this episode is on Beatrice’s experiencing of this 
encounter, underscored by an emphasis on tactility. As Young points out drawing on 
Irigaray, “[a]n epistemology spoken from a feminine subjectivity might privilege 
touch rather than sight” (Young 81). By means of the focalization through Beatrice 
the reader learns that the lover’s hand “move[s] gently” and that it is Beatrice who 
“felt him.” Moreover, she is puzzled by the way his head brushes against her ear, 
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probably because it is familiar; still she does experience “the far-off intimations of 
that familiar pleasure,” the possibility of sexual pleasure. Moreover, even though she 
does not orgasm because she is “too alert and too curious,” the episode indicates that 
Beatrice is actively experiencing this sexual encounter. 
 When Beatrice realizes that it is Danny who has come to her at night, she 
absorbs the news “with a mixture of fury and mysterious pleasure,” but forgives him 
quickly (VT 167). Partly because “[a]s he came nearer, his eyes, which had grown 
dark and deliquescent, exerted a lodestone attraction over her which brought about an 
unexpected loss of will” (VT 168). In the previous episode, Beatrice compares 
Danny’s skin to Aishalton rock, thus establishing a connection to non-human entities. 
Again, Danny is compared to stone-like, mineral matter, his eyes, however, become 
liquid, which attracts her and brings about a loss of her ‘will.’ When they make love 
again, Beatrice now fully aware of whom she is making love to, experiences her 
sexual pleasure fully. This time she does not compare him to a rock but to “a baffled 
root in the darkness seeking moisture, striking out and always trying to go deeper” 
(VT 169) instead. And the feeling is compared to something material, yet flexible, 
namely clay: “it felt to her as if a potter was running his thumb around the top edge of 
a spinning, wavering, moist clay pot, like one she had seen at the convent, so that the 
rim grew sometimes bigger and sometimes smaller” (VT 169). Moreover, the detailed 
description of Beatrice’s pleasure, or to be more precise, her orgasm, is reminiscent of 
several non-human others, such as water (“For a long time, she waited, and then she 
squeezed and the pleasure came unstoppably from the outer rim to the dark base and 
burst outwards from there,” VT 169) or snake skin (“When they made love, her 
insides felt as if they changed pattern like a kaleidoscope or the expanding and 
contracting geometrical pattern of a snake’s skin,” VT 172). The novel’s emphasis on 
Beatrice’s unusual pleasures and the frequent parallels to organic and inorganic matter 
oppose western notions of sexuality and thus make the reader question what s/he 
herself considers to be ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ female sexuality. 
 Beatrice’s decision to continue the relationship is, on the one hand, connected 
to the naturalness it conveys. For Beatrice, her incestuous relationship feels quite 
natural, as the text keeps reminding us: “They were brother and sister. The 
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relationship was by nature indissoluble” (VT 232, emphasis added); “Danny and 
herself still felt so natural that she could not believe there was anything bad about it” 
(VT 268, emphasis added). By engaging in an incestuous relationship Beatrice rejects 
her Catholic schooling and the values it conveys. This then also includes the incest 
taboo and the notion of the exchange in women it carries. According to Gayle Rubin, 
the incest taboo ensures the exchange in women and she explains that  
marriages are a most basic form of gift exchange, in which it is women who 
are the most precious of gifts. [Lévi-Strauss] argues that the incest taboo 
should best be understood as a mechanism to insure [sic] that such exchanges 
take place between families and between groups. Since the existence of incest 
taboos is universal, but the content of their prohibitions variable, they cannot 
be explained as having the aim of preventing the occurrence of genetically 
close matings. Rather, the incest taboo imposes the social aim of exogamy and 
alliance upon the biological events of sex and procreation. The incest taboo 
divides the universe of sexual choice into categories of permitted and 
prohibited sexual partners. Specifically, by forbidding unions within a group it 
enjoins marital exchange between groups. (778)  
However, as I show in a later section (section 6.2), the novel engages ironically and 
critically with the anthropologist Michael Wormoal and his Lévi-Straussian analysis 
of the Amerindian incest myths, in particular the idea that the incest taboo is 
universal. Beatrice’s defiance of the incest taboo, then, represents an act of female 
agency that defies western logic. Lugones shows how colonialism and patriarchy 
mutually constitute each other. She argues: 
Colonialism did not impose precolonial, European gender arrangements on the 
colonized. It imposed a new gender system that created very different 
arrangements for colonized males and females than for white bourgeois 
colonizers. Thus, it introduced many genders and gender itself as a colonial 
concept and mode of organization of relations of production, property 
relations, of cosmologies and ways of knowing. (186) 
Thus, by engaging in an incestuous relationship Beatrice rejects both a colonial power 
setup and patriarchal gender relations. 
 Later in the novel, after Beatrice and Danny are separated, Beatrice is exiled to 
Canada. However, instead of being rejected because of the incestuous affair, she is 
sent away because of another transgression; she is believed to be a kanaima: 
“Whereas people had tolerated, although not particularly liked, her relationship with 
Danny, when they began to suspect her of being a kanaima, they were appalled and 
attitudes towards her changed altogether” (VT 266). Kanaima, or the spirit of revenge, 
 
 168 
is even more threatening to the community than incest. When Beatrice realizes what 
form her reputation has taken, she “resign[s] herself with surprising patience to her 
fate” (VT 266) and agrees to leave her community. However, this episode also 
signifies that female power and anger, directed at Father Napier primarily, is kept in 
check within a society marked by colonialism and patriarchy. Agnel Barron suggests 
that “Beatrice’s exile in Canada can be read as a suppression or containment of 
female resistance to the intrusion of colonial outsiders” (5). Beatrice’s patient reaction 
also demonstrates that she is aware of the limited agency she has within “the 
modern/colonial gender system” (Lugones 187).  
 The novel also addresses female agency in later episodes, when Beatrice has 
moved to Canada. In Montreal, at first, she suffers because of the cold: “It was then 
that it occurred to her that what she had been taught at the convent was wrong. The 
nuns had told them that hell is one hot place, full of fires and conflagrations” (VT 271-
72). Yet, this is not the only thing the nuns at the convent were wrong about, as the 
text ironically implies – they were also wrong about believing that Beatrice stepped 
on Nella’s foot on purpose (see section 6.3). Beatrice also seems to feel homesick 
because “for the first six months or so Beatrice felt quite numb” and she feels like a 
doll that is being handled by other people, “someone had picked me up and put me 
down somewhere else and I’d just continued walking” (VT 272). In the Notre-Dame 
Cathedral she feels as if in an “icy forest . . . dead and fossilised” (VT 275), which 
contrasts with the rain forest, which was teeming with life. 
 Within a short space of time, Beatrice has received a marriage proposal and 
contemplates whether or not to accept it.  
Everything seemed to have brought her to a point where she was about to 
make a decision she had hoped to avoid. She could feel herself drifting 
towards marriage. And the odd thing was that she felt she would be marrying 
to spite the world in some way. As if she would be saying to the world: There. 
See. Look what you made me do. The way some people’s suicide is an act of 
triumphant aggression. Although no one was forcing her to do it and nobody 
really cared whether she married or not. (VT 272) 
It is interesting that Beatrice contemplates marriage as a form of spite or even 
revenge. “Look what you made me do.” In spite of this, Beatrice starts going out with 
her future husband Horatio regularly and grows quite fond of him. When a travelling 
circus comes to town, they visit it together, yet “Beatrice felt the faint warning signs 
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of an approaching migraine” (VT 275) – an indication that something is not quite right 
– and thus does not join Horatio. Instead, she slips into a tent where the spectacle 
consists of a Native American Indian woman being locked in an ice coffin.  
After a while, Beatrice began to worry that the woman’s air must be in short 
supply. In a minute or so, surely, she would be unable to breathe. Beatrice 
could almost feel the anguished burning of the flesh on ice. She tried to see 
whether the woman was still breathing. Astounded and horrified, she stared at 
the woman in the ice tomb. The circus artist must surely be released now or 
die, she thought, and then lapsed into a state that felt like eternity without 
passage of time. (VT 277) 
Beatrice sees the ice coffin as a representation of the state she is in. She feels confined 
in Montreal, in particular because of the cold, which is so unlike the warmth she 
knows from the Savannahs. Moreover, she does not have the same kind of agency or 
freedom she had in the Rupununi. Yet, she comes to understand that she has a 
different kind of agency in Montreal. When the woman is finally freed, Beatrice “felt 
as though she herself had been freed” (VT 277). Surprisingly, her “headache had 
vanished” (VT 278). Moreover, Beatrice’s attitude has changed: “Everything looked 
bright. It was possible to survive the ice coffin and emerge unscathed. For the first 
time for months she felt lively. The feeling spilled over into a renewed affection for 
Horatio” (VT 278). This episode seems to suggest that a different life is not 
necessarily better or worse, it is simply different. Relatedly, the agency that Beatrice 
felt she had in the Rupununi is not the same as the agency she has in Montreal, yet 
again, neither is superior to the other, it is simply different forms of agency. In short, 
the novel takes issue with global forms of feminisms that “elide[…] the diversity of 
women’s agency in favor of a universalized Western model of women’s liberation 
that celebrates individuality and modernity” (Grewal and Kaplan 252). 
5.2 “[V]egetable acts of love:” Grotesque Intertwining 
The incestuous relationship further breaks up the borders that seemingly exist 
between individual bodies and can thus be regarded the central grotesque motif in the 
novel. It challenges the humanist, patriarchal idea that bodies are separated from other 
bodies, instead of being inherently connected as suggested by phenomenology. To 
quote Weiss again: “To describe embodiment as intercorporeality is to emphasize that 
the experience of being embodied is never a private affair, but is always already 
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mediated by our continual interactions with other human and nunhuman bodies” (5). 
Beatrice and Danny’s making love is at one point described as reminiscent of the 
original grotesque drawings, which were found in the ‘underground chambers’ of 
emperor Nero’s pleasure house: During their “vegetable acts of love” (VT 197) their 
“arms, thighs and legs [are] entangled like roots” (VT 198) paralleling the definition 
of the grotesque as “[a] style of decorative painting or sculpture consisting of the 
interweaving of human and animal forms with flowers and foliage” (OED). 
 At another point, Beatrice and Danny are described in terms of rocks, which 
become magnetized: 
There is a certain sort of black rock-stone to be found on the banks of 
savannah creeks. The rocks lie scattered all around. If you take one in your left 
hand and one in your right and circle them round each other, they become 
magnetised and it is impossible to prise them apart. Danny and Beatrice 
became as inseparable as the savannah rocks. (VT 170) 
Beatrice and Danny’s attraction is described in terms of magnetic fields or magnets 
attracted to each other, “[t]he attraction was both inexplicable and irresistible. And 
growing stronger” (VT 171); it is inevitable, something that is outside of their control.  
 Indeed, Beatrice’s and Danny’s affair is intimately connected to the agency of 
nature. A case in point is Beatrice and Danny’s escape to the jungle: 
Beatrice . . . thought that she had never seen surroundings that were more 
alive. The river was about thirty feet across. The trees on either side 
shimmered, tingled and exploded with exuberant bird noise. The surface of the 
water teemed with ducks and otters. Over by the far bank an alligator lazed, 
his goggle-eyes just above the water. . . . Danny himself seemed to come alive 
in the bush. He was more alert, vigilant and inventive than at home. . . . There 
was an abundance of food. They lived well on fish, nuts, fruit and game. (VT 
196) 
Instead of presenting nature as passive and inactive, as something that is acted upon, 
Melville depicts nature as active and agentic and Beatrice and Danny as active 
participants in it, albeit not superior participants.199 There is an abundance of vegetal 
and animal life, but organic matter itself seems to display an activity usually only 
associated with animals or humans: 
 
199 The abundance and fertility might further be read as a comment on the paradisiacal image which the 
first explorers had sought and thought to have found in the new world, yet realized to have the potential 
to become hell. In fact, to Father Napier the same surroundings are hostile (VT 215, 223). 
 
 171 
It was a storm. Lightning lit up the topmost arches of the trees and a massive 
crash of thunder burst overhead. A distant clattering in the canopy of leaves 
hundreds of feet above signalled rain. After a few minutes, dead leaves and 
twigs began to float and drop to the forest floor. Beatrice stood still, alerted by 
movement in a nearby bush. Movement usually meant an animal. But all at 
once, everything started moving. Bushes swayed. Leaves upturned and 
shivered, showing their pale sides. Everything shook. Little rivulets and 
streams began to run down the tree trunks. Soon pools occupied every hollow. 
(VT 218) 
In the forest during a storm, everything is in motion, all matter is moving, not only the 
animals. Inorganic matter such as lightning, thunder, wind and rain is as powerful as 
organic matter. It seems as if the entire forest were moving. The forest undoubtedly 
has a life of its own, for whenever Beatrice is in the forest, she has the feeling she is 
being watched (VT 218). This is so because “the wild rain forest . . . was neither 
darkness nor light but a gigantic memory” (VT 96); it is a gigantic organism with 
human characteristics. Not only is the rain forest anthropomorphized in the novel, but 
various animals are as well. In contrast to this, as Gigi Adair shows, “[c]haracters in 
the novel are also repeatedly given the characteristics of various animals, plants, 
fungi, rocks, geometrical patterns and quantum particles” (179). Father Napier, for 
instance, to the amusement of the McKinnon family, resembles a cricket when 
playing his violin. 
 The differentiation between nature and culture is further displaced by the 
images of entanglement between the Wapisiana community and the ecosystem they 
inhabit. Even though the Wapisiana men kill animals, they are aware of their own 
dependence on animals, plants and other organic matter and express a degree of 
respect towards these living bodies. Both Danny and his uncle Shibi-din feel sad 
when they have to shoot an animal (VT 122). “Animals are people in disguise” (VT 
122), Shibi-din suggests after having Danny shoot his first deer. Moreover, the 
narrator describes hunting in terms of a relationship: “[H]unting means making love 
with the animals. The hunt is a courtship, a sexual act” (VT 7), thus further 
underlining the respect that is involved. Ultimately, the novel evokes Karen Barad’s 
suggestion that “‘[h]uman’” bodies are not inherently different from ‘nonhuman’ 
ones” (Barad, “Posthumanist” 823). It is important to note, however, that the novel 
does not present an idealized version of nature (see Bonnici). In fact, the way of life 
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of the Wapisiana community is connected to hard work, something Scott refers to as 
the “unromantic experience of labor” (105). In addition, the connection to nature or 
rather their entanglement with it, frequently leads to hardship as the beginning of the 
novel suggest, when Chofy’s cattle are wounded and killed by blood-sucking bats. 
 The incestuous relationship between Beatrice and Danny is presented as 
natural in other terms, too, because it is associated with Wapisiana and other 
Amerindian myths concerning the creation of the world. Michael Wormoal, the 
anthropologist with nationalistic tendencies whom Rosa meets at the beginning of the 
novel, conducts research in comparative mythology and carries out an analysis of 
Amerindian eclipse myths à la Lévi-Strauss (81). John Thieme argues that “the 
influence of Levi-Strauss permeates” The Ventriloquist’s Tale and is an indication of 
the continuing influence of European narratives on postcolonial writers, who do not 
seem to succeed in dispelling these narratives (184). According to Thieme,  
the comparatively understated use of the incest motif in The Ventriloquist’s 
Tale has not sufficiently overcome the problem of slipping into a subtle form 
of sensationalism, since it still promotes a degree of intellectualized exoticism 
through its use of the Levi-Strauss archetype. (183)  
Yet, this overlooks the ironic treatment of both Lévi-Strauss’s theory and its main 
supporter in the novel, Wormoal. I suggest instead that anthropology, especially Lévi-
Strauss, is invoked only to be undermined.200  
 In contrast to Thieme, I argue that the novel provides a trenchant criticism of 
the mind/body dualism. As Anke Abraham and Beatrice Müller show, the idea that 
the mind can control the body does not merely derive from occidental cultures and the 
Christian belief in the dichotomy between body and soul, but also goes back to 
classical anthropology, which envisioned the human as superior to other lifeforms 
(11) and has thus also given rise to ideas on the superiority of certain ‘races.’ The 
Ventriloquist’s Tale employs the incestuous affair to reveal the inconsistencies in 
Lévi-Strauss’s theory and hence in the founding beliefs of anthropology and western 
‘civilization’ in general. 
 
200 The novel also parodies Charles Darwin and his On the Origin of Species: “My grandmother. She 
still refers with rage to a man called Charles Darwin who wandered through the region with the slow-
motion frenzy of a sloth, measuring and collecting. . . . Anyway, according to my grandmother, Charles 
Darwin without so much as a by-your-leave parked his behind on my ancestors and wrote the first line 
of Origin of Species, declaring that we were descended from monkeys. If his eyes had been in his arse 
he would have known better” (VT 3). 
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 Lévi-Strauss argues that there is a universal incest taboo, which the novel 
vehemently defies. Even the quotes at the beginning of the novel insinuate that there 
is no universal rejection of incest, because the “fifteenth-century Portuguese proverb” 
of the epigraph suggests that ‘[b]eyond the equator, everything is permitted,’ 
potentially including incest. And, in fact, incest, or a brother and sister living “close” 
as it is described in the novel, is not “unheard” of in Amerindian communities (VT 
176). It is not a taboo, nor is it the worst transgression. As Maba states: “I know it’s 
not good, what Danny and Beatrice are doing, but it’s not the worst thing in the 
world” (VT 215). The text is quite explicit: “It was not unknown for a brother and 
sister to live together, usually outside the village. Nobody approved of it, but nobody 
tried to stop it. . . Vengeance attacks were more terrifying than incest” (VT 266). 
Rather than the relationship with her brother, Beatrice’s poisoning of the priest, which 
leads to casualties, is considered an unacceptable transgression. Unlike many 
Christian, western cultures, which consider incest to be a “mortal sin” (VT 214), as 
made manifest by Father Napier’s and McKinnon’s reactions, for Amerindians in the 
novel Beatrice’s revenge constitutes a much graver wrongdoing.  
 Furthermore, the novel challenges Wormoal’s ‘scientific’ approach to myth 
which is devoid of the human element. In contrast, the Wapisiana community uses the 
myths to justify or explain Danny’s and Beatrice’s behaviour: “What they were doing 
was more understandable in relation to an eclipse” (VT 208). This demonstrates that 
myth functions as a method or methodology similar in the way that Lévi-Strauss’s 
‘structural analysis of myth’ does. However, the aim is not ordering and dissecting, as 
is the case with the European methodology, but rather making sense. While incest is 
not entirely approved of, yet not prohibited, by means of its representation the text 
raises the reader’s awareness as regards the inapplicability and universal invalidity of 
cultural rules and thus undermines Lévi-Strauss’s claim to a universal incest taboo.201  
 
201 Moreover, as several scholars have suggested, the novel also writes back to Evelyn Waugh and his 
‘version’ of Amerindians. Ness notes that “such textual links are also intended to remind us that the 
stories’ writers tell imply the ‘absent’ stories and the hidden potentialities, which we do not hear” (56). 
Thieme suggests that “the reader – and particularly the Western reader – who comes to the novel with 
the assumption that the links with Waugh will provide some kind of key to the text’s meaning is almost 
certain to be disappointed” (177). 
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 The ‘factual,’ historical incestuous relationship between Beatrice and Danny is 
intricately linked to the fictitious, though equally ‘real,’ stories of the sun and the 
moon as siblings. Wormoal recounts the Wapisiana myth as follows: 
The Wapisiana myth I am using also concerns the eclipse. They believed that 
man was at one with nature – incest I should add is the symbol of nature as 
opposed to society – until an eclipse separated humankind from the animals 
and plants. They believed that a brother came secretly to his sister at nights. 
She enjoyed this but, not knowing who he was, blackened his face with the 
magical genipap plant to identify him. In his shame he rose to the sky and 
became the moon. That is why the moon has dark patches on its face. (VT 82) 
Scott argues accordingly that the incest theme in the novel serves to comment on a 
blurring of fact and fiction, as “the historical tale of incest . . . does conform to an 
Amerindian myth” (98). However, the incest theme also comments on other blurrings: 
“There is no fixed dividing line between ‘self’ and ‘other,’ ‘past’ and ‘present’ and 
‘future,’ ‘here’ and ‘now,’ ‘cause’ and ‘effect’” (Barad, “Nature’s” 148-49). The 
incest myth does not only evoke notions of a blurring of fact and fiction, but a 
blurring of past, present and future: past, for the myth has been passed down and in 
fact explains the origin of the Amerindian peoples; present, because Beatrice and 
Danny turn into the myth at the present (see the following quote); and future, because 
both the myth by means of oral storytelling and Beatrice and Danny, by means of 
Sonny, will continue to exist. Relatedly, this episode blurs ideas of cause and effect, 
for it makes the reader question what caused what, the myth the incest or the incest 
the myth. In fact, Beatrice and Danny turn into the protagonists of the myth in the 
narrative: 
A field of fireflies, caught by the sudden shower, had settled on the ground. 
They winked in the blackness, as brilliant in the dark underfoot as the stars in 
the sky above. It was as if the vast night sky had unfolded under their feet as 
well as over their heads and they were suspended in space. For a long time she 
stood there, feeling that she was where she was meant to be, standing in the 
sky with Danny. (VT 270) 
This establishes Beatrice and Danny’s bodies as grotesque in the Bakhtinian sense 
because of their “cosmic and universal” quality: “It stresses elements common to the 
entire cosmos: earth, water, fire, air; it is directly related to the sun, to the stars. . . . 
This body can merge with various natural phenomena, with mountains, rivers, seas, 
islands, and continents. It can fill the entire universe” (Bakhtin, Rabelais 318). Not 
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only are Beatrice and Danny’s bodies part of their natural surroundings; they in fact 
merge with them, leaving Beatrice with the feeling that they are in the sky and thus 
have turned into the mythical figures.  
 Beatrice and Danny’s incestuous affair produces new life, another 
transgression of bodily boundaries and a materializing of the myth.202 Beatrice gives 
birth to a son and admits to herself that she “loved him but felt that he should never 
have been born – that she had expelled a beautiful secret out of her body that should 
have remained there. He was a secret made flesh” (VT 268). Something immaterial, 
abstract, “a secret” turns into a human being – which is why the birth scene is not 
depicted. Moreover, they “never gave him a name” (VT 228) and he is simply 
nicknamed Sonny, which parallels one of the Amerindian myths that Wormoal 
recounts (VT 83) – in the myth a brother and sister make love, he turns into the moon 
and she turns into the evening star; they leave a child behind “who is never named” 
(VT 83). Because he is so detached, there and not there, “a walking event-horizon. A 
singularity. No one knew what went on inside” (VT 283), he is a “figure of 
indeterminacy” (Adair 182). He seems to both exist and to disappear at the same time 
(VT 298), which makes him an ambiguous, grotesque figure. He describes himself as 
a “chameleon” (VT 7) and as the reader learns in the course of the narrative, he 
transgresses human boundaries, for he disappears quite magically (VT 290).  
 The narrative adds a further layer of complexity to the character of Sonny by 
having him declare that he is descended from stones (VT 2). On the one hand, this is a 
reference to the creation myth of Macunaima and his brother Chico, who are the sons 
of the sun and his wife, who is a “reddish, rock-coloured woman” (VT 105). On the 
other hand, this establishes a link to Beatrice and Danny whose attraction is compared 
to magnetized savannah rocks. Moreover, similar to Beatrice and Danny who become 
entangled like roots, Sonny states: “If you were to see me fishing, in the dim green 
light of the forest, you would never be able to tell my legs from the twisted tree 
branches at the side of the creek” (VT 7). Whether this refers to his skills at 
 
202 Incidentally, the novel also dispels with the misconception that a child born out of incest will have a 
disability, for there is nothing wrong with the child (VT 228), even though some people think 
otherwise. Adair explains: “Characters in the novel (just as critics of the novel) cannot decide whether 
he is precociously intelligent or intellectually disabled” (Adair 182, emphasis in original). Ness refers 
to Sonny as autistic (64), even though there is little evidence in the text to support this. 
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camouflaging himself or whether this is meant quite literally, Sonny is a grotesque 
figure by all means. Ultimately, The Ventriloqusist’s Tale questions (western) 
boundaries of bodies as stopping at their skin. Instead, the novel suggests that bodies 
extend beyond their confines, implying that they are not as individualized as we often 
think of them. The novel challenges a dominant western conception of bodies which 
has been shaped, among other theories, by anthropological thinking and has given rise 
to racialized and sexualized distinctions. 
5.3 “[T]he blows had driven him back to some period before speech:” 
Bodily Traces of Racism 
Aside from having an indigenous or mixed-race family at its centre, The 
Ventriloquist’s Tale also engages with the more bodily aspects of being an indigenous 
person. It exemplifies how indigeneity is embodied, i.e. inscribed into bodies. When 
Beatrice and her sisters are sent to a convent to be educated, their bodies’ and body 
images change considerably: 
For the first few weeks, all three girls felt sick in the pit of their stomachs. 
What depressed Beatrice most was wearing shoes. Her feet weighed so 
heavily, dragging her to the ground. The school uniform felt as restraining as 
one of the harnesses that hung in the outhouse at Waronawa. (VT 137) 
Not only do the girls feel sick, which might be interpreted as home sickness, but as 
the text implies, it is the physical restraint that has a lasting impact. Their bodies are 
being shaped in a western, Catholic fashion. It is the shoes and uniform which mould 
the girls’ bodies. The allusion to a harness, used for horses or other draught animals, 
insinuates the dehumanizing treatment of indigenous people by making them conform 
to bodily rules and customs that are not theirs. Moreover, it is in the convent where 
Beatrice is confronted with some of the notions that colonialism has brought with it:  
Beatrice was introduced to the complicated colour-coding that afflicted 
Georgetown society. Behind the natural friendships that sprang up at school 
lay the poisoned knowledge of who was ‘high-yellow’, ‘high-brown’, ‘red’ or 
‘black.’ (VT 139) 
The convent, as part of broader Georgetown society, clearly adheres to colonial ideas 
of race and distinctions based on skin colour. And these are ideologies that the 
children learn from early on and which will affect their friendships later on, as the text 
suggests, in spite of the ‘natural’ friendships that develop at school. Since Beatrice 
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cannot be easily placed within this colour-coding scheme, because she “was not black 
and she was not white” (VT 139), even though she is the most popular of the three 
sisters, she is nevertheless exposed to bullying. Because of her indeterminacy she 
causes “confusion:” “People circled her warily, not certain where to place her, 
proffering friendship and then arbitrarily withdrawing it” (VT 139). In addition, other 
people take the decision of placing the McKinnon’s within the racial spectrum. One 
of Beatrice classmates states: “‘The McKinnons are bucks’” (VT 139). “She said this 
firmly,” the narrator remarks, “as if that put an end to the matter. It then became 
permissible to taunt them” (VT 139). 
 In fact, Beatrice is further racialized when she accidentally steps on one of her 
classmate’s feet. It is interesting that the other girl, Nella Hawkins, has a “haughty 
brown face and frizzy hair” (VT 141), implying that she is part of the group of 
coastlanders who frequently discriminate against indigenous people in the novel. 
Nella calls Beatrice a “dirty buck girl” and as a result, “Beatrice’s heart thumped with 
fright. At the same time she felt humiliated” (VT 141). To add further humiliation, the 
other girl indicates that Beatrice stepped on her foot on purpose (VT 141). When 
prompted by the teacher, who accepts Nella’s story without doubt, to apologize to her 
classmate, Beatrice remains silent because she “could not get her tongue round the 
unfamiliar word that was required” (VT 142).  
 The Portuguese Jesuits in Brazil explain to Father Napier that Wapisiana is 
one of the languages which does not have a word for sorry (VT 186). Chofy, too, 
clarifies that he only learned to “to say please, sorry and thank you” because he was 
partly raised by a priest (VT 40). On the one hand, Beatrice cannot apologize because 
Wapisiana does not have a word for ‘sorry.’ On the other hand, this is because 
Beatrice did not step on her classmate’s foot on purpose and she was insulted, which 
would require an apology from Nella. Yet, Beatrice knows that this is not an option. 
As a result, Beatrice’s teacher asks her to come to talk to her after class and when 
Beatrice returns to her seat, “the left half of her field of vision [is] blacked out” VT 
142) and she faints. Beatrice’s body reacts to an injustice she suffers, for she is not in 
the position to clarify the matter. The text thus shows that verbal harassment affects 
bodies. To quote Chen once more: “Words more than signify; they affect and effect. 
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Whether read or heard, they complexly pulse through bodies (live or dead), rendering 
their effects in feeling and active response” (54). In fact, verbal harassment turns into 
physical harassment. This also demonstrates that certain social relations, here a power 
relation based on notions of race, have materializing effects. 
 Bla-Bla, too, learns physically what it means to be an indigenous child. When 
his mother comes to his school to talk to him one day, she addresses him in 
Wapisiana, and he, quite naturally answers in Wapisiana. However, because the 
children are forbidden to speak Wapisiana or Macusi at school (VT 316), and his 
teacher, “from the coast, who did not understand the language and who, anyway, was 
eaten up with rage because his wife had left him” (VT 317) punishes him: 
The blow took Bla-Bla utterly by surprise. It stunned and cut. The strap caught 
him on the side of the head but the blow seemed to coil round the root of his 
tongue. The teacher was asking him something angrily and telling him to 
speak English. But his English deserted him and he was unable to answer: the 
strap whistled and landed on the other side of his head and the top of his left 
shoulder. Instinctively, he held on to the desk but nearly lost his balance. Tiny 
electric shocks ran from his cheek to the fingertips of his left hand. He stared 
down at the wooden desk, speechless with misery. Since his father left, he had 
especially wanted to do well. He had done everything he could to please the 
teacher. The ugliness of the blows shocked him. The teacher told him to sit 
down and he did. The little girl who sat next to him was looking at him, her 
eyes full of worry. During the morning break, Bla-Bla stayed apart from the 
others and refused to speak, as if the blows had driven him back to some 
period before speech, as old as silence. It was not until he was walking home 
on his own at the end of the afternoon that he allowed himself to sob. (VT 317) 
This episode illustrates that indigeneity is being kept in check not by a white man, but 
rather a coastlander. The novel thus complicates a simple colonizer/colonized 
dichotomy, for Amerindians in the novel are primarily oppressed by black 
coastlanders. Moreover, Bla-Bla is punished for the use of his native tongue which 
equals an annihilation of indigenous history. Melville explicitly raises issues of the 
forgotten history of indigenous peoples in the Caribbean.  
 The novel exemplifies how indigeneity is being controlled physically. While 
Beatrice’s encounter with racism is verbal, yet nonetheless harmful, Bla-Bla is 





[b]oth race and sex are . . . most definitely physical, marked on and through 
the body, lived as a material experience, visible as surface phenomena, and 
determinant of economic and political status. Social identities cannot be 
adequately analysed without an attentiveness to the role of the body and of the 
body’s visible identity. (102, emphasis added) 
Because Bla-Bla is marked physically as an indigenous child, the teacher decides to 
respond to his body in a particular way, namely by beating him. Yet, this further 
marks him, for it leaves long-lasting traces in his body which further reinforce his 
racialized identity. This becomes apparent in the description of the blow and the pain 
it causes suggesting that everything is connected in a body. It is not merely separate 
parts that suffer, but separate parts in the body are always interconnected and thus one 
part affects the entire body.203 The pain Bla-Bla feels demonstrates that these blows 
have a much deeper impact than just superficial, cutaneous pain. The hits permeate 
his whole body, reaching to the root of his tongue (where speech is produced), and 
even his fingertips. The dehumanizing quality of this violence is evoked by the image 
of the blows driving him back to “some period before speech, as old as silence” (VT 
317). Thus, these blows further consolidate his status as an indigenous, racialized 
individual as they lead to a change in behaviour, namely silence. We also encounter 
this silence when Chofy comes to Georgetown and is insulted by a “sharp-faced boy, 
black as ebony” with the words “‘Hey, buck man’ . . . ‘Look at de moon-face buck 
man’” while another boy throws a mango seed at him (VT 31). In response, “[h]e 
[Chofy] put on a blank expression and continued walking” (31). Chofy has 
internalized the modes of behaviour ascribed to racialized, and in particular 
indigenous, individuals and groups. While on the one hand, indigeneity is inscribed 
into bodies by upbringing and an identification with a community’s way of life, it is 
also inscribed from the outside by physical violence and humiliation. 
5.4 “Beatrice McKinnon underwent some kind of seizure:” The 
Grotesque and the Gothic 
In their collection of essays, Unsettled Remains: Canadian Literature and the 
Postcolonial Gothic (2009), Cynthia Sugars and Gerry Turcotte explore the 
 




“subgenre” (x) of the postcolonial Gothic in a Canadian literary context. According to 
these authors, the postcolonial Gothic “is concerned less with overt scenes of romance 
and horror than with experiences of spectrality and the uncanny” (viii-ix). They see 
the portrayal of ghosts and hauntings in literary works from Canada as emblematic of 
“unresolved memory traces and occluded histories resulting from the experience of 
colonial oppression, diasporic migration, or national consolidation” (vii). They further 
contend that  
[i]n Canadian literature, the postcolonial Gothic has been put to multiple uses, 
above all to convey experiences of ambivalence and/or split subjectivity 
resulting from the inherent incommensurability of conflicted subject positions 
that have emerged from a colonial context and persisted into the present. (xi)  
However, much of what they establish for the Canadian white settler context is 
equally applicable to other postcolonial and transcultural nations. Accordingly, when 
they suggest that “[i]n many instances, the postcolonial Gothic involves a 
transposition of conventional gothic and colonialist metaphors, turning gothic 
conventions on their head by converting the unfamiliar or ghostly into nonthreatening 
– even sustaining – objects of desire,” (xi) this applies just as well to the Guyanese 
situation represented in Melville’s novel. 
 Sigmund Freud’s notion of the uncanny is central to the postcolonial Gothic, 
as many essays in Sugars and Turcotte’s collection demonstrate.204 The German term 
unheimlich refers to a situation in which the familiar, or “the familiarity of home,” has 
turned into something unfamiliar. According to Freud, “the uncanny is that class of 
the frightening which leads back to what is known of old and long familiar” (620). 
The word itself has two meanings in the German language; one refers to the familiar 
and the homely, a state of comfort, the other to something hidden, concealment and 
discomfort. Thus, derived from these two meanings, something uncanny creates a 
sense of unease, disquiet and even fear. The uncanny is a major mode of the 
postcolonial Gothic which “include[s] scenes where the distinction between past and 
present, real and spectral, civilized and primitive, is tenuous and disjunctive” (Sugars 
and Turcotte ix). In Sugars and Turcotte’s collection, Shelley Kulperger states: 
 
204 In her entry on the “Grotesque” in the Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, Connelly links the uncanny to the 
traumatic strand of the grotesque (245). 
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Whether it is a historical or geographical artifact, there is an undeniable 
(re)assertion of the material within the literary and a return to the ‘real.’ 
Within the postcolonial Gothic, this realism resides, comfortably and 
naturally, alongside the supernatural and the unreal. This blurring of the real 
with the surreal is not a marker of postmodern aesthetics but, rather, is very 
much in keeping with the cultural materialism of the postcolonial Gothic. 
(108) 
Even though this study is not concerned with postcolonial literatures as such (see 
“Introduction”), I consider the concept useful in particular when discussing the 
grotesque. As was delineated in section 2.7, scholars have identified two varieties of 
the grotesque, the humorous-physical grotesque and the threatening, terrible or 
alienating grotesque. Thus, the Gothic as a genre can be associated with the latter. 
While I would argue that in The Ventriloquist’s Tale, the postcolonial Gothic does not 
develop its full potential as uncanny episodes do not lead to fear, it nevertheless helps 
to make sense of the ambiguity that the text creates. 
 The novel is replete with unusual reactions of bodies, such as children going 
blind after watching a solar eclipse reflected in a pond (VT 147), violent shudders, 
unexplainable seizures and inexplicable blindness. In this section, I argue that these 
constitute examples of the postcolonial Gothic which reveal something that had been 
hidden. The sheer number of headaches that members of the McKinnon family suffer 
from is revealing. Chofy suffers from “continuous headaches” for the first few days in 
Georgetown (VT 32), as the way of life there is unfamiliar to him. He specifically 
suffers from having to work in a closed space; it makes him “feel imprisoned and 
breathless” as well as “diminished” (VT 32). So as not to let other people know how 
he really feels, he puts on his “buck-man face” which is expressionless, suppressing 
his emotions. Chofy further has trouble adjusting to a work and life routine that 
includes time for leisure. 
 Beatrice has a headache that lasts for three days after the aforementioned 
episode in which she passes out because of the inability to react to the injustice done 
to her (VT 142); Maba develops a “blinding headache” when she learns that an eclipse 
is approaching (VT 181); Wifreda’s headache worsens at the mention of her brother 




All her adult life, she had feared that she would go blind simply because of her 
kinship with her brother Danny and sister Beatrice. Kinship with them was 
itself enough to warrant some sort of supernatural reprisal. She ran her hands 
over her forehead where the headache sat behind her eyes, the thoughts 
clawing at her brain like crabs in a barrel. Don’t say the whole matter was 
going to re-surface now. She would say as little about Mr Evelyn Waugh as 
possible – not that he had anything directly to do with it. (VT 72-73) 
Rosa wants to meet Wifreda in order to find out about Evelyn Waugh’s stay with the 
McKinnons. Yet, the sheer thought of it causes a physical reaction in Wifreda. It is 
not only “guilt” that makes Wifreda react physically to the mention of Evelyn Waugh 
because she was “indirectly responsible for Beatrice’s final departure” (VT 75) and 
she told Evelyn Waugh about the affair (VT 74). It is also the fear of going blind, for 
Beatrice cursed her for having revealed the affair. When Rosa accompanies Chofy to 
the St Francis of Assisi home, where Wifreda is staying, at the mention of an eclipse, 
Wifreda’s body reacts: 
Suddenly, Auntie Wifreda felt violently ill and hot. She could hear a booming 
sound in her ears as if someone had struck a heavy bell that vibrated on a long 
single note. Rosa’s face began to melt at the edges and metamorphose into the 
face of her sister Beatrice. The whole room began to waver. The floor and the 
walls billowed slowly. (VT 87) 
Wifreda reacts bodily to the memory of Danny and Beatrice’s incestuous affair and 
the curse that Beatrice spoke which would make Wifreda go blind: “I will make you 
blind, like a termite” (VT 88). While, initially, Wifreda’s bad sight seems to be 
medically grounded in cataracts, Wifreda’s blindness after her operation does not 
have an “organic reason” (VT 297). The doctor suggests that it might be triggered by 
stress, something he refers to as “hysterical blindness” (VT 297). What causes this 
extreme version of stress are her memories and the secrecy she lived with most of her 
life: 
Staring sightlessly straight ahead of her, Wifreda told him [Chofy] for the first 
time the whole story of his Uncle Danny’s affair with Beatrice; Father 
Napier’s madness; the existence and disappearance of Sonny; the eclipse and 
the threat that Beatrice had uttered to make her blind. (VT 297-98) 
Only after she shares the story both with Chofy and the reader does her condition 
improve. The novel thus implies that knowledge or a ‘secret’ can weigh heavily on 
someone and can even leave corporeal traits. However, this does not only refer to 
individuals but can be extended to the national level, as some countries barely engage 
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or come to terms with their colonial pasts, continuing colonization and their lasting 
effects. 
 Some episodes in the novel underline uncontrollable physical reactions that 
come about as a result of something else. After Beatrice and Danny have run away 
because their relationship has been revealed, Danny displays an unusual bodily 
reaction while a solar eclipse occurs. (Solar eclipses and incest are linked in 
Wapisiana mythology, as Wormoal explains, VT 83.) Danny’s reaction is described in 
the following manner: 
But then something happened to Danny. He was seized with a terrible icy 
coldness all through his gut, a coldness indistinguishable from sadness. He 
gave an almighty shudder that rocked the hammock. [Beatrice] held on to him 
but he could not control the shivering. She rubbed his back vigorously. The 
shudders rocked him four or five times more, leaving him helpless. She tried 
to warm him and soothe him by rubbing and stroking him and holding him 
tightly in her arms. (VT 204) 
This ominous attack occurs at the same time as the eclipse. The coldness akin to 
sadness functions as a prolepsis which shows that just as the myth predicts, Beatrice 
and Danny will not be able to stay together – the sun and the moon will be separated. 
Moreover, the coldness alludes to the place where Beatrice will eventually immigrate, 
which is characterized by coldness: “It was not until her second winter in Canada that 
Beatrice came to understand that the devil has to do with cold, not heat as most people 
think” (VT 271). 
 Later still, when Beatrice and Danny have been forced to separate, Beatrice, 
too, has an uncontrollable bodily reaction, which is described in terms of a fit. 
Some distance from the house, she stepped for a moment on to a large flat 
rock-stone that lay across the path. Standing in the sun, in the full light of day, 
Beatrice McKinnon underwent some kind of seizure. Her head snapped back. 
As she stared at the sun, her eyes rolled back in her head. Her arms were flung 
out in mid-air and remained there quite rigid for several seconds in some sort 
of fit or spasm. During those few seconds, all the grief turned into violent fury. 
The hairs on her head bristled with rage. Her face turned dark, her mouth 
began to work, her features contorted. The wind blew strands of black hair 
across her mouth. At the same time, a noise erupted from her throat, a long, 
choking rattle that seemed to have its origins in the base of her spine and 
shook her whole body. (VT 238-39) 
Beatrice’s eerie seizure is connected to the now broken off relationship with Danny as 
the allusion to rock-stone and the sun indicate. The mention of the sun evokes 
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Beatrice’s sexual pleasure, which is being controlled, as well as the myth of the solar 
eclipse, in which the female part is ascribed to the sun. The sadness which turns into 
rage is not directed at Danny, however, but rather at Father Napier who drove Danny 
to end the relationship. The anger that is unleashed is important, for anger remains an 
emotion that is usually suppressed in women. For Tania Modleski, “anger, . . . 
continues to be, as it has been historically, the most unacceptable of all emotions” for 
women (24). Beatrice’s fury is directed at Father Napier, primarily because he has 
meddled in her relationship but further because he has come to her community as a 
missionary bringing with him colonial ideas, including which types of sexual 
relationships are acceptable and which are not. In fact, later on it is revealed that the 
education Beatrice received at the convent does not make much sense to her: 
Not that Beatrice felt that she had done anything wrong. Whatever had 
happened between Danny and herself still felt so natural that she could not 
believe there was anything bad about it. Perhaps in that underwater world that 
Maba had told her about as a child, she would be united with Danny again. 
She dipped under the water until she could breathe no longer and was forced 
to surface. She could not find the entry to it. She and Danny had been expelled 
into everyday life. Danny had accepted it more easily than she had. Nothing 
that she learned at the convent ever made as much sense to her as what she 
had learned at Waronawa. (VT 268) 
Even after it has been broken off, Beatrice does not feel that there was anything 
wrong with the incestuous relationship. It felt ‘natural’ to her because it only becomes 
unnatural in the context of Christian religion. Moreover, the education she received at 
the convent did not provide her with much understanding for an Amerindian life; 
quite on the contrary, it is completely inadequate for her life in Waronawa. Imposing 
a Christian lifestyle and modes of thought on non-Christian cultures, the novel 
suggests, is not only inadequate but also harmful to individuals. 
 The various instances of the postcolonial Gothic not only hint at something 
that had been hidden on the character plane such as secrets and insidious forms of 
racism, but it serves also as a reminder of the colonial legacy and what it did and 
continues doing to bodies. However, these uncanny elements also present a haunting 
reminder of the unpredictability of bodies. These bodily reactions are disturbing from 
a dominant western perspective, simply because the mind is thought to control the 
body. However, as these episode aptly demonstrate, the mind does not have complete 
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control. Yet, if the mind does not have complete control, what implications does this 
have for men, especially white men, who have been associated with the mind and 
rationality? 
5.5 “Hot and bitter or cold and sweet:” Polyphonic Entanglements 
The polyphonic nature of The Ventriloquist’s Tale becomes apparent in the coming 
together of various, often opposed, character’s voices.205 According to Bakhtin, a 
truly polyphonic novel is one in which characters, including the narrator, are on the 
same level, i.e. no one character is superior to the others. This is why the narrator is 
merely a “participant in the dialogue without retaining for himself the final word” 
(Bakhtin, Problems 72).206 While there is a narrator in The Ventriloquist’s Tale, who 
both opens and closes the narrative and thus, presumably does retain the final word, it 
is not clear whether or not he is the narrator throughout. In spite of his claim that he is 
the narrator and that he has to “appear to vanish” in order to “become a realist” (VT 
9), different parts of the novel are focalized through different characters and it is at 
least hinted at that the second part of the novel is narrated by Wifreda. However, it 
might also be narrated by Beatrice, whose memories lead over to the second part.  
 The second part is Wifreda’s flash-back to the past which is more graphic than 
her current life: “It was odd how memories from so far back were more vivid in her 
mind than what happened yesterday” (VT 73). And “Wifreda told him for the first 
time the whole story” (VT 298). Yet, the text suggests that she does not only tell 
Chofy but also the reader the ‘whole’ story. Moreover, the narrator from the pro- and 
 
205 The most pertinent intertextual dialogue within the novel is the intertext with Evelyn Waugh’s a 
Handful of Dust and his travel writing. While it is not the aim of this chapter to disentangle all the 
intertextual references between Waugh’s writing, Melville’s family history and The Ventriloquist’s 
Tale, because this has already been accomplished by other scholars (see Ness, Jenkins and Wallart), it 
is important to note that the ironic intertextual references suggest that Waugh misses the important 
story: “For all that he was looking for material, he missed one story that was under his nose” (VT 49). 
Waugh is not particularly interested in the affair, and “in fact, [Wifreda] detected a certain distaste as 
he listened” (VT 74). While Rosa suggests that his disinterest might have been the result of the story 
not being “Evelyn Waugh’s sort of story” (VT 49), it nevertheless raises questions of what counts as 
‘proper’ material for an English writer who composes travel pieces. According to Ness, Melville “has 
laid Waugh’s travel book and diary under requisition to help provide several characters and events in 
her novel” (52). Moreover, McKinnon is based on Melville’s ancestor. For more intertextual parallels 
between Waugh’s biographical writing and Melville’s novel see Ness, Wallart and Jenkins. 
206 Similar to the other novels in this study, The Ventriloquist’s Tale also displays typical traces of 
novelistic dialogue be means of “[s]tylization of the various forms of oral everyday narration” and “the 
stylistically individualized speech of characters” (Bakhtin, “Discourse” 262). A case in point is Rohit’s 
idiosyncratic speech (VT 30). 
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epilogue does not intervene or provide metafictional comments that undermine the 
characters’ views. Even more crucially, one of the novel’s main questions of whether 
Amerindians should mix with outsiders or whether they should remain among 
themselves is approached from exactly these distinct characters’ voices and 
standpoints, without raising any one above the other. Thus, while the narrator is in the 
position to retain the final word, he does not provide an answer to this much-debated 
question. 
 Some characters in the novel suggest that mixing between Amerindians and 
‘outsiders’ should be avoided. The fiercest defender of this position is ironically an 
outsider, the anthropologist Wormoal who cautions that “Indian culture is 
disintegrating these days – contaminated mainly by contact with other races” (VT 78). 
He believes in the “purity of the nation” (VT 79), yet is aware of the exploitation he 
participates in: 
I have the entire map of this country in my head. I know about the history and 
movements of the indigenous peoples here, their kinship structures, 
occupations, philosophies, cosmologies, labour pattern, languages. We 
Europeans have access to all the books and documentation that they lack. And 
what do I do with it? I become a professor and enrich European and American 
culture with it. (VT 79)  
Being aware of his own complicity in the exploitation of Amerindians is justified, 
however, by his notion of knowledge. He believes that he knows “more about the 
Amerindian peoples than they know about themselves” (VT 77-78). However, he is 
also aware of the influence he has on his ‘subjects:’ “We try just to observe but our 
very presence alters things” (VT 79). This is exemplified when his ‘knowledge’ of 
Wai-Wai leads to the accident that costs Bla-Bla his life.  
 Chofy’s cousin Tenga is also opposed to the idea of ‘mixing.’ “The worst 
thing,” he states, “is when they come and marry us” and he observes how 
Amerindians are being colonized anew: 
We Amerindian people are fools, you know. We’ve been colonised twice. 
First by the Europeans and then by the coastlanders. I don’t know which is 
worse. Big companies come to mine gold or cut timber. Scholars come and 
worm their way into our communities, studying us and grabbing our 
knowledge for their own benefit. Aid agencies come and interfere with us. 
Tourists stare at us. Politicians crawl round us at election times. (VT 54) 
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Not only does Tenga refer to the neo-colonialism of big, predominantly US-American 
companies that exploit the natural resources of economically dependent countries, but 
he also carves out the role of research in colonial efforts. According to Tenga’s 
position, research is equally harmful as big companies, robbing Amerindians of 
another kind of natural resource, that is, knowledge. However, Tenga later 
acknowledges: ‘What to do? We’re destroyed if we mix. And we’re destroyed if we 
don’t’ (VT 55). Thus, Tenga gets to the heart of the conundrum indigenous 
communities face in modern times. 
 Chofy struggles with questions of mixing or staying within one’s own 
community as well. While he believes that “any change was the beginning of 
disintegration” (VT 15), he seems to have feelings of “dissatisfaction” (VT 14, 24) 
with his life and is drawn to a more ‘western’ lifestyle as a newspaper clipping which 
shows “millionaire Claus von Bülow and his wife attending a movie première in New 
York” (VT 18) and which he hides from his wife implies. In fact, when he meets 
Rosa, it is “love before first sight” (VT 40) because he is in love with the idea of an 
affair with a European woman, rather than with Rosa herself. Robert Ness argues 
accordingly that “Chofy instantly falls in love with Rosa because he was already in 
love with the exotic idea of Rosa . . .” (62). Chofy is also of the opinion that 
Amerindians “have to mix. Otherwise we have no future. We must get educated” (VT 
54). His affair with Rosa, whom he meets in Georgetown, seemingly suggests that 
mixing is possible as it presents “an endeavor at ‘progressive’ multiculturalism” (Ness 
62).  
 Even though Rosa differs from Wormoal in many respects as she does not 
want to be “bracketed with him” (VT 80), her position is a fraught one. She is aware 
of many colonial and neo-colonial practices, as her reaction to Chofy’s apologizing 
indicates: “All words that make you feel inferior” (VT 40). However, similar to the 
anthropologist, she engages in research and, ironically, postcolonial research at that. 
The title of her work is “Evelyn Waugh – a Post-colonial Perspective” (VT 351). Yet, 
Rosa’s perspective is based on very little evidence, for she does not actually collect 
much information about Evelyn Waugh and his stay with the McKinnons. Ness 
suggests that “Waugh is not the only cultural outsider who misses the story. Rosa, as 
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scholar of the post-colonial, also misses the story she is seeking, since Auntie 
Wilfreda, having little use for anyone outside her own family, refuses to speak about 
her recollections of Waugh” (57). Moreover, Rosa is so focused on her own research 
that she loses all attentiveness to other issues. Even though Nancy Freeman advices 
her not to bring up the relationship between Danny and Beatrice, she mentions the 
eclipse to Wifreda, without drawing the connection between an eclipse and incest, 
which Wormoal writes about and she is aware of because she only recently read about 
it herself (VT 87). 
 Bla-Bla’s accident, however, seems to suggest, on the narrative level, that 
mixing with foreigners is harmful. While Chofy is in Georgetown, a group of 
Americans go to the Rupununi to look for oil, drilling holes and exploding dynamite. 
Chofy’s son Bla-Bla falls victim to such an explosion because of a misunderstanding. 
The Americans shout “Chofoye,” which Bla-Bla decodes as a sign that his father has 
returned instead of the warning the Americans believe it to be. Wormoal had earlier 
explained to one of the Americans that Chofoye means “explosion of waters” as Rosa 
had informed him (VT 309). The Americans, however, think it is simply an 
Amerindian word for “explosion” (VT 343). One could read Bla-Bla’s death as proof 
of mixing leading to tragedy. However, it is not the mixing itself that gives rise to this 
disaster but rather a lack of knowledge or failure of communication. This also 
problematizes the role both of the researcher Wormoal and Rosa: Wormoal because 
he provides information or knowledge to the ill-informed Americans, but fails to put 
this information into context and Rosa because, as a someone who is “a complete 
rationalist” (VT 298) and “preferred a degree of orderliness and rationality in her life” 
(VT 43), she is not aware of Chofy’s belief to never disclose his name or its meaning 
(VT 84, 302) and even if she did, she would probably not pay it much heed due to her 
rationality. Without giving it much thought, Rosa tells Wormoal Chofy’s name and its 
meaning. Neither Wormoal, nor Rosa, are simply passive observers, then, who seek or 
provide information, but set in motion a process that leads to the death of Bla-Bla, the 
end of the affair between Rosa and Chofy, and Chofy’s return to the Rupununi.207   
 
207 Pierre François interprets “McKinnon’s flight from Rupununi and Chofy’s return to the bush [as] 
multicultural failures” (47). 
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 In the embedded narrative the conundrum between mixing and staying within 
one’s own community is also addressed. Beatrice is confronted with these questions 
in Canada. Even though she settles into her new life with ease, as it is “easy and 
comfortable, if a little unreal” (VT 278), she is occasionally reminded of that other 
‘world’ (VT 280), especially after she sees the Native American Indian woman from 
the circus again but ignores her. She wakes up one night and thinks:  
How odd, she thought, to be lying here with my head two inches from his 
[Horatio’s] and for my head to be still full of forest and savannah while his is 
probably full of the Montreal of his youth with its electric trams and toboggan 
slides. How odd that these two worlds should be lying inches from each other  
. . . She kept thinking about the woman. Perhaps, after all, the woman had 
been safer inside the ice coffin at the fun-fair than out of it. She wondered if it 
was better for her own people to preserve themselves within their own 
traditions or to allow change. (VT 280-81) 
Beatrice wonders about the possibility that two lives are closely connected, yet their 
inner workings seem to be so far away from each other; hers revolves around the 
forest and savannahs and Horatio’s around Montreal. This is also why she thinks that 
the Native American Woman might have been safer inside the ice coffin, for being 
inside it does not burden her with thoughts of the kind that Beatrice has, and it 
prevents her from having to face the question of whether people should stay with their 
own kind or mix. Nonetheless, Beatrice appreciates her new life: “Life was easy the 
way she now lived. She had even learned to play tennis. Oh Montreal, Montreal. 
What was she to do there?” (VT 281). While the allusion to playing tennis is 
humorous, for apparently successful integration entails such practices, her question of 
what she was to do there ironically echoes Evelyn Waugh’s “Nothing appears to 
happen here. What do you find to do?” (VT 288). The novel seems to suggest that 
neither life style is superior to the other but equally confusing for someone who has 
not grown up in it. Finally, Beatrice is reminded of her mother saying “[h]ot and bitter 
or cold and sweet. Everything in the world is divided up like that” (VT 281). The 
novel thus suggests that there is no easy way out or simple answer and that you 
cannot have it both ways. Either choice will have its advantages and disadvantages, 
whether it refers to Beatrice’s life in the Rupununi versus her life in Montreal, or the 
questions of mixing versus staying with your own kind. Sonny too addresses the 
question of ‘mixing’ in the “Epilogue:” 
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It was while I was in Europe that I nearly became fatally infected by the 
epidemic of separatism that was raging there. The virus transmutes. 
Sometimes it appears as nationalism, sometimes as racism, sometimes as 
religious orthodoxy. My experience in the rain forests of South America 
provided me with no immunity to it. It was very infectious. I felt my mouth 
twitching with unaccustomed fervour. Chameleon-like I marched amongst 
them. The Serbs, the Scots, the English, the Basques, the Muslims, the 
Chechens – everybody was at it. I crammed my mouth full of Belgian hand-
made chocolates to avoid speaking out and giving myself away. I saw that the 
desire to be with your own kind exerts a powerful attraction. (VT 355) 
Sonny is both aware of the attraction of staying with your own kind and the danger it 
poses. However, the idea of staying with your own kind differs depending on the 
context. Sonny remarks that his “experience in the rain forests of South America” did 
not provide him with “immunity,” for even though people stay together there, they are 
not affected by separatism. Sonny opts for staying with his own kind and returns to 
the savannahs and to his community, only to be confronted with the other extreme, 
complete neo-colonial conquest: 
I decided to give up my quest for the parrot, temporarily, and head for home – 
sweet irony – to my own people. Back in my village I debated seriously with 
myself the appeal of staying with your own kind rather than mixing on equal 
terms; the virtues of untrammelled nature; the split between magic and 
science. I was getting nowhere happily when the ear-blasting sound of a 
helicopter landing brought me from my hammock. Lo and behold! I was 
confronted by the notorious Cosmetics Queen, the tycoon who frequently 
drops in on my village searching for recipes from indigenous people. I told her 
immediately of the wonderful face cream we make from ants’ balls. (VT 356) 
Even though Sonny does not have an answer to the question “of staying with your 
own kind rather than mixing on equal terms,” what happens does seem to give an 
answer. For the Cosmetics Queen coming to the village and exploiting their 
knowledge and resources suggests that what is at the heart of the problem is not 
mixing itself, but rather mixing on unequal terms. As the novel illustrates abundantly, 
mixing does happen, but rarely on equal terms, resulting in the exploitation of 
Amerindians. Sonny is ultimately “[u]nable to decide whether we should stick to 
ourselves or throw ourselves on the mercy of the wide world” (VT 357) and takes up 
residence in the stars, opting out, thus, in a truly polyphonic mode rejecting a definite 
answer, leaving the readers to make up their own minds.  
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  I would like to suggest that what the text ultimately offers is an ‘ethics of 
entanglement’ in which indigenous peoples are necessarily entangled with non-
indigenous ones. “Entanglements,” according to Barad, “are not intertwinings of 
separate entities but rather irreducible relations of responsibility. There is no fixed 
dividing line between ‘self’ and ‘other,’ ‘past’ and ‘present’ and ‘future,’ ‘here’ and 
‘now,’ ‘cause’ and ‘effect’” (“Nature’s” 148-49). However, the question of mixing is 
never disengaged from questions of continuing colonization, which complicates 
matters. Indigenous communities become or rather remain increasingly dependent on 
corporate companies and national governments, and it is in fact this dependence that 
makes them in turn reliant on ‘mixing.’ The novel cautions against the unequal 
positions that members within the process might have, i.e. an ethics of entanglement 
without the ethics. In the novel’s case, it is the Amerindians who are ultimately in an 
inferior position socially and economically speaking to the US-Americans and 
coastlanders. In addition, while the novel’s characters express divergent views in 
regard to endogamy and exogamy, on the narrative level it is only through mixing and 
transcultural movement that this story comes to life. If it were not for the Scottish 
Alexander McKinnon’s marriage to Maba and Zuna, which results in offspring, 
Beatrice and Danny, who in turn produce offspring, Sonny, this story would not have 
been told.  
5.6 “It takes more than one life to make a person:” Summary of Results 
In this chapter, I have shown that The Ventriloquist’s Tale calls into question core 
western ideas of the body, including the gendered body. The novel elucidates both the 
concept of the grotesque body and phenomenological notions of embodiment by 
means of its emphasis on various interlinked and transgressive bodies as well as in its 
emphasis on the unpredictability of bodies. The novel presents a particularly powerful 
challenge to dominant western forms of feminism. It both defies dominant feminist 
discourses that sideline indigenous experience and challenges dualistic and simplistic 
thinking about embodiment. 
  Beatrice’s body is marked as grotesque because of its immense transgressive 
potential. Initially, her sexuality is disconnected from other human beings; she 
experiences sexual pleasure because of the warmth of the sun and the intense colour 
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of some flowers. Later, she engages in an incestuous relationship with her brother – 
which reflects the Amerindian myth of two sibling lovers who turn into the sun and 
the moon. Both Beatrice’s sexual pleasure caused by non-human and inorganic matter 
and her incestuous relationship undermine dominant western ideals of female 
sexuality. The novel corroborates stereotypical representations of female bodies as 
inherently linked to the earth and fertility and thus complicates an essentialized 
reading of female bodies. The novel further complicates western notions of female 
bodies and their agency as it illustrates that dominant Western feminism is 
predominantly based on ideas of female agency as linked to modernity and 
individuality and thus universalized ideas of female experience as predominantly 
white, middle-class women (see Grewal and Kaplan 252). Moreover, the novel 
illustrates that colonial and patriarchal ideas go hand in hand. Beatrice’s incestuous 
relationship with her brother constitutes an act of agency and a defiance of both 
colonial and patriarchal ideas. 
 The incestuous relationship is the central grotesque motif in the novel. Not 
only does Danny and Beatrice’s relationship pose problems for an understanding of 
human beings as individuals, separated from each other, but it also ironically subverts 
anthropological thinking and in particular Lévi-Strauss’s claims. On the one, by way 
of the figure of the grotesque intertwining of Danny and Beatrice, the novel illustrates 
that human bodies are always linked to each other and their surroundings, raising 
questions of belonging and responsibility. On the other hand, the playful hint at Lévi-
Strauss questions the validity of ‘scientific’ approaches to Amerindian myths and 
lifestyles puts into doubt the validity of Lévi-Strauss’s generalizing theory of a 
universal incest taboo. 
 The Ventriloquist’s Tale resonates with embodiment theory by exemplifying 
how race is inscribed into bodies by both psychological and physical violence. During 
Beatrice’s time in the convent, her body is disciplined in a particular – western, 
Catholic – way. Moreover, she is taunted because of her indigenous background. 
Relatedly, Bla-Bla is physically punished by his teacher for using Wapisiana. In both 
instances, the seemingly superficial violence that is being done to them has a deeper 
impact on their subjectivity as it forms their body images permanently. The novel also 
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shows that mental and physical experiences go hand in hand in the creation and 
transformation of body images. Beatrice faints as a result of verbal harassment and 
Bla-Bla’s physical punishments translates into a mental blockage.  
 Furthermore, the novel resonates with the grotesque in its representation of 
uncanny bodily reactions present throughout the novel. Several characters in the novel 
suffer from headaches and seemingly unexplainable bodily reactions such as 
blindness, violent trembling or seizures. Not only do these episodes point to the 
materiality of bodies, but they also represent and transform instances of the 
postcolonial Gothic which provide haunting reminders, first, of the unpredictability of 
human bodies, and, second, the colonial legacy. As Adam Roberts argues, “One of the 
consistent lessons of Gothic is that, though we may try, we cannot escape the past” 
(33-34). Similarly, the grotesque bodies in The Ventriloquist’s Tale are reminders of 
corporeality that is shaped by past and continuing colonization. 
 The novel also stands out because of its mixing of voices. The novel’s 
polyphony is expressed via the ambivalent role of the narrator who outs himself as the 
narrator of the story but fails to reappear in the main sections of the narrative as well 
as the different opinions concerning the question of whether to mix or stay within 
one’s own community. While divergent opinions are expressed, the narrator adds a 
twist to this dilemma by clearly establishing the unequal forms of mixing, for it is 
predominantly US-American and European companies and scholars that either come 
to exploit natural resources or knowledge, without taking responsibility for the traces 
they leave in the Wapisiana community. The novel thus ultimately suggests that 
people and communities are entangled, but that ethics need to be involved in order to 
create an ‘ethics of entanglement.’ 
 Similar to Cereus Blooms at Night, The Ventriloquist’s Tale illustrates that the 
mode of the transcultural feminist grotesque is not limited to representing middle-
class, cisgender and white experience. By depicting indigenous experiences and 
demonstrating that these are marked by racism and by exemplifying that female 
sexuality is controlled not because of inherent sexism within the indigenous 
community but because of dominant western and especially Catholic ideas of what 
constitutes normal sexuality, the novel comments on the intertwining or rather 
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congruence of colonialism and sexism. Thus, the novel demonstrates that female 
embodiment cannot be understood without taking into account race, ethnicity and a 
different, in this case, indigenous Amerindian epistemology. It ultimately argues for 






This thesis has combined more traditional understandings of the grotesque, in 
particular Bakhtin’s concept of the grotesque body, with the newer and more critical 
insights of the field of embodiment theory. Embodiment theory, and in particular 
feminist phenomenology, has helped to mitigate some of the problems the Bakhtinian 
grotesque poses (see “Introduction”) and has contributed to extending some of the 
elements present in Bakhtin’s theory. These include the positive and active role that is 
assigned to matter and materiality, the criticism of a mind/body dualism and its 
effects for non-normative bodies, as well as an emphasis on the inherent connection 
between the mind and the body by means of the concept of body images. In short, the 
Bakhtinian grotesque has been extended by the newly established field of feminist 
phenomenology, which has added a critical and innovative edge to this study of the 
grotesque. Further, this thesis has put an emphasis on the stylistic characteristics of 
the grotesque, which are often sidelined. The grotesque is frequently only thought of 
in terms of theme, yet it is a mode which foregrounds stylistic aspects, such as 
double-voiced discourse, irony, and polyphony. 
 I have shown how the novels in this study employ the grotesque aesthetic and 
style to represent a new conception of the ‘body.’ This new conception entails 
primarily two aspects: First, it presents the body and the mind as intertwined entities. 
All of the novels call into question a clear differentiation between mind and body (as 
grounded in much of dominant western philosophical thinking and religious beliefs). 
In Atwood’s novel, this is less pronounced, for in fact, Marian’s body and mind are at 
odds with each other for most of the narrative. However, this is due to the inscription 
of gender into her body. Marian incorporates femininity and is unable to resist these 
inscriptions consciously and intellectually at first. However, her body actively resists 
these inscriptions by rejecting food, which her mind is, initially, not able to fathom. 
Carter’s Nights at the Circus puts emphasis on a change in body images and shows 
how the mind and body are inextricably linked; for the traces that are left on the body 
are ultimately also traces left on the mind. Mootoo’s and Melville’s texts envision the 
body as multiple, both in the sense that Bakhtin understands the grotesque body as 
social body and in feminist phenomenologist terms of a multiplicity of body images. 
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Cereus Blooms at Night focuses on bodily connections between characters, above all 
Tyler and Mala’s connection. It suggests that bodies are not as individualized as they 
might appear and that they should be granted characteristics that are usually ascribed 
to the mind, such as communication. Moreover, Tyler’s change in body images 
indicates a fluidity of gender. The Ventriloquist’s Tale, too, does not conceive of 
human bodies as individualized, for they are always linked to other bodies, both 
human and non-human. This is exemplified in Beatrice and Danny’s incestuous 
relationship which crosses the boundaries between nature and culture, reality and 
myth, human and plant, and human and animal. The novel also defies a mind/body 
dualism by means of its challenge to anthropological thinking and continuing colonial 
practices. 
 Second, these novels have shifted the focus from ‘the body,’ i.e. a 
prediscursive, generalizable, and normative body, to modes of embodiment. Emphasis 
is given to the singular experience of bodies; to perception, feeling and emotion. 
Concomitantly, experience of the grotesque, lived body is foregrounded instead of its 
mere representation. The Edible Woman foregrounds embodiedness by demonstrating 
that the inscription of gender into bodies leaves traumatic traces. The novel 
exemplifies that it is by having to fit into binary gender and concomitant 
heterosexuality that femininity is experienced as insidious trauma. Marian’s eating 
disorder and her body’s unexplainable and unexpected reactions, then, are symptoms 
of her trauma, as her increasing alienation from her own body image illustrates. 
Marian’s body has to develop an eating disorder so that she can overcome and 
redefine the inscription of gender into her body. 
 In Nights at the Circus, Fevvers experiences physically what it means to be 
deprived of agency and bodily freedom. These physical, bodily experiences leave a 
permanent trace on her subjectivity and become manifest in her broken wing. I have 
shown that Fevvers’s perception and point of view in regard to her own body, i.e. her 
body image, change throughout the narrative and that, as a consequence, she sheds a 
view of her body as fetish object by regaining a sense of her lived body. Agency, 
according to Carter, can only be (re)gained by means of the lived body. However, 
Nights at the Circus also brings issues of embodiment to the fore by commenting on 
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the mutual construction of the marker female and disabled. The novel exemplifies that 
both gender and disability, rather than being merely performative identities, are in fact 
embodied and leave material traces in bodies. 
 Cereus Blooms at Night puts emphasis on Mala’s experience of loss, abuse 
and social ostracism. It vividly depicts how Mala’s mental and physical experience of 
years of violence lead to a state of grotesqueness, in her case, an intimate connection 
to the earth, plants and animals, and a rejection of speech. Accordingly, the embodied 
communication that is established between Mala and Tyler is presented as a viable or 
in fact better alternative to verbal communication, as it accounts for Mala’s traumatic 
experiences. In addition, the materializing effects of discourse that translate into 
bodily traces, as they do in Chandin’s case for instance, also speak to an 
embodiedness of language, which is often overlooked. Moreover, the novel comments 
on gender being embodied by means of the two transgender characters Tyler and Otoh  
and shows that a body can be moulded defying notions of the stability of biological 
sex, as is the case with Otoh, or that gender does not have to pursue a specific aim and 
does not have to conform to binary gender roles, as is the case for Tyler. 
 On the one hand, The Ventriloquist’s Tale foregrounds the, in particular 
sexual, experience of an indigenous, female character, Beatrice. Her transgression of 
norms of dominant western sexuality – by having non-human sexual partners and by 
engaging in an incestuous relationship with her brother – are modes of resistance 
against the inscription of western femininity via her Catholic schooling. The novel 
illustrates that colonialism and patriarchy are mutually constituted and mutually rely 
on each other in exercising control over individuals and communities. On the other 
hand, the novel focuses on the experience of the wider indigenous community and 
exemplifies how it is marked by racism. The novel shows that far from being 
superficial, racist speech and acts leave permanent traces in bodies. However, 
resistance is conveyed via a wide-reaching unpredictability of bodies which defies 
western logic. 
 Furthermore, the novels investigated here all display a particular type of 
grotesque style, characterized by polyphony, and, first and foremost, the use of 
double-voiced discourse, humour and irony. In The Edible Woman, double-voiced 
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discourse serves to complicate some of Marian’s utterances and thoughts. It 
ultimately undermines Marian’s voluntary acts and thus questions her and other 
characters’ adherence to feminine ideals. In Nights at the Circus, humour and irony 
are powerful tools to put some characters and their opinions into place. Fevvers is 
frequently ‘degraded’ by the narrator so that her real motives are revealed and 
challenged. In both Cereus Blooms at Night and The Ventriloquist’s Tale polyphony 
plays a major part in creating ambiguity as regards the role of the narrator in the 
novel. While Tyler is supposedly the narrator in Cereus Blooms at Night, several 
episodes suggest that this might not be the case, complicating notions of them taking 
over the narration and thus reinforcing colonial modes of storytelling. In The 
Ventriloquist’s Tale, the assumed narrator appears in the pro- and epilogue, that is, the 
frame narrative, but is absent from the embedded narrative. Moreover, the novel’s 
reflection of a coming together of different voices and opinions reflects a truly 
polyphonic engagement with difficult questions that the novel raises, suggesting that 
there is rarely a simple or right answer. Not only does this grotesque style of narration 
result in an undermining of traditionally ‘male’ genres, narratives and forms of 
storytelling but it also aptly connects to laughter. Laughter challenges a mind/body 
dualism like no other phenomenon, because it is a phenomenon that blurs the 
boundaries between the mental and the bodily. 
 Due to space constraints, this thesis could not provide a comprehensive review 
of all possible manifestations of the transcultural feminist grotesque. The current 
study was limited by its focus on Anglophone literatures with links to Britain and 
Canada. Thus, this thesis only represents a starting point in the analysis of the 
transcultural feminist grotesque. Further research is needed to account for the varying 
manifestations of the transcultural feminist grotesque in other geographical and 
cultural locations, such as South-Africa, India, New Zealand or Australia, Ireland and 
other partly or fully Anglophone contexts. Other equally compelling novels for the 
study of the transcultural feminist grotesque would have been Fay Weldon’s The Life 
and Loves of a She-Devil (1982), Jeanette Winterson’s Sexing the Cherry (1989), 
Kathrine Dunn’s Geek Love (1989), Jenefer Shute’s Life-Size (1992), Barbara 
Gowdy’s Mr. Sandman (1995), Merle Collins’s The Colour of Forgetting (1995), 
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Arundhati Roy’s The God of Small Things (1997), Jackie Kay’s Trumpet (1998) and 
Nalo Hopkinson’s The New Moon’s Arms (2007). Moreover, it was beyond the scope 
of this thesis to examine other literary productions in the area of poetry or drama, 
even though there exist a variety of examples of the use of the grotesque mode in 
these genres as well.208 The current study has only examined texts produced in the 
second half of the twentieth century in order to trace the shift in the use of the mode 
during this period of intense theoretical, feminist debate. However, further research 
can trace the occurrence of this mode in more recent, twenty-first-century texts. 
 The focus on literature from British and Canadian transcultural backgrounds 
that this thesis pursued, has also implicitly led to a choice of theoretical texts that are 
predominantly Anglo-European. However, as has been established in the theory 
chapter, feminist phenomenology, while being predominantly shaped by Anglo-
European scholars, can help to reconcile seemingly divergent approaches or forms of 
activism, such as feminism and indigenous studies. Similarly, Bakhtin’s concept of 
the grotesque body, even though it goes back, for the most part, to medieval, 
European cultural productions, is easily applicable to literatures outside of Europe or 
Canada. Nevertheless, one of the strengths of this thesis is that it looks at the 
grotesque from a transcultural and transnational perspective. This approach towards 
reading the grotesque transculturally has revealed parallels in the use of themes and 
styles that might otherwise not have become so apparent. While acknowledging the 
differences in the cultural contexts, time periods and approaches in the respective 
literary works, this thesis has deliberately highlighted similarities. For, to quote 
Grewal and Kaplan: 
Transnational feminist practices require this kind of comparative work rather 
than the relativistic linking of ‘differences’ undertaken by proponents of 
‘global feminism’; that is, to compare multiple, overlapping, and discrete 
oppressions rather than to construct a theory of hegemonic oppression under a 
unified category of gender. (Grewal and Kaplan 253) 
My approach of a transcultural combined with a grotesque-feminist 
phenomenological reading has changed the ground of research concerning the 
grotesque. Not only has this enabled a re-examination of terms such as the ‘female’ 
 




grotesque and argued for a more engaged type of ‘feminist’ grotesque, which is not 
based on specific gender or national background, but it has also uncovered a general 
shift towards questions of embodiment in contemporary writing, irrespective of the 
place of origin of the literary work. This dissertation suggests that there is a global 
turn towards (female) embodiment, in particular in Anglophone writings which 
engage with feminist issues. Thus, this thesis demonstrates that the analysis of literary 
texts within a national framework is only useful to a certain extent and cannot account 
for the many similarities that novels in different Anglophone cultures reveal. 
Moreover, the examination of the transcultural feminist grotesque texts studied here 
has unearthed that there is a growing understanding of gender being always 
implicated with other markers such as race, ethnicity and disability.  
 While the novels analyzed in this thesis elucidate and complicate feminist 
discourses of their time, they also provide timeless comments on female embodiment 
within patriarchy. Thus, they also establish a pertinent link to current debates 
surrounding #MeToo, US-American abortion bans and taxation on sanitary products 
in Germany and in other countries, to name but the most prominent ones. For these 
debates illustrate that the female body continues to be devalued. On the one hand, 
these debates make it abundantly clear that the status of women, or their lack thereof, 
is connected to their bodies and their ‘biological’ traits, such as menstruation or the, at 
least for some women, option of bearing children. 209  Women continue being 
characterised by their bodies and, as a consequence, their intellectual capabilities are 
put into question subliminally. While abortion bans regulate women’s ‘use’ of their 
bodies and do not grant them basic rights, their existence and prevalence also reveals 
that women are not deemed capable of taking considerate and independent decisions. 
 On the other hand, these debates are not simply connected to women’s bodies 
and their ‘biology’ but to their lived experience.210 When women’s pain during their 
menstrual period is not deemed to interfere with their well-being, when their fears 
concerning childbirth are belittled, when women with disabilities face difficulties in 
 
209 Contrary to common believes, childbirth remains a potential threat to women’s lives. Even though 
maternal mortality rates have decreased on average, at least in the ‘developed West,’ the US, to give 
one example, has the “highest maternal mortality rate of all the world’s wealthy democracies” 
(Ehrenreich and Quart n. pag). 
210 This then also includes people, especially transgender, who are marked as female. 
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accessing health care, and when harassment and abuse are not taken seriously, then 
the lived experience of women is denigrated. This denigration is particularly 
pronounced for women who are racialized. Numbers indicate that African American 
women “suffer severe complications twice as often as white women” do during or 
after pregnancy (Purnell n. pag.) and native women in the US are up to ten times more 
likely to be murdered depending on the county (Bleir and Zoledziowski n. pag.). 
Similarly, the Murdered and Missing Indigenous Women (MMIW) inquiry launched 
in Canada was supposed to account for the 1,060 indigenous women who disappeared 
or were killed in the past decade (Simpson 20).  
 It is not the biology of female bodies that makes individuals, groups and states 
act in such an unsettling way towards women, but it is the continued devaluation of 
‘the woman’s body,’ especially in its leaky, disruptive, ‘grotesque’ form. People 
respond to a body in a particular way because it is gendered and thus culturally 
imbued with meaning. Accordingly, it is not bodies themselves that inspire hate but 
the meanings attached to them. Yet, as the debates mentioned above and the novels 
examined in this thesis show, these cultural meanings leave material traces in bodies 
and thus form subjectivities. These material traces take various forms: They range 
from women internalising objectification and as a consequence not trusting their own 
capabilities and intellectual capacities to insidious trauma due to having to live up to 
certain feminine, heterosexual ideals or owing to living in an environment in which 
suffering sexual assault is a constant threat. In the most disconcerting way, these 
material traces result in abuse and even death, especially in the case of racialized 
individuals and groups. 
 Raising awareness of these links by means of literature – the link between the 
body and its cultural meaning, the link between the body and femininity, the link 
between the body and racialization – can provide a form of resistance to dominant 
narratives, both literary and cultural. Literature and its research articulates and 
disseminates new epistemological frameworks, new approaches and understandings 
of gender and the body. It can extend far beyond the publishing and academic 
establishment to provide a pertinent critique of issues past and present. Hence, the 
transcultural feminist grotesque is a crucial means of changing the ground in 
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contemporary discussions of embodiment as it provides more nuanced and more 
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Meine Dissertation mit dem Titel „The Transcultural Feminist Grotesque: 
Embodiment in Contemporary Anglophone Literatures“ befasst sich mit der 
Darstellung von grotesker Körperlichkeit in zeitgenössischen anglophonen 
Literaturen. Anhand der Analyse von vier repräsentativen Romanen, The Edible 
Woman (1969) von Margaret Atwood, Nights at the Circus (1984) von Angela Carter, 
Cereus Blooms at Night (1996) von Shani Mootoo und The Ventriloquist’s Tale 
(1997) von Pauline Melville, zeichnet die Arbeit eine Veränderung in der Benutzung 
des Modus des Grotesken nach. Es wird herausgearbeitet, dass das Groteske am Ende 
des 20. Jahrhunderts nicht mehr nur als Repräsentation von Körpern, und 
insbesondere von weiblichen Körpern gelesen werden kann, sondern dass sich der 
Modus auch im Sinne eines phänomenologischen Verständnisses von Körperlichkeit 
interpretieren lässt. Körperempfinden, Wahrnehmung und taktile Erfahrungen werden 
in diesen Romanen in den Vordergrund gerückt. Somit spiegeln diese literarischen 
Werke die Entwicklungen aber auch Problematiken in feministischen Diskursen zu 
der Zeit ihrer Publikationen wider, in denen Materialität, Körperlichkeit und 
Einschreibung von Geschlechterstrukturen in Körper an Wichtigkeit gewinnen. Dies 
bezieht sich zwar hauptsächlich auf die Debatten der 1990er Jahre, wird aber auch 
schon in früheren Romanen aufgegriffen. In diesem Zusammenhang lässt sich auf die 
theoretischen Arbeiten von Elizabeth Grosz, Moira Gatens und Iris Marion Young 
hinweisen. Darüber hinaus verdeutlichen die Romane und deren Veränderungen des 
Modus des Grotesken, dass Geschlecht immer auch in Verbindung zu anderen 
Markierungen („disability,“ „race“ und „indigeneity“) gelesen werden muss. 
Die vier Romane, die den Korpus meiner Arbeit bilden, stammen aus diversen 
anglophonen und transkulturellen Kontexten: England, Kanada sowie der Karibik. 
Diese Auswahl soll einerseits gewährleisten, dass die Analyse der Werke sich von 
einem nationalen Kontext abhebt, der in vorherigen Studien zur Groteske 
überwiegend im Vordergrund stand. Darüber hinaus situiere ich meine Analyse in 
Bezug zum „transnational turn,“ der seit einigen Jahren in den 
Literaturwissenschaften identifiziert und praktiziert wird. Ich setze meine Analyse 
ferner in Kontext zu dem Konzept der Transkulturalität und einer transkulturellen 
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Lesart, die eine postkoloniale Lesart zwar nicht vollständig ersetzt, aber eine andere, 
m. E. inklusivere Lesart dieser Werke ermöglicht. Anderseits soll die Auswahl des 
Korpus die Parallelen in den feministischen Diskursen und Problematiken in den 
Werken unterschiedlicher kultureller Kontexte widerspiegeln. The Edible Woman 
(1969) von Margaret Atwood, Nights at the Circus (1984) von Angela Carter, Cereus 
Blooms at Night (1996) von Shani Mootoo und The Ventriloquist’s Tale (1997) von 
Pauline Melville bilden eine Auswahl an Werken, die nicht nur die zeitliche 
Entwicklung des Modus abbilden, sondern trotz ihrer immensen Unterschiede, 
Gemeinsamkeiten in der Wende hin zu einem Verständnis von Diversität weiblicher 
Körperlichkeit erkennbar werden lassen. 
In der Einleitung wird das Themenfeld der Arbeit und die Hauptproblematik 
in philosophischen Diskursen und somit auch im Umgang mit dem Grotesken 
eingeführt,  die aufzeigen, welche Einschränkungen ein Verständnis des Körpers als 
Projektionsfläche mit sich bringen kann. Dabei wird ebenso auf die feministische 
Kritik an dem bachtinischen Konzept des Grotesken eingegangen, wie teilweise eine 
Verbindung zum Diskurs von Körpern erläutert. In diesem Zusammenhang wird 
sowohl das Potential des grotesken Modus dies zu umgehen, als auch das 
phänomenologische Verständnis von Körperlichkeit, welches eine kartesische 
Unterscheidung zwischen Körper und Verstand deutlich unterläuft, thematisiert. Die 
Einleitung dient darüber hinaus der Vorstellung der Romane und einer Übersicht zu 
Aufbau und Struktur der Arbeit. 
 In dem der Textanalyse vorangestellten Theorieteil meiner Arbeit werden 
zuerst transnationale Theorien und eine transkulturelle Lesart als relevante 
Überkategorien vorgestellt. Hier nehme ich unter Anderem Bezug auf die Schriften 
von Wolfgang Welsch, der die Definition des Begriffs der Transkulturalität 
maßgeblich geprägt hat. In einem nächsten Schritt wird die Veränderung eines 
Verständnisses von Körper zu Körperlichkeit nachgezeichnet. In diesem Teil nehme 
ich Bezug auf die Phänomenologie und die New Feminist Materialisms und wie sie 
maßgeblich dazu beigetragen haben, dass sich das Verständnis des Körpers (the 
‚body‘) und vor allen Dingen einer vom Körper/Geist Dualismus geprägten 
Auffassung des Körpers zu einem Einblick in Körperlichkeit (‚embodiment‘) 
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gewandelt hat. Die feministische Kritik an einem alle Menschen stellvertretenden 
weißen, männlichen, heterosexuellen, leistungsfähigem Körper, wurde zum Anlass 
genommen ein Verständnis von Körperlichkeit zu entwickeln, das die Erfahrungen 
unterschiedlicher Menschen, vor allen Dingen Menschen, die dem beschriebenen 
Ideal aufgrund ihres Geschlechts, ihrer Hautfarbe, ihrer Herkunft, ihrer sexuellen 
Orientierung oder ihrer körperlichen Fähigkeiten kategorisch nie gerecht werden 
können, einschließt.  
Eine Alternative zum traditionellen Körperbegriff bietet die Phänomenologie 
von Maurice Merleau-Ponty, der in seiner Schrift Phénoménologie de la perception 
(1945) nicht nur das kartesische Verständnis von Körper und Geist kritisiert, sondern 
auch seine Auffassung des objektiven (‚objective body‘) und des gelebten (‚lived 
body‘) Körpers, oder des Körpers und des Leibes entwickelt. Des Weiteren arbeitet 
Merleau-Ponty die soziale Komponente des Leibes, in anderen Worten gefasst, ein 
den individuellen Leib übergreifendes Verständnis zwischen Menschen, heraus. 
Jedoch muss auch Merleau-Pontys Deutung auf Grund des beinhalteten 
Androzentrismus kritisch reflektiert werden, weshalb sich ein Teil des Kapitels mit 
der feministischen Phänomenologie und deren Erweiterung der Merleau-Pontyschen 
Interpretation beschäftigt und diese dadurch für eine feministische Analyse fruchtbar 
macht. Die feministischen Phänomenologinnen Elizabeth Grosz, Moira Gatens und 
Gail Weiss zeigen wie anhand des Körperbildes (‘body image’) Merleau-Pontys 
phänomenologisches Verständnis des Leibes für eine feministische Analyse von 
Körperlichkeit eingesetzt werden kann. Überdies ist ein Unterkapitel dem Thema 
gewidmet, wie Geschlecht in Körper eingeschrieben wird. In diesem Teil der Arbeit 
gehe ich auf Iris Marion Young und Bettina Wuttigs Ausführungen diesbezüglich ein. 
Ein Teil des Kapitels beschäftigt sich außerdem damit wie die westlich zentrierte 
Theorie der feministischen Phänomenologie mit indigenen Theorien (Indigenous 
Studies) vereinbart werden kann. 
Im Übrigen befasst sich das Theoriekapitel mit dem Grotesken als literatur- 
und kulturwissenschaftlichem Konzept. Dabei wird der Ursprung des Begriffs in der 
Kunstgeschichte verankert und Bedeutungsveränderungen, insbesondere die 
Entwicklung von zwei Strängen des Grotesken, werden kurz thematisiert. Das 
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Verständnis des Grotesken, das Michail Bachtin in der Mitte des zwanzigsten 
Jahrhunderts entwickelte und dass von feministischen Kritikerinnen in den 1980er 
und 1990er Jahren stark kritisiert wurde, wird unter Hinzunahme der feministischen 
Phänomenloginnen erweitert und somit für die Analyse meines Korpus anwendbar 
gemacht. Hier werden Ähnlichkeiten in den Theorien nachgezeichnet, aber auch 
aufgeführt in welcher Hinsicht Phänomenologinnen Bachtins Verständnis des 
grotesken Körpers noch kritisch ergänzen. Dieses Kapitel beschäftigt sich außerdem 
mit stilistischen Eigenheiten der transkulturellen feministischen Groteske, die sich 
durch den Gebrauch von anti-realistischen Elementen, ‚double-voiced discourse‘, 
Humor und Ironie auszeichnet. 
Das erste Analysekapitel ist Margaret Atwoods The Edible Woman (1969) 
gewidmet. Da der Roman ein frühes Beispiel der transkulturellen feministischen 
Groteske darstellt, treten bestimmte Thematiken noch nicht so deutlich hervor wie in 
späteren Romanen. Nichtsdestotrotz ist dieser Roman von Bedeutung, da er 
verschiedene feministische Diskurse der 1990er Jahre vorwegnimmt, in dem er die 
agentische Materialität des Körpers herausarbeitet. Der Roman veranschaulicht durch 
seine Darstellung des grotesken, unkontrollierbaren Körpers der Protagonistin die 
Einschreibung von Weiblichkeit in Körper und legt dar, dass Geschlecht traumatische 
Spuren in Körpern hinterlässt (siehe Wuttig). Im Laufe des Romans entwickelt die 
Protagonistin Marian ein subversives Körperverhalten, durch das sie allem Anschein 
nach die Kontrolle über ihren Körper verliert. Darüber hinaus entwickelt ihr Körper 
eine Abneigung gegen Nahrung, was bestimmte Ereignisse in ihrem Leben, in denen 
sie sich oder andere Frauen als verdinglicht empfindet, reflektiert. Der Roman 
zeichnen somit nach, wie Marian zunehmend eine Sichtweise des Körpers (‚objective 
body‘) internalisiert, ihr Leib (‚lived body‘) dieser Internalisierung allerdings 
entgegenwirkt. Dadurch wird deutlich, dass Marians Essstörung auch als Symptom 
des „insidious trauma“ gelesen werden kann, das sie erfährt, da sie ein Ideal von 
Weiblichkeit verfolgt, welches eine Illusion bleibt und das Scheitern an diesem Ideal 
Spuren in ihrem Körper hinterlässt. Das Verschlingen des Kuchens am Ende des 
Romans kann somit als erlösender, grotesker Akt interpretiert werden, der Marian 
ihrem Leib (‚lived body‘) näherbringt. Der Roman fällt stilistisch sowohl durch eine 
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veränderte Erzählperspektive im Hauptteil auf, der die Verdinglichung und somit die 
Entfremdung vom Leib, die Marian erlebt, widerspiegelt, als auch durch den 
Gebrauch von „double-voiced discourse,“ der Marians offensichtliche Zustimmungen 
und Konformität untergräbt. 
Das zweite Analysekapitel beleuchtet den Roman Nights at the Circus (1984) 
von der Autorin Angela Carter. Der Roman, wie Carters Oeuvre allgemein, wurden in 
der Vergangenheit oftmals mit Judith Butlers Theorie zur Performativität in 
Zusammenhang gesehen. Ich argumentiere in diesem Kapitel allerdings, dass der 
Roman dem Denken der feministischen Phänomenologinnen näher ist und daher 
aufzeigt, dass Geschlecht materielle Spuren in Körpern hinterlässt und somit eine 
Butlerische Lesart erweitert. Dies stellt auch eine Verbindung zu dem Aspekt der 
„disability“ dar, der bisher kaum in Analysen des Romans thematisiert wurde. Das 
Kapitel geht daher einerseits dem Zusammenhang zwischen dem Grotesken, dem 
„freak“ und „disability“ und Behinderung als sozialem Konstrukt nach, das Spuren in 
Körpern hinterlässt. Außerdem verfolgt meine Analyse die Darstellung von Sexualität 
und arbeitet heraus, wie der Roman die asexuelle Verdinglichung von Frauen durch 
Bezugnahme zu „disability“ in Frage stellt. Andererseits beschäftigt sich der Roman 
damit wie Objektifizierung bleibende Spuren in Körpern hinterlässt. Carters 
Hauptcharakter Fevvers wird größtenteils von Männern verdinglicht, da sie als Frau 
mit Flügeln einem „freak“ entspricht und ihr daher menschliche Züge versagt werden. 
Sie verdinglicht sich aber auch selbst, da sie, unter anderem in einem Bordell, diese 
Objetifizierung internalisiert, indem sie sich idealer und mythologischer Frauenideen 
in ihrer Konstruktion als Trapez-Künstlerin bedient. Nichtsdestotrotz zeichnet der 
Roman auch ein erweitertes Körperverständnis von Fevvers nach. Somit wendet sie 
sich zunehmend von einem Verständnis ihres Körpers als Körper (‚objective body‘) 
ab, hin zu einem Verständnis des Leibes (‚lived body‘). Dies spiegelt sich auch in der 
Erzählperspektive wider, in der Einblicke in Fevvers Gedanken und Empfindungen, 
wie Schmerz, hervorgehoben werden. Als Beispiel der feministischen Groteske sticht 
der Roman auch sprachlich hervor. Das Groteske, in der bachtinischen Bedeutung, ist 
stark an Degradierung gebunden, was sich stilistisch in der konstanten Herabsetzung 
des Hauptcharakters ausdrückt, wodurch Humor generiert wird. 
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Das dritte Kapitel analysiert Shani Mootoos Cereus Blooms at Night (1996). 
Obwohl der Roman sich vordergründig mit Mala und ihrem grotesken Körper 
beschäftigt – sie hat eine enge Verbindung zu ihrer Umwelt, den Pflanzen, Tieren und 
Insekten in ihrem Garten und lässt ihren körperlichen Prozesse freien Lauf – die von 
Jahren von Missbrauch und sozialer Ausgrenzung herrührt, schafft der Roman es auch 
eine Verbindung zu transgender Subjektivität herzustellen. Die Erzählung von Malas 
Geschichte wird nur durch Tyler, dem Erzähler des Romans und Malas Pflegekraft, 
ermöglicht. Obwohl Tylers Charakter generell als homosexueller Mann verstanden 
wird, argumentiere ich in diesem Kapitel, dass Tyler tatsächlich transgender ist. 
Durch die körperliche Verbindung, die Tyler und Mala aufbauen, – Mala 
kommuniziert nicht mehr mit Worten – wird einerseits auf den Körper als 
Kommunikationsmedium verwiesen. Andererseits wird durch die Verbindungen, die 
der Roman zwischen unterschiedlichen Erfahrungen schafft, verdeutlicht, dass die 
Arten von Unterdrückungen, die diese Charaktere erfahren, Teil des „modern/colonial 
gender system” ist, so wie Maria Lugones es definiert. Somit geht die Unterdrückung 
von Frauen und Personen, die nicht in ein binäres Geschlechtskonstrukt passen, auf 
dieselbe Quelle zurück, nämlich die gegenseitige Konstituierung von Kolonialismus 
und Sexismus. 
 Jedoch können auch die beiden transgender Charaktere Tyler und Otoh als 
grotesk gelesen werden, aber in einem Verständnis des Grotesken, dass den New 
Materialisms sehr nah kommt, da sich ihre Körper in einem konstanten Wandel 
befinden. In diesem Kapitel zeige ich, dass sich Tylers Körperbild verändert, ohne ein 
genaues Ziel, im Sinne einer binären Weiblichkeit oder Männlichkeit, zu verfolgen, 
und dass Tyler daher als transgender Charakter gelesen werden kann. Otohs 
Charakter deutet auf die Wandelbarkeit von biologischem Geschlecht (‚sex‘) hin. 
Otoh wird zwar als Mädchen, Ambrosia, geboren, schafft es jedoch seinen Körper 
insofern zu formen, dass er einem weiblichen entspricht. Dies veranschaulicht im 
Sinne des New Feminist Materialism, dass biologisches Geschlecht ebenso formbar 
und veränderlich ist wie soziales. 
Darüber hinaus verdeutlicht der Roman die materialisierende Macht von 
Diskursen, indem er demonstriert, dass es sich selten um ‚bloße Worte‘ handelt, 
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sondern dass Worte Spuren in Körpern hinterlassen, die zerstörerisch wirken können. 
Auch dieser Roman weist formale Merkmale auf, die ihn als grotesk ausweisen 
lassen. „Double-voicedness“ wird verwendet, um Ambivalenz in Bezug auf die Rolle 
des Erzählers zu generieren. Trotz Tylers Erzählerrolle bieten einige der Episoden 
einen Einblick, den Tyler nicht haben könnte oder lassen vermuten, dass Tyler diese 
nur nacherzählt. Somit schafft der Roman es sich von androzentrischen und dominant 
westlichen Erzählformen zu distanzieren. 
Pauline Melvilles The Ventriloquist’s Tale (1997) bietet die Grundlage für das 
letzte Analysekapitel. Der Großteil des Romangeschehens ist in einer Gemeinschaft 
der indigenen Wapisiana in Guyana angesiedelt. Obwohl der Roman zwei 
Erzählstränge beinhaltet, die von einer Rahmenerzählung umschlossen werden, wird 
der Hauptteil der Narration durch die inzestuöse Beziehung zwischen den 
Geschwistern Danny und Beatrice dominiert. Die inzestuöse Beziehung stellt in 
vielerlei Hinsicht das zentrale groteske Motiv des Romans dar, in dem zwei 
Menschen zu einem zu werden scheinen und in ihrem Umfeld aufgehen. Dadurch 
wird einerseits die Auffassung eines stark abgetrennten, in sich kohärenten Körpers, 
in Frage gestellt und andererseits Kritik an einem westlich-anthropologischen 
Verständnisses des Körpers und des Subjekts geübt. Denn die Beziehung verbildlicht, 
wie sich der amerinidische Inzestmythos der Sonne und des Mondes in den 
Geschwistern Beatrice und Danny materialisiert und wie eine anthropologische und 
christliche Herangehensweise an diese Beziehung zum Scheitern verurteilt ist. 
Beatrice ist überdies ein weiblicher Charakter, der durch die Affäre mit ihrem Bruder 
und nichtmenschliche und anorganische Sexualpartner dominanten westlichen Ideen 
von weiblicher Sexualität entgegenwirkt. Ähnlich wie Mootoos Roman verdeutlicht 
auch Melvilles Roman, dass Kolonialismus und Sexismus sich gegenseitig bedingen. 
Der Charakter Beatrice wird aber auch als Kritik an einem westlichen Feminismus 
gelesen, der Individualität und ein universelles Model der Befreiung von Frauen, das 
oftmals auf den Erfahrungen weißer, mittelständischer und somit privilegierter Frauen 
basiert, interpretiert. 
Der Roman zeigt im Übrigen auf, wie durch verbale und physische Gewalt 
Rassismus in Körper eingeschrieben wird. Der Text ist mit Kopfschmerzen, 
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unerklärbarer Blindheit und unheimlichen Anfällen durchsäht und lässt sich daher im 
Sinne das Genres des ‚postcolonial Gothic‘ lesen. Somit wird einerseits verdeutlicht, 
wie vergangener, aber auch fortlaufender Kolonialismus Spuren hinterlässt, die über 
das Oberflächliche hinausgehen und andererseits, wie der Körper einen Agens 
entwickelt, der mitunter von einer dominanten westlichen Sicht als unheimlich 
wahrgenommen wird. In dem polyphonen Zusammenspiel von unterschiedlichen 
Stimmen und Sichtweisen, entfaltet der Roman das stilistische Potential des 
Grotesken. Obwohl es einen Erzähler gibt, der allem Anschein nach ‚das letzte Wort 
hat,‘ bleibt der Roman ambivalent bezüglich einer seiner zentralen Fragen, ob 
indigene Gemeinschaften unter sich bleiben sollten oder sich mit anderen 
Gemeinschaften oder Außenseitern verbinden sollten. 
Im Fazit meiner Arbeit gehe ich auf die Forschungsergebnisse, den Beitrag, 
den die Arbeit in dem Forschungsfeld leistet, Einschränkungen des Projektes und die 
Möglichkeiten die Forschung auszuweiten ein. Bezüglich des Forschungsbeitrags 
lässt sich sagen, dass diese Studie dazu beiträgt, das Groteske in ein neues und 
positiveres Bild zu rücken, das nicht binären Konstrukten von Geschlecht und damit 
teilweise misogynen Verständnissen von Weiblichkeit unterliegt und daher durchaus 
für feministische Analysen fruchtbar gemacht werden kann. Die Analyse hat überdies 
Lücken bezüglich der Forschung einiger Romane aufgezeigt, die noch nicht unter 
dem Aspekt des Grotesken durchleuchtet wurden, wie beispielsweise Mootoos und 
Melvilles Romane. Durch die geleisteten Analysen wurden allerdings auch frühere 
Forschungsergebnisse zu Atwoods und Carters Romane in ein neues Licht gerückt, 
was einen Beitrag zum Umdenken in Bezug auf den Feminismus dieser Texte leistet. 
Die Ergebnisse der Analysekapitel werden in Bezug auf thematische 
Überschneidungen zusammengefasst und in einen größeren Zusammenhang in Bezug 
auf ähnliche Texte gestellt. Des Weiteren geht das Fazit darauf ein, welche weiteren 
Aspekte im Bereich der transkulturellen feministischen Groteske beleuchtet werden 
könnten und es werden Romane genannt, die hierfür von Wichtigkeit und Interesse 
sein könnten. 
Meine Dissertation stellt heraus, dass die Primärtexte eine transkulturelle 
Veränderung des Verständnisses des Körpers hin zum Leib nachzeichnen, die über 
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nationale Grenzen hinausgeht und Anhand der Verwendung des Grotesken sowohl 
thematisch als auch stilistisch ihren Ausdruck findet. Somit kann in den Romanen 
auch eine Auseinandersetzung mit und teilweise Infragestellung der dominanten 
feministischen Diskurse ihrer Zeit erkannt werden, insbesondere in Bezug zu 
Markierungen wie „disability,“ „race“ und „indigeneity“ angeht. In dem Modus der 
transkulturellen feministischen Groteske werden daher auch nicht westliche, nicht 
weiße und nicht hegemoniale Subjektivitäten, kurz gesagt, die Diversität (weiblicher) 
Körperlichkeit dargestellt, insbesondere jene, die durch Sexualität, 
Geschlechtsidentität, Hautfarbe, Ethnizität und Indignität kategorisiert werden 
können. 
 
